



The Brittany Campaign: a logistics raid, coupled with a "logistics raid" (5 June 1944 - 11 May 1945)

military-Earth thinking notebook

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Histoire & stratégie

While still relatively unknown because it is often overshadowed by the neighbouring landing on 6 June 1944, the campaign in Brittany from 1944 to 1945 is interesting for more than one reason. If only by its duration: started with the SAS [1] drops the day before June 6, it ends after the surrender of May 8, 1945. One could cite the problem of "pockets" as a field of interest for military history enthusiasts. (St-NAZAIRE and LORIENT), the very high level of inter-service and joint cooperation among the Americans (and a little forced among the Germans...), the "pockets" problem (St-NAZAIRE and LORIENT) and the "pockets" problem (St-NAZAIRE and LORIENT).), the important role of the French resistance (maquis of St Marcel and Saffré, FFI battalions, intelligence and escape networks), the deception operations launched by the Americans, the particularly dense Atlantic Wall in this region, etc... This article will focus on the logistical aspects of the campaign.

1) Special Air Service. In fact the 2nd French Airborne Regiment.

The major effect sought by the allied command for this campaign is indeed the provision of a deep-water port in order to reinforce the logistic flows coming from Great Britain and the USA. In the summer of 1944, the sending of elite forces [1] due west was indeed not self-evident, whereas tactical logic would have dictated concentrating the effort on reaching the German border as quickly as possible... And the very usefulness of this campaign is still quite controversial today among historians, especially American ones. Indeed, if the Allied operations in Brittany after 1940 were exclusively Franco-British [2], they became largely an American affair from the summer of 1944 and the triggering of the OVERLORD plan to invade the continent.

The "CHASTITY" operation

In July 1944, 28 Allied divisions were engaged on the western front: they each needed 700

to 750 tons of supplies per day (10 times the demand during the 1st World War). The Allied success in Normandy was moreover largely linked to their overwhelming material superiority (ratio of 3.5/1 for troops, 4/1 for tanks), a superiority dependent on logistic flows with the British rear base and indirectly with the USA. Even if logistic operations from the beaches [3] and innovations such as the Mulberry artificial ports[4] exceeded the hopes of Allied planners, the capture of ports capable of handling the cargo was obviously essential to ensure the necessary flows following the offensive. The American logisticians like to recall that the OVERLORD plan had only one goal: to ensure a sufficient logistic base ("lodgment") on the continent to then launch into an offensive maneuver [5]. In fact, the choice of Normandy for the landing had been largely influenced by its logistical advantages: presence of CHERBOURG and HAVRE but also immediate proximity to many active or potential port areas (bay of QUIBERON) on the Breton coast. The Allies, convinced that the Germans would completely destroy the ports of Brittany before they were liberated [6], had planned as an alternative to build a huge artificial harbour in the bay of QUIBERON: this operation was code-named CHASTITY.

CHASTITY, the last major alteration of the OVERLORD plan, was the real objective of the breakthrough in Brittany (although probably ignored by the American commanders on the ground) [7]. The Bay was capable of accommodating deep-sea Liberty Ships [8] and was connected to the railway network. The small port of Locmariaquer in the river AURAY would have been one of the reception points, as well as the beaches of the bay, but it was mainly a question of building an artificial port of the Mullberry type which had shown some efficiency in Normandy. Large vessels (up to 5 at a time) could have docked at the prefabricated quays and piers to land 2,500 tonnes/day of goods, with the delivery capacity of the area being increased by a further 7,500 tonnes through transshipments directly in the harbour[9]. The plan required the capture of BREST and LORIENT for security reasons: approved on 22 April 1944, it gave absolute priority to [the](#) seizure of QUIBERON Bay [within](#) SHAEF[10].

After the breakthrough of AVRANCHES (operation COBRA), on August 1st, 1944, General PATTON commanding the 3rd US Army gave the order to the Général MIDDLETON, commanding the VIIIth ^{Corps}, to liberate Brittany and if possible its ports intact - but without reference to the CHASTITY plan. General PATTON's unhoped-for breakthrough seems paradoxically to have had a negative impact in the medium term: instead of the 3 Corps initially planned to capture the Breton ports or the Bay of QUIBERON, only VIII Corps and ^{one DB} were allocated to this campaign, the other units of General PATTON being reoriented due East. The logistical impact of this decision was to be felt rather quickly [11], no major ports had been captured in good condition (some argue that the ports of St-NAZAIRE/NANTES-INTOURAIRE and QUIBERON were not captured in good condition). or even BREST - could have been captured "on the fly" if the forces dedicated to the armor raids across Brittany had been more substantial). However, the capture of port areas on the Atlantic coast would have allowed the Americans direct links with the USA.

St-NAZAIRE and BREST had moreover been their two main entry points in...1917-1918. Moreover, Allied logistical planning was based not only on the capture of Breton ports and access to a dense and intact railway infrastructure, but also on an operational pause at the level of the SEINE in order to rebuild stocks [12].

OVERLORD's planning included first the intensive use of 6 minor ports before reaching QUIBERON or a large port on the Atlantic coast: GRANDCAMP-les-BAINS^[13] and ISIGNY west of OMAHA; St-VAAST-la-HOUGUE and BARFLEUR north of UTAH; GRANVILLE in the Cotentin and St-MALO in Brittany. All these ports of small capacity and subject to the tides were transitional solutions but were to be effective from July 6th - in practice by July 16th GRANVILLE and St-MALO were still in German hands. BREST, LORIENT, the

QUIBERON area, St-MALO and NANTES should have provided a capacity of more than 27,000 tonnes/day on D+90...but at the end of August only St.-MALO was in American hands. On August 25th the logistic command asked for the acceleration of the port's reconditioning and the exploitation of 3₄₁ ports not foreseen by the plans of OVERLORD (MORLAIX, St-BRIEUC and CANCALE). The 1057th Engineer Port Construction and Repair Group quickly rehabilitated these secondary ports, except CANCALE. A MORLAIX-ROSCOFF harbour area, split on two quite different sites but with a unity of command, was formed. The port "MORLAIX/ROSCOFF" was capable of accommodating 6 Liberty ships operating the breaking of cargo either directly at quay in ROSCOFF or via the amphibious boatyard. In the case of MORLAIX (whose railway viaduct was intact), the relay was taken by very shallow draught vessels of type LCT[15] able to go to the bottom of the river DOSEN. It should be noted that the American Navy used its incredible range of amphibious means as a river navy on the whole of the Breton front: from barges sailing up the Loire as far as NANTES, including under German fire, to LCVs literally invading the small port of LANDERNEAU [16].

Between September 5, 1944 and its (American) closure on December 14, 1944, MORLAIX/ROSCOFF achieved the feat of processing more than 2,000 tpd. During this time, important amphibious operations were urgently carried out on the beaches of St MICHEL.

A landing...in Brittany

At the beginning of 1944, a network of Resistance fighters was in charge, specifically in the North Coasts [17], of the maritime links with England as well as the intelligence on Brittany. The network checked the enemy's position practically from MONT St.-MICHEL to BREST. It was very solicited by the allies as at the end of May 1944, when it was asked to photograph from the sea ...the large beach of St-MICHEL-en-GRÈVE near LANNION which proved to be perfectly suitable for a landing.

The "Lieue de Grève" is one of the largest bays in Brittany, it stretches over 4 km from Saint-Michel-en-Grève to Saint-Efflam (commune of PLESTIN). It was the scene of the only large-scale amphibious operation after D-Day [18] on the Atlantic coast. Preceded by more modest operations during the fighting around St-MALO, namely the use of barges to seize the Fort National and theCézembre Island[19], this series of landings - 81 in total - was however of a purely logistical nature. Classically, the first step was the securing of the area by the Americans, with the help of the local resistance. The beach engineers having blown up the various German defenses (including the famous piles of Rommel and other Czech hedgehogs intended to gut the landing craft but also IEDs [20] behind the beaches), the American tringlots of the Transportation Corps took over for the unloading of the ships. The LST, Landing Ship Tanks[21], could then enter the scene. Arriving from Great Britain in convoys, the English or American LSTs were escorted by English or even French ships such as the frigate "La Découverte" during the first landing operation, the "AUTHOR Ist" operation on 10 and 11 August 1944 [22]. A combined operation between the Army and the Navy and set up in a hurry, it made a strong impression locally [23]. The operation was a success and will be renewed with, in total, the landing of more than 9,000 t of freight until its closure on 1 September (a respectable average of 475 tonnes/d, including fuel and ammunition).

In Normandy, the Transportation Corps (Arme du train) was in charge of the organization of the small ports and, in the landing areas on "bare beach" like the famous UTAH Beach, the taking over of freight from the beach under Navy control and in close liaison with the engineers [24]. [24] In fact the demarcation between engineer and train units did not seem

to be set in stone: the CT assisting in the unloading of ships and managing the traffic on the beaches for dispatch to secondary depots behind the beaches, as well as regulating the flows to the area of operations. An approximate schematic of the approach to the beach of St-MICHEL with a Marine ^[26]PC is shown below ^[25] but managing only the movements of vessels, traffic control ^[26] managing operations on the beach and US engineer elements (later reinforced by the British). The Normandy experience was also useful in demonstrating the feasibility of "high and dry" beaching of LSTs (and not just beaching): even if the maneuver was long because it was conditioned by the tides, it allowed the grounding in good conditions. The St-MICHEL site had been chosen in part for the hardness of its sand, but this did not prevent a large consumption of perforated plates...

In order to best prepare the first assault on BREST, ammunition shipments were diverted to MORLAIX from August 6th and then to St-MICHEL which served as an emergency logistic plot. From the 7th the stocks were replenished and the progression could resume on the 8th. According to the history of VIII Corps, the ^{flow of} ammunition was so efficient that at the fall of BREST, there remained nearly 10,000 t of ammunition in stock and 12,000 in depots close to the landing points (despite the fact that orders had stopped as the surrender approached). In order to redirect these loads towards the east, 5 ad hoc truck companies were hastily formed by artillery units. The Breton railway network, considered one of the major advantages of the peninsula by the allied logisticians, was also used [27]. 27] It is worth noting that the number of German units overwhelmed and the initial American tactic of speed left the communication routes at the mercy of German actions. Logistics flows were adapted (no isolated vehicles) and the resistance was put to contribution.

The battle of BREST: a Breton "Stalingrad" very resource-consuming

The VIII ^{Corps} was composed of the 2nd, 8th and 29th Infantry Divisions ^{as} well as the 6th Armored Division. Its mission was to seize BREST, to set the

enemy elements of LORIENT and St-NAZAIRE and cover the southern flank of the 3rd Army. Other units also intervened in Brittany such as Task Force A of General GARNESS which liberated SAINT-BRIEUC and MORLAIX where bridges and viaducts were intact thanks to the massive help of the Resistance (which will be of great help everywhere in Brittany [28]). As for the 66th ^{ID} intervened around the pockets of St-NAZAIRE and LORIENT alongside the FFI [29], the 94th ID facing LORIENT ^{or the 83rd} in the assault of St MALO which ^{surrendered} on September 6th. Another DB, the 4th ^{at} the orders of General WOOD (nicknamed "Tiger Wood" by the Germans), also played an important role in liberating RENNES, BAIN de BRETAGNE, DERVAL, REDON then VANNES from August 6th. Arriving in front of LORIENT on 7 August, it contained the German forces there before setting out again towards the East (it liberated NANTES).

The 6th ^{US DB} arrives in front of BREST on August 6th but cannot capture the city which is organized in joint "fortress". The capture of BREST is directly linked to the operation CHASTITY, the Navy conditioning the use of the bay of QUIBERON to the capture of the city for security reasons (coastal artillery and especially submarine base...). The presence of General RAMCKE's seasoned and fanatical paratroopers did not encourage the Americans to ignore BREST either.

Having the reinforcement of DIs and a sufficient supply of ammunition, the Americans launched the attack on 21 August 1944 in the peninsula of PLOUGASTEL, in concert with Colonel FAUCHER's FFI. The main attack against the town was launched 4 days later with

three divisions. At the same time the Allied air force and the American artillery pounded the town and its defence network, which was based in particular on former French fortifications. On September 9th, the 2nd Infantry Division approached the town and took a thousand prisoners. For its part, the 8th ID crossed LAMBEZELLEC and took 1,000 other prisoners. Once the PENFELD river was reached, street fighting began. The Germans resist in every street and in every building: the magazine YANKS will speak about the hardest fights of the American infantry since 1918. A proposal of surrender was pushed back on September 13th and, on the 14th, the fort of Montbary fell into the hands of the 29th ID after furious and bloody bayonet fights and the support of British flame-throwing tanks [30]. On the 17th, the 2nd Division seized the station and on the 18th the submarine base was taken. All opposition ceased west of the PENFELD. During these 45 days of fighting, 10,000 German soldiers were killed, and 38,000 others taken prisoner, including Generals RAUCH and SPANG. General RAMCKE, commander of the BREST square, left the city on the 17th and took refuge in the peninsula of ROSCANVEL where he was captured two days later.

BREST, like St-MALO are free but... entirely destroyed by the Germans or Allied bombs. The initial objective of capturing a major port area had finally been diluted before being purely and simply abandoned on 9 September [31]. The operations on BREST, already well under way, were completed (in any case, it seemed difficult to accept the presence of a parachute division on the Allied rear) but the QUIBERON area and the CHASTITY plan were abandoned. The rise of the Normandy and MARSEILLE ports would participate in the "downgrading" of the Breton front and the reorientation of melee units and teams specialising in the rehabilitation of ports [32]. This front became all the more secondary as SHAEF quickly placed great hopes in the Belgian port of ANTWERP, which was liberated intact on 4 September [33]. Two figures seal the fate of the offensive actions in Brittany: the distance from BREST to AIX la CHAPELLE is nearly 1,000 km, that from ANTWERP to AIX about 150 km .

The "fortresses" [34] of LORIENT [35] and SAINT-NAZAIRE become "pockets" which will surrender only after the end of the war. In the case of the pocket of St-NAZAIRE, the front went from the mouth of the VILAINE river to REDON, then followed the Canal de Nantes à Brest to BLAIN, passed the LOIRE river at CORDEMAIS and joined the coast at PORNIC [36], thus forbidding the use of the port of NANTES. As with LORIENT, there was no general battle throughout the pocket, but a series of sporadic battles, sometimes very violent. During the last months of winter the fighting on the Pocket front around PORNIC and BOUVRON sometimes took the form of trench warfare. The FFI, which had been given the mission of containing the pockets with limited American support, faced very harsh conditions during the winter of 1944. Collateral victims of the Allied logistical crisis and less of a priority than their comrades engaged further east, they carried out their mission while lacking food, clothing, ammunition and weapons [37].

Conclusions

Without settling the polemic that agitates some historians around the usefulness of this campaign (or simply the extent of the destruction that accompanied it), we can better understand this "forgotten campaign" with a logistical reading.

We can highlight some particular points, which are still rich in lessons for current operations:

- The need to keep in mind at all levels the major effect desired and to ensure a sufficient diffusion of the "I Want" of the leader: the objective of the campaign, the capture of intact ports and the establishment of a logistic base, seems sometimes

to have been better understood by the Germans than by the Allied commanders on the ground [38] .

- Maintain destruction at an acceptable level so as not to compromise the operation phase[39]The aim is not to get caught up in direct confrontation and lose sight of the strategic objective (in this case logistics).
- The necessary versatility of forcesDue to a lack of resources: following D-Day, the command_{mol} noted a cruel lack of infantrymen but also a lack of transport capacity. in particular to support the eastward march. In some cases this meant turning support personnel into infantry and in others turning infantry companies into temporary "truck companies" .
- Do not neglect the importance of the ground transport component in strategic planning, do not neglect the fundamentals of combat for support troops that can be rapidly transformed into marching units.
- In addition to their intelligence role (both in the offensive phase and in reconstruction), Intensive use of "local forces to help manage the rear area or secondary fronts
- Attach local forces, which are inherently familiar with the terrain of operations, by providing support, reconnaissance and mentoring.
- The effectiveness of beach operations and the intensive use of secondary harbourswhich have greatly reduced the shortfalls inherent in delays in the use of deep-sea ports on an urgent basis. The incredible American amphibious shipping and their ability to work together with other armies and armies has greatly contributed to this ...
- Maintain sufficient amphibious capacity to be able to carry out real "logistical raids" on the coasts (as in Lebanon in 2006).
- And, beyond the eternal battle of the cuirass and the cannonball which found many illustrations during this campaign, we will note another speed race, this time between the trowel and the TNT ... Extensive use of specialists for reconstruction of the port areas (very often reserve cadres using their peacetime skills [41]), in the wake of the melee troops, indeed made it possible to limit the delays due to the effectiveness of the German destruction
- Identify and prepare in peacetime the civilian resources essential to the exploitation of military successes.

Finally, to close this logistical chapter, let's leave the final word to Lieutenant-Colonel John R. RHOADES, Commanding Officer^{4th} Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron " we halted at the frontier for a reason unforeseen, Not because of hostile action but for lack of gasoline..."

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1) 2 armored divisions, Rangers, several infantry divisions including the famous 29th Infantry Division that participated in D-Day.

2) In addition to small raids on the coasts and intelligence operations with the resistance, one thinks of course of the ambitious operation Chariot in St-NAZAIRE (destruction of port facilities by the Royal Marines).

3) For more details on LOTS operations - Logistics to the shore - and in particular operations on the bare beach, see the thesis "Bare beach logistics over-the-shore: an outdated concept?".

4) The Mulberry ports, an important technical innovation of the D DAY with the famous Pluto pipe line, consisted of prefabricated elements brought from Great Britain. They were, however, vulnerable to the heavy storms of the English Channel.

5) "OVERLORD planners concentrated their attentions on the Brittany ports because they expected the peninsula to serve as the entryway for Allied forces and materiel before any other development on the Continent. In Breakout and Pursuit. And also: "What's not well known about Operation Overlord is that the direct military objective of Overlord was neither strategic nor tactical, but logistical. The primary objective of the plan read: "To secure a clear lodgement on the continent from which further offensive operations can be developed". Since it was clear the war would be a battle of industries, we had to be able to rapidly deliver our industrial output to the front lines". In The operator-logistician disconnect.

6) And moreover the freed ports like CHERBOURG or GRANVILLE were effectively sabotaged with great efficiency by the German Engineers. Traffic only resumed in mid-July in CHERBOURG, more than 15 days after its capture (which was already behind schedule, the port being the first major objective of the campaign).

7) A major change in Overlord would thus be required. "It involved the capture of Lorient, either the capture or isolation of Saint-Nazaire, and the reduction of the German installations on the islands facing the coast--a combined military and naval operation of major proportions." After many strategy meetings the plan "then was changed to include the capture of Quiberon Bay... The operation was given the code name Chastity and was a very closely guarded secret." In The Operator logistician disconnect.

8) Capacity figures range from 30 to 200.

9) This was seen as a very efficient scheme, since the two [Mulberry](#) prefabricated ports constructed on the Normandy beaches provided 6,000 tons of supplies a day at a construction cost of 120,000 man-months, whilst Operation Chastity facility would provide 10,000 tons per day but would only need 4,000 man-months to construct the prefabricated facilities. (Source Wikipedia)

10) The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) was the headquarters of the Allied forces in northwestern Europe from late 1943 to 1945. Dwight David EISENHOWER was the general-in-chief.

11) About General PATTON, Colonel Harold L. MACK says "Unfortunately for all concerned, his genius was curtailed and his victorious advance stopped because of the initial failure to carry out the Chastity plan, needed to keep him supplied. By September 1st, his army was short of everything - gas, rations, blankets, winter clothing". From an operational point of view, General Dwight D. EISENHOWER drew the following conclusion: "You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics".

Pensées mili-terre

Centre de doctrine et d'enseignement du commandement

12] Rather than a gigantic chase, the Allies had initially envisioned staggered German resistance - which would have allowed them to consolidate their lines of communication and rebuild before each new push. A 30-day reconditioning period was thus planned at the SEINE before General EISENHOWER decided to push the advantage and pursue the routed German forces. At D+100 (14/09/44) the 1st Army approached the German border near AIX LA CHAPELLE, that is to say the zone of engagement planned for D+330!

13] In 88 days of operation, (from 23/06 to 19/09/44), the small port of GRANDCAMP received more than 58,000 tons of freight, much more than the 500 tons/day expected and a better output than "bare beach" operations.

14] MORLAIX, St-BRIEUC and CANCALE had to handle 9,500 tons/day on 5 September 44, St.-MALO, 2,400 on 1 October - objectives which were never reached (CANCALE was never used for hydrographic reasons). This was despite the efforts of the 1053rd Port Construction and Repair Group and 360th Engineer General Service Regiment, which then left for BREST. St-BRIEUC opened in mid-September for only one month (317 tons/day mainly coal for locomotives and power plants).

NB: American sources actually use tones (which do not quite correspond to metric tons but are very close to them).

15] Landing Craft Tanks: barges (not freighters) capable of transporting tanks but also cranes or trucks and of course freight such as batches of ammunition.

16] Let's hope they weren't too noisy...Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel were small barges capable of carrying for example a truck or a platoon.

17] Current Côtes d'Armor.

18] Except for the 13th RD operations in ROYAN in 1945.

19] From a logistic point of view, the routing of barges by road ... served moreover as a test for the transit of the means necessary to cross the Rhine some time later.

20] Improvised Explosive Devices (already!...) from aircraft bombs or shell bombs.

21] The LSTs, ironically nicknamed by soldiers "LargeSlow Target" were 100 meters long and almost 4,100 tons heavy when fully loaded (all things being equal, the current Mistral BPC is 199 meters long for a displacement of 21,500 tons...). These "swing-bow cargo ships" implemented several innovations that were to inspire contemporary ferry boats. Capable of carrying about twenty tanks, their draught was 3m at full load.

22] "La Découverte" participated as group leader in Operation AUTHOR. The group was composed of La Découverte, Hothal, Middlesex and LSTs 421, 57, 344. The landing took place without incident at PLESTIN-les-GREVES.

23] One only has to imagine the spectacle of the LSTs, sometimes a dozen of them, landing directly on the beach, trucks and armoured vehicles, under the protection of captive balloons (Cf "..."). War Memories of a child from St.-Michel" by Yves KEREMPICHON.

24] Engineer Special Brigades (amphibious engineering). The organization is somewhat reminiscent of the current French Train Beach Joint Units.

25] Located in a civilian house on a high point allowing the guidance of ships, a real "control tower" for landing operations.

26] A detachment of the 785th traffic control regiment according to local sources.

27] "I was always intrigued by the possibility of utilizing the excellent ports and railroads on the southern coast of Brittany (...). Quiberon Peninsula, jutting out into the bay, seemed to offer excellent beaches for the landing of supplies because it could be approached from different directions in any kind of weather. One of the best freight railroads in France ran along the coast and, straight from there, east to Paris and Germany". In The operator-logistician disconnect.

28] See in particular the Musée de St-MARCEL (56).

29] 19th and 25th Infantry Divisions regrouping about 12,000 FFI under the command of General BORGNIS-DESBORDES.

30] For a combatant's account, see for example <http://www.1jma.dk/articles/MyWar-text%20only.pdf>.

My War The Family Version Thomas Clayton Quigley Bedford, Texas, 2001.

31] "The plans to build up a major supply port at Quiberon Bay and use Brittany as the principal American support base gradually faded and were finally cancelled on September 9. This turning away from Brittany meant a loss of port capacity that would prove serious in the coming months" In The Big L. On 9 September, Eisenhower abandoned all plans for further exploitation of Brittany ports, including Operation Chastity, which were now seen as irrelevant since, unlike Antwerp, they were now hundreds of miles from the front of the Allied advance. Source Wikipedia.

32] When GRANVILLE's tonnage objectives increased, on 25 August the 1058th Engineer Port Construction and Repair Group, originally intended for the port of LORIENT, was reassigned to GRANVILLE.

33] Captured by the British, its planned capacity was 40,000 tons. But the Germans clung to the approaches to the port (banks of the ESCAUT) until November 8!

34] The four German fortresses or Festungen: Saint-Malo (Colonel Von AULOCK), Brest (General RAMCKE), Lorient (General FARMBACHER), Saint-Nazaire (General JUNCK).

35] See article by the Service Historique de la Défense: René ESTIENNE, curator of the SHM of Lorient and associate lecturer at the University of Southern Brittany.

http://www.servicehistorique.sga.defense.gouv.fr/04histoire/articles/articles_rha/lorientet2guerrmondial.htm

36] For more information on this zone, see the site <http://www.grand-blockhaus.com/> and the various works of the BRAEUER brothers. And of course the excellent museum of BATZ sur MER (44).

37] So much so that a reserve officer, Captain BESNIER, created an FFI armoured squadron only mounted on... captured panzers! See L'escadron BESNIER, BRAEUER.

38] General BRADLEY "underestimated the logistical need for obtaining the use of Quiberon Bay and the railroads running east from there. These were most costly mistakes." In The operator-logistician disconnect.

39] We find here a flaw in the American military mode of reasoning where victory only comes through the destruction of the enemy.

40] One of the most acute problems, if not THE problem for logisticians from the D DAY until the German surrender was ground transportation: At the end of August 45% of the load landed was still in Normandy in depots...

41] These specialists were not limited to engineering or naval units dedicated to the evaluation and reconstruction of port areas, some units were thus in charge of evaluating the damage caused to the cultural heritage.

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