Translation for the British Army of the Strategic Defense Review [1]- SDR 2010 - and in response to the severe budgetary constraints imposed, the Army 2020 project was unveiled by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in July 2012. Going far beyond a simple reduction in capacity, this project fundamentally transforms the way the Army operates in its organisation and its very design, but with the ambition of maintaining intact its capacity to act in operations. Attractive on paper, this reform - even this revolution - also presents significant risks.

1] The Strategic Defense Review (SDR) is the British equivalent of the French White Paper on Defence and National Security.

• The updated version of the Army 2020 project, which was made public last July, is the roadmap for the British Army. Based on an unchanged operational contract and ambitious objectives, it not only redesigns the active army in terms of its organisation and operation, but also proposes a complete reform of the reserve system to create a single, coherent whole. However, its implementation exposes the army to obvious risks of profound dysfunctions on the national territory as well as in operations.

The objectives: consistency and renewal

This large-scale project is based on an analysis of the evolution of recent conflicts and on a new situation for the Army with the planned withdrawal from Afghanistan: for the first time in several centuries, the Army will find itself mainly on British national territory. However, the General Staff intends to maintain its ability to act globally, even if the footprint of international engagement is shrinking. As a result, the Army's operational contractremains unchanged. It must be capable of arming:

• a long-term operation with 6,500 men, a complex operation with 2,000 men without relief and a simple operation without relief with 1,000 men;
• or three complex operations without relief at 2,000 men each;
• or a massive commitment of all assets.

To achieve this, theArmy must first of all cope with a 20% reduction in its active manpower (from 102,000 to 82,000 men) over the period up to 2020. This reduction is partly offset by an increase in the reserve (Territorial Army, TA) of 30,000 men. The latter is therefore called upon to play a greater role in the functioning of the Army, and isone of the most ambitious objectives of the reform.

The modelling of the future format of the Army has also been based on a number of observations drawn from recent commitments and from the outlook, in particular on the following points:

• the need to redefine the respective roles of the division and brigade levels in order to improve the operational level;
• the predominant role of the mechanised infantry, the core of the tactical manoeuvre;
• the use of precision fire as opposed to suppression fire;
• the ever-increasing need for CIS[1] and their dissemination throughout the area of operations;
• the increased importance of SSI[2] capabilities ;
• the necessary study and definition of the role and place of outsourced support in an "end-to-end" approach to the full support of a projected force;
• the strengthening of adaptation to NATO standards as a basis for interoperability in the context of interventions increasingly carried out in coalition;
• the development of synergy with other government ministries and agencies in connection with increased commitments on national territory.

The land force, whose format, structures and operation have been radically revised, has thus been redefined around a triple core of missions:

• Projection and deterrence: to maintain at all times a force capable of projecting, on a strategic scale, an intervention force capable of dealing with any threat. This expeditionary force represents the constant aspect in the missions entrusted to the army, in the continuity of the previous SDR of 1998. In fact, the government intends to maintain its capacity for strategic action, which implies the conservation of the entire spectrum of means in this field.
• PreventionThe aim is to anticipate potential conflicts through preventive action in the countries concerned, contributing to stabilisation in order to avoid the subsequent deployment of conventional forces. Clearly, the aim here is to develop ACA concepts[3], to participate in the training of local security forces, etc. It is not a question of acting, as is often the case today (e.g. Afghanistan), as a complement to and within a stabilisation operation, but of intervening upstream of any potential crisis. Through this anticipatory action, Great Britain naturally intends to save its forces and financial resources by avoiding sending a large contingent in response to a crisis.
• National territoryThe aim is to contribute to resilience on the national territory by assisting other ministries by providing experts and an organised mass of manoeuvre. As in many other nations, theArmy wishes to develop the capacity for action of its forces on national territory. The best example of a large-scale commitment in this area was the securing of the 2012 Olympic Games. The aim is not only to meet the objective of resilience mentioned in the SDR, but also to show itself on a daily basis among the population and to highlight the relevance, effectiveness and usefulness of an army. This represents a real evolution for the land forces, whose footprint on the national territory was until now rather small.

The implementation of these objectives therefore requires profound reform. The active army will lose part of its expeditionary vocation and will have to adapt to a broader spectrum of potential missions. The reserve, whose missions are set to increase, will have to be integrated much more finely in support of a reduced volume of forces.

Unprecedented reorganisation

TheArmy of 2013 is the heir to the previous SDR. It was designed as an expeditionary force for stabilization operations or armed conflict. It must now transform itself into an army maintained in a flexible state of alert depending on the situation. This requires the creation of two key elements: the Reaction Force (RF) and theAdaptable Force (AF).

• The spearhead: Reaction Force (RF)

Comparable to the French principle of the rapid action force (FAR), this force will be based on three mechanized brigades and a logistics brigade[4] grouped within the 3rd (UK) Division, and on^an air-mobile assault brigade (16th Air Assault) which will constitutethe emergencybrigade. This rapid reaction corps will be composed of 90% active elements. It will primarily carry out the mission of intervention and deterrence, with a one-year alert tour per mechanized brigade.

• The reservoir of forces: The Modular Force (AF)

These active and reserve forces are organized into seven infantry brigades and one logistics brigade[5] under the command of the 1st ( UK⁾ Division. The AFis intended to carry out a wide range of missions, including the replacement of the reaction force for long-term operations. It will provide the contingents for overseas presence (Cyprus, Brunei, Falklands, ...) and participation in UN operations. It will also support the Security Assistance Group (see below) in its operational military assistance missions. Finally, and most significantly, it will be the core of the action on national territory.

In addition to these two bodies, a Security Assistance Group will be created,whose mainmission will be to assist in the training of foreign security forces.

Finally, there remains a set of units that make up the bulk of the support and assistance: the Force Troops (FT). These elements, under the command of the HQ Force Troops, will be grouped into ten Force Troop Brigades and will therefore not subscribe to any one of the forces, but will have to meet the needs of both.

This structural and functional reorganisation must be carried out in conjunction with a territorial reorganisation. All units will now be based mainly in Great Britain, not only because of the return of troops from Afghanistan, but also following the announcement in the SDR that all British forces stationed in Germany will return by 2020. The RF will be regrouped in the south of England (Tidworth, Bulford, ... ) and will thus benefit from the large training camps in the region. The units of the AF brigades will be deployed in the different regions of Great Britain (plus the 38th Irish Brigade in Northern Ireland )^. All these active units will be associated with a reserve unit. Given the central importance of these reservists in the future functioning of the Army and the essential need for their integration with the active army, the reform of the TA has become a key element of this reform, but also its greatest vulnerability.

Consequences and risks

By its scope and ambitions, the Army 2020 project presents risks which, having been taken into account and accepted, are no less important.

First of all, this reform will be costly. Indeed, the territorial reorganisation of the units - the repatriation of the forces stationed in Germany in particular - but also the disengagement of troops from Afghanistan will have a financial cost that will weigh heavily on budgets in the years to come.

Secondly, this geographical reorganisation is not without consequences for the core of the reform, namely the organisation of the future TA. Its units, which must be fully integrated into the active army (which is already a challenge in itself), rely on a human resource that is overwhelmingly located in the major urban centres. It is therefore necessary that the active units to which they will be attached, whose missions they will share and on which they will rely for their training, should be located close not only to training facilities but also to the places of residence of the reservists. While the FR will be clustered in Salisbury Plains, taking advantage of the Army's many local training facilities, the Modular Force or Force Troops , spread across the UK, will find it much more difficult to access all of these facilities.

Even more generally, the reform of the reserve requires a complete redefinition of its employment framework. Bringing it up to the level required by the reform implies that it must be fully trained and operational, and therefore particularly available. This has far-reaching consequences in terms of labour legislation, for example, or the organisation of work between the MoD, reservists and their public or private employers.

For the active army, it is also obvious that the pace and attractiveness of the reaction force and the modular force will be completely different. Therefore, in order to maintain future recruitment as well as to retain the current workforce, which has been engaged in a largely offensive pattern over the last decade (Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.), it is necessary to define career paths and jobs that can remain attractive.

Finally, there is one point that seems to be relatively little addressed in this reform: support. Indeed, the Force Troops have been dimensioned for the sole support of the FR. What would be the consequences of a massive commitment of the modular force, for example on national territory, if the reaction force was already heavily involved in an international operation, such as Afghanistan, for example?

Conclusion

The Army has embarked on an unprecedented reform that will involve not only the army but also British civil society, either through downsizing and movement of units or through the evolution of the reserve. While the project is ambitious in its scope and objectives, the reform of the TA seems to be the nerve centre of this manoeuvre. A large part of the Army's future capabilities will indeed depend on the ability of this reserve to act as a task force, at a level compatible with the rest of the units. More than simply redefining the processes of its operational preparation, training or engagement, the challenge is to completely redefine the partnership between civil society and the army. In a very uncertain economic context for employers, obtaining their agreement and support to part with part of their personnel over annual periods that are still poorly evaluated could prove difficult to obtain.

1] SIC: information and communication systems

[2] SRI: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

3] AMO: operational military assistance.

[4]^1st,^12th,^20th Armoured Infantry Brigades, 101st Logistic Brigade.

5]^4th,^7th , 11th, 38th, 42th, 51st, 160th Infantry Brigades, 102thLogistic Brigade.

An EMIA officer in the Signals Army (promotion to Captain COIGNET, 2000-2002), the PINET Battalion Commander served as a lieutenant in the 6th Command and Signals ^Company of Nîmes. From 2008 to 2010, he took command of the 7th Command and Signals ^Company in Besançon, before being assigned to the Centre for the Doctrine of Use of Forces (CDEF) in Paris, within the NATO interoperability cell. He is currently studying for a technical diploma in information science and technology (STI), networks and telecommunications (RTL) at the Cesson-Sévigné Signal School.