Troop morale on operations is a key factor in the success of a mission. As such, its consideration deserves special attention from the commander, who must, like the other themes in the paragraphs of his order of operations, include it in his tactical reflection on the "friendly situation". The command is then confronted with the difficulty of influencing an element that is at once immaterial and intimate but also driven by numerous collective dynamics. So what role can the leader really play in ensuring the precarious moral balance of his unit in combat?

From the autumn of 1914, the operations of the Great War came to a standstill and the belligerents settled into trench warfare. The search for a breakthrough became the preoccupation of the staffs, who reacted differently to this situation. The most innovative solution came from the German side. It is in keeping with the imperial military tradition and contributes to the transmission of its values beyond its dissolution.

The management of the third dimension in coalition is an abstruse science a priori reserved for specialists. However, understanding its complexity makes it possible to better grasp the workings of air support and to see the other side of the coin.

The number of actors involved, the specific geographical features of the terrain, the limited size of the areas of responsibility and the persistence of civilian air traffic make Afghanistan a particularly interesting case study in this field. While bearing in mind that the organisation and action in this theatre could not be considered as standards, and although operations there are now over for the French forces, it seemed interesting for readers of the Cahiers to measure this complexity. This is the ambition of this article, originally published in Penser les ailes françaises, and reproduced here with the kind permission of the Centre d'études spatiales et aéronautiques.

Dealing with the action of war, character, prestige, doctrine, the relationship between the politician and the soldier, "Le fil de l'épée" (The Thread of the Sword) by General de Gaulle, who was a member of the French army, is a very interesting book.The thread of the sword" by General de Gaulle, which is based on numerous historical, literary and philosophical examples, could be one of the reference works for the training of officers and civilian decision-makers.

In these troubled times of drastic budget cuts, the US Army, like the rest of the Department of Defense, is led to wonder about the future to be given to its reserve. The question is sensitive from many points of view and reveals a situation that is difficult to compare with that of France.

The Army's reserve forces are composed of two entities with very distinct characteristics: the Federal Reserve, under the orders of the President of the United States, and the National Guard, under the orders of the state governors. In less than a quarter of a century, these two components have gone from an exclusive status of strategic reserve to a recognized experienced task force that wants to maintain this new status.

In order to fully understand this issue, it is necessary to provide a brief history of the United States Army, in which the reserves have played an essential role. An overview of the current situation will then precede a discussion of the challenge facing the Army through the use of its reserves in the coming years.

In Mali, French Army units are engaged in operations, some of them in stabilization and others in normalization. On the one hand, they seek to reduce and then contain violence in order to create the conditions for a return to peace, while on the other hand they ensure that the "establishment" and "consolidation of a sustainable political, legal and social system accepted by the protagonists of the conflict" [1]. 1] Complex, these missions impose particular modes of action that are not strictly speaking warlike, but are no less demanding on force, with political and military actors sometimes reluctant to organize elections or to promote a transition that challenges their power and resources. Each theatre imposes its own constraints and requires specific solutions. However, the example of the Licorne force in Côte d'Ivoire illustrates how land forces can contribute to a phase of normalisation to accompany the transition from a situation of war to one of peace.

1] Winning the battle. Conduire la paix, FT-01, CDEF, January 2007, pp. 12-13.

In light of the counter-insurgency operations of the past decade, the need for cultural knowledge is now a widely accepted idea among the military. The ability to assimilate the cultural factor is an increasingly decisive element and a real force multiplier, even if it has brought additional complexity to the battlefield space.

The concept of the duty to remember has become an unavoidable concept in recent years. While recognizing the importance of the past for any society, it is a question of not allowing oneself to be trapped in it at the risk of turning one's back on one's future. It is therefore necessary to forget the details of the past in order to retain only the useful lessons.

Time is relative and irreversible. This is why its management requires a real reflection on the part of the decision-maker in order to be controlled and thus be a factor of domination of the opponent.

For Western militaries engaged in counter-insurgency, the concept of force protection must be based on a process of comprehensive and dynamic action to ensure the necessary, but fragile, balance between the imperative of protection and the preservation of freedom of action.