The deterioration of the security situation since January 2015 has led to the consequent engagement of the armies on the national territory (TN). This commitment has highlighted the need for the military chief to have a clear vision of his environment in the conduct of operations in the TN.

Furthermore, he stressed the need for the organic head (chief of corps or chief of right-of-way) to have a better understanding of the threats to his or her right-of-way, in order to contribute more to the safety of military personnel and their families. This observation led to the creation by TN COM of the "Information for Operational Purposes" Working Group (IFO WG), bringing together various army and military actors. This WG led to the drafting of a joint doctrinal reflection project, RDIA 2-60-2, which could lead to several concrete projects.

First of all, RDIA 2-60-2 is a reflection on information for operational purposes (IFO) in the land operational environment, on national territory. IFO encompasses all the elements capable of enlightening the military leader's understanding of his environment. This doctrinal reflection is based first of all on a brief description of the threats and their effects on armies. It then gives rise to a description and mapping of the actors involved in the production of operational information on the NT. Finally, it proposes avenues for reflection to improve the production and exchange of information, which is indispensable to the operational and organic military leader on the national territory.

Following the drafting of this project, the IFO WG should continue its work on the concepts mentioned in this document. In this respect, the Committee for Exchange and Information (CDEI), consolidates the role of the military delegate in the field of information exchange.As such, the CDEI (CDEI) consolidates the role of the DMD as a major player in situation assessment and as a facilitator in this area for the various military entities present in his department. This structure would consist of bringing together the military actors of the department around the DMD to exchange information for operational purposes. This initiative could thus strengthen the DMD's capacity for autonomous situation assessment, in the conduct of Operation SENTINELLE, and in its prerogatives to ensure the security of rights-of-way, soldiers and their families.

In addition, the RDIA proposes the creation of a documentary and events database (BDD) to improve the analysis of security events. A DDB, based on the structure of the MUNEX DDB of the Pôle Interarmées de traitement du danger MUNEX (PIAM), i.e. the DDB of the EOD teams used to to catalogue MUNEX incidents, could make it possible to map and classify, in an intuitive and visual way, the security events identified by the military on the national territory. This tool, which requires a maximum of one hour of training to use, would bring undeniable added value to the analysis of the reports of military personnel present on the national territory.

Thus, the proposals set out in RDIA 2-60-2 could help to meet the need for an autonomous assessment capability for operational and organic military leaders in the national territory, toThe proposals set out in RDIA 2-60-2 could meet the need of operational and organic military commanders for an autonomous assessment capability in the NR, firstly by improving the flow of information exchanges at departmental level through the CDEI, and secondly by setting up a technical tool for rapid and rigorous analysis of the information gathered.