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Henry Humphrey Evans LLOYD, a tactician philosopher

military-Earth thinking notebook
History & strategy
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A renowned military writer of the late 18th century, the life and work of Henry Lloyd remain largely unknown.


Until the work of Franco Venturi [1] on the correspondence between Lloyd and Pietro Verri, only the records of his son Hannibal Lloyd [2] and his friend John Drummond [3] provide some biographical indications. These were taken up by Henry Manners Chichester[4 ] in theOxford Dictionary of National Biography and in a humorous work by Francis J. Hudleston [5]. The first British thinker to exert a decisive influence on strategic thinking before the 20th century, the study of his theories has long been neglected among his compatriots, apart from the article devoted to him by Liddell-Hart [6]. 6] On the contrary, German and Russian military writers discerned his decisive influence earlier, notably the contributions of Major Wilhelm Rüstow[7], Lieutenant-General Genrikh Antonovich Leer[8] and Rudolph Vierhaus[9]. Studies conducted in France and the United States attempt to assess its impact on the intellectual training of certain military leaders such as Napoleon, Washington and Patton; we can cite here the work of Brigadier General Jean Colin[10], Colonel Olivier L. Spaulding[11] and Lieutenant-Colonel Steve E. Dietrich[12]. More recently, in addition to the excellent synthesis of Azar Gat [13], Patrick J. Speelman presents the most accomplished biography of the theorist [14], and his annotated edition of his complete works [15] offers the first comprehensive approach of an original thought embracing political institutions, economics, and military art. This research marks a revival of interest in Lloyd, who now appears to be a key thinker in understanding the limited warfare practiced in the Enlightenment.

Major-General Lloyd, a cosmopolitan officer of fortune, was born in Llanbedr around 1720, the son of a Welsh pastor who had no prospects in Great Britain, turned to foreign service and went to France after his studies at Jesus College, Oxford. In 1744, he was a Dairy Brother at the English Jesuit College in Anchin when he met John Drummond. With the support of this Stuart supporter, he fought with the Irish brigade at Fontenoy and Bergen-op-Zoom; then, at the end of hostilities, he was recommended to Lord Marischal and James Keith, who opened up the ranks of the Prussian army to him. Again thanks to the support of the Jacobite diaspora, Lloyd served with Count Franz Moritz von Lacy at the beginning of the Seven Years' War and participated in the last two campaigns of the Sixth Russian-Ottoman War under Marshal Piotr Alexandrovitch Rumyantsev. But his shady character also led him to break his commitments on several occasions. First in 1754 when he left the service of Frederick II to accept a mission from the Duke of Belle Isle; then in 1760 when he abandoned the Austrian army in the middle of the conflict to serve on the staff of Hereditary Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, where he met Sir Henry Clinton. This rich experience provided him with the material for a first essay on European armies entitled "Captain Lloyd's Lists"[16]and then "The history of the late war in Germany"» [17]. This relationship of the campaigns of 1756 and 1757 established his reputation through an innovative approach to military history which made him an initiator of utilitarianism [18]. 18] The author breaks with meticulous narratives, favouring the description of the theatre and the plan of operations. His narrative integrates battlefield engagement with strategic manoeuvre and reveals the central concept of lines of operations. At the same time, influenced by the reading of Hobbes, Montesquieu and Helvetius, Lloyd apprehends "grand strategy" through the link between the nature of a political regime and military means. He thus wrote an essay on British institutions [19], in which he defended the electoral reform proposed by John Wilkes and criticized American colonial policy; then a book on monetary policy [20] dedicated to the First Lord of the Treasury Frederick North, where he asserts himself as a precursor of Adam Smith's liberal theories [21]. [21] In addition, Lloyd established himself early on as an expert on clandestine missions and amphibious operations. With Drummond, he took part in Charles Edward Stuart's Jacobite uprising, during which he recognized the English coast from Devon to Kent in anticipation of a French raid. Belle-Isle entrusted him with a similar mission on the eve of the Seven Years' War; his memory dissuaded Versailles from undertaking a raid on Torbay and contributed to the choice of the Menorca operation. Finally, after the failure of the raid by Louis Guillouet, Count of Orvilliers, the British cabinet entrusted him with a prospective study on the risks presented by a French raid and the means to counter it. His memoir, dedicated to Sir Robert Clerk and published under the title "Rhapsody on the Present System on French Politics on the project invasion, and the means how to defeat it"22], wascensored by order of the government, but reissued in 1790, 1794 and 1798. Lloyd's first attempt at a theoretical synthesis, the work demonstrates that any attempt at a descent would be doomed to failure, and that the government must therefore work to preserve and fortify maritime domination, the true pillar of British power. When does Lloyd become a British agent? Perhaps as soon as he was arrested in 1746 during the Jacobite Rebellion, but more likely after the Seven Years' War. He carried out several missions on the continent in the 1760s on the orders of St. James and was in charge of studying ways to support the insurrection of Pascal Paoli in 1768. In 1780, he tried in vain to obtain a command against the Insurgents , but the North cabinet invited him to withdraw to Huy in the principality of Liège, where he stayed until his death in 1783. During these last years, he wrote a theoretical introduction to "The history of the late war in Germany"[23], better known under the title of "Political and military memoirs».

Among contemporary British military leaders, only Major-General Clinton seems to be influenced by Lloyd's theories [24]. [24] On the other hand, his impact on the continent is more significant. In 1762, he briefly corresponded with Count Friedrich Wilhelm de Schaumburg-Lippe, under whose orders he was to be detached in Portugal [25]. These two apostles of defensive strategy developed a similar approach to the art of warfare based on the study of human nature and passions, from which they deduced very similar tactical models and reform of the military state. His theories are also taken up by Marshal Suvorov in his "Nauka pobezdat" (Art ofWinning), while in Prussia his criticisms of Frederick II are translated and refuted by "... the art of war".The history of the late war in Germany" by Major General Georg Friedrich von Tempelhoff [26]. [26] The same work is the subject of two translations in France. One by Pierre Roux de Fazillac published in 1784[27], extracts of which are included in a "aide-mémoire" of 1786[28], then the work was republished and completed in 1803[29]. The second by Godefroy Joseph de Romance, Marquis de Mesmon, also published in 1784[30], some extracts of which are taken up in "... the second by Godefroy Joseph de Romance, Marquis de Mesmon, also published in 1784[31].The philosophy of war"31], wrongly attributed to Guillaume Imbert de Boudeaux who, on the other hand, translated "[31].Political and military Rhapsody[32]. In 1793, the manuscript of Romance was seized by the Revolutionary Committee of Rethel, then printed and distributed to the general officers by order of the Committee of Public Salvation. This last version was the subject of a civilian edition in 1801 [33]. 33] It is difficult to determine in which translation and when Napoleon read Lloyd's work; however, we do have an annotated version of the "...".Military and Political Memoirs of General Lloyd"during his exile on St. Helena[34]. 34] While the emperor considered the concept of the line of operations to be paramount, he was very critical of the author's emphasis on the defensive.

The "[t]heMilitary and Political Memoirs of General Lloyd"remain strongly marked by the mechanism but, guided by a concern for clarity, the author breaks with the formalism and taste for detail of contemporary treatises. In his Reflections on the General Principles of Warfare, which introduces the book, he attempts to define the art of warfare: the most difficult but least meditated human science and, consequently, often reduced to the study of tactics. Like any art, it is based on principles which vary in their application. Lloyd thus introduces a dichotomy into his field of study: the "material" and the "sublime". The former refers to doctrine, the mastery of principles and their application in the preparation of troops and the planning of a campaign; the latter, the product of the experience and genius of the military leader, is the application of principles in the conduct of operations. The author does, however, offer two pieces of advice for cultivating this branch of the art. The soldier, the primary tool of combat, must constitute the basis of all reflection on the "sublime"; a military leader must identify his limits and qualities, and above all the means of cultivating them through an agreed discipline based on "trust and friendship". Secondly, he must have an absolute knowledge of the theatre of operations: its physical and human geography, its history, its institutions, etc., and see them as factors that will influence a nation's offensive and defensive capabilities. Lloyd completes his introductory remarks with a table of the main European armies. According to him, military institutions reflect a "national character", the product of a given mode of government, a given society, its beliefs, values, economic system and so on. The French had the advantage of a society with a broad recruiting base; on the other hand, they were portrayed as an arrogant people prone to improvisation on the battlefield. Their impetuosity, bordering on indiscipline, led them to brief and violent assaults, but they were also quick to become discouraged as soon as they suffered a setback. An enemy must therefore seek to destroy their confidence by engaging in a campaign of harassment and by acting on the hostility of the theatre of operations. Lloyd develops here an argument very close to those of the Chevalier de Folard, criticizing the spirit of the system and the slavish copy of the fashionable Prussian model.

Lloyd is not immune to contemporary tactical controversy. He notes that the uniform equipping of infantrymen with individual firearms, whose value is essentially defensive, and the generalization of thin, parallel orders have led to the expansion of operations in space and time. Consequently, less deadly and less decisive campaigns evolved into a "war of attrition". Lloyd's ideal army is based on mutual support, inter-service liaison, and instructed according to simple tactics reducing the number of its evolutions to a minimum. It should be based on three principles: "strength", i.e. the articulation and arming of troops, "agility", i.e. their manoeuvring capabilities, and "universal mobility". The first two principles, which are interdependent and relate to "equipment", must contribute to bringing the largest possible number of troops to the decisive point in the enemy's plan. The latter is a matter of choosing the order of battle and belongs to the "sublime". Without going into the details of these tactical considerations, Lloyd's work is a synthesis of the theories dear to the Marshal of Saxony and the proponents of the legionary model such as Antoine de Ricouart, Count d'Hérouville de Claye, or the Chevalier de Rostaing. In addition, the author pleads for a reform of the military state, in order to attract vocations and to involve the soldier more in safeguarding the state. Drawing inspiration from the Austrian military colonies, he advocates putting an end to the nomadic nature of armies in peacetime. Garrisons on the borders would serve as recruit depots, training centres and stores; clothing and equipment would be manufactured on the spot by wives. The State should also encourage the marriage of soldiers and implement a natalist policy to compensate for losses in the field. Lastly, invalids, soldiers and retired officers would be allocated land, thus relieving the State of the burden of pension payments.

In a second step, the author deals with the "philosophy of war". Here he gives his considerations on the passions applied to the art of command, that of "committing men to rush into an obvious danger [...] the most difficult and sublime part of the art, and such that no profession, no art offers the same". In complete opposition to the principles of his time, Lloyd portrays the military leader as a humble, virtuous, exemplary and virtuous man in excellent physical condition, looking after the welfare of his troops and the improvement of his subordinates. He kept his men in a balance between inaction and uninterrupted field service, preventing success, setbacks or idleness from corrupting their morale. In charge of leading this mass of individuals, of safeguarding their cohesion by his moral influence, he will use coercion only as a last resort. On the contrary, he must take advantage of the "passions of the masses": fear, pride, honour, ambition. But Lloyd believes that only "love of freedom", "religious fanaticism" and "national fanaticism" are universal principles to motivate the soldier. Finally, his reflections lead him to determine that the "middle classes", animated by "the highest degree of social activity", are the most favourable to the recruitment of soldiers.

The third part of the book is devoted to the relations existing between the different forms of government and the operations of a campaign. The author notes that the objectives of a campaign are defined almost uniformly without taking into account the specificities of a regime, the particularities of a despotic, aristocratic, monarchic or republican government, which are nevertheless sensitive in all branches of civil and military administration. After a pertinent and erudite analysis of the historical processes leading to the emergence and evolution of a regime, the author questions the aptitudes of an army for offensive or defensive warfare. He thus asserts that an offensive campaign offers the chances of a victorious outcome in the face of a despotic government insofar as the army generally constitutes the exclusive basis of its power and cannot count on a genuine national sentiment. If such a regime is allowed to take the lead in operations, it will keep its material forces intact and can build up its moral strength through initial success. On the other hand, taking the initiative and inflicting even partial setbacks on such an enemy while advancing towards its capital will lead to the fall of the regime and easy conquest. Absolute monarchies, based on hereditary land ownership, a guarantee of "well-established civil liberty", prove particularly effective in a defensive war, but incapable of a prolonged war effort in an offensive campaign. The republics also appear to him to be more suited to the defensive than to the offensive war and, in the prospect of a war of conquest, would be forced to equip themselves with a strong executive.

The last two parts of the "Military and Political Memoirs of General Lloyd"are devoted to operations, more particularly to the general principles governing their conduct, and conclude with an examination of the borders of the main European states from the point of view of the concept of lines of operation. Lloyd first defines the criteria for choosing the point at which to attack an enemy position. If this suitable point cannot be identified, one must manoeuvre on its flanks to threaten its communications, its stores and force it to abandon its position. In such maneuvers, the author discusses the danger of supporting his flanks at natural obstacles, or rather cuts. Excellent in the case of keeping one's position intact, they become fatal in a retreat if the enemy penetrates the lines and pushes towards that obstacle. Concerning the marches, the "key to operations", he fights the current Prussian model, preferring a tight company column similar to "Guibert's column". These principles were widely shared among the French military elite and implemented at the end of the 1760's. However, he remained the first to theorise the concept of lines of operation. He defined lines of operation as the direction followed by an army marching against the opposing force: it starts from a store and ends at a specific point, the objective of the operations; his choice is the first guarantee of success of a campaign. It should be remembered here that Lloyd's choice is part of the limited warfare practised in his time, where the objective of a campaign is the conquest of a portion of enemy territory. From then on, the goal assigned to the line of operation would be the main place defending that province or an obstacle bordering it, and behind which the enemy had to be driven back or contained. If the province did not have these characteristics, Lloyd recommended that a "war of devastation" be waged. This leads him to a criticism of traditional fortified lines: the frontier square is primarily suitable for an invasion campaign, but ineffective in defence. On the contrary, defensive curtains should be erected about 100 kilometres from the frontier, which is the optimum distance an invading army can cover in enemy country. Such an army would be forced to establish a depot between the border and the besieged place and to spread its forces to cover its line. Lloyd gives primacy to the defensive over the lines of operation. An army operating on the defensive would have multiple, internal lines of operation, which would provide greater freedom of action in the face of the attacker's single line of operation. The aggressor must seek the decision, compel his opponent to operate on a single line of operation, while the defender must avoid it, engage in limited combat while withdrawing, and extend the enemy's line of operation until a favourable balance of forces is achieved. Finally, the defender must always seek to disrupt the opponent's line of operation, either by adopting a single line aimed at the end of that line or by adopting lines ofconcentric multiple lines of operation so as to fix the enemy at the front and carry a mass of troops on its flanks and detachments on its rear.

Lloyd appears as one of the great interpreters of French military thought in the 18th century. Leader of the geometric current, strategist of the "active war on the defensive", Lloyd tried to emancipate the ideas of his time, with some success at the tactical level, but without applying the same principles in the field of operations. His thinking remained dependent on the conceptual framework of limited warfare and could not envisage armies being able to break free from the store system. This task falls to its continuator, Antoine-Henri Jomini, in particular by correcting and developing his concept of lines of operation.

1] Venturi Franco, "Le avventuredel Generale Henri Lloyd", in Rivista storica italiana, 1979, pp. 369-433.

2] Lloyd Hannibal Evans, "[2 ] Lloyd Hannibal Evans, "Memoir of General Lloyd, Author of the History of the Seven Years War"( Printed for Private Circulation), London, Marchant, Singer and Smith Printers, 1842.

3] Lloyd Henry Humphrey Evans, "[3 ] Lloyd Henry Humphrey Evans," (1842).A Political and Military Rhapsody on the Invasion and Defence of Great Britain and Ireland. Illustrated with three copper-plates ... To which is annexed an introduction, and a short account of the author's life [by J. Drummond]", London, Egerton and Sewell, 1790.

4] Lee Sidney (Dir.) (1893). "LloydHenry, or Henry Humphrey Evans (1720-1783 )". Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (vol. XXXIII pp. 422-423). London: Smith, Elder & Co.

5] Hudleston Francis Josiah," Hudleston Francis Josiah, ".Warriors in undress"Boston, Little, Brown & Co, 1926, pp. 116-126.

6] Liddell-Hart Basil Henry, "SomeExtracts from a Military Work of the 18thCentury," in Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, XII, London, 1933, pp. 138-152.

7] Rüstow Wilhelm,".Die Feldherrenkunst des 19. Jahrhunderts"Zurich, F. Schultess, 1857.

8] Leer Heinrich Antonowitsch, "[8 ] Leer Heinrich Antonowitsch, "Vorträge über Strategie aus dem Russischen übertragen von Eugen Opačić"Wien, 1868.

[9] Vierhaus Rudolf, "Lloyd und Guibert", in Werner Hahlweg (ed.), "Klassiker der Kriegskunst"Darmstadt, Wehr und Wissen Verlag, 1960.

10] Colin Jean Lambert Alphonse, "[10 ] Colin Jean Lambert Alphonse.Napoleon's military education"Paris, Chapelot, 1900, pp. 87-126.

11] Spaulding Olivier Lyman Jr., "Themilitary studies of George Washington", in American Historical Review, Vol. 29, No. 4, July 1924, pp. 675-680.

12] Dietrich Steve Emmett, " Theprofessional reading of general George S. Patton Jr.", in Journal of Military History, Vol. 53, No. 4, October 1898, pp. 387-418.

13] Gat Azar, "A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War"Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 69-80.

14 ] Speelman Patrick John, "[14] Speelman Patrick John, "Henry Lloyd and the Military Enlightenment of Eighteenth-Century Europe", Westport, Greenwood press, 2002.

15] Speelman Patrick John (ed.), " War,Society and Enlightenment: The Works of General Lloyd," Leiden, Brill, 2005.

16 ] Lloyd Henry, "Captain Lloyd's List of the Forces of the Sovereigns of Europe"London: J. Millan, 1760.

17 ] Lloyd Henry.The history of the late war in Germany between the King of Prussia and the Empress of Germany and her allies"(by a general officer, who served several campaigns in the Austrian Army), London, printed for the author, 1766.

18] Charters David A. MILNER (Marc) WILSON (J. Brent), "[18 ] Charters David A. MILNER (Marc) WILSON (J. Brent), "[19] Lloyd HenryMilitary History and the military profession"Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport, 1992, pp. 25-28.

19 ] Lloyd Henry.An essay on the English constitution"London, printed for the author and sold by J. Almon 1770.

20 ] Lloyd Henry.An essay on the theory of the money"London, printed for the author and sold by J. Almon, 1771.

21] Reinert Sophus A., "Onewill make of Political Economy...what the Scholastics did with Philosophy: Henry Lloyd and the Mathematization of Economics", in History of political economy, Vol. 39, No. 4, Duke University Press, 2007, pp. 643-677.

22 ] Lloyd Henry.Rhapsody on the Present System on French Politics on the project invasion, and the means how to defeat it; illustrated with plans, on three copper plates"(by a Chelsea Pensioner), London, Faden, 1779.

23 ] Lloyd Henry, "[23 ] Lloyd Henry," London, Faden, 1779.Continuation of the history of the late war in Germany between the King of Prussia and the Empress of Germany and her allies. Illustrated with a number of maps and plans"(by major-general Lloyd, who served several campaigns in the Austrian service), London, printed for the author and sold by S. London, printed for the author and sold by S. Hooper, 1781.

24] Willcox William, "[24 ] Willcox William, "Portrait of a General: Sir Henry Clinton in the War of Independence"New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1964, pp. 32-36.

25] Ochwadt Curd (ed.).Wilhelm Graf zu Schaumburg-Lippe: Schriften und Briefe", 3 vols, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1977-1983.

26] Tempeloff (Georg Friedrich von), "....Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges in Deutschland"als eine Fortsetzung der Geschichte des General Lloyd, Berlin, Johann Friedrich Unger, 1785.

[27] «History of the German War in 1756, between the King of Prussia and the Empress of Germany and her allies. Translated from the English (by Pierre Roux de Fazillac), to which was added the campaign of 1744, written by the King of Prussia himself", Lausanne, 1784.

[28] « From Field Warfare to General Officer's Use"( First part. Extract from the military and political memoirs of General Lloyd 1784; Second part. Extract from the provisional regulations given to the camp of Vaussieux in 1778), Maëstricht, 1786.

[29] « History of the German War in 1756 and after, between the King of Prussia and the Empress of Germany and her allies; partly translated from Lloyd's English, and partly based on the original correspondence of several French officers and mainly on that of M. de Montazet."Paris, Magimel, 1803.

[30] « Introduction to the History of the War in Germany in 1756, or Military and Political Memoirs, translated from English and augmented with notes and a précis on Lloyd's life by a French officer."(Godefroy Joseph de Romance, Marquis de Mesmon), London and Brussels, Bruys, Pion, 1784.

[31] « The Philosophy of War, excerpt from General Lloyd's Political and Military Memoirs, translated by a French officer", Paris, Barrois l'aîné, 1790.

32] "Political and MilitaryMemoirson the Invasion and Defence of Britain, by General Lloyd. Translated from the English, on the Fifth Edition, by Gme Imbert",Paris, Barrois l'aîné, 1801.

[33] « Military and Political Memoirs of General Lloyd. Serving as an introduction to the History of the war in Germany in 1756, between the King of Prussia and the Empress Queen with her Allies. Translated and augmented with Notes and a Précis on the life and character of this General. By a French Officer"(Godefroy Joseph de Romance, Marquis de Mesmon), Paris, Magimel, 1801.

34] Ducaunnes-Duval (Aristide), "Unpublished notesby Emperor Napoleon I onthemilitary memoirs of General Lloyd", Extract from volume XXXV of the "Archives historiques de la Gironde", Bordeaux, G. Gounouilhou, 1901.

Captain Roussel is an officer under contract, historian, currently a history teacher at the Military Schools of Saint-Cyr-Coëtquidan. He previously held the position of conservation assistant in the artillery and emblems department of the Musée de l'Armée in Paris, then professor of history-geography at the École nationale des sous-officiers d'active. He holds a DEA from the University of Paris IV Sorbonne "L'art opératif dans l'œuvre d'Antoine-Henri Jomini, fondements et héritages", (directed by Olivier Chaline), and is a doctoral student at the same university "Aux fondements de l'art opératif: Antoine-Henri Jomini and the Seven Years War, from historical practice to strategic theory", (still under the direction of Olivier Chaline).

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Title : Henry Humphrey Evans LLOYD, a tactician philosopher
Author (s) : le Capitaine Antoine ROUSSEL
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