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Recruitment, training and employment of local troops as a strategic vector for success at Lyautey 3/4

Recruitment, training, life and employment of local regular troops: the example of the spahis
History & strategy
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As much as the creation and development of the goums belong more to the Moroccan adventure, as much as those of the spahis find its roots in the conquest of Algeria. Even if Lyautey, an aesthete of his image, likes to appear in blue and white burnous, he likes to be only counts in the history of the spahis because he's the first one to propose native riders to participate in the fights... of August-September 1914.

To remedy the burdens imposed on French troops on difficult terrain and a harsh climate, to make up for losses due to the illness and the recall by Paris of a party ...of the Algerian Expeditionary Force, King Louis-Philippe confirms by prescription the existence of regular spas. in 1841. The corps receives organization and status (recruitment, promotion, hierarchy, pay, etc.) Colonels Moncey and Yusuf recruited from among the soldiers of the dey Hussein, many of whom of Turks, and the warring tribes of Algeria (especially Kabyle). In 1841, there are twenty squadrons of Algerian spahis, namely 40 00h ommes and the value of four to five regiments. In 1939, there will be thirty regiments divided between Algeria, Tunisia, the Morocco and the Levant.Each squadron was originally made up of 4 French officers, 3 native officers, 20 French NCOs and cavalrymen, 173 NCOs, brigadiers and native spahis. This mix in management will be reinforced in Morocco under the impetus of Lyautey and his successors . It shouldbe noted that in Morocco, given thespecial status of the Protectorate, recruitment must be authorized by the Sultan. It is also by authorization of Mohamed V that several regiments of spahis could be deployed in France in1939-1940 and fight from the south of Sedan to the north of Valencia .

The spahis, as regular forces, are encased, live in the neighborhood and receive instruction and training similar to African hunters or any European troop. (shooting, manoeuvring, maintenance, etc.) They take part in the big maneuvers organized annually. Each spahi carries a regulatory uniform adapted to its origins.

Their use varies according to the times. In Algeria, after the conquest, they constitute, along with the African hunters, the mounted part... of the mobile columns and are responsible for immediate reaction, sometimes brutally, to any attempt at an uprising, and of calling for the Holy War. Fast or light troop, mounted on their little rustic horses passing over all terrains, including including mountainous, they illuminate the columns, exploit in ...the depths, go around and flank the enemy. But during the great uprisings, they will be of all operations... led against rebel leaders (Abdel Kader in Algeria, Mouley Afid then Abdelkrim in Morocco), to be dislocated by the shock the enemy troop. Preceded by the goums, they constitute leading edge­garde of forces sinking into the bled sibaat every stage of the pacification of Morocco. Finally, these troops indigenous regulars were originally made to serve in their country of origin. They were a testament to the warrior's fidelity from the Arab tribes, Muslim Berbers to the French authority, in the case of the Protectorate to the Sultan and the Makhzen. Despite the magnificent feats of arms recorded in both wars... (La Marne, Uskub, La Horgne, etc.), their employment in Europe on the various Western or Eastern fronts was against­nature. When the Native Auxiliary understands that the process has been reversed and that he is the one who is rescuing a authority that has become wavering, the doubt will set in.

Initiated in Algeria, the "spahi" model, a native rider in was repeated elsewhere by the French army: the Crimea, where Yusuf was responsible for setting up squads of native riders ;

-• au Senegal, with a sketch in 1843, then the creation of Senegalese spahis for the operations of pacification from 1872 to 1881;

-• in Tunisia, where the first Tunisian spahis regiment has been formed in 1886;

-• au Morocco, with the creation in 1912 of ten squadrons of spahis formed with the cavalry tabors of the Sultan of Morocco;

-• au Levant, where Cherkish and Druze squadrons are created and integrated into Moroccan spahis regiments or Algerians.

5 . Qulessons for the operations of thetoday and tomorrow?

In today's conflicts, the military operational partnership in all its forms (operational, technical, support to export support) applies mainly to consulting and collection.of regular forces, in a context of profoundly different from that of colonization (Algeria, Indochina, Madagascar, AOF-AEF) or the Moroccan and Lebanese protectorates-Syrian. Indeed, the relationship is now on an equal footing. and not from dominant to dominated. Similarly, trust with local forces are less now than they were. in the 1930s in Morocco, in particular because of the relational discontinuity imposed by the significant cycle of rotations and of the barrier created by the protection conditions overseeing the deployment of all French forces. By elsewhere, the ethical discrepancy (especially the relationship to death) and technology is probably stronger today, between French units and local forces, than it was at the time of Lyautey.

But at the­ds only MMS and the contemporary framework of the commitments, a certain similarity can be found between the objectives pursued and yesterday's criteria for success, of today and tomorrow. First of all on the needs and the objectives, the military aid that France can provide to the allied countries is, as in the past, directed at regular troops (national armies). Should it in the future concern entities or even irregular entities? As in Lyautey's time, this assistance is today on a broad spectrum: training initial, coaching and combat support. It has also for the purpose of fighting an enemy who is fighting a battle... ideological and military guerrilla warfare, made up of combatants fanatics, often motivated by the Holy War or trafficking, led by warlords in dissent against the government... central. Today and in the future, this aid from France is aimed at to meet four factors of operational superiority of the eight described in the forward-looking document Future Land Action (ATF) of 2016: the mass as a complement and not as a substitute for the French forces, the influence in all its components, the cooperation, understanding.

At ­ds success criteria for the PDP as described by the DIA- ones developed by Lyautey during the Pro­are interesting and still relevant. Transposed today, they relate to the training of French and foreign executives. the degree of trust and the level of intertwining of the contact strangers.­between French and local forces, and finally to the command politico-military and operational :

-• Empathy, generosity, benevolent curiosity to develop in school among officers and non-commissioned officers French vis-à-vis populations from Africa or the Middle East. PMO. There is no doubt that this is already being done at present and that it is a natural tendency of the French soldier, but this condition spirit must be accentuated, since the potential territories of long-term intervention concern these regions. Lyautey wanted every officer called up to serve in Africa develops a strong Islamic culture and deep respect for the customary law, customs and usages of the people. This otherness and empathy deserves to be a selection criterion in the profiles searched for in the officers, upon initial recruitment. The creation of a PMO at the EMSOME should promote this acculturation.

-• The establishment of a pool of officers similar to the IATs, capable of advising local sovereign, civil authorities and military and having a real influence on the troops... local, they­my mentors from French teams on a mesh size to be fixed, according to its own categorisation. growing of Lyautey: sector, circle, territory. The officers ACM are doing fundamental work to rebuild, rebuild, rebuild, rebuild, rebuild. intelligence and integration of French forces into the their operational environment. But they are not qualified to take on an advisory role in the administration of the territories and command of local troops. The officers concerned could be selected from best officers, at the time when they are going through a period Transition: During the two years of Assistant Officer of company or in the period following successful completion of the School of War. This obviously involves training that can start as early as the training schools initial. Without calling into question the sovereignty of States officers involved in the development and implementation of the command in hostile territory would likely be a to the coherence of our operations, to the fight against corruption, to the against the adversary and the return to peace. Moreover, the success success of IATs came first of all from the permanent presence they had in their area (3- 4 years or more). Today, one year of presence is the period you have to aim for in order to regain that state of mind... that made the strength of the Lyautey method.

-• At the same time, the installation of officers of the national forces on conflict areas in an administrative role and back to civil peace. The relocation of prefectures, gendarmeries, hospitals, markets without a period of time of military administration is often devoted to failure and leads to dramas (rezzous, executions, etc.). For this reason, our African or Oriental fellow officers must be broken away from the civilian functions of organization (administration, law, economics) adapted to their country, to enable them, for a period of time, to be capable intermediary, to assume politico-military prerogatives in territories reclaimed from rebels or terrorists, before making a successful transfer to the authorities... authorities. It's the Lyautey ex-OAI principle. It was also the principle of the military school in Dar El-Beïda (now the Royal Moroccan Academy of Meknes), created by Lyautey at the end of 1918, which welcomed officer cadets to train them in the exercise of command but also prepared them to take on functions of pashas, khalifa or khalifa in the country. the regions of Morocco. This approach is difficult to do accepted by the civil authorities. But she is pragmatic recognizing that the return to peace in a region can also go through a military administration provided by competent, fair, prepared officers for the complexity of the public functions. Within this framework, while respecting the sovereignty of States, an awareness of observation of international humanitarian law, made, inter alia, to the leaders of local troops, would promote the installation of an climate of trust and would avoid detrimental abuses. to populations still at risk.

9 PThe term "articular" is here understood in the sense of the customary military regulations to which goumiers are not subject. Their commitment must be renewed every year (2 years depending on the period), unlike all the other troops of the African army. But they are not substitutes. They are well integrated into the African army and are governed by ministerial instruction.

10 Le General Picquart, Minister of War, advised by Lyautey, who saw all the benefit of these particular troops during his stay in the South-Oranais to Aïn Sefra, gives the authorization to recruit Moroccan goums.

11 I'dentification of the required competence, effective progressivity of the transfer of competence, regular monitoring of skills acquired and measurement of the sustainability of the footprint left; cultural and linguistic knowledge and predisposition of the supervising staff, ability to adapt to local conditions and to relative isolation.

12 Un curriculum equivalent to that of a contract officer or career officer (ESMSC-EMIA).

Title : Recruitment, training and employment of local troops as a strategic vector for success at Lyautey 3/4
Author (s) : le colonel Arnaud de LA GRAND’RIVE