Seeking to define "high-intensity conflict" cannot therefore be limited to a simple assessment of the degree of limitation or "totality" of the resources committed by the belligerents, nor can it be limited to the level of violence of the clashes.

On April 16, 2019, the annual seminar of the2035 Army Observatory was held on the theme: "What kind of army to fight tomorrow in high intensity? ». In his introductory remarks, the Chief of Staff of the French Army wondered about the very notion of "high intensity" (HI), even calling for a reflection on what this notion covers and the definition to be given to it.

Do we need to read Lyautey again? More than a hundred years after Taza was taken and after the "Lyautey method" has been served to us "in all sauces" for ten years, with the success that we know, as referred to in the "Lyautey method", in the "Lyautey method".the theories of the American counter-insurgency and the French doctrine of counter-rebellion, the time seems to have come to try to unravel, behind the screen of the thurifiers, the truth of the myth.

In recent years, SMPs have been the subject of international processes of legal legitimacy that incorporate a minimum of statutory protection for assets in this sector.

There are several dozen Russian SMPs (Časnaia Voennaia Kompania or ČVK), the best known of which are RSB-Group, Moran Security Group, Mar or Redyt-Antiterror. In addition to a wide range of actions and services, from training to demining, they also carry out training missions, as was seen in Sudan during the winter of 2017, or in the Central African Republic (CAR) from the spring of 2018.

Since the 1990s, a new form of paramilitary entrepreneurship has emerged with the proliferation of private security companies. This process of defence outsourcing, initiated by Great Britain and the United States, is now widely used by Moscow and Beijing.

The author explains why this is not the case in France, where developing such entities in order to have combat units is neither legitimate nor relevant, and contrary to both The author explains why this is not the case in France, where developing such entities in order to have combat units is neither legitimate nor relevant and contrary both to our tradition and to our convictions, even if he points out that timid progress is being made, in very specific cases, with the legislation on the use of "contradictors".

The soil of the peninsula is unusual to that usually trodden by imperial eagles and particularly favourable for ambush warfare.

He wrote to de Pradt, Archbishop of Mechelen: "...if this undertaking were to cost me 80,000 men, I would not attempt it. But it will not cost me 12,000. That's childish. The Spaniards don't know what a French army is. Believe me, it will be over soon. "

Saint-cyrien de la promotion Grande Armée (1981-1983), Doctor of History, Lieutenant-Colonel HOUSSET served ten years in the Train Corps before taking up the post of office manager, successively in the Minister's Office (SDBC), the Directorate of Heritage Memory and Archives (DMPA) and the Defence Historical Service (SHD). In 2006, he was assigned as Deputy to the General Delegate for Army Heritage (DELPAT) and then returned to the SHD to head the Defence Symbolism Division. Since 2015, he has served at the Command Doctrine and Education Centre (CDEC) as head of the research and history function within the PEP (pôle études et prospective), deputy to the commander of the PEP.

What would be part of a specifically French counter-rebellion culture is a complex whole based on a long history. Attempts at categorization, sometimes caricatural, make it possible to differentiate between several approaches¹⁰.