



## Recruitment, training and employment of local troops as a strategic vector for success at Lyautey 4/4

BRENNUS 4.0

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Histoire & stratégie

The integration of small volumes of officers from the countries at war (of the order of five per theatre) in the French units deployed in areas of operations, with for those who have completed a full course of study<sup>12</sup> in our training schools and have followed the conditioning final before screening, the possibility to live fully in combat companies and to participate in their command in operations.

Such an approach deprives of course the national armies of some of their best officers, but it enhances interoperability... with our forces and therefore efficiency. The experience has already been already been launched, for example in Mali, but it is only for short periods of time. periods, within the framework of binomials and aims essentially to give young African lieutenants, who follow a French lieutenant mentor, the basics of the command. Here, it is about fostering trust, confidence, and the recognition of the value of the training courses provided to our brothers-in-arms and to increase integration between troops French and local. Of course, such an approach presupposes a larger volume of cadets from the countries at war in Coetquidan and in our application schools. This system was in place in the African military, since there were indigenous officers commanded combat units<sup>13</sup>.

-• The intertwining with the people and the fighters... allied locals, with the management of operational risk corresponding-while robotization and foresight, by example on the SALA<sup>14</sup> could suggest a some distance between Western forces and the area of contact combat. It's not about living with family anymore, in an isolated post, as our forefathers did in Erfoud or in Taza, left to the sole security of the local troops, as in the case of officers and non-commissioned officers of goums or the OAI. The physical integrity of the French soldier, the judiciarisation of operations, the current demand for high standards of comfort posts make it counterproductive to isolate the staff in a non the conditions of employment, whatever the conditions of employment of deployed French forces (conventional and non-conventional) conventional). However, the prolonged presence on the of French management units or teams in the field, in the rustic conditions, along with local forces, must be deal with the acceptance of a certain amount of risk taking on the health extensions, the capacity of support facilities to return-dedicated lights, the degree of protection of the vehicles or the volume of the autonomous elementary pawn. These conditions can be applied to

certain units conventional (type GCP-GCM, SAED/PRI or teams type DIA-PMO/OMLT) capable of semiautonomy to acquire the "renso-called actionable bleeding», create uncertainty in the enemy and provoke respect and the adhesion of local troops (national armed forces, militias).

-• The assurance of a complementarity, and not of a substitution, between French units and local forces framed, in a handover logic and disengagement. As part of a strategy of influence over the partner and supremacy on the opponent, the commitment of teams steps mentoring of local troops should only be done that in addition to French conventional forces or Western countries, often the only ones able to lead the major neutralization operations. Even back then, it is only after reaching a certain degree of maturity and supported by the forces classics (spahis, hunters, skirmishers, legionnaires) that the ghouls have been able to hold practically only a peaceful Morocco and unified from 1939 to 1945, after thirty years of pacification. Even though he reversed the ratio between French and indigenous troops between 1912 and 1925, Lyautey has always demanded in many of her reports the maintenance of metropolitan forces, alone to create the favourable balance of power and the concentration of efforts on the occasion of the major operations. Thus, in the context of modeling of a Western army to intervention vocation, it would be dangerous to imagine that the desired effects on airspace-can be provided by local troops only, supported by a few teams of French managers on the ground. From divisions, brigades or regiments of cadres, capable of to be projected alone in support of allied countries at war, in a simple concern for economy of means and a small footprint on the ground, will not be able to conduct major operations that are turning the situation into a theater. Recruitment and the engagement of local forces allows for the acquisition of intelligence and provide a mass of combatants indispensable in the field network, the organization of the manoeuvring and obtaining a favourable balance of power. However, the tactical and technological superiority of the units units is essential to deliver decisive blows to the enemy. to an asymmetrical enemy fighting a guerrilla war.

-• The combination of French troops and forces national (or more agile special groups) for to ensure a military, administrative and economic lost areas. That's what's done today partly in the Sahel through OMCTs<sup>15</sup> and of CF-G5S operations<sup>16</sup>. But the heaviness of their preparation, which often brings out the effect of surprise on the the opponent, and their ephemeral appearance, in view of their mediocre impact on regional development, show that such operations must now exceed the objective politico-military. Marshal Lyautey used to say: "The blows weed-clearing chips are only used to if they grow back the next day. "Once again, the role of local forces as an agent for the development of regions is crucial, and their support by our strengths is an intangible capital that France holds, especially from the African army.

-• The selection of seasoned, well-equipped, well-supervised units... by known leaders who are, in short, fully credible, among the local troupes in each theater. They would be capable of manoeuvring in a privileged manner with the forces for "punch" operations ». To the latter, a tactical, ethical and technological training effort will be made (in particular on CISs and certain RENS means).<sup>17</sup> accessible to all), and logistical support(individual equipment, supplies), including transfers inreactive mode. After studying the operational ( security and confidentiality of our system) and organic consequences (legal commitments ,financial and purchasing procedures, maintenance, etc. ) of the project, we have decided to sell the equipment.), such an approach deserves to be considered in themonths following our engagement in a theatre, in order to avoid any tactical and technological break between the French armed forces andfriendly local forces .It would give confidence to local troops, particularly inresponse totheenemy's tactical and often technological opportunism.

-• Unity of command, of decision and action on French and local forces at the theatre level considered. It is she who brings the best intelligence and agility of use to the

commander. Lyautey delegated the in-theatre operations to some of its generals who were constantly acting in concert, in a maneuver where each end effector (regular troops, airborne and ground forces) European or indigenous people, gums, IATs) was employed in support, complementing each other.

-• Consistency in the strategy developed with regard to the allies and adversaries. Today, the commander of a force normally has full control and control of the knowledge of alliances, nature of discussions or unofficial meetings that France has with the different factions in a conflict, without having the same latitude as Lyautey<sup>18</sup>. No matter how complex of the relationship between government and opposition parties, rival ethnic groups or tribes or the history of the links between them between France and this or that component, a choice single French national must be made on the local troops on which France wishes to rely. Opacity and conflicting alliances cause heartburn, appear as betrayals and turn around... often against the one who changed his word or played a double play. While stepping on the edge of the blade between Arabs and Berbers, Lyautey has always chosen the side of the Sultan vis-à-vis the Caïd of Fez, Moulay-Hafid, the Caïd Siba, Thami El Glaoui the master of the mountains of Marrakech, or the secessionist Abdelkrim again. Despite the romanticism maintained with regard to the Berber figure<sup>19</sup> and who often The European Commission has been working with diplomats, writers, humanitarians, and other interested parties on a wide range of issues, including the fight against terrorism and the fight against terrorism. even the French officers, Lyautey always defended an Alaouite Cherifian policy and a recruitment of local troops loyal to Mohamed V.

Marshal Lyautey was therefore the true founder of the army... of Africa, composed largely of indigenous troops, by provoking within its ranks what you might call today the amalgam: a real mutual esteem between European and Arab warriorsberbères, forged in the fights but also in the awareness of the development of an Unified and modern Morocco. It expressed itself during the pacification and the Protectorate and even thedthere. It also manifested itself in Europe among the regular troops: spahis de la Marne in September 1914, from Uskub in September 1918, from La Horgne in May 1940 or the Rhone Valley in June 1940. It was also expressed within the individual troops, with good obviously the goudiers of Garigliano, of the landing of Provence of 1944 and those of the fighting in the Vosges and Alsace at the autumn and winter of 1944-45. This fraternity of arms is praised by Lyautey was based on sincerity and fair relations, an equally shared exposure to combat, a humanism of military officers or IATs, so a deep trust reciprocal, a common project that was the construction of a country. Under the impetus of this "Lyautey method" used at the local troops, France built a peaceful and peaceful Morocco. unified.Today, even though the context has changed and France only comes into play in support of our African comrades, the vision of Marshal Lyautey on the relations to be maintained with the national armies and local troops remains relevant, with some adaptations to today's environment of committing our forces. Cooperation with these troops of any kind, while taking some of the local ethical and military consistency precautions, responds perfectly with most of the factors of superiority of today's and tomorrow's combat.

13 À For example, were used at the 1er Chasseurs d'Afrique in 1955 six Moroccan lieutenants and captains, fully integrated and in all fraternity in the group of their French comrades.

14SAutonomous Lethal Armed System.15O Cross-border Joint Military Cooperation.16F orce conjointe interafricaine du Groupe des cinq pays du Sahel, qui lutte contre les trafics et le terrorisme, notamment dans les zones transfrontalières.

17 Lhe equipment transferred (mobile phones, civilian mini-UAVs, etc.), used by some current armies or militias, would not in any way affect

the security of our own devices.

18 À at the time and for Morocco, he mastered both the tools of power (military, economic and cultural strategy) and those of influence (the diplomatie). Moreover, the level of intervention that the central level could ensure on the political-military command of the Protectorate was adapted to the to the means of transmission and communication of the early XXe century, which in fact gave the Resident a certain latitude. This is no longer possible today.

19 Montagnards of the Moroccan Atlas, Kabyls of Algeria or Tuaregs of the Sahara and the Sahel.

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