The multilingual contents of the site are the result of an automatic translation.
 

 
 
 
 
 
Français
English
Français
English
 
 
 
View
 
 
 
 
 
View
 
 

Other sources

 
Saut de ligne
Saut de ligne

✅ Hezbollah's strategy of influence in South Lebanon 3/3

BRENNUS 4.0
History & strategy
Saut de ligne
Saut de ligne

Became a satellite channel in 2000, al-Manar developed for Hezbollah as a direct link to the others. Arab populations. From the beginning of 2001, al-Manar counted more than 10 million viewers and was thus the second most watched television most-watched channel in the Arab world48.


His website, which broadcasts the news live, available in four languages, adapts its content according to the chosen language, thus bypassing its prohibition in some Western countries49. In addition to its uninterrupted coverage of the second intifada in 2000, al-Manar broadcasts, among other things, a program in which families of the Palestinian diaspora are reunited with their families relatives in the occupied territories. By adopting the slogan «lhe chain of all Arabs and Muslims»she scores. its willingness to extend its reach beyond Lebanese borders.

All significant events (the second intifadathe September 11th or the "9/11 or the"gwar on terror») become so many political opportunities for Hezbollah to broadcast its message throughout the Arab and pan-Arab world sound image50. Its communication adapts to different audiences to broaden the spectrum of Arab street mobilization. Also, the 2006 war, although caused by the kidnapping by the Hezbollah of two Israeli soldiers, provided a platform for the a movement that has proclaimed itself as the voice of the Arab world. and winner of the conflict. The movement presents itself as the the only Arab actor that has managed to resist the Hebrew state and the undo, which his perfect communication allows him to demonstrate51.

Psychological warfare: using communication to target the enemy

In its analysis of the communication strategy of the Party of God, Ron Schleifer identifies a "aenemy udience» and a «adomestic udience»52. Where the audience "domestic» must be convinced of the legitimacy of the conflict, it's a question of... the hearing".atnemie» to persuade her that not only her chances of winning are nil, but that the war is also unjustified and futile. Psychological warfare therefore plays a role essential, not only militarily, but also in terms of the on the communication level. Thus, a crucial dimension of the Hezbollah's communication is the dissemination of information to the population at large. of images and messages that could undermine their morale.

Since 1996, al-Manar broadcasts announcements in Hebrew announcing the forthcoming victory of Hezbollah against its enemy, as well as the interviews with anti-Zionist Jews or images of bombings of Lebanese civilians with comments in Hebrew53. The channel also has a "dobservation deck Hebrew» to follow the Israeli media. Some of its emissions are part of a similar dynamic : The canvas spider identifies and analyzes Israel's weaknesses, while Terrorists illustrates the acts"terrorists» which the Israelis are guilty in Palestine54. Hezbollah also used a confusing technique to the attention of the media in order to Decredibilizing the IDA among Israeli citizens : he announces that its soldiers have penetrated an ILA position, but only provides little video evidence. It wasn't until the ADI denied the truthfulness of the attack that Hezbollah is broadcasting all of its recordings, thus calling into question the information communicated by the army to the population55.

Summarized by a Hezbollah official, "sIn the field, you touch a soldier, but a recording of him crying on the touch of a finger. Thousands"56. This psychological warfare also continues on the web. The hackers of Hezbollah have repeatedly replied to Israeli hacking of their means of communication by other virtual attacks. For example, they used vulnerable, particularly in India, Canada and the United States. Thanks to these countries, they have been able to disseminate their videos or bank account details for accounts at for which their overseas supporters could make a contribution. donations57. If information warfare relies heavily on the ability to disseminate, control information provides also a strategic advantage to the movement. Thus, during the 2006 war, the party allowed journalists to journalists to visit conflict zones under its control, but only in the areas accompanied by activists, on a route presenting the areas most affected by the Israeli bombings. Hezbollah thus conceals both its wounded fighters and its own military actions, while at the same time controlling the facts and gestures of journalists that are almost inserted (embedded). This institutional control is complemented by informal supervision, exercised by journalists fromal-Manar pressuring their foreign colleagues with regard to the content of their publications58. Hezbollah's information strategy is thus based on both characteristics: on the one hand, the existence of a "culture privy» manifested by this organized cover-up ; on the other hand, the use of inhabitants or activists for purposes information at59. This communication strategy is exercised so both outwardly and inwardly60.

Conclusion

L’Hezbollah's primary strategic objective remains, still today, to appear in the eyes of the Lebanese, as well as other populations in the Arab world, as the figurehead in the fight against Israel. Despite a clear asymmetry, the Party of God has mobilized a strategy of protean influence, based on both military bases, political-social and communicational. These three dimensions have all aimed to produce the same pattern simultaneously narrative. Taken as a whole, this strategy demonstrates that Popular support is the mainstay of the movement in South Lebanon. This strategy has evolved less in its objectives than in its form. It is always based on a clever mix of warfare... of usury, operational guerrilla warfare, social anchoring and mobilization with an emphasis on communication.

However, the conflict in which the Party of God occupies a crucial place in Syria, in which the providing military, technical and logistical support to the regime, complicates the position of the movement. On the one hand, it seems demonstrate continuity: Hezbollah is using its knowledge... guerrilla techniques by forming militias and continues to prove its superiority in urban territory. It also seeks to to extend its political and social influence there, for example by creating Syrian branches of its own organizations, like the scouts Imam Mahdi61.

On the other hand, the Party of God seems to be moving away from her strategy of influence as she had was designed for his opposition to Israel. Militarily, many observers noted that the capabilities of the Hezbollah were getting closer and closer to an army conventional army: the movement reportedly sent between 7,000 and 9,000 fighters to Syria and deployed particularly sophisticated air-to-surface missile systems ,while according to an Israeli general, " workingwithRussian forces will certainlyencourage the movement's shift towards a more offensive strategy" .62. Similarly, the strategy of Hezbollah ischanging on thepolitical level. Its support for the Syrian regime, as well as thelosses recorded (1,300 combatants dead and thousands wounded in2016), are generating criticism both among the Lebanese population and among theleadership of the party, thusweakening its domestic base.63.

Despite its deeply Shiite identity, which remains visible in its actions and declarations, the Party of God in Lebanon is seeking to nationalize his political discourse to make it more inclusive. In Syria, instead, he uses rhetorical and symbolic language eminently Shiite, considerably aggravating the tensions religious denominations on site. The "lexistential utensil» is therefore not only against Israel, but also against the Sunni extremists, described as "takfiris»64.

Moreover,its intervention in Syria has emphasised its links with Iran, weakening its nationalist claims. Finally, thecommunication strategy of Hezbollah has also changed by becoming more reactive than proactive, thus seeking to limit the damage to its image and todivert attention from the Syrian situation .65. The Syrian experience thus underlines that themovement's strategy of influence is essentially evolutionary .Two readings can thus be made of the impact of the Syrian conflict on Hezbollah: both a new structure of opportunity that could give rise toa possible rise in power of the movement and a source of fragility that calls intoquestion the popular anchoring of the Party of God in Lebanon.

48 Joseph Daher, The Political Economy..., op. cit.

49 Briec Le Gouvello de la Porte, Information strategies..., op. cit.

50 Khatib, Matar and Alshaer, The Hizbullah phenomenon..., op. cit, p. 77.

51 Peter Ajemian, "Resistance beyond time and space: Hezbollah's Media Campaigns", Arab Media & Society, 5, Spring 2008, pp.1-17.

52 Ron Schleifer, Psychological Warfare..., op. cit.

53 Olfa Lamloum, "Hezbollah Communication Policy...", op. cit.

54 Briec Le Gouvello de la Porte, Information strategies..., op. cit..

55 Iver Gabrielsen, art.cit.

56 Walid El-Houri and Saber Dima. "Filming Resistance: A Hezbollah Strategy." Radical History Review, 106, 2010, pp.70 - 85.

57 Iver Gabrielsen, art.cit.

58 Briec Le Gouvello de la Porte, Information strategies..., op. cit.

59Ibid.

60 Khatib, Matar and Alshaer, The Hizbullah phenomenonop. cit.

61 Joseph Daher, The consequences of Hezbollah's military intervention...op. cit.

62 Brigadier General Muni Katz and Nadav Pollack, «Hezbollah's Russian Military Education in Syria», The Washington Institute, December 2015.

63 Joseph Daher, The Political Economy..., op. cit.

64 Joseph Daher, The consequences..., op. cit.

65 Khatib, Matar and Alshaer, The Hizbullah phenomenon..., op. cit., p. 77.

Séparateur
Title : ✅ Hezbollah's strategy of influence in South Lebanon 3/3
Author (s) : Madame Clara DUROVRAY, du pôle études et prospective du CDEC
Séparateur


Armée