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From the autonomous mobile group of the Indochina War to today's Joint Battle Group

Cahiers de la pensée mili-Terre n° 47
Operational commitment

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Are the GTIAs contemporary versions of the autonomous Mobile Groups (GM) of the Indochina War? For the authors of this article, the answer to this question is yes. Indeed, the GTIA, tactical manoeuvre pawns with a modular structure, draw their strength from the proven commitment and flexibility of the MGs, while benefiting from a well-established doctrine of use and being enhanced by the modernity of their equipment. These assets are highlighted by the "GTIA SCORPION" project.

Derived from the Army's "Au contact" model (adT), the School of Inter-Service Combat [1] was created in 2016. This creation highlights the need to teach the inter-service combination right from the application school in order to guarantee the best combat preparation of the joint battle groups (JTGs). This was not obvious in 1949, at the time of the first autonomous mobile group[2] (GM) in Indochina.

The GM in Indochina was the French adaptation of the American Regimental Combat Team (RCT) of 1943, a joint unit outside the rigid framework of the infantry division, capable of carrying out autonomous missions with limited tactical objectives. The GTIA defines itself as the Army's contemporary basic tactical employment module.

However, are the GTIA the contemporary versions of the autonomous mobile groups of the Indochina War?

We will see that the GTIA, like the autonomous GM, is both a military and political tool whose value comes from the combination of joint effects and the flexibility of its use, inherited from the GMs and enhanced by the modernity of its equipment.

A military tool and a political object

  • Modular force generation

The first joint tactical unit engaged in Indochina was the North African Mobile Group (NAMG), which landed in Haiphong on August 25, 1949 [3]. 3] This group responded to a concept already experimented by the regiments of the 1st French Army of the GMNA.ral de Lattre de Tassigny, during the Liberation and German campaigns, adapted after the war with the setting up of infantry groups within divisions [4]. 4] The battalion then became the tactical maneuver pawn.

The GMNA was composed of three North African infantry battalions (the II/6th RTM, II/1st RTA andIV/7th RTA ) reinforcedby a section of natives. Its artillery is articulated in two 75 mm batteries on trucks plus a muleteer. Only a 40 mm section on trucks is kept from its anti-aircraft battery (the rest is attached to the DCA [5] on Hanoi). The GMNA also includes an engineer marching company (19th CMG), for infantry combat support and route re-establishment. For organic support, the group has a repair company, divided from the outset between the 3rd echelon establishments. It also has a supply and stewardship company and a medical company, only half of which remains attached to it. The essential support element of the GMNA is its signals company, in liaison with its units and the upper echelon.

Consequently, the GMNA engaged in Indochina is a pre-existing inter-service manoeuvre pawn, readapted to the theatre's contingencies. After ten months of presence, its head of corps will underline the deficiency of its support (signals, 105 mm guns, armoured platoon) in relation to its operational needs, which will contribute to the evolution of the model [6].

At the battalion level, the ATIG is made up from the catalogue of generic joint forces modules[7], depending on the duration, the nature of the area and the desired end state. Respecting a quaternary structure, it includes up to six "contact" operational function units (landed, airborne or air-to-air combat), reinforced by "support" function units from the same original brigade [8]. 8] Its structure includes a command and logistics unit with supply, maintenance and medical capabilities, at least two units from the same regiment of the contact function, and at least two units from the same regiment of the contact function. to give it its specificity and cohesion, units from other components of the "contact" function, a GCC [9], a DLOC [10] and a ground-to-ground artillery or ground-to-air defense battery.

The AIMG is thus by essence a modular and conceptualized tactical maneuver counter. Its set-up is singular but common principles ensure its consistency. The first of them are the uniqueness and permanence of command. The IATF then has autonomy in terms of support and sustainment. Finally, inter-service action at the subordinate level (SGTIA[11]) and the quaternary structure are also conceptualized to provide a framework for the formation of any IATF.

The force generation of the two groupings studied therefore responds to the commitment of a unit with an adaptable structure, seeking the application of inter-service effects. The structures and principles governing the concepts of GM and AIMTG are broadly similar, even if "quaternisation" is not sought for the constitution of the GM. Likewise, its logistics and communication capabilities are lacking at the outset. Are these differences and similarities the result of a specificity of commitment or the particularities of different contexts?

  • A high-visibility response

The GM and its organic assets are rapidly proving to be the most tactically effective means of conducting destruction operations. Between October 1949 and July 1950, clean-up operations in the Tonkin Delta gave the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Group an exceptional prestige. Nearly 2,000 rebels were killed and 2,500 taken prisoner, against 250 men of the group put out of action [12]. In order to cope with the rise of Viet Minh (VM) forces and in view of the success of these actions, a 1950 instruction [13] ordered the formation of six GMs from North African regiments and the Foreign Legion. This creation, which was necessary at the operational level, was operationally risky because it imposed the withdrawal of battalions from the territorial security system, leaving the rear to the reserve troops and self-defense militias.

Following the recommendations of the GMNA corps commander, these GMs are then composed of a hard core of three infantry battalions, to which a tank platoon and a 105 mm artillery battery are added [14][15]. Moreover, the nomadization of the GMs guaranteed them safety and freedom of action [16] at the tactical level, facing an enemy that now engaged coordinated battalions and heavy mortars.

While the GM has tactical and operational effects, it offers a limited response to strategic and political requirements. Indeed, the use of indigenous troops[17] ensures that it is supported by the local population. It also embodies a strategic leap forward in the face of the expansionism of the Sino-Soviet bloc. But this has no impact on public opinion in Metropolitan France, which is not interested in it apart from its communist detractors. Moreover, it must be noted that "[...] the various governments in charge of the Indochinese question (mainly SFIO and MRP [18]) are incapable of pursuing a coherent policy...".the definition of specific war aims and the elaboration of a global strategy [...]"[19]. 19] This political inertia is a constraint for the action of the GM, which also faces internal resistance within the expeditionary force. The zone commanders fear losing certain prerogatives and seeing the guarantees of their pacification operations wiped out [20]. 20] Absorbed by their responsibilities, they did not have an operational staff to effectively command the battalions placed under their command from time to time. The GM is therefore necessary to conduct offensive operations, but represents a double risk for the territorial command, which must nevertheless support them.

At the same time, the AITG has a strong impact on all levels of command. Its involvement is a response to a political will to launch an offensive operation to neutralise an enemy. Air campaigns do not destroy an adversary on the ground, at best compartmentalising or weakening it. Special forces action does not allow for this either, and above all does not have the same footprint, responding to a covered and indirect engagement (training, sabotage...). The political visibility of an operation depends on the GTIA and the deployment of its sub-groups on the ground.

On the tactical and operational levels, the joint and joint effects of the AITG combine to concentrate the efforts of its various organic components. Its engineer, artillery, armoured or infantry units act jointly on the same space and against the same enemy. The CGC can thus open a route autonomously, but also detach a platoon to an infantry company engaged in combat in an urban area, and then arrange the defensive positions of the artillery battery. Such an engagement of combined forces on the ground produces multiplied visible effects. The success of Operation Serval in 2013 illustrates this perfectly.

Finally, the GTIA is driven by a real political will to support the development of land forces. The new model of the Army "In Contact", validated in 2015 by the political leader, is based on two divisions, each comprising three BIAs[21], from which the GTIAs are derived. It thus reaffirms this emphasis on the interarmy at the organic level. Historically, this is an updating of the inter-service divisions, such as the 7th Rapid Mechanical Division of 1954, which had adapted the concept for the Algerian theatre to include inter-service regiments[22]. 22] This strategic choice to generalize the inter-service division is the best response to a political logic of mutualization and efficiency of means.

Both the GM and the GTIA therefore respond to modular structures, combining joint effects and joint support, in compliance with common principles that ensure their coherent use. Nevertheless, the persistence of a ternary structure penalises the capabilities of the GM. Moreover, the GM is more responsive to a cyclical logic that evolves its model during the course of an operation, while the AIMWG is conceptualized prior to engagement as a modular unit. Finally, their deployment also responds in the same way to a political will to conduct ground operations with high operational visibility, following a logic of efficiency and fair sufficiency of means. Nowadays, however, the political class is putting more effort into this, due to the different nature of the commitments.

It is now a matter of looking at the characteristics of the use of these two tools in order to define the strengths and limitations of their respective commitments.

Place-based employment

  • The coordination of the joint manoeuvre

The primary quality of the GM lies in the presence "[...] of a permanent chief, with a large staff, whose officers know each other and whose formations have developed a real cohesion" [23]. 23] The GM thus combines the effects of joint and even joint effects under the same command. This increases the speed of execution. Its power then comes from its 105 mm battery and its capacity in transmissions, which ensures to obtain the support of the air force. A tank platoon, which is assigned for certain operations, is an additional asset. In addition, it is also equipped with equipment adapted to the tropical environment: crab reconnaissance vehicles enable it to take advantage in rice fields, while amphibious alligator vehicles are used in flooded terrain.

However, there are still limits to this "interarmisation": the fixing of its (non-handheld) means of transmission in the superstructure of its vehicles and its dependence on support from the territorial services restrict the mobility of its subordinate units. Moreover, because of the doctrine for the use of armoured units in the Indochinese era and the nature of the local environment, the sub-function "on-board combat" is, for GMs, only envisaged as a support element for landed combat. Finally, logistics is more oriented towards overall support not dedicated to GMs, which lack medical, maintenance and transport units in the field.

The ERTF manoeuvre is based on a joint weapons combination that makes it possible to conduct tactical operations as a whole by combining fire with movement. "This combination [...] also results in the formation of subordinate joint structures: Joint Battle Group (JBG) or Joint Detachment (JDD)" [24]. Integrated into the manoeuvre down to the lowest echelon, the lights are coordinated by a DLOC which ensures the implementation of the third dimension lights. A TACP team [25] coordinates air-to-ground support for the IATF. An EOC[26], at the SGTIA level, conducts the manoeuvre of the artillery observers, who implement the ground-to-ground fires. Up to the SGTIA level, fire coordination is therefore carried out and implemented with the appropriate organic means. Engineer support is similar.

Moreover, the coordination of the IATF's joint manoeuvre is further improved by info-enhancement. With this technology, the sharing of information and the coordination of both movement and fire are facilitated towards all recipient command levels. This results in a better sharing of the tactical reference situation, but also accelerates the decision-making loop. However, this requires more intellectual discipline and control of weapon systems in order to preserve subsidiarity and avoid information saturation.

A successful form of inter-service manoeuvre, conceptualized within the modern IATF, is to take it down to the lowest echelon. Moreover, info-enhancement increases its effects tenfold, while the GM suffers from many limitations. However, these two models offer their commanders a common asset.

  • Flexibility of use at the heart of the engagement

If the superiority of the French artillery and the supremacy of the French air force in Indochina were indisputable, the Viet Minh enemy bypassed them by operations conducted at night and in covered terrain. It was therefore a question of attacking it on its own ground, if possible by surprise. The success of the GM was then based on intelligence and its rapid exploitation. For this, the support of the B2s[27] of the territorial commands is essential. Once the enemy has been located, the GM has an excellent capacity to adapt to combat in deltas as well as in residential areas, day and night. Its artillery can crush Viet Minh defensive positions and its infantry can deal one by one with islands of resistance thanks to well-equipped assault groups (explosive charges, flame throwers), supported by the air force in case of fortifications. Moreover, it is transportable by all means (air, naval, road, rail).

On the other hand, this flexibility of use does not include actions in depth, and the GM is vulnerable in defensive action. Indeed, the GM's operations remain localised, as no long-term support is possible without organic logistics. Moreover, the wear and tear of its infantry on these hostile terrains makes it necessary to limit operations. Then, the ternary structure forces to devote a company to the protection of the CP, which must remain on the roads because of the transmissions fixed on its vehicles. Finally, the GM's complete motorization and its dependence on communication axes constitute its main vulnerability. In 1954, this led to the loss of the GM 100, with 3,000 men and 250 vehicles. During its withdrawal from Ankhe to the RC19, its convoys were successively ambushed at company and battalion level. In spite of joint actions and joint support from the air and naval group, the companies lost 60% of their manpower and 85% of their equipment.

28] On theother hand, the GTIA has total flexibility of use, capable of conducting deep or localised actions, offensive, defensive or securing, in any environment (desert in Mali, temperate in Europe, tropical in the CAR...), with transmissions enhanced by the digitisation of the battle space. Moreover, it has general autonomy in terms of both logistics and manoeuvres due to its organic quaternisation and its support integration. Adapted to both urban and open terrain, it develops its specific know-how in training centres up to SGTIA level (CENZUB and CENTAC [29]). Finally, regiments from the "embedded combat" and "air combat" operational sub-functions can arm the core of an AIG, which further increases its flexibility.

On the other hand, while it is more flexible than the GM, it remains dependent on the technology on which it is based. Indeed, the new "On Contact" model is based on the Scorpion program [30]. 30] It creates a two-tier army in terms of SICS[31], because the support and logistics units are not integrated into the SICS[32]; only an interface connects them from their 4th Generation posts. Thus, the generation and then the optimal use of a GTIA are penalized. Moreover, this advanced info-enhancement makes the modern ATIG vulnerable to a cyber or computer attack, which could paralyze it by prohibiting the use of its C2 capabilities [33].

Both the GM and the AIMTF are levels of coordination for joint maneuvering. Conceptual and technological advances have made the AIMTF's capabilities in this area particularly effective. In terms of flexibility of use, the AIMTF therefore appears to be a successful model, unlike the GM, which remained trapped by a concept of use limited to the contingencies of the Indochinese theatre.

Ultimately, do not these two modular and flexible inter-service units, each with its limitations, respond to the progressive evolution of the same model?

Modernity at the heart of the model

  • Lessons from the Indochina War

From Indochina, several essential lessons can be drawn from the key role of the GM as early as 1949. While the model may seem perfectible in view of the demands of the terrain and the constant adaptation of the enemy, the GM has nevertheless undergone relevant changes, both in its structure and in its use. "The actions carried out by the GM are characterised[34] (thus) by flexibility [...], power [...], speed"[35]. 35] On the other hand, its weaknesses have been identified and the IATF is addressing them.

First of all, one of the limitations of the GM was that it was "committed to only one general direction" [36]. 36] Its armoured component, which remained limited, highlighted the inappropriate use of on-board combat means. In this case, the tanks were only intended to be used as mobile artillery, without bringing neither a true freedom of action nor an additional freedom of movement. Similarly, its artillery fixed on the tracks during deep missions, remained out of range to support units engaged in the jungle. Nowadays, the use of tanks as the main component of the armoured GTIA and the technological evolution of the CAESAR-generation guns [37] compensate for these original deficiencies.

At the same time, another limitation is the lack of responsiveness of battalions engaged in landed combat, due to the habit of more conventional combat. Thus, "Leaders of all echelons often still have motorized reflexes, accustomed to maneuvering with motorized units. [...] They are inclined to forget that our enemy is completely independent of the engine" [38]. On the other hand, the MCF[39] has increased training (CENTAC, CENZUB) in constituted units, with the aim of delivering a common training, adapted to the future theatre of employment of the GTIA. This period was also characterized by an acquaintance with the environment thanks to the interventions of the EMSOME[40], by reconnaissance of the future theatre and by the use of the RETEX[41] drawn up by the CDEC[42].

[42] In addition, there is a lack of portable stations to manoeuvre ashore. On the other hand, if the means were weak, there was a real desire to provide the GMs with a quantity and quality superior to that of the territorial regiments. The NEB,[43] which appeared in the 1990s, has since totally revolutionized modern combat by using technological means[44] that multiply the capabilities of the GTIA in operations.

In comparison with the use of Indochinese GMs, doctrinal changes have forged modern AIMTFs. The quaternary structure[45] inherent to the AITG ensures the protection of the CP, the conservation of a reserve, and thus the preservation of the leader's freedom of action. Similarly, the integration of support and backing is now doctrinal[46].

Moreover, absent in Indochina, the air-combat now finds its full place in the current GTIA with its 3D combat capability, combined with artillery fire support. It thus frees the modern GTIA from any dependence on communication axes, which was one of the GM's main vulnerabilities.

Thus, the GTIA is applying some of its capabilities from the experience gained from the GM's engagement in Indochina, enhanced today by technological and conceptual advances. Based on these assets, prospective studies in the Army have enabled the development of an ambitious new joint forces system.

  • Scorpion and the operational effectiveness of the GTIA

Contrary to the Indochinese GM, Scorpion[47] is above all a global approach which intends to push back the limits of the GM mentioned above, in order to ensure the interconnection and integration of new equipment. This latest evolution of the IATF, currently under development, emphasises interoperability by adapting to all types of environments and operational commitments.and by interoperable tactical simulators on which training and preparation for operational missions is generalised through the OPS[48] and the FECS[49].

This project highlights C2 and info-enhancement [50]. 50] It enables the IATF to concentrate its efforts by fully integrating it into a common digitised environment[51], by limiting the phases of violent contact over time and the51], by limiting the phases of violent contact in time and space thanks to the integration of all the information provided by the various vectors deployed (UAVs, aircraft, robotics, human sensors) within the air-land bubble.

As a result, Scorpion increases the power and reactivity of the UAV by providing superior aggression and maneuverability, increased protection and autonomy, and greater modularity.silience, and ensures tactical responsiveness and versatility through an efficient combination of landed and airborne combat with FELIN [52], as opposed to the GM.

In addition, Scorpion facilitates the control of the use of force through the timing of the maneuver and increased freedom of action for the leader, thanks to the lightening of logistics flows (800 km and three days of autonomous combat). The GTIA-S[53] draws this lesson in particular from Indochina.

But the major evolution of the GTIA-S (with its modular quaternary structure with a predominantly infantry, armoured, air, even engineer or artillery focus) lies in the fundamental principles of manoeuvre. The modes of action will be adapted taking into account the new weapons systems equipping the GTIA-S [54]. Thus, the indirect approach of the centres of gravity is favoured, abandoning the sequential attack of the different echelons of the enemy and any line of coordination between ground units. This notion leads to collaborative info-enhanced combat (in coordination with 3rd dimensional players), while seeking the most favorable balance of power, thanks to real capability improvements such as active protection, TAVD [55] and substantial gains in autonomy.

However, all these prospects can only be validated in a fireproof manner. "The Army's objective is then to be able to project the first GTIA-S in 2021 and the first BIA-S [56] in 2023" [57]. These future commitments should validate the operational effectiveness of this new generation GTIA.

Ultimately, it is legitimate to think that the GTIA, as tactical manoeuvre modules, have their origins in the proven commitment of autonomous GMs in Indochina while benefiting from a successful doctrine of use.

In this sense, on the basis of 65 years of RETEX since the engagement of the first GMs in Indochina, the operational value of the GTIA as a multi-purpose combat unit and tactical level of design and conduct of joint operations, has continued to evolve. It should be further enhanced by the implementation of the GTIA-S, the result of interoperability combined with the latest technologies. However, as Sun Tzu wrote: "He who knows the other and knows himself, in a hundred battles will not be defeated"[58]. 58] Thus, the weaknesses inherent in the technological whole must not endanger this new model.

Beyond the projection in external operations of the IATFs, it seems necessary today to ask the question of the appropriateness of their engagement on national territory within Operation SENTINELLE[59]. 59] Their enhanced means of communication, coordination and motorisation would make it possible to make up for the shortcomings reported in current deployments. However, there would be a risk of political mistrust of a change in the legal framework for military action on national territory, which is necessary for the optimal use of their capabilities, as the current debate on the creation of a future national guard shows.

Squadron Leader ABILLARD chooses the weapon of the train on leaving the Special Military Academy. Upon completion of his specialty training in maritime transhipment, he serves as a port platoon leader in the 519th RT and is deployed in Kosovo, Côte d'Ivoire and Chad. Commanding the port unit of the 519th GTM, whose traditions are inherited from Legion units in Indochina, he is projected to Senegal. He then served at EALAT in Le Luc as OSC-P Brigade Chief, before joining EMS2 in 2015. He joined the War School on 1 September 2016.

Squadron Leader BURETTE chooses the weapon of the train when he leaves the Special Military School. Upon completion of his specialty training in the field of movement, he served as a road traffic platoon leader at the 601st RCR, then commanded a supply unit at the 515th RT. From 2006 to 2013, he was deployed five times to Afghanistan, Kosovo and Lebanon as part of the AIMTG, from which he gained operational experience. He then served in OTIAD-N as head of the intelligence office, before joining EMS2 in 2015. He joined the School of War on 1 September 2016.

1] Training School within the "Joint Training and Training Command" pillar, one of the eight pillars of the "In Touch" model.

2] In this case, the North African Mobile Group (NAMG).

3 ] SHD, Lieutenant-Colonel d'Esneval, JMNG Corps Commander, "The JMNG in Tonkin", N° SHD/GR/10H808, July 1950.

4] Around an infantry regiment are thus grouped support formations (artillery group, tank battalion) and support (commissariat company, engineers, etc.).

5] Defence against aircraft.

6] SHD, Lieutenant-Colonel d'Esneval, head of the GMNA corps, op. cit.

7 ] CICDE, PIA 5.4.1, 2014.

8] CDEF, Generic Joint Battle Group Employment Doctrine (EMP.24.201 ), 2012.

9] Engineer Combat Company.

10 ] Observation and Coordination Liaison Detachment.

11 ] Joint Battle Group Sub-Group.

12] See Annex 1.

13 ] SHD, North VN FT and Tonkin ZOT Command, "GM Instruction", No. SHD/GR/10H808, 25 November 1950.

14] SHD, Northern FT Command VN, "Mobile Groups", No. SHD/GR/10H2435, 14 March 1952.

15] See Annex 2.

16 ] SHD, Commander-in-Chief of the Land, Naval and Air Forces in Indochina, "Study on the combat procedures of the GM", N°SHD/GR/10H986, 14 October 1953.

17] SHD, Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces in Indochina, "GM100 Inspection CR", N°SHD/GR/10H488, December 1953.

18] French Section of Workers' International and Mouvement républicain populaire.

[19] Ivan Cadeau, "Les enseignements de la guerre d'Indochine, report by General Ely"Volume 1, April 2011.

20] These are based on three phases: preparation (intelligence gathering, political action), operation (destruction of enemy units, occupation of the terrain) and establishment (construction of posts, restoration of routes, recruitment of replacements).

21] Joint Brigade.

22] Lieutenant-Colonel Franc.Inter-arms combat since 1935, 2015.

23] Ivan Cadeau, "Laguerre d'Indochine - De l'Indochine française aux adieux à Saigon 1940-1956", Tallandier, 2015.

24] CDEF, op. cit.

[25] Tactical Air Party.

26] Observation and coordination element.

27] Intelligence office.

[28 ] Jean-François Mourages, "Latest fighting. Five days in hell, or the end of the GM100 in Indochina..."», 1954 .

29] Urban area training centre and combat training centre.

30] Synergy of contact reinforced by versatility and info-value.

31 ] Operational information and communication system.

32 ] Scorpion combat information system.

[33] Command and Control.

34] These characteristics are similar to those of the Scorpion IWG presented today.

35 ] SHD, Commander in Chief of Land, Naval and Air Forces in Indochina, "Study on the combat procedures of the GM", N°SHD/GR/10H986, October 14, 1953.

36] SHD, Commander in Chief of the Land, Naval and Air Forces in Indochina, op. cit.

37] Gun equipped with an artillery system.

38 ] SHD, Commander-in-Chief of the Land, Naval and Air Forces in Indochina, "Lessons from the last fighting", N°SHD/GR/10H2435, 15 January 1954.

39] Final conditioning: phase of 4 to 6 months programmed before projection by the Land Forces Command (LFC).

40 ] Specialized staff for overseas and foreign countries.

41] Feedback.

42] Centre for Doctrine and Command Teaching.

43 ] Battlespace digitization.

44 ] Blue force tracking and satellite links.

45 ] CDEF, FT02 - General Tactics, July 2008, p.53.

46 ] CDEF, op. cit.

47] SIRPA Terre, Plaquette Scorpion, en attendant la Doctrine d'emploi du GTIA SCORPION du CDEF à paraître en 2017.

48] Simulation for operational preparation.

49] Scorpion Combat Expertise Force. The FECS will develop the Scorpion doctrine based on the RETEX.

50] Using SICS as an interoperability tool.

51] Single information system from the vehicle to the GTIA CP (SICS), simple and intuitive, allowing to share a common tactical situation and to ensure fluid exchanges in reflex time, in particular thanks to the performances of CONTACT (high range and without communication interruption).

52] Infantryman with Integrated Equipment and Links.

53] We are talking here about the SCORPION GTIA (GTIA-S) whereas we should talk about a GTIA equipped with technological equipment, developed within the framework of the SCORPION program.

54] Presupposed abandonment of the categorization of melee weapon and support weapon: the 5 combat functions of the S-TIAG can potentially all achieve the destruction of a centre of gravity with the support of the 4 others.

55] Firing beyond direct sight.

56] SCORPION Joint Brigade.

57 ] General Bosser, CEMAT, La lettre du chef d' état-major de l'Armée de Terre, N°31, December 2015.

58] Sun Tzu, "The art of war", Fifth century BC.

59] Decided by the President of the Republic, Operation SENTINELLE strengthens the VIGIPIRATE system by implementing the operational contract of the Army "TN 10,000" since 12 January 2015.


  • LCL d'Esneval, GMNA Corps Chief, "The GMNA in Tonkin", N° SHD/GR/10H808, July 1950.
  • Jean-François Mourages, "Last fights. 5 days in hell, or the end of the GM100 in Indochina.»,
  • Ivan Cadeau, "Lesenseignements de la Guerre d'Indochine, Rapport du Général Ely", Tome 1, April 2011.
  • CDEF, Doctrine for the use of the Generic Inter-Arms Tactical Group (EMP.24.201 ), 2012.
  • Ivan Cadeau, "The Indochina War - From French Indochina to the Farewell to Saigon 1940-1956"Tallandier, 2015.
  • Lieutenant-Colonel Franc, "Lecombat inter armes depuis 1935, 2015".
  • Général d'armée Bosser, CEMAT, La lettre du chef d' état-major de l'armée de Terre, N°31, December 2015.
Title : From the autonomous mobile group of the Indochina War to today's Joint Battle Group
Author (s) : Chefs d’escadron Aymeric ABILLARD et Sébastien BURETTE