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In 2035, will the leader in combat be a leader of men or a connected manager?Published on 09/06/2020

Earth Thought Notebooks
le Chef de bataillon Sebastien PISTRE, le Capitaine François-Xavier LAMBIN-BERNOT et le Captain Bernhard KIRCHNER

Command support tools are multiplying in information and command systems. The challenge is to define the room for manoeuvre for tactical military leaders in an environment saturated with top-down and bottom-up information.

Will and CapacityPublished on 08/06/2020

Earth Thought Notebooks
le Lieutenant (Air) Yole DE ANGELIS

After reminding us of the major historical developments in ethical thinking in the face of warfare and the progress of military capabilities, and showing us how the notion of international humanitarian law emerged, the author makes us reflect on what has become of these notions today, in particular that of "war". In this respect, this study is highly topical.

Fighting in the City: The Israeli ExperiencePublished on 07/06/2020

military-Earth thinking notebook
le Colonel de la RUELLE

Probably linked to the long experience of fighting Palestinian terrorism, the Israeli army is often considered an example of efficiency in "urban" wars.

Colonel de la Ruelle considers that the reality is more nuanced. If the Israeli army prevails by the quality of its tactical training and the superiority of its equipment, it is not safe from half-failures linked, in particular, to very short-term planning.

History and doctrine of the use of French tactical nuclear weapons (1959 - 1996) 1/2Published on 06/06/2020

military-Earth thinking notebook
le Commandant BAILLE

"The Army's nuclear armament has not ceased to emancipate itself, from its birth to the end of its life. This emancipation was achieved with difficulty. But in the end, the Army's nuclear weapons had acquired its letters of nobility" [1].

This quotation from Major General de Chergé, first commander of the HADES force, invites us to remember the little-known history of nuclear armamentThis quotation from Major General de Chergé, first commander of the HADÈS force, invites us to remember the little-known history of nuclear armament, the tactical area that the French Army implemented between 1957 and 1996, when President Chirac decided to reorient our model of nuclear deterrence.

Why did France decide to acquire tactical nuclear weapons? In what strategic framework did it acquire them? What was the doctrine for the use of tactical nuclear weapons and how did it evolve?

1] Cf. Major General Robert de Chergé, "Specificity of the land-based nuclear component and the transitions between Histoire de l' artillerie nucléaire de Terre française 1959-1996, CERMA hors-série n°7, Paris, 2013 (henceforth CERMA), p. 13.

History and doctrine of the use of French tactical nuclear weapons (1959 - 1996) 2/2Published on 06/06/2020

military-Earth thinking notebook
le Commandant BAILLE

Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Service in the Army

. The Army began by deploying American tactical nuclear weapons acquired in 1957

Indeed, in the wake of the adoption of MC 48 in December 1954 by the Alliance (see above),France demanded that the United States allocate tactical nuclear warheads to increase its combat potential within the "shield". The United States thus delivered, under the Mutual Assistance Plan [1] of 1957, some 30 HONEST JOHN rockets with an adjustable power of up to 20 kT. With a range of 5 to 38 km, these first-generation rockets were fired from all-terrain ramp trucks.

Napoleon's conception of massPublished on 05/06/2020

Foresight Letter
Pôle Etudes et Prospective (CDEC/PEP)

This insert evokes the notion of mass through the prism of Napoleon I's practical conception of it. If it is appropriate to discern what retains a lasting meaning, this retrospective study helps to identify some of the challenges facing the architects of the land forces.

Homeostasis in armies: understanding resistance to changePublished on 03/06/2020

military-Earth thinking notebook
Par le Chef de bataillon Cyrille LACROIX

While technology is a paradigm that armies use to gain the upper hand, there is a certain conservatism in the military. Battalion Commander Cyrille Lacroix describes this resistance to change, or homeostasis, as a necessary property for organizational resilience. It can, however, have negative consequences for operations. This resistance must therefore be taken into account in order to succeed in any strategic evolution based on technological innovation.

"On thewhole, military organizations tend to be conservative in their approach to technological innovation.

Martin Van Creveld

Most of them won't be coming backPublished on 02/06/2020

military-Earth thinking notebook
le Chef de bataillon Sébastien PY

More than an account, "Most will not return" is the testimony of a young Italian artillery officer on the Russian front. Only 28 days are recounted in this book, but what days, those of the retreat of German-Italian forces since the Don, from December 19, 1942 to January 17, 1943, under constant threat of encirclement by Russian forces. It is therefore not so much a road book as the gaze of a witness plunged into this turmoil, a witness who was one of the survivors of this agony in which only 10% of Italians survived.

Combat and distancePublished on 31/05/2020

military-Earth thinking notebook
le Général HUBIN

To approach the subject of combat in terms of the distance factor is to look at it from the point of view of mobility, the range of weapons, the extent of links and devices, and logistical elongation. The question is therefore very broad. We will attempt to deal with it through a historical and technical approach that will enable us to discern how the combination of distance and precision will challenge the Napoleonic organisations that are still at the heart of our combat systems.

IFKHA MISTABRA or the doctrine of contradictionPublished on 29/05/2020

Free reflections on C2
Chef d’escadron Jean-Baptiste FARGEREL

On October 6, 1973, a coalition led by Egypt and Syria attacked by surprise territories occupied by Israel in what would be called the Yom Kippur War. The Egyptians in particular intoxicated the Israeli military intelligence services by taking advantage of one of their exercises near the border to carry out their attack. The Israelis neglected all indications of an imminent attack, bringing the country very close to total defeat before turning the situation around. This failure, as well as subsequent mismanagement, cost Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir her job.