Marshal Hubert Lyautey occupies a respectable and impregnable place in history, which some have tried to challenge him to make him forget, but without success.Some have tried to challenge him to make him forget, but without success, agreeing with Louis Barthou, former president of the Council and academician, who wrote in his preface to "Paroles d'action" (1927): "Marshal Lyautey can confidently await the judgment of history".

Much is said about history on the occasion of the celebrations and commemorations, debates and publications that are being held to mark the centenary of the four years of the 1914-18 war, and Lyautey has his rightful place in them.

The Army is today facing a hardening of its commitments with a radicalization of armed violence led by an irregular enemy. For the author, it is the moral forces of its soldiers that count to win or resist over time. Cultivating moral strength therefore means developing an army's ability to give confidence to its troops and to cope with adversity.

Near, make believe that you are far away, and far, that you are near; let him believe that you are weak where you are strong, and strong where you are weak". Sun Tsu reminds us that surprise has long been an objective of military leaders, seeking to deceive the enemy about their strength, position, or intent. In the same way, we have often sought to preserve security by preventing the enemy from acquiring intelligence about our dispositions and intentions.

The conflict in Transnistria, also known as the "Dniester War", is one of the first crises in the post-Soviet space.

While this war is little known in Europe, insofar as it did not benefit from the same media coverage as the war in Yugoslavia, its consequences are not as well known as those of the former Yugoslavia.The Russian Federation has had a major impact, which is why we need to look at the causes of this crisis. At first glance, the Transnistrian conflict could have the appearance of an ethnic war, symptomatic of the emergence of new states, but its origin is much more complex.

Is it a paradoxical injunction to ask the Forces to innovate? If "only victory counts," why not use even old means if they bring victory again?! Everything must change so that nothing changes, Lampedusa said in The Cheetah. Hence the question: what would be the right use of innovation within the Ministry of the Armed Forces?

For my part, I see three areas of indispensable and permanent innovation:

• The mindset

• The weapon system

• Artificial intelligence

A simple study of the tools, machines and processes that human beings have created to satisfy their needs for some, a true science for others, technology contributes, along with the human and organizational aspects, to the efficiency of a modern army. Moreover, the "technological race" dates back to the dawn of humanity. The link between technology and the army is undoubtedly the result of man's desire to gain the upper hand over his adversary.

According to Confucius, power is not intended to oppress, but to advance materially and above all spiritually the peoples under its care. Professor Françoise Thibaut details the contents of President Xi Jinping's white papers on the governance of China, with the management of spaces and populations, the rediscovery of its maritime potential and the opening to liberal capitalism with a view to conquering the world.

Julie d'Andurain holds a doctorate in history from the University of Paris-Sorbonne and is a professor of contemporary history at the University of Lorraine (Metz).

A specialist in questions of conflict, particularly in colonial situations, Julie d'Andurain is interested in the warlike phenomena of the 19th and 20th centuries along several lines: a RETEX approach, which allows the tactical field to be approached, a classical historical approach in order to reconstruct professional paths, and a broader approach, such as "War Studies", which allows an opening to other human sciences.

If war appears to be an ever-changing phenomenon, is it nowadays considered to be becoming more complex than the world itself, or does it simply follow the natural cycle of history?

Squadron Leader JAY considers that despite the uncertainty and instability of our environment, the sustainability of the principles of warfare is not questioned and that the evolution must also find its declination in the training of military leaders. Inter-service, joint, inter-domain skills, understanding of the environment and adaptability appear as threads directors.

Western militaries agree that tomorrow's success will be based on deconcentration of manoeuvre, on a capability approach guided by expected effects, on Command and Control (C2) agility and not on available technologies. Squadron Leader Jay considers that the prospects for the evolution of the C2 matrix organisation challenge the traditional functioning of the chain of command and that the expected gains, in a purely technological approach, should not make us forget that warfare remains an eminently human activity and that this type of approach carries significant risks of force disruption.