



Recruitment, training and employment of local troops as a strategic vector for success at Lyautey 2/4

The Lyautey doctrine on the recruitment, training and employment of local forces

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Proud of his experiences in Algeria, Indochina and Madagascar for, Lyautey, when he was appointed to pacify Morocco from of Algeria and Casablanca, will develop during fifteen years a state of mind among military executives, and civilians, value indigenous troops⁵ and restructure the army of Africa. First of all, it strives to protect the local authorities and populations by calling for "empathy and generosity" among the local managers and the local population. military and civilians.

Likewise that the business officers natives are there to protect people versus demand believessantes of settlers, the supervising officer of the indigenous troops must show humanity and exemplary with respect to its soldiers with whom he must living, training and fighting permanence, in particular when units are deployed in the field. Not to the bivouac between French executives and Moroccan officers or soldiers. This search for mixing is particularly true in particular units (goums or méharis) where the officer lives permanently with his men, weaving strong bonds of friendship. This form of paternalism stems directly from his previous writings, in particular the "Social Role of the Officer".

The other pillar of this Lyautey doctrine is the valorization of the Moroccans themselves within the administrative framework or military. The General Resident understood that the logic of the expeditionary force was fragile since it was based on an eventual withdrawal or significant reduction of troops sent to the countryside. As soon as he arrived, he took the initiative of creation of the first squadrons, companies and goums. He estimates that the Algerian spahis and riflemen employed by the body of landing of General d'Amade must be replaced by Moroccan units initially made up of Arabs from the Chaouïa (Morocco of the plains and hills in the triangle) Casablanca-Fès-Marrakech), then Berbers during the phase for the pacification of the Atlas Mountains. He oversees the tribal mixing of the units to avoid clan spirit. He knows he can only count temporarily on European units (legionnaires, zouaves, African hunters), who will later on be largely recalled to the front line as early as 1914. The first units are formed from the Sultan's tabors (battalions). Only the Black Guard (the Sultan's protection unit) is preserved. Very quickly, he wishes that officers and non-commissioned officers the potential of the Moroccans, are integrated into the the supervision of indigenous units. Thus, officers from the "great tents" (noble families of the Cherifian kingdom)

are promoted to regular units, especially cavalry.

Lyautey will also change the profile and employment of the army. army deployed in Morocco. Upon his arrival and the following day of the First World War, he asked the statemajor of officers "top of the basket". In particular, he is looking for a type of special profile for indigenous affairs officers⁶ and for those dedicated to the management of the goums, because of the skills and the autonomy left to the interested parties on the huge areas. Unlike officers in the offices created in Algeria at the time of the conquest, he wishes that the Moroccan IATs belong to a centralized, separately managed body, with a very comprehensive one-year training course given first at the University of Algiers and then, in a centre of improvement in Meknes, and finally from 1920 onwards at the newly created Institute of Hautes Etudes Marocaines in Rabat. This is what General Yusuf in his book "De la guerre en Afrique", but he was that he'll never get. It will also change the way the army of Africa is at war. To the concept of mobile columns used in Algeria to pacify an armed conflict in a huge area by "punch" operations, consisting of of French, foreign or tribal horsemen and infantrymen. and the policy of rallying support and support for the development of the the integration of rebel fighters and systematic monitoring of all uncertain territories by IATs and ghouls. The army must avoid using "repressive columns", but implement the local troop in the field, and respect traditions native people. The presence is thus permanent and the objective of the fighting is no longer the destruction of an adversary to be punished, but its rallying to the cause of the Sultan and the union of Morocco .

When it left in 1925, the African army welcomed into its ranks the best officers who choose to serve in units regular units, IATs, or ghouls. During the Second World War, Morocco will be held by indigenous units, notably the goums, partly with Moroccan executives. Lyautey is largely to blame for this qualitative increase. and this indigenization of the army of Africa. General Andrea in charge of pacifying Syria in 1925-1926, after the repression ferocious but futile led by General Sarrail on the mountain... druze, will use the same method: "In replacement of the body expeditionary, the recruitment of our forces must be local because that the partisans know the country, the language and are a powerful a means of getting closer to the people who are void in front of our columns". In the interest of accountability of the authorities and the local population, this principle will be taken up by the marshal. de Lattre, in its application of the "vietnamisation" of the conflict Indochinese from 1952 onwards, with the added intention of creating a national army Lyautey also ensured as Resident General that he had real freedom of action.action vis-à-vis Paris and a command unit in the theatre (intelligence services, regular and special units) .He did not tolerate any interference from one or another metropolitan service by secretly or officially supporting tribes or factions, in violation of the frank alliance that he himself had decided upon. In this way, he freed himself from the regular interventions of the central staffs and the political authorities on the constitution of forces and the coordination of operations of conquest and then pacification, as was the case in Algeria .Relations with rallied or rebellious tribes , the commitment of regular or special troops, any decision of operation depended on him, his staff or his subordinates .

Likewise, while in Algeria the operations were conducted on a regional basis (by military region), Lyautey ensured overall consistency. No operation was launched in an Atlas region without the report of the forces, the possibilities of shifting from one territory to another and the commitment readiness of troops are measured only in the Chaouïa (central Morocco), the coast or the Rif. This concentration-unity of command has avoided many setbacks, even during the severe revolt led by Abdelkrim in 1925... in the Rif, where the situation was controlled until the arrival of the reinforcements which Marshal Pétain took advantage of in his recovery in vigorous hand, with troops from France equipped with modern equipment.Finally, with regard to the recruitment, training and use of local troops, Lyautey was fully in line with a

logic of integral and indirect strategy, far from the Prussian concepts in Europe, or even English for their colonies, of total war... overkill and direct strategy where it was a question of exterminating the opponent, whether European or indigenous (one thinks of the theories of the from Clausewitz or Ludendorff for the European wars, to those of American President Andrew Jackson in theàvis of the Indians of America and Horatio Herbert Kitchener in the conflicts against the Mahdists, then the Boers). Lyautey was strategizing without the namely, as Monsieur Jourdain was doing prose. These troops by weapons officers or IATs were becoming the vectors of an integral strategy made up of military manoeuvres bypasses, economic development (in particular by the installation of flourishing souks or the construction of tracks of communication) and the cultural and religious dissemination of the sacred and centralized authority of the Sultan. This integral strategy was accompanied by an indirect rallying strategy, or of flexible counter-guerrilla warfare where it wasn't about exterminating the opponent and to deport the population, but to show his force to get him to lay down his arms⁷.

When Lyautey was relieved of his duties as Resident General in 1925 in the face of the difficulties in containing the Rif revolt⁸ led by Abdelkrim, the Marshal Pétain has chosen to return to a strategy total punitive repression of the populations, destruction the regional economic system (livestock, crops, markets) and of crushing the opponent by mechanical force, decision which will leave scars on the Moroccans (creation of parties, etc.). independence in the 1930s; massacres of Europeans in the the 1950s, including the particularly bloody one at Oued-Zem, mode of terrorist action that is not in Moroccan culture).

Le recruitment, training, neck life and the use of particular troops. lières⁹: the example of the goums

The journey of these atypical troops dependent on the makhzen(Government of the Sultan), at the orders of officers of the Indigenous Affairs, must be known.

Originally, the first goums were created during the conquest of Algeria. The principle is not new. For the sake of collection intelligence and economy of forces, every conqueror has always used locum, infantry or light cavalry, often in discovery in front of armies, in back or as a booster troop during the battles. Thus the Algerian goudiers will take part, starting from from 1907, when Morocco took over control of the company, between Casablanca and Fez. While the first goums recruited during the conquest of Algeria are uncertain troops, with no money to pay for them.dRecently French, whose loyalty is sometimes ambiguous (Yusuf complains in his writings of their collusion with the rebellious tribes), those of the beginning XXe century have become indigenous auxiliaries devoted to their chiefs, capable of skirmishes and raids, commanded by officers of the Indigenous Affairs of Algeria.

In 1908, General d'Amade commanding the corps of landing in Casablanca creates the first six goums¹⁰, each comprising 150 goudiers on foot and 50 on horseback, recruited among the tribes of La Chaouïa, who will be integrated as «surrogate goldtives» from 1912. They will be fifty and one in 1934 (or 10,000 goudiers) at the end of the Pacification and a hundred or so in 1939. They will be spread all over the country, from the Atlantic to Algeria, from the Rif to the Sahara.

Their recruitment is done after authorization from the Sultan (in the time of Lyautey, Sultans Mouley Youssef and Mohamed V). The first goums were recruited from among the Arab tribes. fresh from the centre of the country, in the douars, under the control of the local chiefs, the kings and the pashas. Thereafter, during the conquest of the mountains, the goudiers will be recruited from the Berber populations of the bled sibathe part of the country in mistrust against the central power of the Makhzen. Lyautey insists as early as 1912 to strengthen the

French management, which, little by little, now comes from the metropolis, not from the units serving in Algeria, and which is benefiting from the brand new civil-military training in Meknes and then in Rabat. Each goum is consisting of a captain, three lieutenants, an interpreter officer, a doctor, an NCO accountant, seven NCOs... all French. Clothing is rudimentary (with the bark-coloured djellaba, the rezza, woolen hairdo typical, and the nahallasleather sandals). The local framing, in of non-commissioned officers up to the rank of warrant officer, brigadiers-chiefs and brigadiers, became denser in 1912. The non-commissioned officers are including the centerpiece of the gum. Originating from all weapons, they are welded around the captain and are animated by the same state of mind as him. Summary at the beginning, the formation of the goudmiers will be structured with their modern weaponry. All in consertheir lightness and their rusticity (uniform, packagings, etc.), mounting), each goum will receive very early rifles model 1886, then four machine guns and two machine-guns . Thetraining is done on the place of the winter bivouac, the kechla ,atthe discretion of thecommander of the goum, once a week or every day .Shooting exercises and tactical manoeuvres strengthen the cohesion of the Gamm,which is constantly welcoming new recruits from sometimes rival tribes . Theunity is also built around the captain and the lieutenant, a charismatic figure for whom each gou mis his sahab, his lieutenant , who will follow him to his death.The goudmiers are not encased. They live in winter around a post, in the hot season in operations. The goudmier lives with hisfamily. A place for kechla is given to bachelors .When travelling, each goudmier will have to take four days' worth of food with him. The commander of the gum is solely responsible for themanagement and finances of the gum, with the accounting NCO keeping thecommitment and payroll records.Their jobs will also change. Initially, the GUM was intended to prove to Moroccans that France respects Islam and that relations of trust exist with Arab Muslim and then Berber populations , but also to gather a maximum of useful information for theknowledge of the country and the pursuit of operations.

Thus, the Goums are immediately implanted on nerve points, their main mission being to inform the command by fighting without excess, but without weakness, a biting enemy, often fanatical about the Holy War and well-armed. They must be able to support the movements and columns of the regular troops on operations, through discovery actions, for rear or flank protection. Little by little, seasoned by the cohesion that they have acquired in the course of incessant fighting. allows to conduct operations autonomously, to hold alone positions that are in contact with the dissent. In 1939, after 31 years of existence, it is the hundred or so goums that will criss-cross the country. peacefully, ensuring its security and loyalty to the Sultan and to France and will protect the main lines of communication.

By proving to be highly flexible employment, deployed in the midst of the popuArab and then Berbertions, they will have was the most economical troop that it is and most consistent with the needs of command, namely the fight ...against guerrilla warfare and the gridlock of the hick town. Their example will be emulated during the counter-revolutionary struggles of the 50-60s, with the formation of the groups of Thai mountain people, meos and nungs in Indochina, or during the war of Algeria with the fighter commandos and harkas, with unfortunately sometimes the excesses that we know. Because under the impulse of the state of mind desired by Lyautey, never substitute troops have been so close to the people that they served and respected, under the control of the IATs and their officers.Finally, it should be noted that unlike the drama of the mountain people Indochinese or harkis, the goudmiers were perfect for the integrated into the Moroccan army, and King Hassan II greeted several years later their commitment and that of their French executives in the service of the kingdom and its people.

5 Cs personality has evolved, since he praises the qualities of European troops more than those of local troops, who are skirmishers. tonkinese or hovas soldiers, at the end of his campaigns in Indochina and Madagascar.

6 Lhe idea of creating the Indigenous Affairs Officers Corps dates back to the late 19th century.e century in Algeria. Unlike the officers of the As an Arab military corps that was independent of any command, the AIOs had authority over the armed forces in their area.

7"« Lhe very basis of all my colonial war doctrine is the negation of prior and violent action of force; it is a question of sending scouts to scout for local troops and intelligence officers trained in Muslim customs. It is this way of acting that saves the maximum effort and the and human lives, the one that leaves the least damage behind, when it comes to building, which is the goal, and the ultimate goal, of any colonial war. »

8 Lhe French army in Morocco, made up of 65,000 men, was then divided between two fronts: that of Taza to the east of Fez and that of the Rif to the north. After reductions in manpower, Lyautey will never get the reinforcements he asks for to reinvest in the Rif.

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