The two world conflicts that ravaged Europe and part of Asia during the "barbaric century" brought the Clausewitzian concept of total war to a climax. States, engaged in what are now described as symmetrical confrontations, mobilised all their forces, both military, economic, social, diplomatic and cultural.

However, the conflicts at the beginning of the 21st century are rather described by experts as asymmetrical [1]. 1] They are characterised by the discrepancy between the means, modes of action or objectives of each belligerent. Some even predict the inexorable generalization, even the primacy, of these types of conflict that history seems to be returning to since the disintegration of the Soviet empire closed the Cold War.

Anesthetized by nuclear deterrence, will the conflicts of the 21st century be inevitably asymmetrical?

1] This notion should not be confused with asymmetry, which reflects a marked imbalance in the level of the stakes or in the quantity and performance of the means, but little in the nature of these means, nor in the way of acting.

Military history, widely used in this sense by our Anglo-Saxon allies, remains, for the future military leader, a remarkable source of reflection, applied as much to the formation of judgment and reasoning, as to the illustration and knowledge of the major tactical and strategic principles. Its main merit lies in the supply of a reference system of concrete data constituting a general fund, on which the assessment and resolution of an operational problem must be based. The importance of the principles of warfare and the art of operations, which remains at the heart of the training of chiefs and staff officers, is thus rarely contradicted by facts and historical analysis.

An anarchist at twenty, a monarchist of French Action at thirty, a fascist at fifty, then a non-conformist republican, resistant and deported to Bergen-Belsen where he died of typhus at sixty-seven, Georges Valois had a most original trajectory. In turn clerk in Singapore, tutor in Moscow and publisher in Paris, he knew the common people as well as the high aristocracy.

The Spanish Civil War could have remained a peripheral event among the many upheavals in Europe in the 1930s if it had been only a confrontation between Spaniards for the deThe Spanish Civil War could have remained a peripheral event among the many upheavals in Europe in the 1930s if it had been only a confrontation between Spaniards for the termination of their future political regime, or if it had been over in a matter of weeks, to the benefit of one side or the other, as many observers - or actors - considered likely.

Proxy warfare is a notion connoted in the wrong terms: is proxy or distant warfare by nature cowardly, illegitimate, ineffective or immoral? What if proxy war were, on the contrary, the future of war? And what if the long movement to question the "decisive battle" - practiced by Napoleon and codified by Clausewitz to perpetuate itself in the future?to kill each other to the present day - had reached its natural conclusion and logically exceeded it? The war of robots activated by civilian and foreign technicians? Are we so far away from it?

Remarks by General Thierry Burkhard, Chief of Army Staff :

The Covid-19 crisis is not over and we must show great humility, because this invisible enemy is difficult to pin down. My feeling is that we have not experienced any real strategic surprise because a large-scale outbreak had long been envisaged. However, the strength of the pandemic has collectively thrown us off balance. At this stage, I believe that the Army is holding up well and remains capable of carrying out its missions, but we must remain vigilant and learn from these two months of crisis.

In "OfWar", Clausewitz described war as the confrontation of two trinities, each of which associates a government, a people and an army. In his mind, this translated into a gigantic duel between two armed forces until one of them was crushed. Deprived of their centre of gravity, the State and the people then had only to submit to the victor on the battlefield. This pattern was undermined when states no longer faced other states, but "organizations" whose centre of gravity was no longer their generally small armies, but the support of the population, transforming the "duel" into an "operation among the people".

lessons for army employmenton the national territory

The Camisard revolt has seen a resurgence of interest due to the resurgence of asymmetrical conflicts and counter-insurgency operations. The Royal Army's engagement against an unconventional adversary promised to provide valuable lessons for today's wars.

Often presented as an indisputable example of the superiority of the "gentle way" over the use of force, Squadron Leader Xavier COMBET, Squadron Leader Etienne THEBAULT and Battalion Commander Jean-Maël VUITTON show that the Camisards' war is, on the contrary, a perfect illustration of the fact that, faced with an armed insurrection, only military domination can effectively deploy all the components of the global approach.