Battalion Leader Emmanuel DUBOIS received, for this article, the 2nd prize of the Fondation du Maréchal Leclerc de Hautecloque, a foundation rewarding the best articles published under the aegis of CESAT.

The sociology of organizations responds to a need of modern man: to know where his place is in society, especially in the world of work. In France, in a context of low morale, persistent economic gloom and a social model in crisis, the individual today more than yesterday seeks to position himself in relation to the organization. From full support to rejection, this positioning is complex. It is a game of reciprocity that influences both the behaviour of individuals and the identity of the organisation. Confronted with a shaken social model and a world of unpredictable changes, the individual naturally tends to dissociate himself from a system that he considers unfavourable. At the very least, he keeps his distance.

Influenced by the questions of their fellow citizens and despite a very different context, the military also questions their relationship with the institution. The main characteristic of the institution is that it is highly structured to deal effectively with situations marked by uncertainty and chaos. Paradoxically, while its foundations are based on adherence, consistency and discipline, keeping one's distance from it is rather synonymous with having a high viewpoint and freeing oneself from the organization, which is fairly well tolerated. Some even detect the mark of a leader with a sharp mind and a strong character who will defy the gods and destiny.

Beyond the pronounced taste of our time that makes the rebel a hero and non-conformism a norm (we are not one paradox away!), it is good to ask: why, after all, are we stubbornly seeking a singular thought? Doesn't union make strength? 1] What does it take to risk being wrong?

And even if we persist, how can we do it? Is taking the systematic opposite tack, brandishing one's non-conformism like a trophy, holding the verb loud and clear, enough to proclaim oneself a free spirit?

In fact,doubt is the cardinal virtue of the soldier. Independence of spirit is not a matter of a balance of power, but the fruit of doubt. Virtue is what guides human action, a doctrine in short. Doubt is the virtue of pragmatism, the voluntary testing of one's own beliefs. Doubt requires scientific rigour. It is to other virtues what applied science is to basic science: a confrontation with reality. But much more than a method of reasoning, it is a way of being. To doubt is to deliberately create disorder in a stable (and therefore reassuring) model. One can have courage (second virtue of the soldier). If it has not passed the test of doubt, it is only boastfulness or recklessness. Doubt is an abyss, a personal and often difficult path. It generates humility and calls for prudence (third virtue of the soldier). From then on, thought is forged, balanced, mature and asserts itself with the strength of conviction. It becomes faith (fourth and last virtue of the soldier), a source of confidence, a bulwark against despair and a guide in uncertainty.

Uncertainty is irreducible

First of all, doubt is only conceivable if we accept uncertainty as an irreducible field of man's actions in war. Without the deep conviction that many things will escape us no matter what happens, doubt is absurd.

The military profession is inherently linked to uncertainty. This is what Clausewitz called the fog of war. It creates friction phenomena that make seemingly very simple war actions complex. As General Desportes[2] pointed out, the greatest lesson learned[3] from the Second Iraq War is that uncertainty remains, regardless of the level of technology reached and the power of one's command and communications capabilities. New technologies make it possible to understand faster and see further, that's a fact. However, they do not change the nature of the war. Why is that? Quite simply because war is a human thing in which intelligence and will compete first and foremost. It is essential to be convinced of this at a time when the FELIN, SIR [4] and other sophisticated systems could give the illusion that the fog cover is definitively broken. This temptation imbued with idealism is strongly reminiscent of 19th century scientism where ^everything, it was thought, could be explained by science. Candor or vanity, everyone will make up their own mind. In any case, the consequences are potentially devastating.

Another danger is dogmatism. It is no longer a question of solving the uncertainty equation, but of neglecting or, worse, denying it. It's good manners, today as much as yesterday, to publicly (and vigorously, of course!) proclaim one's detestation of the thing. However, a bit like in a superstitious ritual, conspiring against a plague is not enough to protect oneself against it. General de Gaulle [5] affirmed moreover that the French had an unfortunate tendency to fall in love with fashionable doctrine and to make a dogma out of it. Marc Bloch[6] had ruthlessly lucid words to stigmatize the disastrous effects of this intellectual sclerosis in the (very short) Battle of France. The defeat was essentially due to a kind of peremptory refusal of uncertainty. The Germans "had to" attack through Belgium or break their momentum on the Maginot Line. It took time to accept the occurrence of a surprise (the Ardennes). However, it is very likely that in 1940, the General Staff commiserated with its 1914 veterans confident of their fact. The fertile innovations of the day, if they can no longer be doubted, are doomed to be the sterile archaisms of the next day.

A third factor tends to overlook the importance of uncertainty. It is not incompatible with the two previous ones, but rather complementary. It is the normative influence of the group. The strategist is never a man alone. A set of individuals (the staff) helps him in his decision making through group work. The use of the same data, the same methods of analysis and mutual knowledge within the group induces a form of convergence of points of view. It is not a question of collective hallucination but rather of the common elaboration of a collective story. The group appropriates its own story. In order both to avoid internal conflict and to be more productive, the group tends to seek common ground. It is "self-appropriating" in a way. This translates into increased moderation of the actors in their relationship to the group. Not to mention intellectual laziness, over time it becomes increasingly difficult to break away from the group and the comfort it provides. Flexibility and reactivity can thus be eroded by habit and daily life.

Uncertainty, therefore, is a fundamental element of war. It is irreducible. To deny or minimize it has catastrophic consequences. Yet, out of pride or simply out of fear of the unknown, it is towards this pitfall that we naturally head[7]. 7] How then can we guard against this tendency? By doubt.

Doubt is a personal, but not solitary, path.

Doubt is not just a method, it is above all a disposition of mind. Doubt is a personal journey, but not a solitary one. Being convinced of the relevance of doubt is a good start. But how exactly do you go about it?

It is essential to be precise in order to clear up any misunderstandings. Let's make a very clear distinction between doubt and systematic opposition. The first aims at abolishing itself, the second at crushing the other. So there is no question of apologizing for professional revolt or for preventing people from "thinking in circles". They have the mistake of confusing arrogance with strength of character. In this, they do not pass the test of doubt, but take pleasure in certainty by denying prudence (our third virtue).

On an individual level, four pillars support doubt: culture, curiosity, humour and the Other. Everyone agrees on the place of culture. It is, moreover, one of the pillars of officer training, whether at the schools of Coëtquidan [8] or later. It aims to make the world intelligible (although one must still want to understand it!), to give meaning to action. One cannot doubt what one does not know.

Curiosity, on the other hand, is the "desire to know the why and the how" [9]. It seeks the understanding of systems and mechanisms. It is a quality of childhood ("Why the devil and the good God?") which brings openness of mind and intellectual flexibility. If youth is a state of mind, the age of old age very probably begins when we stop being curious.

The third pillar, more unexpected, deserves to be developed. Humour is a distance. It does not abolish the meaning of things, quite the contrary, but puts them into perspective. The military thing is serious, that's undeniable. Armies hold the power, and war causes suffering and death. One might think that laughing at such serious things is very casual. Yet it is indispensable. Humour frees us from the temptation of dogmatism, and avoids, in short, taking serious things too seriously. It prevents from being stuck by what is at stake, fixed [10] (in military terms) by the gravity of things. Carlos[11], very ill, affirmed: "death will not take me alive". Humor mocks what he loves and warns against vanity. Thus, even as French soldiers are dying in Afghanistan, it is indispensable to laugh at oneself, one's brothers in arms and the military institution. It is also very healthy that a teasing, facetious and slightly provocative spirit continues to blow on the Breton moors, the cradle (wet and cold, it makes humility easier!) of our young officers.

The Other, finally, and more precisely the meeting, is the last pillar of doubt. An army is first of all rich in human relations. The Other is the leader who guides, encourages, exhorts and, on occasion, "puts in his place". He is also the comrade with whom one crosses swords. Finally, it is the subordinate who will know how to ask the right questions if his leader, too lyrical or not pragmatic enough, has failed to explain to him in concrete terms what he means by "taking the lead".The subordinate will be able to ask the right questions if his leader, too lyrical or not pragmatic enough, has failed to explain to him in concrete terms what he means by "taking the initiative", respecting orders "in letter and in spirit" and so many other formulas as soft and familiar to the ear of the soldier as they are complex to understand.

However, although doubt is above all a matter of individual initiative, time erodes the intensity of the process to the point of calling into question the willingness to use it. A human phenomenon that is largely highlighted by the sociology of organizations is unavoidable: the fatigue of the actors. This is where the organization has a role to play.

Relationship of the military institution to doubt

The military institution is based on a system of men. The problems of fatigue, routine and motivation are taken very seriously. War is a confrontation of wills. How effective would an army be if its soldiers had no motivation and no plans for the future? None! Numerous strategies already exist to create and maintain a dynamic, emulation, and to motivate personnel. One can think, for example, of the very high level of internal recruitment, the competitive examinations and tests that mark out professional careers, and geographical mobility. These strategies can probably be improved, but they are already working very well. Moreover, certain exogenous factors are likely to mitigate the routine effects of the organization. At the forefront of these is the adventure of operational missions, today in countries at the antipodes of France. However, one avenue remains to be explored in relation to doubt: the institutionalisation of contradiction in staffs at all levels.

The normative influence of the group, mentioned above, and the phenomenon of self-appreciation are particularly topical at staff level. One ISAF [12] initiative deserves all attention and could easily be applied in France: the Red Team. This is a group whose role is to be the devil's advocate[13], to question commonplaces, to mishandle concepts (especially those that are most widely accepted). Far from confusing, they offer an iconoclastic light that is intended to give depth to the leaders' views and fuel debate. There is no risk of ego conflicts here since, by construction, this team's mission is to bring contradiction. This point is very important given the typically French difficulty in distinguishing between constructive criticism and personal attack. An equivalent structure would make it possible to appease the susceptibility of our strategists while encouraging the debate of ideas by using doubt as a method.

While this seems fairly simple to achieve at the tactical and operational level, the contradiction at the strategic level is more difficult to put in place. We still bear the stigma of the Algiers putsch. In fact, too often, the political class confuses, through mistrust, ignorance or dogmatism, the legitimate demand for absolute fidelity with servility, a criticism (however virulent) with unforgivable treason[14]. 14] Yet it would be a matter of forming a kind of think tank dealing with strategy and doctrine. No corporatism, but a Red Team with a national and independent dimension, capable of leading a debate on the major issues of defence and national security. Here again, the idea is not to create polemics, but to use doubt to ensure that the choices affecting the future of the Armed Forces are not just the result of a cost study. Today, despite their relevance, the rare individual interventions that are relayed by the national press are too much like maverick snipers to really stimulate a wide-ranging debate. Why not, for example, call on our general officers who are leaving the institution? The business world has understood the benefits to be derived from individuals who are at the height of their intellectual power, their competence and their understanding of systems.

We have tried to show that doubt is the fundamental virtue of the military. Paradoxically, what might appear to be an unusual weakness for a warrior without hesitation is a strength of infinite power. An intellectual process, but above all a state of mind, doubt is never acquired. Invariably, every age is tempted to believe that it has solved a mystery as old as humanity itself: the uncertainty of war. Doubt keeps us at a distance from this vanity that comes at a high price. When we examine our own intelligence without concession, we risk being confronted with its contradictions, doubt is not self-evident and requires courage. It is a personal journey based on culture, curiosity, humour and meeting the Other. Armies will benefit substantially from its institutionalization.

In a broader perspective, the certainty of the sustainability of the social model is today shaken in France. Destabilized, the Nation would be well advised to use doubt. This would probably help to substitute reactivity for disarray. In short, it would be a guarantee of resilience.

1] For those readers who would doubt it, I would remind you that statistically, the success rate of the public opinion is 91% in the game Who Wants to Win Millions.

2] General Desportes, "Deciding inUncertainty", Economica, 2007.

[3 ] Lessons learned from operational experience. It is an unavoidable procedure within the American armies to learn from one's successes as well as from one's mistakes and thus increase one's skills.

4] FELIN: Infantryman with Integrated Equipment and Links; SIR: Regimental Information System. The concept is that speed of understanding and decision making provides a decisive advantage over a de facto enemy unable to take the initiative and whose reactions are consistently lagging behind.

5] "TheThread of the Sword", Omnibus, 1999.

6] "TheStrange Defeat", Gallimard, 1990.

7] The commander of our battalion of St. Cyril youths, having a good sense of the formula, stated that "in the thalweg of ease, the EOA (active cadet officer) always takes the slope at the highest percentage".

8] Initial training schools for army officers.

9 ] Thomas Hobbes, "TheLeviathan", Gallimard, 2000.

10] It is said of an enemy that he is fixed when he has been prevented from maneuvering. He can no longer take the initiative, advance or retreat. This is generally the stage that precedes its destruction.

11] The singer and comedian, son of Françoise Dolto and unforgettable interpreter of "Rosalie", not the terrorist!

12] International Security Assistance Force. It is the coalition of nearly 50 countries that is currently intervening in Afghanistan.

13] This is the exact term officially used to describe the concept.

14] One can think, for example, of General Desportes' criticism of the relevance of the counter-insurgency doctrine in Afghanistan in July 2010. A potentially very rich doctrinal debate was quickly overshadowed by the more conventional debate on the duty of reserve.