The People's and Peasants' Army, a prestigious institution under the Soviet Union, was transformed into the "Armed Force of the Russian Federation" after the fall of the USSR.

This change was not without major setbacks that have lastingly damaged the army's image among the population. With a significant reduction in the resources allocated to the military by the Russian government at the time, the former Red Army found itselfe found itself in a deplorable state when it had to intervene in various conflicts on the territories of the former Soviet Union.

Due to a lack of political consideration and in the absence of a real doctrine, the Russian armed forces declined sharply during the 1990s. While the obsolescence of the equipment is also an explanation for the difficulties encountered by the institution, equally important is the authorities' failure to take account of the human dimension of the military profession.

Man is indeed at the heart of the army. However, since the 1990s, a period during which the living conditions of the military have deteriorated considerably, the morale of the troops has fallen as a result.

While serving in the Soviet Red Army was an honour, the Russian army of the 1990s and 2000s saw its appeal to the younger generations fall drastically. During this period, military service was perceived as a waste of time and the profession of arms was considered to be of low prestige. Thus, in 1992, there were about 23,000 people refusing military service and in 1995, the figure even reached 31,000. 1. There are many reasons for this lack of will.

First of all, there is the geopolitical context: during the 1990s, NATO was not perceived as a major threat by the population. Moreover, a significant number of young men did not want to join the army in order not to be forced to fight in Chechnya. Severe hazing ( dedovchina ) was another repulsive factor: according to a survey conducted by the Levada Centre in 2005, of the 84% of Russians who did not want to join the army, 40% cited hazing of young recruits as the main reason.

Faced with this lack of willingness on the part of conscripts, the government decided to recruit "contract workers" into the army. 2The government decided to recruit "contract workers" into the army, i.e. to create a professional force capable of responding to modern threats. However, the lack of training and means did not allow the creation of this professional army, which was intended to be the elite of the Russian forces. Even the arrival of Vladimir Putin to power in 2000 did not radically change the soldier's life. The lack of experience of the officers, the population's rejection of his army and the lack of interest shown by politicians are all reasons leading to the weakening of this institution.

The effects of this lack of interest in the army became apparent in 2008 during the Russian-Georgian conflict, when the Russian forces, although victorious, showed significant shortcomings. Beyond the problems of equipment, the conduct of the soldiers, especially the "contract soldiers", proved that they were not properly trained or had an adequate physical condition. 3.

A reform was therefore undertaken in order to modernise and upgrade the Russian army to attract profiles with a better intellectual level (in the 1990s, 70% of conscripts did not benefit from secondary education...). 4). However, this upgrading of the soldier's profession was only really launched in 2012, with the appointment of Sergei Choigou to the post of as Minister of Defense.

Although he is not military, he has taken into account the aspirations of the military. Indeed, the Minister of Defence has increased the salaries of officers and contract workers and has made it a priority to improve the quality of life of the soldier (ordinary and housing). By increasing the number of military exercises, he has improved the training of troops, particularly professional forces, the spearhead of the Russian army.

Special forces, paratroopers and marines are the first units to benefit from these improvements. But more than the reform itself, it is the geopolitical context that has given the army credit. Jihadist and Western threats have been skillfully used by the Kremlin to motivate individuals to commit themselves, or at least to consider their army as useful.

These new threats and their use for political purposes have significantly changed the way Russians view their military. Indeed, the bad image of the Russian military seems to be fading in public opinion. According to a February 2018 poll, the military profession is considered to be the third most prestigious profession for families. 60% of Russians consider that joining the security services is prestigious, compared to 32% in 2010. 5.

Despite these good figures, however, we have to put the army's renewed popularity into perspective. If in reality society seems to be in favour of a powerful military tool, if it considers the profession as prestigious and if units such as special forces, navy troops or parachutists seem to be catching up with the level of Westerners, the rest of the army is still to be modernised.

Moreover, there are few testimonies from Russian army soldiers who can actually confirm that their situation is actually improving. The fact that many 'contract workers' do not renew their initial contract which has come to an end seems to demonstrate that the condition of soldier is not yet attractive enough. 6.

Finally, Vladimir Putin signed a decree establishing a political institution within the army. Although its missions have not yet been defined, many commentators claim that it would be a return of the political commissioners in charge of supervising the soldiers. If such officials reappear in the army, it would seem to indicate that Vladimir Putin wants to work on patriotism and the psychological condition of the soldier, meaning that moral confidence in this institution is still limited. 7.

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1 Charles J. Dick (1997), "A Bear Without Claws: the Russian Army in the 1990's",
The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 10:1, p. 4.

2 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 466, "Establishment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation", 7 May 1992.

3 Carolina Vendil Pallin & Fredrik Westerlund (2009), "Russia's war in Georgia: lessons and consequences", Small Wars & Insurgencies, 20:2, p. 413.

4 Charles J. Dick (1997), "A Bear Without Claws: the Russian Army in the 1990's", The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 10:1, p. 5.

5 Aptekar Pavel, Prosvetov Ivan, 22 February 2018.

6 Facon Isabelle (2016), "What is the Russian Army worth? "Foreign Policy, 2016/1 (Spring), p. 151163. 7 TASS Agency 30 July 2018.