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## Black Hawk Down and the French principles of war

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If iconic films exist, *Black Hawk Down* ranks among them. Released in 2001, by British director, Ridley Scott (*Alien*, *Blade Runner*, *Gladiator*, *Robin Hood*, *Prometheus*, etc.), the film is based on Mark Bowden's non-fiction book, *Black Hawk Down: A story of Modern Warfare*. The film manages, via its impeccable direction, a star-studded cast and an original score, to plunge the viewer into fighting that took place as part of the battle of Mogadishu. On 3 and 4 October 1993, American forces clashed with the Somali militias of Mohammed Farrah Aidid.

The Battle of Mogadishu, also known as the "Battle of the Black Sea", was part of the American-led Operation Restore Hope. The operation aimed to restore, via political reconciliation, minimal food supply chains to Somalia; a country torn apart by civil war. Following a series of violent clashes between UN troops and General Mohammed Farrah Aidid's militias, the United States sent in Task Force Ranger, made up of 450 Ranger troops and Special Forces. On 3 October, a CIA informer told the Americans that an important meeting would be taking place with two of Aidid's main lieutenants in attendance. The operation launched, aiming to capture the meeting's participants. The battle that followed saw the loss of two Black Hawk Helicopters, 18 American KIA, one American POW, 1 Malaysian KIA, 84 WIA and several vehicles destroyed. Several hundred Somalis, both

militia members and civilians, also perished. On paper, the raid was a success. However, the media backlash that followed meant that, strategically speaking, the operation was a failure. On 6 October 1993, President Bill Clinton called an end to operations against Aidid. Depicting the exact historic truth is not the issue here. Only the people who took part in the battle itself would be capable of doing so, presuming that they could provide an overall picture of events. The point of the film, independent of the exact nature of the events presented, is to provide a demonstration of certain principles of military strategy. This demonstration is conveyed extremely well and is captivating for the viewer. The film also shows the often underestimated or unappreciated hard realities of modern combat. Throughout, the film respects the key facts of how the operation unfolded. As such, a brief analysis is appropriate, not from a film critic or cinephile's point of view, but from a strategist's perspective. In order to complete this, two main corpus are cited throughout this article. The first is the definitions established and compiled by Professor Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, in *Traité de Stratégie*. The second is terms from French doctrine, mostly drawn from *Action terrestre future (ATF)*<sup>1</sup>, *l'instruction générale des forces terrestres* (1994), *FT-02 Tactique générale*<sup>2</sup>, *le concept d'emploi des forces* and the *glossaire de l'armée de terre* (2013)<sup>4</sup>.



## FRICION IN WARFARE

*What happened to him? – He fell! Missed the rope! – How'd he do that?*

*The Humvees ain't coming back, dude. – What? Were we supposed to go to them? – I thought they were supposed to come to us. – Shit. Shit. I think we're supposed to go to them.*

In military strategy, friction is defined as the uncertainty surrounding the conduct of operations. Friction is, variously, friction between ourselves and the enemy, force components, the environment, and in short, the very dynamic of events<sup>5</sup>. Clausewitz theorized on the first of these examples, stating that friction with the enemy: “distinguishes real war from the one we can read about in books”<sup>6</sup>. As such, as the best-laid plans collide, friction leads to “(...) phenomena that are unpredictable simply because they are mainly left down to chance”<sup>7</sup>.

Clausewitz offers two ways of telling these apart. The first is narrow in scope and boils down to rifts on the same side. Although it is not the primary dimension, it is nonetheless present in the film. In the first few minutes of *Black Hawk Down*, immediately after the opening sequence providing the context, it is explained that Washington has been losing patience. The mission has reached its sixth week when it was only meant to last three. Ten minutes later, this dimension also becomes apparent when General Garrison is talking to his deputy, who reminds him of how the political authorities are not satisfied. The same goes for the initial briefing, explaining the lack of certain heavy assets; an issue that plays a major part in numerous military mishaps. Coalition fighting, while an increasingly common occurrence, also comes with its own set of problems. These come to the fore during the dispute between Garrison and the Pakistani General as the emergency unit is set up. Nonetheless, the main draw of the film is how it portrays friction in the general sense, as according to Clausewitz: the multitude of factors that “make difficult everything that appears easy”<sup>8</sup>. In Ridley Scott's film, practically every aspect that is straightforward to depict makes an appearance: lack of resources, unexpected enemy resistance, errors in design and execution, misinterpretation of an order, non-compliance of a soldier.

One of the most striking scenes in this respect comes right at the start of the operation, when Private Todd Blackburn falls. As the Rangers deploy via the *fast-rope*<sup>9</sup> technique, the pilot of the helicopter with Sergeant Eversmann's chalk onboard has to make an abrupt swerve to dodge enemy RPG fire. The maneuver results in Blackburn falling from the helicopter. He lands on the ground, unconscious and in a critical condition. The entire chalk immediately has to focus entirely on managing the wounded. Eversmann is unable to reach his superior, Captain Steele, who then does not understand the information relayed to him over the radio. Eversmann therefore takes the initiative to evacuate Blackburn via the main convoy sent to evacuate the prisoners. To evacuate Blackburn, Colonel McKnight decides to detach three of the twelve vehicles at his disposal. Meanwhile, the disposition is taken by surprise by the degree of violence displayed by the militia members. Rocket fire rains down on the disposition. The three vehicles responsible for taking Blackburn back to base come under heavy fire. Very quickly, there is one KIA and two extra wounded. The vehicles that stay at the target building are also subject to harassment. Soon after, several Americans are wounded and one vehicle is destroyed.

Another example is the fact that two soldiers are forgotten by McKnight's convoy. While some of Eversmann's chalk attempts to reach the Super 6-1 crash site by foot, two soldiers, Twombly and Nelson, stay behind to cover the extraction of the prisoners. And yet, where is the coordination between the different elements? Twombly and Nelson believe that the convoy is going to come back and get them: the reverse of what was meant to happen. The result is that the two men are left stranded and alone, before having to join the units surrounding the Super 6-1 crash site by foot. Although this development may seem far-fetched or trivial, it becomes a central concern for the military leaders. In circumstances as violent and chaotic as combat, even the most simple of errors can quickly pile up. One such incident was the subject of a report on the Battle of Alasaï. In 2009, French troops clashed against the Taliban. Brigadier General (then-Colonel) Le Nen tells his subordinates: “If we forget anyone, that guy's finished. I'm telling you that he won't make it back on foot”<sup>10</sup>.

The film's dialogue provides a good summary of the concept itself during the conversation between Eversmann and 1<sup>st</sup> SFOD-D Master Sergeant Hooten, "See, you're thinking. Don't. Because Sergeant, you can't control who gets hit or who doesn't. Who falls out of a chopper or why. It ain't up to you. It's just war." – "Yeah, well Smith's still dead. If Blackburn wouldn't have fallen, none of this would've happened." – "Should have or could have, it don't matter. You'll get plenty of time to think about all that later. Believe me."

## PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY

*"We just lost the initiative."*

*Black Hawk Down* is illuminating in its depiction of the impact and the mechanics of the principles of strategy. The principles of strategy can be interpreted as evaluation criteria for the validity of a decision, from tactical to strategic level. Coutau-Bégarie defines these principles as "general rules which aim to not submit to the law of the enemy and that ensure superiority on the point(s) selected via rapid and determined action"<sup>11</sup>. Intuition and experience have dictated that these principles have appeared in varying forms in the work of the majority of strategists and authors. When it comes to an event as extraordinarily variable and unpredictable as war, the difficulty lies in identifying them. It is nevertheless possible to make some general remarks on how the genius of strategists has managed to transform the principles into procedures adapted to different sets of circumstances. As such, from this point onwards, a principle should be viewed as an axis, not a rule. As circumstances vary, it is useful to know that we can stray from the original purpose.

Foch maintained three principles: freedom of action, economy of means and the dual principle, security-surprise. Identifying these three principles has had a major influence on French Land Forces doctrine, which maintains the first two and supplements them with unity of effort. The French Army also later added an extra two, complementary principles, taken from the work of Admiral Guy Labouërie - uncertainty and **lightning**<sup>12</sup>. It is interesting to view *Black Hawk Down* from the angle of the final three, setting aside freedom of action – a principle Foch lifted from the works of the Greek soldier, Xenophon. Freedom of action is more of a general reminder than a direct influence on operations: "The art of war is, in the last result, the art of keeping one's freedom of action"<sup>13</sup>. Given the circumstances of the battle and the film, it may be useful to group some of these principles together, such as direction/objective, mass and initiative.

### Economy of forces/unity of effort :

This principle orders us to make optimal use of our forces. It has not been subject to extensive theorization. However, there are several accepted definitions, which subtly differ from one another. Clausewitz suggests that economy of forces seeks to implement means proportionate to the desired outcome. This accepted definition, in raising the issue of the dialectic between the aim and the means, is doubtless the most

operational<sup>14</sup>.

Although it may appear straightforward, this principle has often been misunderstood. Between 1915 and 1917, the most legitimate objective the French had was to seek a breakthrough. However, the offensives this entailed had little to no impact on the Germans' freedom of action and resulted in a devastating number of losses. The situation should have triggered a revision in strategy, which Pétain did eventually impose. We can argue that as long as we are not privy to the effect on the enemy disposition, it remains unclear how to calibrate one's actions. The extent of modern sensors available has meant that, these days, Western Armed Forces are no longer kept in the dark on this matter. Intelligence is provided in both quantity and quality (volume and nature). For the most part, the enemy's intention remains unclear. During the Battle of Mogadishu, while the Americans were certainly aware of the extent of the enemy forces, they had apparently underestimated the enemy resolve and capacity to maneuver. Likewise, Garrison may have made the mistake of not ensuring sufficient QRF. When the unexpected occurs, it is primarily the troops who are already deployed as part of the main mission who are redirected to manage both crashes.

Economy of forces is, in many ways, similar to the unity of effort. Unity of effort orders us to **gather the maximum amount of forces on a selected point to have available a mass of maneuver or shock**<sup>15</sup>. As Corbett says, this enables us to "be in the stronger position, at the right place, at the right time"<sup>16</sup>. For Napoleon, it was a major imperative. Once again, though the idea itself may seem obvious, it is met with a cluster of conflicting imperatives. A concentration of troops can curtail surprise, entail logistic necessities and is, often, politically restrictive. General Garrison had intended to employ the heaviest means via fire support and vehicles, but Washington prevented him from doing so. They were deemed "too high-profile". In the same vein, Command had to manage the necessary dialectic between cohesion within the disposition and extending the disposition to fulfil other missions. For the American Command, this was undoubtedly part of the problem as the following had to happen simultaneously:

- Evacuate Blackburn;
- Secure the Super 6-1 crash site;
- Secure the Super 6-4 crash site.





## Uncertainty :

The principle of uncertainty aims to provoke surprise in the enemy. Labouérie stresses that its principle objective is to topple the will of the other and paralyze him. Uncertainty is similar to the security/surprise duo retained by Foch. As a principle, it commands us to take every disposition necessary to enable the execution of an operation without risking being surprised by an unexpected enemy movement<sup>17</sup>. Uncertainty is always relative and we cannot seek to eliminate it. Even so, in *Black Hawk Down*, within the first few minutes of the operation, the viewer is privy to a network of non-armed spotters signaling the air and land assault of the Americans. As stressed by Colonel Michel Goya, Western Forces deploying heavy means, from solid and identifiable bases, cannot hope to keep hold of surprise as an advantage for very long, if it has not already been dismissed. To counter such a situation, Labouérie commands the secret, which is the “refusal of pre-established or restrictive rules<sup>18</sup>, intelligence, parallel diplomacies, unholy alliances, the maneuver of the media<sup>19</sup>”.

## Lightning:

Labouérie defines speed as the necessity to “shatter the pace of the other”, to “break, at the right time, and along sensitive lines, any attempt to gain or regain the advantage<sup>20</sup>”. This is where we come across the concept of the initiative. Initiative orders us to not wait for the enemy to take action, but to anticipate how he will reveal his freedom of action and then deny it by making him subject to our will. Jomini suggests that it is the preferable way to impose ascendancy on the enemy. Coutau-Bégarie reveals that the initiative can be gained via creative thinking in design and speed and flexibility in execution<sup>21</sup>. Such is the case for the Americans as the film starts. The plan is a classic one, and has been implemented effectively in several previous raids. And yet perhaps some of the reason for the plan’s success was down to luck. The plan is quickly set up, properly executed and, to start with, seems to run smoothly. When he hears that the prisoners are ready for extraction, General Garrison says, “That’s it, we’ve got them”. The Ameri-

cans’ technical and technological superiority (the helicopters in particular) enables them, for a time, to outclass their enemies in mobility and flexibility. As a result, they take their enemies by surprise. To begin with, the initiative is theirs. The problem is hanging onto it.

In order to keep the initiative, Coutau-Bégarie puts forward two major factors: sufficient power to support the operations undertaken and a degree of security to prevent surprise, which would hand the initiative to the other side<sup>22</sup>. As we have seen, from the outset, the American Forces were not equipped to endure in the long term. Nor were there enough of them to spread across several points. The *Traité de Stratégie* provides an additional point which Michel Goya explains well in terms of the Battle of Mogadishu<sup>23</sup> : the micro management of superior echelons and the lack of initiative from the lower echelons on the ground, made possible by modern means of communication. Everything centers on Garrison. In the film, he takes a long time to do anything other than sending out the various elements, via staggered orders, securing the two crash sites and repeating, “No one gets left behind” and “I want them out of there. All of them”. Meanwhile, McKnight perhaps takes too long to realize that, realistically, he has no hope of reaching crash site Super 6-1. In the same vein, the delays in the coordination and communication between the base, Air control and the convoy makes it especially difficult to direct the vehicles, “Uniform 64 left turn, left turn.” – “Romeo 64 I need to know before I get to the goddam street!” Here, technology is just as much a factor in friction as it is an aid.

As such, the viewer often has the impression that all the Americans are doing is endure, for hour upon hour, attacks from the Somalians, without making any change to either their dispositions or their objectives (securing 6-1 and then 6-4). In the film, it is only when all elements are combat ineffective that Garrison seeks the help of his partners. A partial shift in the initiative only comes with the arrival of the UN armored column, enabling the disposition to disengage.

## Direction / objective:

Direction maps the axis along which operations should be led<sup>24</sup>. For Jomini, the “fundamental point of strategy lies in selecting the right direction to give the masses”<sup>25</sup>. One of the major problems in the film is the command helicopter’s incapacity to guide the convoy to the Super 6-1 crash site. Meanwhile, the vehicles are met with fierce resistance and a multitude of improvised roadblocks. Likewise, for the militias, the destruction of the two helicopters was a great choice in defensive direction. By increasing the number of TICs for the Americans, they restricted their freedom of movement. This put the Americans in a dilemma: to make the main convoy return to base, or, simultaneously, to make an attempt to secure the two crash sites to first evacuate the teams and the troops on foot, both with the main convoy and the remains of the convoy which had evacuated Blackburn, backed up with some reinforcements. Either the Americans could try to continue the main mission, leaving their devastated teams vulnerable in hostile territory, or they could try to retrieve them, while dangerously exposing themselves to militia maneuver.

The similarity with the “objective” concept can be referred to in several ways. Economy of forces and unity of effort are also incorporated into this principle. By dispersing, the American forces put themselves in an unfavorable position. At one point it seemed, for a variety of reasons, that the Command had given in to the risk described by Coureau-Bégarie, “The idea of direction fades when the meaning of the maneuver is lost and we ask shock and fire to reach a decision”<sup>26</sup>. Rather than restructuring the disposition, three elements are stranded and as a result, are incapable of making any difference by themselves. The chinks led by Eversmann and Ditomaso manage to reach the crash site, but given their insufficient volume, they are unable to make any difference and have to take cover in nearby buildings. Captain Steele’s troops do not manage to reach the crash site. There are too many wounded for them to move any further and they are combat ineffective. This unit also has to take cover in a building to wait for assistance. Only one small detachment from the Deltas and Rangers, led by Sanderson, manages to join Eversmann at the 6-1 crash site. The convoy that was meant to pick up Steele’s troops from the crash site does not manage to complete either mission in the end. McKnight is also eventually made combat ineffective. He makes the intelligent decision to abandon his mission and return to base. The troops on foot, now running low on water and ammunition, have to spend the night where they are. Two Deltas are dropped off at the 6-4 crash site to retrieve the pilot, who is the lone survivor. However, they are quickly overwhelmed and they are killed at the crash site. Mike Durant, the pilot, is captured.

## Mass

Mass is defined as the grouping of the maximum amount of means with a view to reaching an objective in the least amount of time, with the maximum chances of success. It is a quantitative approach: success lies in superiority in number and in equipment<sup>27</sup>. This is a decisive factor for the militias. Despite the Americans’ clear technical superiority (vehicles, helicopters, precision fires, support power, troop cohesion, training), the



Somalis are able to repeatedly attack them simultaneously and on every point, without too much concern for human losses, raining fire on the Americans to destroy or, at least, immobilize them. We are therefore alerted to and reminded of the continual increase in firepower in irregular groups. This can in part be explained by technological progress, the mass spread of light weaponry (the infamous Kalashnikov and its offshoots), as well as the decompartmentalization orchestrated by globalization (The militia members allegedly learned how to make proper use of their RPG, particularly against helicopters, via training provided by Al Qaeda).

Mass’s value is only relative to the circumstances. Nonetheless, mass is becoming an increasingly decisive factor, especially between irregular groups equipped with increasingly powerful and accessible fire, and regular Western Forces who are certainly powerful, but whose reduced volumes make them particularly vulnerable to friction and attrition. Attrition describes the continual downturn in human means and equipment due to losses sustained during combat. Time-wise and space-wise, the Somalis find it easier to tolerate attrition than the Americans do, whose forces are only sized to a mission of less than an hour. This is especially apparent when the preparation of the equipment is shown and, later, when the soldiers complain to each other, “No, I didn’t bring the NOD, and you want to know why? Because you said, ‘you’re not gonna need that, dude, we’ll be back in a half hour’”. As such, the different elements are quickly doomed to a state where they can no longer maneuver effectively, as the WIA and KIA build up too fast. This fact reminds us that quantity is itself a quality on the ground.

The example of Shughart and Gordon, the two Deltas killed at the 6-4 crash site, reveals the underlying problem of special units. Deploying in very limited volume means that they can only uphold their initial superiority for a very short period. Beyond the first few seconds or minutes of fighting, the advantage quickly goes to the side with the decisive number of troops, or armor, or fire power... or even all three.

## THE WEIGHT OF ASYMMETRIC DYNAMICS

During the events of the Battle of Mogadishu, the dynamics of asymmetry played an even more decisive role than friction and the principles of war. Tactically speaking, the dynamics of asymmetry are just as valid for high intensity conflicts as they are for an expeditionary operation against an irregular adversary. Too often, asymmetry is - wrongly - understood as the weak pitted against the strong. However, all of military strategy focuses on the creation and exploitation of the differences in human, material, psychological and moral forces between two adversaries. The concept is more useful to describe a confrontation between two adversaries with radically different war goals. The force balance can be symmetrical (more or less equal, equivalent structures), or dissymmetrical (considerable difference in forces, different structures). The importance lies in how these are viewed once the conflict ends. One of them is often engaged during an expeditionary conflict, with very limited war goals, while the other is engaged in total war, determining the survival of an entire group, or at least, its existence as a political stakeholder. As such, General Guy Hubin suggests that the symmetric adversary refuses any symmetry in means, primarily because he refuses any symmetry in objectives<sup>28</sup>. This disparity in goals necessarily entails a difference in perspective across several domains, as shown by Joseph Henrotin<sup>29</sup> :

### Public opinions :

The Somalians tolerate several hundred losses, both civilians and fighters. For the Americans, the 19 KIA and, to a greater degree, the images of one of their soldiers, stripped and paraded in the middle of the street, provoke considerable shock. The political effects are completely disproportionate in relation to the operational impact of the 19 KIA and 84 WIA of the armed forces.

### The limitations of each other :

For an irregular fighter, the freedom of maneuver is, most often, far greater than that of his regular adversary. Irregular fighters seldom adhere to humanitarian law or the law of armed conflict. Regular fighters are very quickly viewed as invaders. Their logistical lines are complex to project, or, like in the film, political authorities do not allocate the means necessary for the conduct of operations.

### Temporalities :

This final factor stems from the two previous ones and is undoubtedly the most important. Irregular fighting is dominated by long time periods, the attrition of morale, capacities and the adverse will. Here, the US Forces are particularly vulnerable to these factors, as are most of the UN forces engaged in this type of conflict. This explains the paradoxical situation in which irregular fighters can suffer tactical setbacks and yet emerge victorious on the strategic level. In truth, it is enough for them to simply endure at the point where a regular adversary becomes exhausted. This point is effectively put across in the film, as there are several moments that mention the constraints places on the Forces by Washington are mentioned, as well as Washington's impatience. And, of course, during the interrogation scene with Mr. Atto. "You've been here, what? Six weeks?" – "Mr. Garrison, I think you shouldn't have come here. This is civil war. This is our war. Not yours." In itself, the raid is a success. But the losses sustained, the media reaction and the surprising nature of the battle, meant it was a defeat for the Americans.





**CONCLUSION**

Besides being excellent entertainment, *Black Hawk Down* calls on a viewer fluent in military matters to reflect on a series of very modern concepts. The difficulties facing reduced volumes of Western Forces, offset and served by cutting edge technologies, to support long term and abrasive engagements; an incapacity to grasp the political, social, and religious human components of strategic realities; the central reflection on the tactical phase, where technology matters the most, and an underestimation of how this reflection is a main factor of operational superiority, leading to political authorities overestimating the military tool's capability to conduct and win a war, and finally, the specific nature of military decision-making, with its extreme psychological constraints.

But the film also reveals another dimension, which is maybe, strategically speaking, the most important one of all. Influence, or the capacity to play with the perceptions in a manner practically equivalent to the use of force, is a major dimension across all strategy. This film, although it is not the only example of its type, reveals, as Gérard Chaliand suggests, the incredible capacity of the United States to give testament to and mythologize its own history<sup>30</sup>. Here, the point lies in how the film demonstrates the American society's capacity to make a great story out of events, which leaves its mark on those who watch it. Through art, military defeat can be transformed in our mindsets into a victory of influence. In 1993, a French unit entered into violent combat in Mogadishu. This time, that unit won. But who remembers that?<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Etat-Major de l'armée de terre, *Action Terrestre Future*, 2016  
<sup>2</sup>CDEC, *Forces terrestres 02, Tactique générale*, EMAT, 2008, <https://www.calameo.com/read/00514150962198e8ebfc2>  
<sup>3</sup>CICDE, *Concept interarmées (CIA)-01 : concept d'emploi des forces*, EMA, 2013  
<sup>4</sup>CDEF, EMP 60 641 : *Glossaire Français/Anglais de l'armée de terre*, EMAT, 2013

<sup>5</sup>Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, *Traité de Stratégie*, 7<sup>ème</sup> édition, p.334

<sup>6</sup>Carl von Clausewitz, *De la Guerre*, p.109

<sup>7</sup>Idem, p.110

<sup>8</sup>Idem, p.111

<sup>9</sup>Technique enabling descent from a helicopter via thick ropes

<sup>10</sup>Youtube, «The Battle of Al assay valley March 14 – 2009 (5/9)», 7m04, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4KVFxz7p39U>

<sup>11</sup>H. Coutau-Bégarie, *Traité de Stratégie*, 7<sup>ème</sup> édition, p.307

<sup>12</sup>Guy Labouérie, *réflexions et variations*, ADDIM, 1992

<sup>13</sup>Ferdinand Foch, *Des principes de la guerre*, p.95

<sup>14</sup>H. Coutau-Bégarie, *Traité de Stratégie*, 7<sup>ème</sup> édition, p.321

<sup>15</sup>Idem, p.315

<sup>16</sup>Julian S. Corbett, *Principes de la stratégie maritime*, p.115

<sup>17</sup>Idem, p.329

<sup>18</sup>The opening scene at the Red Cross camp is the perfect example. The Super 6-1 cannot engage in fire, *UN's jurisdiction*, 64, *we cannot intervene*.

<sup>19</sup>G. Labouérie, Art. cit., p.14

<sup>20</sup>Idem, p.15

<sup>21</sup>Idem, p.323

<sup>22</sup>Idem, p.324

<sup>23</sup>Michel Goya, Mogadiscio 1993, « l'Oryx et le Faucon noir », *Blog La Voie de l'épée*, <https://lavoiedelepee.blogspot.com/2013/10/mogadiscio-1993-loryx-et-le-faucon-noir.html>

<sup>24</sup>H. Coutau-Bégarie, *Traité de Stratégie*, 7<sup>ème</sup> édition, p.319

<sup>25</sup>Henri-Antoine Jomini, *Précis de l'art de la guerre*, p.83

<sup>26</sup>H. Coutau-Bégarie, *Traité de Stratégie*, 7<sup>ème</sup> édition, p.320

<sup>27</sup>Idem, p.327

<sup>28</sup>Guy Hubin, *La Guerre : une vision française*, p.193

<sup>29</sup>Joseph Henrotin, *Techno-guérilla et guerre Hybride, le pire des deux mondes*, p.38-39

<sup>30</sup>Interview with the author, 9 October 2018

<sup>31</sup>Michel Goya, « Pour le retour des Héros », *Blog La voie de l'épée*, <https://lavoiedelepee.blogspot.com/2015/03/pour-le-retour-des-heros.html>