Under the pretext of interoperability, an absurd version of the concepts of operational or tactical command and control, based on counter-sense, has gradually been imposed on French national organisations.

The populations living in the French suburbs - portrayed in the media as "lost territories of the republic" - are often presented as resistant to order and the various symbols of the nation-state.

Shortly before midnight, French special forces engage on the bridge of Wabaria (Mali). A pick-up truck loaded with explosives then rammed into the French positions under fire from soldiers and exploded in a flash that tore the night away.

While doctrine and discourse consecrate, below the "operative" command, three sacrosanct "earthly tactical levels of command", misunderstood substitutes for large unitsWhile doctrine and discourse enshrine three sacrosanct "land tactical levels of command", misunderstood substitutes for the large, inter-services units of the past, as a condition for the coherence of command, the observation of actual operations shows that most of the time we implement only one level of command in all and for all.

Dense and clear, "Why Deterrence" openswith two contemporary crises, emblematic of the international use of deterrence: the Syrian chemical crisis and the Ukrainian crisis. The approach consists in questioning the conditions for the use of force and the protection of the collective interests of the planetary community (in other words, peace) in the face of "non-cooperative actors" who see in any negotiation a sign of weakness.

This reflection was published in October 2003 at ISAF Joint Command (IJC) Headquarters, Kabul International Airport, Afghanistan, as a contribution to the work being conducted as part of the planning for Operation HAMKARI II, an operation to regain control of the Kandahar oasis.

Is the evolution of weapons "central to the understanding of battles" or on the contrary "unworthy of academic study"?

The provisional version of the MEDO published by the CDEF under the name MEDO-T mentions, instead of constraints, "limitations", "constraints" and "restrictions", innovations that have triggered intense cogitation in the microcosm of trainers (and what about that of trainees?).) One gets lost in conjectures about the causes and consequences of these changes in terms, some not hesitating to see it as a change in method.

Following the recent revision of the MEDO conducted by the DEP of the Staff College, the CDEF thought it appropriate, among other minor corrections and additions, to rename the latter MEDOT, with a "T" for "tactical (1)". Although this amendment had the laudable aim of underlining the usefulness of this method in comparison with those coming from the upper echelons of the joint and allied forces (2), the author of these lines (3) would like to express his disagreement with this addition, which leads to the idea that the method would be adapted to one and only one level of operational command.

Geneviève Gosselin-Fleury, MP for Manche, presented this morning with Mr. Charles de la Verpillière, their report on the social protection of military personnel, before the National Defence and Armed Forces Commission.