Acceleration, aggressiveness, plasticity
Acceleration of the maneuver and increased aggressiveness should be the main contributions of collaborative combat. The innovative aspect is not so much in the combination of inter-service effects as in the acceleration of the detection/comprehension-analysis/strike loop.

The concentration of effects of dispersed units in the field can thus be obtained. Powered by by a near-perfect knowledge of the situation and guided by decision-support systems, the tactical commander will be able to focus on his maneuvering, becoming more fluid and less subject to friction. The implementation of the common strike capability, particularly in depth, makes it possible to envisage an increased capacity for destroying tactical units. The concept of indirect support should thus be completely renewed through its increasing integration with contact functions.

Moreover, reducing uncertainty¹⁹ will allow for greater flexibility in tactical arrangements and improved manoeuvring capabilities. The battle space will thus be less compartmentalized: a higher degree of interlocking with neighboring units and the enemy will be This offers the opportunity to conduct a non-linear, in-depth battle. The objective of information sharing is, among other things, to authorise rapid concentration-deconcentration manoeuvres that make it possible to conceal one's intentions from the enemy while preserving the safety of the devices.

Finally, tactical organizations should demonstrate renewed plasticity. The detailed knowledge of friendly situations and the flexibility of organisations will allow rapid reconfiguration, during action, of the organisation of units.²⁰. Adaptability, efficiency in combat will thus be largely optimized.

Although the characteristics expected from collaborative combat are attractive, it seems important not to be overwhelmed by its promises. Rather, it will be an "evolution", if not a rupture, of the land combat corresponding to the adaptation to a new phase of the conflict, marked by the loss of "operational comfort".²¹ and the return of a symmetrical threat.

Consequences to be controlled

If the need to reappropriate the fundamentals of high combat intensity is obvious, the implementation of collaborative combat brings challenges and questions that need to be addressed today in order to control the consequences and guarantee its operational efficiency.

A human challenge

Paradoxically, if the backbone of collaborative combat is primarily technological, the main challenge to overcome is human. The cognitive capacities of the soldier and especially of the leaders could indeed prove to be the limiting factor of its effectiveness.

The agility of the structures, offering the possibility of easily aggregating modules to a unit in contact or to support its operation by the coordination of numerous effects.²²The effects of this, however, need to be understood.

The most obvious is related to the risk of cognitive overload of the combatant. What will be the capacity of a section leader to lead a combat while taking into account the implementation of all the effects made available to him sometimes for only a few hours? Will he be able to use all the information necessary to conduct a more effective maneuver? Operating within hierarchical pyramid structures, the convergence of a massive influx of information and requests to tactical leaders could lead to a saturation of their analytical capacities and lead to the opposite effect of the one sought: paralysis.

Another question concerns the isolation of the combatant and the loss of the "tactical link".²³. How can the interoperability of entities operating within ad hoc communities of interest be preserved without knowing or seeing each other? The plasticity of organisations requires us to rethink the nature of the link between the formations that interact on the battlefield. Moreover, physical dispersion on the battlefield, and consequently the predominance of exchanges through digitized communication systems, is likely to further distort the human link and affect the resilience of devices. Indeed, the combativeness and the warlike spirit of a combat unit are nourished by the brotherhood of arms uniting the soldiers and on the meaning given to the action. If the collaborative combat soldier will benefit from a level of information unequalled in history, on the other hand, he will often be far from his leaders and will act within devices of low human density.

Taking these risks into account requires adaptations in many areas. In terms of training, the challenge will be to have soldiers and managers capable of dealing with more complex situations and to accommodate a high degree of autonomy. At the same time, technology will be used to lighten the "cognitive weight" of the soldier through the use of man-machine interfaces and decision support systems. Command organization will probably have to be rethought to rebalance the weight based on different levels. Above all, an effort will have to be made to improve interoperability between the different operational functions through the implementation of common and standardised procedures. The experience of special forces, whose operations have many similarities with collaborative combat, could serve as a laboratory for land forces in this respect.²⁴.

A technical challenge: combining information control and simplicity

Mastering the data flows generated by collaborative combat will be the main technical challenge. This implies the definition of a system that preserves information overload, establishes a reasoned sharing of information and obeys the principle of simplicity. The challenge will be to disseminate only the essentials, while avoiding overloading combatants, tactical leaders and command posts.

However the accumulation of knowledge will not be enough. Only decisional superiority being a guarantee of superiority in combat, it will be necessary to guard against the illusion of information superiority. In a combat where the tactical leader will increasingly refer to a reference situation fed in a collaborative manner, excessive reliance on information systems could expose units to surprise. As General de Gaulle put it, "to believe that one is in possession of a means of avoiding the surprises of circumstances is only to give the mind the illusion of being able to overlook the mystery of the unknown".²⁵.

The simplicity and clarity of the interfaces, especially at the tactical level, will be indispensable to avoid falling back into the limits of battle space digitisation (NEB).²⁶ and ensure optimal use of the information available to combatants. The use of artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things, must not obscure the essential: in a degraded environment and under fire, a collaborative combat can only be carried out on the condition that restricted and essential data is made available to the soldier through easily understandable interfaces.

An organizational challenge: which command structure to lead a collaborative combat?

The implementation of a form of collaborative combat will not rely solely on technical means of communication. Collaborative combat can only be effective if it is combined with an appropriate command organisation. Indeed, two pitfalls seem to be emerging: "tactical chaos" and the temptation of "over-centralisation". Shared knowledge provides units in contact with each other with an unprecedented knowledge of their environment and a capacity for initiative. It is imperative to supervise this initiative at the risk of losing all coherence in the overall manoeuvre. On the other hand, the temptation to overwhelm the hierarchical levels and to centralize to the extreme is accentuated. Maintaining traditional hierarchical structures would limit the scope of the promises of a collaborative combat. The organisation of the chain of command and subsidiarity will have to be rethought. The definition of a level of command responsible for battle area management, the re-articulation of tactical arrangements and the conduct of decentralised manoeuvres will be of crucial importance. True to the thinking of General McChrystal "Eyes on. Hands off"²⁷this level of command will be responsible for bringing additional agility to the maneuver without hindering the freedom of action and initiative of subordinate levels.

Beyond the effects of announcements and modes, the desire to create a land combat tool capable of conducting a more collaborative combat, based on a decentralised and non-linear manoeuvre, is a necessity. It responds both to the desire to maintain a technological lead over our adversaries and to the need to adapt to new forms of conflict.

However, collaborative combat will not only be the result of a technological and capability-based approach. An effective form of combat can only be born from in-depth reflection in the fields of doctrine, command organisation, training and education. This reflection must enable the development of a balanced land force, avoiding "all-technological" choices and emphasising the capacity to adapt. Future forms of warfare are by nature difficult to predict. Faced with an enemy that will always seek to circumvent the power of its adversary, it is essential to develop a combat tool that is capable of adapting. If it is to be more "collaborative", tomorrow's joint combat will have to be above all "adaptive", at the risk of suffering cruel tactical surprises.

19 General Michel Yakovlev, Theoretical Tactics, 3rd ed paperback, 2016.
20 This notion of organisational agility capable of permanent reconfigurations is notably reflected in the appearance of the notion of "echelon" in the exploratory doctrine of the SCORPION combat. The echelon makes it possible to go beyond the rigid articulation of units. One of the conditions for the effectiveness of these echelons will be their ability to evolve, to aggregate capabilities to adapt to their missions.
21 Future Land Action, Land Staff, 2016.

22 Indirect fire, helicopter fire support, air-to-ground support for example.
23 Guy Hubin addresses this observation under the concept of "battlefield readability". Guy Hubin, Perspectives tactiques, 3rd edition, Économica, 2009, pp. 92-93. "...] we are going to have to question the continuity and therefore the solidity of the tactical link. This continuity was based on both physical and psychological proximity achieved within well-formatted structures [...]".

24 The division of responsibilities between the tactical commander, the various modules deployed (land, airmobiles, aircraft, UAVs, etc.) and the tactical commander's staff is a key factor in the success of the operation. 24 The division of responsibilities between the tactical commander, the various modules deployed (land, airborne, aircraft, UAVs, etc.) and the command echelon sometimes located several hundred kilometres away in charge of coordinating the various vectors could provide a relevant basis for reflection, as could the management of the isolation of units and the development of robust operational procedures.
25 Charles de Gaulle, Le fil de l'Épée and other writings, Plon, Paris, 1994.
26 Cahier du Retex,Des électrons dans la brousse, CDEF, 2007. As early as 2006, the operational experimentation of the 6th BLB in Côte d'Ivoire, despite significant contributions, had highlighted the NEB's vulnerabilities: management and prioritization of the mass of information, complexity of system implementation, "cognitive pressure" on decision-makers had been identified.

27 General Stanley Mc Chrystal, Team of Teams, New rules of engagement for a complex world, Portfolio Penguin, 2015, p. 218.