At a time when the French armies have long since committed only expeditionary land forces that are tailored to the needs of the enemy, most often asymmetricalIt is difficult to imagine what the command post system of a force at the division or corps level could be. The last experience of a large-scale land engagement dates back to the Gulf War in 1991, when the DAGUET Division Command Post (CP) was divided between two COs [1] (red and green).

Although well-established know-how existed in the not-so-distant past, the absence or even decline of open terrain training, the reduction in material and human resources has led to a decline in the number of personnel and equipment available for such operations.The absence or even decline of open terrain training, the reduction of material and human resources dedicated to headquarters and the material difficulties of accommodation and food on the training grounds have gradually eroded them despite their digitalization.

Now France, which intends to have the first European army, has become aware that a return to major conflicts against a "peer to peer" or asymmetric enemy, but able to obtain tactical superiority locally and punctually, is once again a possible hypothesis. Based on a study on the movements of General Guderian's CP during the Polish and French campaigns, this article aims to ask questions related to the mobility of our CPs in the current environment, with the latest available technologies, and to provide answers in a first approach.

While the "scorpionisation" of the Army is well underway, the CEMAT has just clarified[1] what a "high intensity" conflict is: "A sustained confrontation between aggressive manoeuvring masses contesting each other to the depths and in different environments all the fields of conflict (physical and immaterial) and whose objective is to defeat the power of the adversary".

Recent developments (technological, societal and geopolitical) have forced the world of defence, and the army in particular, to adapt to these changes. New modern equipment has been delivered, digitization is ubiquitous and the speed of information exchange has increased considerably. However, the fundamentals of the exercise of command remain, including the need for anticipation, the obligation to take decisions and the importance of control. The exercise of command remains and will remain first and foremost a human exercise.

La Malmaison fut la troisième et la plus formidable d’une série de trois batailles caractérisées par l’ampleur des moyens mis en oeuvre pour des objectifs limités.

Threats of surprise and circumvention require us to review our capability innovation processes.
afin to restore flexibility and agility to an army model that aims to be complete and the first in Europe.

The identity of the Paris Fire Brigade is linked to its operational vocation and its historical heritage. A singular military unit with daring values. This identity is expressed through ceremonial and is embodied in traditions.Thecall of the fire dead is the very expression of the DNA of the Paris firefighter and his motto: "Save or Perish". This ceremonial has several purposes: cult of remembrance, exaltation of the sense of duty, operational vigilance, and esprit de corps. Created in 1881, this (neo)tradition continues today. Far from being a vestige of the past, it evolves and adapts.

Russia's return to Africa is accompanied by a significant communication activity, whether it be that of African states that rely on Russian assistance or the stories of Western journalists who are fascinated by the connections between the current era and that of the Cold War. In any case, the Russians themselves are organising the staging of this return by developing an informational manoeuvre combining positive communication actions with actions of influence and disinformation, withoutMoreover, it is always possible to completely untangle what is a matter of institutional and diplomatic action or that of the avatars who represent private Russian interests in the CAR.
Nowhere else than in the CAR has the support provided for this return by communication been so visible and in this country in crisis, France has found itself in the front line in the face of a particularly virulent Russian information offensive. Directly targeted, France had to develop a reactive communication strategy aimed at restoring, locally and internationally, its tarnished and defamed image.
But was this Russian communication strategy and media hype effective and did it really serve Russia's interests in Africa? The purpose of this study is therefore to examine the communication strategy implemented by Russia in the CAR since October 2017 and its results.

"We have killed thousands and thousands of "enemies" in Afghanistan, and it's obvious that it hasn't no closer to our goals. We could kill a thousand more, and yet, we're still would be no closer in five years."¹.
That's how Major Jim Gant of the U.S. "Green Berets", analysis, October 2009, the strategy American in Afghanistan.

The culture of operational decision-making in the French Army is rooted in the very rich history of Western ideas and strategic thinking. It has undergone notable changes in recent decades, mainly linked to an acceleration of scientific progress and to a willingness, commendable in any case, on the part of military leaders and private and public officials to draw inspiration from good practices observed among them.

The need for interoperability, the need to take account of new forms of conflict and adversity, and the integration of new technologies, especially information technologies, have led the armed forcesor nearly three decades, Western armed forces have adopted a command organisation and operational reasoning methods that are broadly similar and very strongly inspired by American doctrine.

Organisations, tools, methods and processes, sometimes highly adapted to the business world, now seem to have taken precedence over the real determinants of decision-making in warfare. In fact, the timeless and universal notions of the fog of war, complexity, adversity, contingency, and the personality of the operational leader, are poorly suited to tools and methods that rely essentially on the acquisition of quantifiable and objective data to enable decision-making.

Operation Verbena" is a logistical support operation conducted by France for Zaire in the spring of 1977 in the form of an air bridge. It is a typical example of force projection carried out at very short notice and adapted to respond to a limited crisis. But it is also an atypical operation, since the air bridge between Morocco and Zaire concerned exclusively freight from the Cherifian Kingdom to Central Africa. This diplomatic use of transport aviation is relatively unknown. It must be understood as the exploitation of air potential and the assertion of military power in the service of clearly defined political goals, but whose realisation excludes a massive use of force.

Hannibal, Rome's adversary during the Second Punic War, was, along with Alexander, the greatest warlord of antiquity. What were the nature and limits of his military talent? We can try to give some answers after having recalled the main lines of his career.