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Recruitment, training and employment of local troops as a strategic vector for success at Lyautey 1/4

Example with spas and gutters - BRENNUS 4.0
History & strategy
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L’use of local troops by Marshal Lyautey was an element of its strategy to penetrate, pacify and rally the population.and unity of Morocco. By relying on regular and special forces, theforces from all the tribes of Morocco, it has also been able to use tactical means of seasoned local fighters, who were acting in discovery and in intelligence of more heavily harnessed units, which by the 1930s had already finished by keeping the territories pacified. This article describes Lyautey's vision of what the the role of the African army in the colonial work, training and employment of troops through the local spahis and goumiers, and finally it proposes lessons to be learned of this experience within the framework of the current operational military partnership and the strategy of influence that accompanies it.


L’army of Africa is part of the start of theof our country, during the its history, to brew French soldiers and local warriors to hold the territories and make the war, since the use of the Huron or the Algonquins of New France, to that of the Meo, Nung or Thai minorities in the struggle against the Vietminh. She continues to fascinate the officer French and more broadly the Army. She remains a reference for adventure, fearlessness and adaptation, since in 130 years of existence, it has been has helped to build and stabilize an Empire and then served as the basis for the reconquest of the world's of the national territory. Since the beginning of the professionalization, with the strengthening of the notion of identity that underlies it, number of units refer to her. Muslim crescents and Cherifian stars have bloomed on the pennants and the shoulder pads of many regiments.

This army of Africa was first an army of natives or foreigners, especially in infantry and cavalry, framed in a large frame party by officers and NCOs French. During the last forty years of its existence (1920-1960), it has been a model of integration and brotherhood of arms. She has developed a cultural, philosophical attitude and new policy. It served as the basis for the creation of some national armies in providing experienced and seasoned executives at the time of independence. She also, do not evade it, create frustrations or awareness among the indigenous soldiers. Some of them have become political leaders and revolutionaries in the aftermath of the campaigns of the Second World War to which they had participated, with no real feedback on investment.

The founding father of this army of Africa is Louis­ Hubert Lyautey, even though Thomas­ Robert Bugeaud was the first to use indigenous troops in his fight against Emir Abdel-Kader, and then created the Arab offices .Paradoxically, Marshal Lyautey expressed little in his writings on the contribution of local troops, concentrating more on European colonial troops and especially on their officers .These indigenous troops were, however, a decisive element in his work for the pacification and construction of Morocco .Before him, France had structured an instrument of conquest ,the colonial army, originally made up of various expeditionary forces sent to Africa or Asia, to which indigenous troops had been added .Embracing the spirit of the Protectorate ,whose official aim was more accompaniment than exploitation ,Lyautey was to educate the cadres of this African army to weave a lasting and peacefulrelationship , a mutual consideration between them and theirindigenoussoldiers.

Hubert Lyautey is the symbol of this humanist and of the modern relationship between the French soldier and the warrior. native. He's going to take a fourth generation officers, colonial civilian cadres and renewing the doctrine of the Empire in its approach to the native population.

Before studying the recruitment, training and the engagement in combat of regular and special troops1in the service of France and Morocco, taking respectively for example goumiers and spahis, it is necessary to to recall the line of colonial officers and administrators in which Lyautey is part of, in order to better apprehend the turning point that he started in this African army, and then to formalize the foundations of the state of mind that it has instilled in all the actors who made it up. Second, the study of the examples that the goumiers (private troops) and spahis (regular troops), laboratories of this African army, will allow to show how much Lyautey's use of local troops has been a success. Finally, it will be a question of learning from this experience. on current operations, the partnership operational military and, more broadly, the strategy of influence of France.

1 . L s colonial action according to Lyautey: from exploitation to partnership

After the first wave of colonization that occurred between the XVIe and the XVIIIe century, France is embarking on a new phase of conquest in 1830 with the intervention in Algeria. Under different regimes, the French army will model a first generation of colonial military officers and administrators ...the most prominent of whom are General Bugeaud, Yusuf, Daumas, from Lamoricière or Du Barail. It's time to conquer, the subjugation of the people, the destruction of the rebellious enemy... under the banner of the Holy War, the installation of settlers, and the organization of a colonial administration with the famous Arab offices. Bugeaud then turned to a strategy purely military direct search for the brutal shock against the opponent or strangling the opponent's-­ci2to which The first step was the administrative and agricultural colonisation of the land.­toires. Thirty years later, another generation is venturing into West Africa. General Faidherbe is conducting a campaign the Senegal River, which is less than half the size of the brutal than that of Algeria. Expeditions to Sahelian Africawill end in the far East with the battle, then the crisis in the Sahel. of Fachoda and the adventure of Captain Marchand's column. A third generation at the end of the 19th centurye century focuses on Indochina and Madagascar. Field Marshal Gallieni is the most famous representative. In Indochina, he put into practice «lprogressive occupation»by establishing mili­which were also used as trading markets with the natives. With regard to local authorities, the following are involved to espouse the interests of the "Mandarin" rather than fighting against him and to practice the politics of the "toil purchase», avoiding the "repressive column" manoeuvre practiced in the past.­in Algeria. Rather than alienating the colonized, it is better to rally him and gradually convert the conquered regions3. Raised at the Gallieni school, Lyautey, fascinated by the Maghreb during of the two operational stays he made in Algeria, will apply in Morocco its own theory which consists, in the particular framework of of the Protectorate, to scrupulously respect the customary laws and religious leaders, relying on the political authorities (the Makhzen, i.e. the Sultan and more generally the Moroccan State) and local forces, to pacify a region, even if it means going beyond French interests alone .A fourth generation of colonial officers was thus todevelop over thirty years, the most famous representatives of which wereCaptain de Bournazel and Lieutenant Duboyer de la Tour .The cornerstone of Lyautey's approach is indeed the role he attributes to the colonial officer, not a simple warrior but anadministrator, architect, farmer, engineer .The myth of the humanist colonial officer, inspired by the ideas of the "social role of theofficer",living in the midst of indigenous troops and populations, was to inspire the literature and cinema of the time .It is this generation of OAI, of meharist officers4The Frencharmy was commanded by a number of soldiers, riflemen or spahis during the Italian and Alsace campaigns (notably General Juin, de Monsabert or Guillaume) .

Finally, the African army or more generally colonial, has known another generation, the fifth, during the period of decolonization. These are the officers engaged in the revolutionary war and struggle counter-insurgency, where the population and local forces become a power issue in a fight to the death against a an enemy guided by Marxist doctrines of political conquest. Finally, there is a sixth generation that could be affiliated with this chain of colonial military cadres: the officers and subofficers of the Marine Corps. In the post-colonial context of the last sixty years, the CT scans, heirs to a part of of the colonial army (not the Africans, nor the Saharans, but rather those of Equatorial Africa, Madagascar and Indo.­china), have switched to a double logic of overseas service, mainly under the heading of cooperation in Saharan Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, and professional expeditionary armies... cultivating amphibious capacity.In this chain of military officers and administrators, Lyautey is probably the one who demonstrated that a country could be pacified and live in peace primarily through membership of local political power, respect for populations and employment priority of well-supervised local forces. As soon as the repression was used in Algeria during the conquest, in Morocco during the Rif war in 1925 or after the massacre of Ouedzem in 1955, in Syria in the Druze mountains between the wars, or even in Madagascar in 1947, it left stigmata and has provided arguments for the toughest revolutionaries.

In Lyautey's colonial action, one ambiguity remains. Did he ultimately wish for the independence of Morocco, a goal not specified in the last text establishing the Protectorate in 1912, or wanted to-­il maintain at all costs the guardianship of France? He was fascinated by the Moroccan monarchy, as a regime political, but he defended France's interests, in particular the interests of against other European powers. He probably never wanted to answer this question, focusing on the effects of its policy (the development of Morocco) on the ultimate objective.

1 IThe term "special" is to be understood here as not obeying the general regime. This was the case in particular for the goumiers or the Meharist troops.

2 Cmobile units that move in mutual support and encircle or harass the enemy; building forts on roads and communication routes­cations; organizing raids like at Isly.

3 Lyautey says: "When a military operation has decimated the inhabitants and bowed their heads in terror, the first fear calmed, it will germinate in the mass of the ferment of revolt that the grudges accumulated by the brutal action of force will make grow even more".

4 Lhe recently published book by Emmanuel Garnier on the role of the Saharans highlights that this generation of colonial officers also exercised their talent in other regions, maintaining for several decades the Nazarene peace against the violence of rezzous in the sandy confines of Sahelo Africa­saharienne.

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Title : Recruitment, training and employment of local troops as a strategic vector for success at Lyautey 1/4
Author (s) : le colonel Arnaud de LA GRAND’RIVE
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