Will it be reasonable to fight in urban areas in 2035?

In truth, that is not the question. We simply will have no choice. Colonel Pierre Santoni is clearing a few avenues for 2035, aimed at improving our tactical engagement capabilities in urban areas.e with a view to regaining real freedom of manoeuvre, from which will come the tactical victory which, if well exploited in the media, will be transformed into a strategic victory.

The observer of conflict in urban areas is seized with vertigo. If the importance of urban warfare has been stressed for a good twenty years [1], the recent battles in Syria, Iraq or even Ukraine since 2014 have marked its burning topicality. An evolution in scale and modes of action is radically transforming our perceptions. We are a long way from Belfast in the seventies, Beirut in the eighties, Sarajevo in the nineties and even more from Mitrovica in the twenties.

The line of inter-ethnic confrontation was generally respected. Neither side ventured long and deep into the stronghold of the camp opposite. It was more duels than conquests.

From now on, it was a fight to the death to conquer the urban battlefield once and for all. Battles that last for weeks or even months. Cities that are nearly eighty percent destroyed. Populations taken hostage or permanently driven from their homes.

So will it be reasonable to fight in urban areas in 2035? In truth, that is not the question. Because we have to admit that, in all likelihood, we will simply have no choice.

From Hué in Vietnam in 1968 to Marawi in the Philippines in 2017, to Hama in Syria in 1982, the mode of action of infiltrating combatants will make intervention mandatory. Fighters who, having infiltrated in one way or another, spring up to take over the city and commit atrocities and massacres against civilians. It is then impossible to set up a proper siege. It will be necessary to react very quickly, whether or not it is planned.

After resituating the exponential increase in engagements in urban areas since 2014, this article will focus on clearing a few avenues for 2035 aimed at improving our tactical engagement capabilities in urbanized areas.

An ever-growing battlefield. An ever-longer battle

• Much longer battles

A raw report is before our eyes. It took nine months of fighting to retake Mosul, with nearly 100.000 men in the summer of 2017: Iraqi security forces from the army, the federal police and the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), supported or mentored by coalition special or conventional forces, all to "breach" [2] in an apocalyptic scenario. Various militias (Shiite, Sunni, Kurdish, Christian) were used for the huge cordon-off, logistical support, support or diversionary missions. We are talking about one hundred thousand soldiers or militiamen in total!

Including about twenty thousand soldiers who went into contact with the jihadists. They take a long time to train and are expensive in terms of equipment and ammunition. High casualties have forced the Iraqi government to suspend operations or to take tactical breaks for reconditioning. Fire and logistics bases have been set up around the city. It took two months to retake Ramadi between December 2015 and January 2016, one month to liberate Fallujah in May-June 2016, almost a year for Mosul.

There had been years of fighting in Deir Ezzor in Syria before one of the parties prevailed over the other in September 2017. It took a debauchery of means involving a daring crossing of the Euphrates. Indeed, heavy bypass equipment was brought directly from Russia by transport aircraft!

Raqqa, the EI stronghold, fell on 18 October 2017 after the first units of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) had seized the first anchorage points at the beginning of June 2017.

Nearly eighty per cent of Iraqi and Syrian cities were destroyed. Some of the remaining houses are booby-trapped and will require extensive clearance work.

The Battle of Marawi lasts nearly five months, from 23 May to 23 October 2017, as a result of theMoro uprisingin the Philippines. For five months, it pitted the Philippine armed forces against the jihadists of the Islamic state for control of the city. Although the Filipinos fought to liberate Manila alongside US troops against the Japanese in 1945, their army has since been more involved in jungle and counter-insurgency than in urban fighting. However, urban and forest fighting share some common characteristics of confined areas. The 3,000 men initially sent are not enough, and in the end no less than 30,000 Filipino soldiers will be employed to defeat the supposed 1,000 Filipino jihadists. At least 165 soldiers and policemen were killed there, while nearly 500 civilians were victims of abuses, hostage-taking or collateral damage. About 400,000 civilians fled the combat zone of this veritable Stalingrad of the Far East. The figures make one dizzy.

• A technological issue and a challenge for the fighters

The disembarked fighter finally evolves rather little between 1918 and 2003. He had an automatic rifle, hand grenades, a protective vest and a more or less efficient helmet. Three important technical evolutions will mark him.

A light portable radio, night vision goggles, a light anti-tank weapon relatively effective at short range.

Concretely, in cities, radio is often limited in range by buildings, and night vision devices are not very effective because of the alternation between light and dark and the polluting residues of artificial light. There is little fighting at night in urban areas.

The light anti-tank weapon remains an asset; however, when properly used with its landed environment, the battle tank remains formidable.

However, micro-tactical combat techniques based on learning and applying immediate intervention, reactive fire, sniping and first aid techniques will also optimize combatants.

Casualties remain high on the urban battlefield while they are sometimes minimal in open areas. With armies that are much smaller in size and necessarily less resilient, a new way of fighting must be considered.

So we must ask ourselves from the outset what new technologies could bring to the fighter who will be disembarked (and embarked) tomorrow in an environment of unparalleled hardness and abrasiveness, probably since Verdun or Stalingrad.

The challenge is there. To allow our fighters to evolve in this hostile universe, to say the least.

Robots and virtual reality technologies are not going to replace the man engaged in the megalopolises of 2035. But they can enable him to fight and even win in the face of an enemy that promises to be more numerous, terribly determined and imaginative, and above all fanatical to the point of death.

Technologies more at the service of the fighter

• The challenge of protecting combatants

No ground force will spare the protection of the combatant [3]. 3] This protection will first of all require geolocation. Does this mean that every soldier has to be geolocated? Not necessarily. But it must be easy to locate him within a group or entity. And solutions will have to be found to deal with the fact that buildings stop or considerably hinder the flow of information. But there can no longer be any question of sending men into the middle of an urban storm without knowing exactly where they are. Part of the work of the operations offices will be devoted to monitoring the situation. It is therefore necessary to review the articulation of tactical command in urban areas by reinforcing the tactical CPs and providing detachment commanders with monitoring capability. These detachments will also be smaller. It will be too difficult to fight a 250-strong Joint Battle Group (JBGTG) commanded by a single 30-year-old captain, even if he is at the top of his class. This could be (in the form of several Joint Tactical Detachments) the return of the battalion level.

This new articulation will be based on a real detailed modeling of the battle space, through screen watches, tablets, "battlefield" and "battlefield" displays.4] virtual "sand boxes" [4], means of augmented reality, to guide and reassure the fighters engaged in this hell of concrete and steel.

Finally, through a whole series of relief, rehabilitation and post-fighting measures, protection against post-traumatic stress will have to be put on the same level as surgical priorities.

• The challenge of mobility

Protection determines mobility. Anyone who does not have a guarantee of an acceptable level of protection will not venture very far forward. This advance will undoubtedly be made partly thanks to armoured bulldozers, militarised construction machinery, robots that recognise tunnels and suburban areas, surveillance drones, but also means of combating enemy drones. Iraqi units in Mosul were equipped with anti-UAV guns that directed jamming transmissions against Daesh's commercial UAVs.

Whether we like it or deplore it, combat robots will have a prominent place in urban combat in 2035. They will then be a possible answer to the inhumanity of combat in this jungle of rubbish, concrete and steel of battlefield cities. Who can reasonably ask fighters to enter such a furnace without at least the support that such projects suggest? Others have already taken the plunge[5] with robots with a mobility necessarily superior to that of humans, capable of compensating for a lack of support.Some others have already taken the plunge[5] with robots that are necessarily more mobile than humans, capable of compensating for a numerical inferiority and of confronting (under the control of dedicated tactical PCs) fanatical enemies for whom human life no longer counts for much. It is not a question of yielding to the fascination of "technologism" [6]. 6] On the contrary, it is a matter of lucidly searching for options capable of restoring tactical freedom of maneuver in urban areas while saving the lives of our soldiers. The choice is not between the omniscient science-fiction killer robot and the over-excited fighter with his assault rifle and his axe. It's a fair division of labour. Russian tracks(Uran-9, Platform-M or Nerekhta[7]) must be watched carefully, without preconceived notions or arrogance. Other ideas may still emerge.

This mobility cannot concern only shock units. It must also be rethought for logistic units. Do we need quadricopter drones to evacuate the wounded? Or should we militarise the self-supporting "FlyboardAir" drone [8] from French inventor Franky Zapata to transport a section over a city and place it on a roof? Or to locate mine digs with acoustic sensors. The tracks are numerous and defy the imagination.

• The challenge of manoeuvring

But beyond technological innovations, what is ultimately at stake is the ability to manoeuvre. Manoeuvring to prevail over an opponent even superior in numbers. Maneuver to limit losses, maneuver to limit the size of units, in short, maneuver to win.

To do this, the question of joint organization must probably be reexamined. Is it always appropriate? The system that came out of the Empire with section, company or squadron and battalion or regiment can probably be reviewed.

Mobility may appear to be high because of the performance of the machines. It has in fact been in relative decline since 1991. The battlefield is full of IEDs, precision weapons, drones and civilians who report by telephone on the progress of our units. This function therefore needs to be regenerated to give tactical commanders real freedom of action.

Firepower is limited by "weight" [9] and the cost of ammunition. But the incredible progress made in recent years in terms of accuracy has profoundly changed the situation. To the point of reducing mobility and therefore ground manoeuvre. Let us note besides that the increase in this precision decreases the "weight" of the ammunition, a relative advantage considering that our means of transport also decreased drastically...

A balance must therefore be struck between cheaper ammunition that can be fired en masse and precise ammunition to tactically destroy the enemy from the outset. Thus the bulk of the losses inflicted would be inflicted by artillery and precision missiles to safeguard and protect the assault and destruction units. At times, maneuver units would even be used as "packs of hounds" to "lift" enemy units to be destroyed by precision fire.

Protection remains the condition for mobility. However, because of the drones and IEDs (VBIED, etc.) posed by combatants acting in civilian clothes, there will be a "permanent lethal threat". Unless we find a technological countermeasure that does not exist for the moment, this protection will only be approached by a few actions (luring the enemy on our intention, diverting part of the projectiles, taking the least violent blows, etc.).

At the micro-tactical level, a particular effort must be made on the "camouflage screen" type protections which make it possible to reduce the physical silhouette and the thermal signature of an armoured vehicle. Significant progress has been made in this area. Some screens transform the silhouette of a heavy tank into that of a passenger car. This will not be sufficient to conceal a unit above the company, but will allow significant safeguards at lower levels. Reactive shielding, DOIP[10]the SlatArmor. [11]systems like theIsraeli"Trophy"...[12]It is therefore necessary to "regenerate" the mobility function by means of a series of protections which, when added together, will restore mobility without which there can be no manoeuvre. This regained ability to move without the enemy being able to guess the objective will be the determining factor in the return of the land leader's freedom of action on the battlefield.

We've already said that. A paradox reveals itself. The maneuver's back on. At once classic, at once new. Anyone who can get out of this IT-induced tactical blockage will regain real freedom of manoeuvre. From this freedom of manoeuvre will come tactical victory. If it is well exploited at the media level, it will be transformed into a strategic victory. The French army can and must rise to this challenge.

1] The battles of Grozny in Chechnya between 1995 and 2000, then Falloudja in Iraq in 2004, Bint Jbeil in 2006 and Nahr el Bared in 2007 in Lebanon, etc...

2] Breaching: forcing or securing a passage through an enemy defence, obstacle, fortification or minefield. EMP 60.641.

Breaching: A tactical task where all means are used to execute a breakthrough or secure passage through an enemy defence, obstacle, minefield or fortification. EMP 60.641.

3] On new technologies adaptable to combatants in urban areas: See "A Soldier's Urban Warfare Christmas Wish List". Major John Spencer. Modern War Institute. 2017. https://mwi.usma.edu/soldiers-urban-warfare-christmas-wish-list/

4] Sandbox: summary model made on the ground representing a compartment of ground on which an operation or a manoeuvre phase will take place. This simple device allows:

- the tactical leader (from the group leader to the operations chief of an AITG) to present the manoeuvre to his subordinates during the mission briefing,

- subordinates to present their mission at the backbrief,

- and to repeat the manoeuvre through rehearsal to validate coordination measures prior to mission execution.

5] On this subject: Marc Chassillan. "The renewal of the armoured fleet: an investment to modernise the Russian army". RDN N° 802. Page 129.

[6] See "Armed forces: "technologism" or "just technology"?". General Vincent Desportes. In Foreign Policy. N° 2009/2. Pages 403 to 418.

7] Uran-9: semi-autonomous armored tank (30mm gun, 7.62mm machine gun, AC Ataka 9M120 missile, surface-to-air missiles...).

Platform-M: remote-controlled robotic combat platform dedicated to intelligence, detection and neutralization of fixed and mobile targets.

Nerekhta: remote-controlled combat robot.

8] This drone (developed by the Marseille-based inventor Franky Zapata) is capable of self-piloting and allows a person to be carried very easily in the air and placed precisely on a very small platform.

^[9] Considerable Weight

[10] Route-opening detachment booby-trapped.

[11 ] Rocket cage armor.

12 ] Active protection system to protect heavy or light armoured military vehicles against different types of rockets and anti-tank missiles. It is composed of three elements: detection and tracking of the enemy projectile, launch and finally interception.

After graduating from the École spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr, promotion "Captain Hamacek" (1989-1992), Colonel Pierre SANTONI chose the infantry where he spent his entire first part of his career. He followed the teaching of the 117th ^promotion of the CSEM then the 12th ^promotion of the Joint Defence College. He commanded the Centre d'entraînement aux actions en zone urbaine - 94th RI from ^{July 2012} to July 2014. He is currently deputy colonel and director of studies at the EEM of Saumur.

He has published: "Grenadiersd'assaut" in 2004, published by SDE, "L'ultime champ de bataille:Combat et vaincre en ville" in 2016 (with Fréderic Chamaud) published by Pierre de Taillac (Prix des Cadets de Saint-Cyr in 2017) and regularly collaborates with the magazine RAIDS by writing articles and two "Hors-Série" (23 and 25) in 2007 on mechanized infantry.