As a rare example of successful counter-insurgency, Malaysia was the scene of experiments that were reminiscent of a "prehistoric" form of the concepts of "integrated" or "comprehensive" approach.

Indeed, Sir Gerald Templer set up a hierarchy of civil-military committees bringing together political, military, legal and police officials in an interdepartmental approach aimed at coordinating efforts, particularly by ensuring the exchange of information, and thus multiplying the effects of military action on the ground. In order to relay directives from above while preserving the initiative of the lower echelons, the civil-military hierarchy will be able to take the lead in the field.Templer's centralized civil-military hierarchy (federal, state and district levels) will prove decisive for counter-insurgency in Malaysia.

There again, if Templer applied it brilliantly, the civil-military command, taken over by the Anglo-Saxon doctrine under the term civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC) , has its roots in Lyautey and Gallieni, who themselves were certainly inspired by Bugeaud's Arab offices in Algeria. Under the mandates of Gallieni and Lyautey, it was the corps of "Civilian Controllers" that played this role, charged with assisting and advising the local authorities (pashas and caïds in Morocco). Lyautey will particularly insist on their essentially supplementary character, as the civilian controllers, as representatives of the Protectorate, were not intended to administer directly. Point of divergence⁶ between the marshals, for Lyautey, the military must give way to politics once the zone has been stabilised. Gallieni, for his part, considered that his officers were perfectly qualified to remain in charge, thus rejecting the adage "Cedant arma togae" (" arms give way to the toga").⁷.

Today, the global approach is so pervasive that it is impossible to imagine a stabilisation operation without civil-military cooperation bringing together military, legal, police, political and NGO leaders.

Thus the Artemis operation to stabilise Ituri was conducted by the European Union in coordination with the United Nations mission (MONUC). This civil-military approach, in which the second aspect is subordinate to the first, does not prevent the military actors from exercising, in an episodic manner, powers that normally belong to civilians. For example, during Operation Sangaris, some section chiefs had to act as coordinators and administrators to compensate for the total absence of a judicial system. In line with Lyautey's precepts, however, this use of civilian powers by the military is only temporary: until a minimum of security is restored. This was the very principle of Operation Sangaris (and before it Artemis) which, as a "bridging operation", was to create the conditions for handing over to the civilians and soldiers of the UN Mission in the Central African Republic (UNMISCA).⁸. Counter-insurgency operations, because they take place in the very heart of the population, are however peculiar both in their strategy and in their tactical modes.

6 This doctrinal divergence is explained, however, by the different statutes of Morocco and Madagascar. While Morocco was a protectorate, justifying the presence only of a "substitute" and adviser to the French administration, Madagascar was a colonial territory. As such, the colonial power was fully entitled to directly administer the territories of Madagascar.

7 Some theorists of the Doctrine of Revolutionary War, including Colonel Trinquier, advocated the introduction of exceptional legislation and the concentration of power in the hands of a military officer until the insurgents and their political-military apparatus were eliminated.

8 The United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) is a United Nations peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic. It has been in operation since 10 April 2014.