"It was the tanks, the planes, the tactics of the Germans that surprised our leaders to the point of bringing them to where they are today" [1]. With these words, and emphasizing beforehand the German ground and air mechanical storm which plunged France into the throes of defeat, General de Gaulle seems to minimize the key factor which allowed this dazzling victory of the German armies in June 1940. Indeed, more than tanks, planes, artillery or motorised troops, it was the doctrines and training of German staff officers that got the better of our armies, and above all their spirit of initiative developed from the lowest echelons to the highest.

1] Appeal of 18 June 1940, General de Gaulle.

The computer weapon is characteristic of the hybridization of today's conflicts, in which the virtual and physical worlds are no longer hermetic. This weapon has the potential to cause a great deal of damage, including to the adversary. Practicing offensive computer warfare in the forces would greatly facilitate the spread of the cyber spirit and provide France with an additional attack capability, adapted to today's world.

"One fine morning men will discover with surprise that kind and peaceful objects have acquired offensive and murderous properties".

Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, "War beyond limits»

While all our attention has been focused since the suspension of national service on the durability and quality of the armed/national link, have we asked ourselves the question of the armed/army link, and therefore of the internal cohesion of our military institution? This is the question that the author of this article asks himself and provides a possible answer in an uncompromising statement.

We must move beyond the stage of indignation provoked by the Snowden affair and be realistic in accepting the fact that the digital world of the Internet must not escape state action because it is at the heart of both economic and security issues.

This analysis of Franco-German defence and security relations is taken from the IRSEM Newsletter, which devoted its December 2013 issue to a special feature entitled "Understanding Germany". It is reproduced here with the kind permission of Major General (2S) Maurice de Langlois, Research Director in charge of this dossier, and author of this article.

When Hubert Lyautey published his article on the "colonial role of the army" in January 1900 in the very famous Revue des deux mondes, he showed a real political sense because, basically, the date of publication corresponds to at a time when, in France, we are moving towards the creation of an autonomous colonial army after having hesitated during interminable parliamentary debates that have been going on for more than twenty years. Given that most of the conquests are now complete, the question arises as to what the scope of action of this new force will be in the future. The new force was refused the title of "colonial army" in favour of the less martial title of "colonial troops" when the law of July 1900 was passed. Published in the largest literary journal of the time, this text shows how much Lyautey - and behind him a large part of the colonials - wanted to participate in the political debate, how much the army of the Third Republic was not as dumb as it was said.

With her usual freedom of tone to which the readers of the Cahiers are now accustomed, Françoise Thibaut uncompromisingly shares with us her vision of the evolution of French military capabilities. Optimistic in spite of everything, she sees European defence as a possible response to the crises we are facing, particularly in Africa.

The transfer of support from the armies to other parts of the Ministry, including the APG, effectively established an intermediary that did not exist between the armies and the nation. This new role requires the administration to realise that it now holds the morale of the troops in its hands.

The term army-nation link leads to the particularization of the military world in relation to the civilian world, without including one in the other. This approach is likely to provoke a phenomenon of communitarianism and withdrawal into itself of an army perceived as a micro-society that would voluntarily place itself apart from the nation, to the detriment of the latter's interests. The author of this article gives some answers to these possible risks, even if he does so, as he himself says, in an iconoclastic manner..

While the White Paper announced the creation of a new cyber defence force as early as 2013, little information has been disseminated since then. This force could play a role well suited to the concept of the defence-security continuum, but its rise to prominence brings with it many challenges.