In the current societal context where the search for saturation of the internal security forces is a declared will of most subversive movements, a reinforcement of the departmental structures of the OTIAD chain could prove useful while remaining in line with the propensity for resilience desired by the command. The Finistère Defence Command, a particular structure, could in this context prove interesting and even inspiring.

The current security context on national territory and the declared desire to saturate the ISPs with various subversive and/or terrorist movements imply, in my opinion, a search for a strengthening of the OTIAD chain.

If, from the national to the regional level, the latter displays a solid and coherent organisation, the departmental level could perhaps see some improvements.

The need to develop a command capacity of at least one brigade, as announced during the OTIAD training courses, as well as a solid network of national territory for the reorganisation of the OTIAD chain.The need to develop a command capacity of at least one brigade as announced during the OTIAD courses, as well as a solid network of national territory to meet the needs of the Land Protection Posture would then result in the establishment of a departmental defence command by reinforcing the staff structures already existing at the level of the departmental military delegations.

The CDF or Finistère Defence Command could set a precedent in this respect.

The CDF, késako?

The CDF is an entity created in 1970 to ensure the land protection of the Strategic Oceanic Force or FOST, in the Brest roadstead and the Finistère department.

It is made up of a hard core of active officers from the Army and Navy at threat level 1.

From level 2 onwards, this core is supplemented by an Operations Centre (OC) armed with some twenty reservists and comprising all the cells of a staff.

The CDF has a double subordination: the Commander-in-Chief Atlantic or CECLANT and the OGZDS-Ouest de Rennes. It therefore has an operational vocation but is also a fully-fledged pawn in the OTIAD chain, whose range of missions it must be able to carry out.

As a specific entity, the SFAO OC has developed a willingness to act as early as level 1 of the threat so as not to wait for it to move to level 2 and only discover everything at that point. The OC's reservists, with the authorisation of their command, have thus set up standing committees :

• a "site defence" committee whose members regularly visit the installations to be protected to check the state of the protection from the outside (fences, surroundings, possible firing posts, etc.). They keep a file for each site and submit their hypothetical recommendations to the SFAO, which is then passed on to the installations concerned. The site manager then has access to an outside opinion, which is always of interest. The action of this committee complements the Special Protection Plan and only concerns external protection. This is why contacts are also maintained with the police brigades on which the installations depend in order to ensure that patrols are carried out.

• An "information" committee that is constantly informed of the state of the departmental road network, particularly the bypasses and the toll roads, is in charge of the protection of the installations.The committee is kept informed of the state of the departmental road network, particularly the bypasses and bypass roads, and of anything that might hinder the freedom of movement of land forces in the Finistère department. This collection of information is based on the various sources available (press, internet) as well as on the network of reservists and former military personnel.

• An "outreach" committee is at the disposal of the DMD, which carries out recruitment actions whenever it has the opportunity to do so. It also assists in raising awareness in the departmental civilian community about the usefulness of the armed forces and nuclear deterrence.

• An "animation-training" committee which keeps a permanent watch on the various threats on national territory in order to be able to feed CO/CDF exercises with realistic incidents. It also plans training scenarios corresponding to the requirements defined in IAP 3.32.

The protection missions of the FOST activities require a permanent search for intelligence, carried out by the OSAS (Specialised Deputy Senior Officer), a Gendarmerie officer, who coordinates the actions of the ISF and other services in this field and reports to the SFAO. The SFAO's Standing Committee on Information is involved to a lesser extent and for its own areas. It can receive feedback from the SFAO if the content of the information provided by the OSAS justifies it.

At higher threat levels

The CO/CDF, which is activated in case of a change of the threat to level 2, remains under the joint authorities of the EMZD and CECLANT. It has the TACON of all land forces engaged in the department. That is why he trains regularly at a rate of one session of 3 to 5 days per quarter to maintain his skills.

As part of the global approach and because of the pre-eminence of the internal security forces in the TN, a liaison detachment of the Gendarmerie is incorporated there with a senior officer to the CO chiefs and a junior officer to the G2 and G3 cells.

The "civil defence" aspect of OTIAD missions is implemented in the CO by personnel seconded from the Finistère Prefecture, depending on availability, in order to ensure liaison between the CDF and the inter-ministerial authorities.

Even if the CDF's action around FOST sites falls under government control of deterrence and does not require prior requisition, its area of action is open ground and therefore requires coordination with the prefecture.

The CDF is present from level 1 of the threat, and already meets all the needs expressed by the OTIAD chain in terms of operational, informational and collaborative plans by putting into practice the concept of a global approach. For this reason, the Deputy SFAO is also DMD of Finistère and maintains links with the prefectural services.

The generalisation of such a structure, by strengthening what already exists at the departmental level, would meet the needs expressed by the High Command in terms of territorial coverage and would strengthen the resilience of the armed forces in the event of a serious crisis on national territory.