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Mali: French military intervention in perspective

military-Earth thinking notebook
History & strategy
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This article by Colonel Michel Goya has been published under the title "La guerre de trois mois: l'intervention militaire française au Mali en perspectives" [1] in the journal of the French Institute of International Relations [2], Politique étrangère, volume 78, n°2, summer 2013.

1 ] The photos were not part of the article.

2] The Editorial Committee of the CESAT Papers would like to thank the Institute and the author for authorizing the publication of this article.


L’intervention in Mali has significantly reduced the potential of jihadists operating in the Sahel. This success was made possible by a combination of clear political decision-making and an effective military force. However, this operation revealed shortcomings, particularly in terms of capacity, and highlighted the need to provide lasting support to the Malian army, which will not be able to cope, even with the support of a UN force, with the possible reconstitution of jihadist groups.

Faced with the urgency of events in Mali, France has broken with years of hesitation in the use of force to strike directly and violently at a clearly identified enemy. Contrary to the ideas accepted at the time, unilateral action was therefore still possible, as long as there was the political will to commit ground troops and take risks.

The military victory in Mali, however brilliant it may be, is still incomplete and above all limited. France has won a battle. But it has neither stabilized the country nor, above all, defeated jihadism in the Sahel, and it will not be enough to say this to make our enemies disappear. It remains to be ensured that this victorious three-month war is not a sword in the sand, which at least requires a strategic vision of the region and the maintenance of adequate military capabilities.

A French strategic surprise

The military intervention in Mali on 11 January 2013 was first of all a strategic surprise for the jihadists who, by launching their offensive towards the south of Mali the day before, had probably not anticipated the French reaction. On the French side, the means of air and ground intervention were nevertheless visible and relatively close, from Côte d'Ivoire to Chad via Gabon and Burkina Faso, not to mention the metropolitan warning system. Very clearly, our enemies did not believe that France, that is to say the President of the Republic, would dare to use them.

This error of appreciation is certainly due to a vision of Western States reluctant to really commit themselves after the expedition.This error of appreciation is certainly due to a vision of Western States that are reluctant to really commit themselves after the Afghan-Iraqi experience, but also increasingly prevented from doing so by a United Nations Security Council that is gradually returning to the cold war. The intervention in Libya in 2011, itself very indirect and not followed by a ground stabilisation operation, may have seemed like the swan song of a declining will. The procrastination that followed in the face of the Syrian civil war seemed to confirm that a low point had indeed been reached.

More locally and in the shorter term, the idea that no external power would intervene in Mali could be based on a number of French statements. Did not a former head of operations of the French armies himself state in July 2012 that "the lessons learned from the operations in Afghanistan in fact prohibit practically any ground intervention by the West in a Muslim country"? More importantly, the President of the Republic - the embodiment of French deterrence, whether nuclear or conventional - declared in October and November 2012 that there would be no direct intervention in Mali but only support for a regional force. The mere absence of a ground protection unit, as had been the case in the past in several African capitals when nationals and intellectives were not available to support a regional force, was a major obstacle to the development of a regional force in Mali.The mere absence of a ground protection unit, as had been the case in the past in several African capitals when French nationals and interests had been seriously threatened, clearly seemed to indicate that we were not prepared to "die for Bamako".

Under these conditions, faced with an International Support Mission to Mali (MISMA) that was particularly slow to set up and a decomposed Malian army, the jihadist organizations could have believed that they would have great freedom of action for a few months, a freedom they wanted to take advantage of. Their analysis was partly correct: a low point had indeed been reached in the way military interventions were conducted, but this low point was also a turning point.

The return to the classic French rapid intervention system

Operation Serval and, to a lesser extent, the aid to Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara in April 2011 first of all consecrates the return to a classic form of rapid intervention by France, close to that which we knew during the Cold War. In a geopolitical context of relative US withdrawal and growing threats in Africa, France conducted 14 war operations in Africa from 1977 to 1980, all of which were military successes. These successes were the result of a specific system based on institutions allowing for a rapid decision-making process, a consensus on this "discretionary" use of forces, pre-positioned unitsThese successes were the result of a specific system based on institutions allowing for rapid decision-making, consensus on the "discretionary" use of forces, pre-positioned units, elements on alert in the mainland, means of transport and remote strike, the ability to merge with local forces and the tactical combination of close combat on the ground and air support.

This system enabled the French forces to put out fires as early as possible, without devoting a great deal of resources to it and without remaining on the spot too long. Since political authority was not inhibited by losses (33 soldiers killed in May-June 1978 in Chad and Zaire), it interfered little in operations. The operations therefore had a greater chance of success and, in the end, losses remained limited, since the duration of the operations was also limited.

French operations began to lose their effectiveness when the system was abandoned. From the United Nations interposition force in Lebanon in 1978 to Operation Licorne, which began in 2002 in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, the French army paid dearly for the abandonment of the notion of enemy. From the engagement in Bosnia to the Afghan conflict, it has discovered the limits of coalition operations: slow decision-making and implementation, disparate military cultures, imposition of the methods of the coalition leader, schizophrenia among its members pursuing both their own national objectives and common goals. In the Afghan case, it has also tasted paralysis through political intrusion.

The spiral of military ineffectiveness

The spiral of military inefficiency finally reached its low point in April 2012 with the conquest of northern Mali by the Tuareg independence fighters and jihadists, sinceThe spiral of military ineffectiveness finally reached its low point in April 2012 with the conquest of northern Mali by the Tuareg independence fighters and the jihadists, since the failure of the indirect American approach of assistance to local armies and the sterility of regional military solutions were simultaneously observed. Without the jihadist offensive, and after 15 years of strengthening African peacekeeping capabilities, it would have taken almost a full year to bring in the equivalent of a light brigade, which would undoubtedly have been one of the least dynamic force projections in history. It is true that this projection had been further slowed by the very modest involvement of the European Union (EU), another weak substitute for direct French intervention since the late 1990s. In retrospect, one cannot but notice the impotence that this first MISMA would have been struck with in the face of the power, however well known, of jihadist organizations.

It was thus necessary to go to the end of a process, to its final stalemate, to stimulate the audacity of our enemies and, in the end, leave no other choice than to return to a classic form of military intervention "à la française". The keystone of the movement here being a clear political will, assuming from the outset the idea of war, and without tactical intrusion. With this prerequisite acquired, the rest of the intervention system was quick to reactivate itself.

Blitzkrieg campaign on the Niger River

The strategic surprise of the decision was therefore coupled with an operational surprise, thanks to the renovation of the warning system in metropolitan France and, above all, the maintenance of the network of bases in the region, reinforced by the special forces in Burkina Faso. This proximity, and the help of our allies, also made it possible to compensate for the weakening of our air transport means. Operation Serval was thus an opportunity to validate the first example of pooling European equipment. Without the existence of the European Air Transport Command and the support of Canada and the United States, it would have been more difficult to have the necessary heavy transporters. After a timid start, the United States added air-to-air refuelling support and drone intelligence support from Niger. The relatively small volume of the operation - about 10% of the operational contract - made it possible to overcome the rigidities of the new French support organisation.

It was thus possible to halt the current offensive in central Mali very quickly, first by air assets and then, within a few days, by setting up a land brigade. Within two weeks, the forces engaged exceeded the largest commitment in Afghanistan in terms of volume. For political or material reasons, no army in the world would have been capable of such a feat at that time and place.

The benefit of surprise was maintained with the risk of an immediate counter-offensive, largely outside the norms established since the long Afghan conflict, with the long conditioning of personnel and equipment, all in logistical strained flow and under the close direction, sometimes down to micro-command, of the Operational Planning and Control Centre (OPCC).

The rapidity of the offensive, with an unprecedented combination of modes of action (airborne operations, assault landing, air-mobile logistics) in the direction of Gao and Timbuktu made it possible to free the Niger loop as of 28 January 2013. The ability to quickly link sub-operations was confirmed with the dissociation of the Serval operation: a battle group was in charge of securing the Gao region with the Malian Armed Forces (FAM), while the rest of the French brigade was in charge of securing the Gao region with the Malian Armed Forces (FAM), while the rest of the French brigade was in charge of securing the Gao region with the Malian Armed Forces.The rest of the French brigade occupied the northern towns and formed a new coalition with Chadian forces, but also with returned Tuareg elements (a very flexible operational diplomacy, but one that carries the seeds of political contradictions).

In this type of conflict, where no treaty formalizes victory, it is up to politics to symbolically mark the successes. This was the purpose of the President of the Republic's trip on 2 February, which was to celebrate the success of the first part of the mission given to the armies: the restoration of the authority of the Malian State over the whole of the territory. The second part, the destruction of enemy organizations, was then limited to the disappearance of Ançar Dine, the radical Tuareg organization. The three other armed jihadist movements - the Movement for the Unity of Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Signatories in the Blood of Mokhtar Belmokhtar - still retained most of their potential, despite the air strikes.

Tigharghar's victory

NSAOs can be classified according to their degree of social establishment and the sophistication of their armament. The "telluric" organizations, with a strong local presence, enjoy multiple advantages (resources, intelligence, concealment and, above all, recruitment capacity) and can only be countered by a global approach, rather centred on population control. Faced with exogenous or "reticular" organisations, as in the case of many Al-Qaeda franchises, the destruction of forces can be sought. However, this search for destruction requires a more or less complex air-land manoeuvre, depending on whether or not the enemy has "anti-access" ground weapons (sophisticated anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles).

AQIM falls into the category of organisations having neither local support enabling it to rapidly reconstitute its forces, nor armaments preventing French fire support resources from acting at their most effective. This does not mean that it is an easy opponent. The AQIM fighters are seasoned, motivated to the point of fanaticism and, although they do not have missile launchers, possess a formidable arsenal of heavy machine guns. Logically, this adversary had settled in the Ametettaï valley, to the north of the Tigharghar massif, taking advantage of both the protection of the massifs and the proximity of the great Timlési valley, an essential axis between the Niger River and Algeria. Several hundred jihadist fighters have been able to organise their stronghold there for years, with the Malian government turning a blind eye to their presence in order to concentrate its efforts on the Tuareg rebels.

After having located this base thanks to an unprecedented deployment of intelligence and surveillance means, the French forces accepted close combat, which undoubtedly constituted a new surprise for jihadists convinced of the reluctance of Western armies to take this risk. After a cordon-off manoeuvre carried out by French and Chadian forces, the area was conquered on foot by a light infantry group, strongly supported by artillery and air assets. Proof was thus given of the power of the combination of contact combat/third dimension support. The latter, particularly by Tiger helicopters, provided the majority of enemy casualties; but they are only fully effective with combatants to detect and fix the enemy, before delivering the decisive blow. This is also proof that in asymmetrical combat, the "strong" wins only if it also goes to the terrain of the "weaker" and competes with him in close combat in difficult environments.

After a month of fighting, from 19 February to 21 March 2013, and at the cost of the lives of two French soldiers and twenty-six Chadians, the AQIM stronghold in Mali was destroyed.Nearly 200 of its fighters, including Katiba leader Abou Zeïd, were killed and some 20 taken prisoner. A great deal of information has also been found which will enable various services to continue the hunt. This success is not enough to proclaim the destruction of AQIM in Mali, but it is certain that its combat potential there has been very seriously undermined.

Asymmetric fighting in Gao

The situation in the Gao region is more delicate. Unlike AQIM, since 5 February the MUJAO has been engaged in asymmetrical fighting there, with multiple outbursts combining suicide attacks, infiltration and harassing shots. These punctual attacks testify both to the motivation of the members of the movement, rather far from the image of a group of bandits sometimes presented, to the persistence of their presence and therefore also to the incompleteness of Operation Serval. Classically, the MUJAO conducts a communication campaign supported by combat actions, where France does the opposite. Its local recruitment, including in the Songhaï and Peule ethnic groups, and regional recruitment, particularly in Mauritania, may enable it to claim regional leadership in place of the Algerians of AQIM. The MUJAO is also holding a French hostage.

In the face of this threat, the Franco-Malian allied forces in the Niger River region, the Touaregs (still enemies of the Malian state) of the National Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) further north in the Bourem region and the Niger battalion near the border at Ménaka are trying to control the terrain and conduct offensive clean-up operations. The MUJAO suffered some blows, particularly in Imenas, where, on 2 March, more than 50 rebels were eliminated at the cost of the life of one French soldier. However, the area is still far from being definitively pacified.

Nevertheless, like the President's visit on 2 February, that of the Minister of Defence on 7 March was intended to mark politically the end of a new sub-operation. The intervention phase is considered to be over and the stabilisation phase is beginning, while the French forces are withdrawing.

Mission not yet accomplished

After three months of fighting, the mission assigned by the head of the armies - to restore the sovereignty of the Malian State over the whole of its territory and to destroy terrorist organizations there - is therefore considered to have been accomplished. Does this mean that the situation has returned to normal and that France's military commitment has come to an end?

The allied forces, and above all French forces, have regained control of all rebel-held cities since January 2012, but with only 12 or 13 French or African battalions, it is not possible to tightly control a territory twice the size of France.

Of the six organisations that were facing the Malian government, the two Tuareg organisations have all but disappeared, such as Ançar Dine, or have joined forces with French forces, such as the MNLA; AQIM has suffered severe losses and appears disorganized; the MUJAO, and probably also Mokhtar Belmokhtar's group, have also suffered losses, but to a lesser extent. These remarkable military results are, however, not decisive and are subject to several uncertainties.

AQIM suffered severe blows

Although AQIM has suffered severe blows, it has close to a front where the former Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) can finally fully justify its endorsement by Osama Bin Laden. It is therefore very likely that he will take offensive action. These may still take place in Mali, if AQIM still has forces in the Ifoghas massif and if it is possible to reinforce or renew them. However, aerial surveillance, allied forces' control of the region's towns, the Algerian army's increased presence in the Sahara and the cooperation of the Tuaregs are reducing the possibilities for manoeuvre in this sector. The most likely mode of action for AQIM is therefore more likely to consist of operations against the French throughout its area of action. Moreover, AQIM is still holding six French hostages after the probable death of one of them. These hostages are now likely to be outside Mali.

The second uncertainty concerns the armed organisations of the Tuaregs. France is openly cooperating with the MNLA, which triggered events in January 2002 and is still at war with the Malian government. Ançar Dine has disappeared, but not all his fighters have been eliminated, far from it. Some have joined the MNLA or the new Islamic Movement of Azawad, others are probably still fighting, perhaps with AQIM. This alliance with the MNLA illustrates some of the difficulties of "coupled combat". The cooperation of the Tuaregs is one of the keys to securing North Mali and even the region. However - apart from the fact that it involves associating with former enemies (many of whom fought with Muammar Gaddafi), including radical Islamists - this alliance irritates above all the allied governments in the region.

The action of Mokhtar Belmokhtar's group, independent of AQIM since the end of 2012, is blurred in this tactical landscape. Close to the MUJAO, he may be fighting alongside it, but some accounts tend to show that not only is Belmokhtar, who was once considered dead, still alive, but that he has reportedly taken refuge in Algeria. An organization that was able to organize the hostage-taking at the In Amenas gas site may surprise at any time.

Who to fight the jihadists?

Faced with these groups that are still very active, local forces are weak. The MISMA contingents arrived quickly on Malian territory, but mostly without equipment and without sufficient funding. In fact, MISMA's action is limited to the Chadian contingent in Kidal - also in search of funding and recently attached to MISMA -, the control of Ménaka by the Nigerien battalion and a presence on the southern roads. As for the Malian armed forces, they are disorganised. At most, they are able to deploy eight small battalions that are very poorly equipped and poorly supervised. Without French support, the AFM are clearly unable to secure the Niger River, let alone the Ifoghas Massif. The European Training Mission of the Malian Army has begun its 15-month work of training four battalions of 650 men. With the EU at least as reluctant to finance and arm the European Training Mission (EUTM) as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is to finance and arm MISMA, the reconstitution of the Malian army is likely to take a long time.

As for the United Nations (UN) force announced to encompass and replace MISMA, its main interest, apart from broadening the scope of contributors, is above all to transfer the funding of operations to the United Nations. This financial relief would come at the cost of reduced tactical effectiveness, as the UN forces would be unable to conduct offensive operations. It is hard to see them, even with a Chapter VII mandate and a volume of more than 12,000 men (which has yet to be assembled), resisting a determined adversary for long. One can hope that AQIM will turn away from such an unrewarding adversary, but this will certainly not be the case with the MUJAO. Moreover, the UN Secretary General has implicitly admitted the ineffectiveness of this force by asking for the presence of a parallel force which, in this case, can only be French. All these movements of forces are supposed to take place at the beginning of an electoral process that should initiate political normalization, itself a source of tension.

Jihadists are strong only because states are weak

More broadly, these military procrastinations demonstrate that the real strength of armed non-State organizations lies above all in the weakness of the States they confront. States are not weak because their armies are weak; the opposite is true, and the trends are not favourable.

Just as AQIM and its allies benefit from the dark networks of globalization (abundance of small arms, parasitic trafficking of all kinds), so local states have seen their means of public action reduced. This applies to security instruments, but also to social action, which leaves the field open to private Islamic organizations. Worse, external funding, whether legal (International Monetary Fund [IMF] aid) or not (drugs), tends to increase endemic corruption which, by contrast, makes the offer of Islamist organizations, hard but honest, increasingly attractive. In a Sahelian zone where the population is likely to double in the next 20 years, recruiters from the MUJAO or any group that is born or transformed will have no trouble finding volunteers. The military coup d'état of March 2012 in Mali must also be seen as a local attempt to react against this general drift.

However, these Sahelian countries, including Mali, have significant resources in their subsoil. Their exploitation can be an opportunity, provided that they manage to reserve a significant part of the revenues for the consolidation of state structures and the cleaning-up of administrations.

In the short term, and without prejudging developments in the nearby Arab world, the easing of tensions with the Tuaregs is a sine qua non for victory against the jihadists. In the long term, censuses, cadastral plans, pension systems, education, judges and administrators who are paid well enough to be honest, and transparent elections are the best instruments for cutting the roots of movements that armies and police forces will be better able to confront thanks to real tax revenues. If we are unable to create this virtuous circle and without strong states, the war against jihadists will be a "Sisyphean war".

Can France fight a war beyond a quarter?

France has proven the persistence, a forgotten time, of its capacity for rapid intervention and its ability to carry out high-intensity and highly complex operations over several months. Like all operations, this one has highlighted shortcomings but also reinforcements.

1 million extra cost per day

This "new rapid intervention" in Africa is slightly more expensive than previous ones, costing just over €1 million per day in additional costs for the use of1 million for all the French external operations in 1978 - largely due to the high cost of using the most sophisticated equipment. It should also be noted that almost half of this additional cost comes from logistics transport, and one can imagine what the proximity of African bases has saved in this area. These operations are also less costly in human terms, due to a better system of protection for combatants, but also to the tactical know-how acquired in Afghanistan. The casualty ratio between friends and enemies has never been so favourable to French soldiers in 100 years. In addition to the well-known and anticipated material shortfalls - a weakening of air-to-air refuelling and airlift capacity, a rapid reduction in the helicopter fleet, delays in building up a fleet of surveillance and combat UAVs, ageing ofOperation Serval also highlighted organisational shortcomings, such as the rigidity of logistic support and the difficulty of setting up a fully coherent command structure in theatre.

Finally, it is surprising to note the low level of media coverage and, related to that, the low level of public understanding of this operation. This under-exposure and under-explanation, which prolongs and accentuates those of the operations to regain Timbuktu and Gao, is perhaps not unrelated to the erosion of public support.

It now remains to demonstrate France's ability to continue the operations over the long term, for we must not be fooled: the combat initiated in Mali is part of a long-term confrontation. Under fairly similar conditions, it will have taken three years of commitment in Chad to temporarily restore security there. At the time, France's strength was based on the fairly successful integration of all its means of action under a single command. Diplomacy did not focus on the fastest possible withdrawal of French forces, but on how to bring the countries of the region together in the same fight, to dissociate the local movement from its sponsors and to help resolve local ethnic problems. Together with the military, which in fact provided almost all the personnel involved, it participated in the parallel restructuring of the local administration and army. For its part, an average contingent of 2,500 men led the fight until it was certain that the local army was capable of taking over. This was only a few years after the Algerian war, which was far more traumatic than the "Afghan syndrome". Public opinion at the time was much more reticent about this type of engagement than it is today where, despite a rapid fall in the polls - which are still questioning - a majority of French people support Operation Serval.

Remembering the fate of its "blue helmets" battalions, France has taken care to preserve the autonomy of its residual force in Mali, the value of a joint grouping, in relation to the United Nations Integrated Mission for Stabilisation in Mali (MINUSMA). Will this force, together with the special forces of Operation Sabre and the regional strike force, carry out independent action against jihadist organisations, in Will this force, combined with the special forces of Operation Sabre and the regional strike force, take independent action against jihadist organisations in the manner of the American Operation Enduring Freedom, at the risk of deeply irritating Algeria, a key player in the security of the region? Will we be able to lose interest in this UN force, whose difficulties can only be predicted, at the risk of an Afghan' destiny, with the effectiveness of the Afghan national army being diminished?

Having won the three-month war, it is now urgent to define a French strategy for the region and to integrate non-military means of power into its implementation. This will require the preservation of the attitudes and means that made the initial success possible, so that it can be repeated. It will also imply, on the part of the politico-military level, qualities of resilience and confidence in the implementers that have sometimes been lacking in the past.

Colonel Michel Goya, an officer in the Army, a graduate of the École de guerre and a doctor of history, has published "Res militaris. De l'emploi de la force au XXIème siècle" (Paris, Economica, 2010).

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Title : Mali: French military intervention in perspective
Author (s) : le Colonel Michel GOYA
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