Moscow's decision to withdraw from Afghanistan was based on its perception of the conflict, on its internal problems, not on global international political considerations. A strategic defeat, the war waged by the Soviets in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 was not a military failure. Through innovation, decentralization of command, taking the population into account, the Red Army kept the Mujahideen at a distance, which only the American Stingers saved from annihilation.

A few months after the September 11 attack, when America declared war on Al Qaeda and deand launched Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban in Afghanistan, America discreetly declared its support for the operation.The Bush administration has been told by young President Putin's Russian envoys (he was elected on May 7) that they are prepared to give them some useful "recipes" for fighting in the Kingdom of Insolence. Twelve years after the end of its war in Afghanistan (1979-1989), Moscow still bears the scars of its military commitment in a country the size of France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark combined, at The country's geography is tormented, with the Hindu Kush mountain range, 7,000 metres high, in the centre, and a veritable ethnic mosaic. Triggered to save the communist regime, its intervention is part of the Russian empire's historic plan to gain access to the warm seas. The death toll is heavy: 26,000 killed and 53,000 wounded among the 620,000 young Russians, most of them conscripts, who took turns fighting in the country against warlords, opium and hashish traffickers, Buzkachi and kites. Material losses are of the same kind:

118 fighter planes, 333 helicopters, 147 tanks, 1314 armoured transport vehicles, 11369 trucks... Soon to collide with the arms race that began inthe war in Afghanistan contributed significantly to accelerating the decay and fall of the Soviet regime. This war was "a bloody wound," said Mikhail Gorbachev, the father of "Perestroika," who negotiated with the Americans to withdraw from Afghanistan.

However, when the 450 vehicles and 1,400 men of the last column of the Red Army crossed the Friendship Bridge over the Amu Daria, the river which then marked the border between the USSR and Afghanistan, it was an undefeated troop that was retreating: In nine years of war, they have escaped the terrible trap of bogging down and managed to consolidate the legal government in Kabul. By combining the use of brutal methods and innovations dictated by circumstances and the pragmatism of military leaders who have taken the ascendancy over political commissioners who are guardians of doctrine, the 40th Army has succeeded in imposing a semblance of order and discipline on a key country on the Asian continent, a strategic pivotal zone between the Middle East and Asia, which has always been intrinsically hostile to any form of rule other than tribal customs and Sharia precepts.

The war began on Christmas Day 1979, when Leonid Brezhnev launched the main phase of Operation Prague. The five divisions assembled in the south-east of the USSR to form the 40th Soviet Army rush into Afghanistan. They are commanded by General Borissov, the man who launched a veritable air bridge over Ethiopia in 1977 to break the Somali offensive and save a satellite regime. Another coup specialist is already in Kabul: General Pavlovksi. After orchestrating the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, following the Prague Spring, he became the number two in the Ministry of Defence. On the spot, he coordinated the mission of the 1500 "advisers": to lock down control of the main Afghan garrisons. He also supervises the work of the men of the parachute brigade that has taken over the large military base at Bagram, north of Kabul, where an Antonov noria soon lands. On the night of 20 December, the paratroopers seized the Salang tunnel, the main roadblock to the capital. On the 27th, the Spetznaz seized the presidential palace where the head of state, Hafizulah Amin, had barricaded himself. On 1 January 1980, the five divisions of the 40th army camped in the Kingdom of Insolence. At the height of its commitment, four years later, the occupation contingent lined up 100,000 men.

The Red Army invaded a country plunged into chaos. Since the coup d'état by the Afghan CP, the internal situation of this satellite of Moscow has deteriorated at full speed. The communists have attacked the traditional structures of society. They have caused general disorganization and, more seriously, an uprising of the powerful tribes that share useful Afghanistan. The crisis is aggravated by indiscriminate repression: 15 000 arbitrary arrests, 300 000 executions. The Afghan National Army, weakened by the purges, is partially neutralized. Only the country's main roads are still under the control of the government in Kabul, which has resolved to call on its protector. After a period of procrastination, the victory of the Shiite Mullah in Tehran and the departure of the Americans from the region in January 1979 led Moscow to take action.

"What can these Afghan peasants in baggy pants do against such a force? "said General Sokolov, who oversaw the rise of the Soviet Expeditionary Force, the day before the invasion in connection with the Afghan rebellion. The shock with the reality of the terrain is, however, painful for the heavy armoured columns hit by the red star, as soon as they move away from their bases and leave the major axes. They had been trained to deal with a possible confrontation with Afghan armoured vehicles or an American task force, in no way to compete against guerrilla warfare, or to operate on terrain that is not conducive to motorised combat, where the overwhelming superiority of the balance of power in their favour becomes their handicap. The material and human losses recorded at each sounding quickly convinced the leaders not to insist. A few weeks after the invasion, the Soviet divisions withdrew to the 20% of the territory making up useful Afghanistan. They confined themselves to controlling the main roads, towns and vital economic areas from their isolated camps, often set up ex nihilo at the exit of the garrison towns, where they bunkered. They only venture out of this perimeter to keep the rebels at bay, and to allow the KGB to deploy its specialists in influence warfare. Objective: to shape a new Afghan people. Utopia soon gives way to reality.

From the spring of 1980, fighting intensifies between Soviet units and the rebels. The former use all the firepower of their weapons with the intention of annihilating the latter, who evade. By day, the Soviet soldier imposes his strength. By night, the Mujahid regains the upper hand. So that by the end of the year the Soviet strategists realize the obvious: They would need between 500,000 and 1 million men to lock the border with Pakistan, where the enemy takes refuge, and crush any group that persists in standing up to them. They derive these figures from the study of the Vietnam War, where the Americans committed three times as many men as they did in Afghanistan to try to control a territory half their size. As the Kremlin rejects its "marshals," the marshals turn to their headquarters. This is the beginning of an internal revolution. The operational staff led it by calling on the advice of Vietnamese generals who were veterans of the wars against the French, then the Americans in the Indochinese peninsula.

Until then hypercentralized, the Red Army discovers the virtues of initiative. The war becomes that of young officers. Failing to gain a decisive advantage over a weak and dispersed adversary, the Russians choose to engage in a low-intensity but longer-lasting conflict. They bet on the gradual exhaustion of the insurgency. One part of their forces occupies vital areas, the other one hunts down the rebels on their own ground. They are now working systematically with Afghan forces who know the terrain. In the recalcitrant valleys, the Soviets are deliberately striking with extreme brutality. They practice scorched earth tactics. High altitude bombardment, destruction of crops, livestock and villages, poisoning of springs: they stop at nothing to cut off the rebellion of their supporters in the population. As early as 1984, they understood that neglecting the human factor was a serious mistake and they tried to rectify the situation. Wherever it seems possible and useful to them, they negotiate and organize the rallying of tribes and villages, encourage and support the return - the installation - of representatives of the State.

More flexible, the helicopter quickly supplants the tank. The infantrymen learn to fight like commandos. Decisive in the invasion, special forces and parachute units become the backbone of this war, both for targeted actions and influence operations. Staffs abandoned the traditional engagement of entire battalions in favour of two- or three-company operations. Key words: initiative, autonomy of decision, freedom of action. Adaptation is not easy. At the end of April 1985, the Russian special forces suffered a humiliating setback in the Marawar parade (Kounar province). An entire battalion (400 men) is caught in a trap: some thirty commandos are massacred. All the wounded are finished, the dead are stripped, their bodies mutilated. Only two survived.

Success was nevertheless achieved at the turn of the year. 1985. Divided into numerous rival clans and factions, a plaything of political parties and foreign interests, cornered in the mountains, increasingly poorly supplied with food, ammunition and medicine, the Afghan rebellion (from 60,000 to 150,000 men, depending on the source) was marking time. If international aid had not been increased tenfold at that precise moment, the Soviets and the Kabul regime would have permanently marginalized the rebellion and imposed their yoke. It is in particular the Stingers introduced by the CIA that save the "Freedom Fighters" from annihilation. Well served by trained Mujahideen on the other side of the border, ground missiles are the most effective means of fighting the rebellion.air missiles with optical sighting and infra-red guidance hit planes and helicopters in flight up to 5000 meters away. Nearly 900 were fired between late 1986 and October 1988. Terror of the Soviet pilots, these weapons reduce in particular the pressure exerted by the couple helicopter-special forces on the logistic caravans of the rebellion coming from Pakistan. The 14,000 kilometres of borders were never airtight. In 1983, nearly 400 infiltration routes were identified in the provinces of Nangahar and Kounar (east of Kabul) alone. The two Russian battalions (800 men) engaged in this battle intercepted only 15% of the resistance's logistical caravans. The spetsnaz do better. From 1984 to 1989, they weighed only 5% of the troops (3900 men) but achieved 60% of the results. The effect of the Stingers on the overall tactical situation is, however, rather relative, as the Soviets are not adept at all-aircraft, as the Americans were in Vietnam.

From 1981 to 1988, the military situation of the Russians did not change fundamentally. They have the insurgency under control and there is no indication of possible defeat. Admittedly, the population is paying a high price for this pax sovietica: one million dead, 700,000 maimed and disabled, 1.5 million displaced, 5 million refugees between Pakistan and Iran, immense material destruction. The decision to withdraw is explained first of all by the perception of the conflict in the Kremlin (uncertain future and no strategic gain), by the internal problems of the USSR (the regime's exhaustion, the breakdown of the economy, perestroika) and by more global international problems. The Russians succeeded in less than ten months in this delicate operation, which confirms their good command of the terrain. Between the summer of 1988 and February 1989, the general staff repatriated 110,000 men, 4,000 armoured vehicles, 2,000 pieces of artillery and 16,000 lorries without hindrance. With the invasion phase of 1979, it is one of the three operations (out of the 220 conducted by them) that the Soviets consider as totally successful. They even left behind them a friendly regime that was able to withstand the blows of the resistance until the beginning of 1992, after the collapse of the USSR.