The ruse of war is particularly important, if not predominant, among the strategists and military leaders of all time. According to Army General Lobov...¹ Two fundamental forms of war trickery can be considered: dissimulation and deception".² ». The verb "to disappoint", which means to deceive, to seduce by an appearance that promises more than it gives, is synonymous with "to lure", the definition of which is to attract by some deceptive hope.

I. Anatomie d’un process

In military terms, the action of deception consists of implementing a whole set of measures designed to impose on the adversary a false representation of the real situation, that of the weapons, safety and support of friendly forces. It also involves "hiding" the nature and future course of operations. This misrepresentation is accomplished primarily by premeditatedly drawing the enemy's attention to facts, intelligence and objectives, while at the same time disguising the real situation.This misrepresentation is done primarily by premeditatedly drawing the enemy's attention to facts, intelligence and objectives, while distracting his attention from the real plans and projects, as well as from the areas planned for future operations and the actual concentrations of troops and materiel. The experience of war shows that the enemy's disappointment is achieved through three distinct actions: disinformation, demonstration and imitation.³.

The ds websiteation

It is the premeditated dissemination of information that does not correspond to reality on, at the same time, the composition, the situation, the system, the availability and operational capability of friendly troops, their coordination, their means of action, the plans and intentions of the command, the destination of armaments, equipment and objectives.

Demonstrations

They are presented as a "comedy" played out to the enemy with specially assigned units and means and featuring activitiesThe aim is to draw the enemy's attention to diversionary directions (sectors) in order to distract him from the real sectors (directions) of friendly forces' activity.

Imitation

It is the reproduction of plausible clues, specific to the real activity of troops and objectives, by installing false objectives, creating false force groupings, a false electronic radio situation, all by means of models of weapons and equipment, fictitious targets and false engineering works.

II. Leurrer, vpersonal olonté of the leader to the maneuver

The will to "lure" one's enemy is as old as war itself. The Bible itself cites various examples of this process⁴. Military history is littered with incidents similar to the taking of Gibha. One need only reread the campaigns of Alexander to be convinced of this.⁵Hannibal6^andCaesar.⁷. At Hastings, William the Conqueror...⁸ Realizing that the Norman cavalry could not break the English infantry, as long as the latter remained united, he pretended to retreat to command the turn as the opposing foot ceased to remain grouped. On 24 July 1712, after building bridges over the Sambre and making a feint towards Landrecies, Villars⁹ escaped by a rapid night march to assault the then bald camp of Denain... It is, in the above-mentioned cases, a simple aspect of the manoeuvre, aiming to act from the strong to the weak. But, the history we

teaches that on a more general level, the conduct of the manoeuvre does not necessarily imply surprise. At least, if there is surprise in the defeated, it will be intellectual, not tactical. Thus, in May 1940, the Germans swept through the Ardennes, without even bothering to encrypt the radio messages, driving at night with all lights on. When Guderian¹⁰ crosses the Meuse, there is no feint, no notion of decoy; the High Command of the Wehrmacht has the adequate tool and is satisfied to apply the famous principle of Colonel de Grandmaison¹¹: "Speed is the best security".

It thus appears that the will to mislead the opponent is not necessarily linked to the idea of manoeuvring. Conversely, the idea of manoeuvre can be entirely conditioned by this will and the Battle of Austerlitz (December 2, 1805) remains, in this regard, a model of its kind. Thus, Napoleon voluntarily settled to the north of Vienna in order to incite the coalitions to an overwhelming movement, aimed at cutting him off from the Austrian capital. He abandoned the Pratzen Plateau to them, to give them the impression that their progression towards the South-West would be solidly covered, facing the North-West. His left is well attached to the small eminence of the Santon which commands the road to Brünn, he leaves Davout on his right.¹²...struggling with 14 battalions against 60 Austro-Russian troops... In the north of Kobelnitz, in the middle of the woods on either side of the Goldbach, he maintained the major part of his army until the time when Tsar Alexander¹³deaf to Kutusov's advice...¹⁴...will make the expected mistake. Austerlitz represents the triumph of a plan designed to deceive the opponent. Under the strategic stakes, the Austro-Russians are incited to cut the road to Vienna, not only because of the apparent articulation of the Grande Armée, but also because of the rumours deliberately spread by Napoleon's entourage of an incessant retreat towards the South.

Napoleon was all the more certain that the Russians were going to fall into the trap, that he was not unaware of the mediocrity of their generals, and that he was aware of the pride to which was added the tsar's lack of military science. From a tactical point of view, it is Davout, whose means are too weak to prevent the coalition from penetrating into Sokolnitz, who "sucks" the enemy. Just as in Guibha, the children of Israel camouflage themselves in ambush, the bodies of Soult¹⁵by Bernadotte¹⁶and the Imperial Guard hide in the woods and come out. However, in doing so, Napoleon took the serious risk of playing on the enemy's intentions. What would have happened if the tsar had adopted another plan of manoeuvre? All the more so as the coalition forces were also trying to deceive the French.

Thus, locally, two Russian regiments, in the fog, try to retake the Pratzen plateau by being preceded by officers shouting that they are Bavarians. One can also quote the furious attack on Bagration¹⁷ on the road to Brünn, which is intended to divert Napoleon's attention north. It is so vigorous that the Santon remains in Russian hands for a few moments. However, the Emperor risks nothing. Even if the Tsar had sniffed out the ambush, the articulation of the Grande Armée allowed for other manoeuvres.

While being the perfect model of the trap, Austerlitz is not unique in the imperial annals. A few years earlier, in preparation for the expedition to Egypt (1798), Bonaparte had already used the "decoy". He was given the title of Commander-in-Chief of the English army and, ostensibly, inspected some 150,000 men articulated along the English Channel coast, while parallel to this, he was given the title of Commander-in-Chief of the British army.32,000 soldiers were discreetly concentrated and then embarked in the various Mediterranean ports from Marseilles to Civitavecchia. So much so that when the English fleet, finally alerted, presented itself in front of Toulon, it had been almost a month since the French escalation had taken the army from the East. In the same way, the so-called Reserve Army that won the victory of Marengo (14 June 1800) met clandestinely during the month of April 1800 in the region of Genève-Lausanne, while its formation was ostensibly announced by the First Consul in Dijon, where only a few battalions of conscripts and veterans appeared. To these distant examples, which could be multiplied, the "decoy" appears to be the personal work of the leader responsible for the maneuver.

III. Le leurreone of the aspects of la disappointment18

In 1917, during the Palestine campaign, led by General Allenby on the Allied side, the Emperor was able to take advantage of a new enemy force.¹⁹It is a fact that "disappointment" is beginning to take on its modern form, thanks to a harmonious combination of specific decisions by the chief and technical measures designed and developed, or orchestrated directly by his staff.

To break the Turkish forces entrenched in October 1917, around East Gaza further south-east, General Allenby decided to make an effort on his right, leading the decisive attack on Beersheba. At the same time, he decided to mount on his left, towards Gaza, a diversionary operation that would be supported from the sea, in the form of bombardments carried out by a British squadron. These decisions will be translated by a corresponding articulation of the means at its disposal and by specific missions given to the units. At the same time, the General Staff began to work on the technical side. Knowing first of all that the Turks had just deciphered one of the English codes, he would, with this code, pass on false messages, in the midst of others, with no immediate connection with the chief's idea of manoeuvre. For example, while the offensive was planned for the last days of October, a telegram announced that Allenby was expected on the 29th of the month in Suez, from where he was not to return until November 4. The staff also set up a stratagem: He "constitutes" a bag containing various objects, including a private letter sent from London announcing the birth of the general's son and a pseudo-reply from the officer giving the impression that no imminent operation was planned, etc. The general's staff also set up a ploy. On 10 October, an English patrol voluntarily clashed with its Turkish counterpart and the famous satchel was lost... the Turkish NCO who brought it back was brilliantly congratulated. False telegrams and objects are exploited... the Turkish reserves are concentrated on Gaza. The naval bombardment and the planned diversionary operation on Gaza begins on October 30, completing the deception of the Ottoman command. Thus, when the real table attack is launched on the night of October 30-31 on Beersheba, the British find few people facing them.

By November 7, 1917, the Turks were in the midst of a rout. Later, Allenby, having noticed that the clouds of dust raised by the cavalry could be seen at very great distances, he simulated a false movement of the cavalry by hanging branches ofThe English general is using a technique from antiquity.

On the French side, disappointment was not to be outdone. We can cite the example of General Gouraud²⁰On the night of 14 to 15 July 1918, he withdrew the bulk of his forces 3 km behind the line of contact in order to "push the German attack into the void". Prior to this, his staff took care to fabricate, on several occasions, falsified documents suggesting that the Canadian army would be engaged to launch an offensive .

During the Second World War, the notion of disappointment took on a growing importance and a broad spectrum. First of all, it was aimed at the field. Thus, in 1940, the Russians succeeded in handing the military attaché at the German embassy to the USSR with false maps of the Republic.The maps showed, from West to East, five roads that did not exist and a dozen imaginary hamlets, deliberately removing the ravines and the many marshes in the region. At the time of the decisive engagement of Alam-el-Halfa (August 31, 1942), the British, who are not unaware that the Afrika Korps knows the terrain badly, abandon a state car in the desert.in which is voluntarily left an informed map indicating to the South a practically non-existent route, while the coastal road, excellent, is carried as then little usable. The excellent coastal road is worn as being unusable at the time. The attempt is also made to disguise the articulation of one's forces. In January-February 1940, troops were formed, initially destined for Finland, and in May they were shown off in Narvik. During the landing of Sicily, diversionary air and naval actions are carried out towards the western end of the island, while the allied effort is exerted on the south-eastern coasts.

Similarly, for Operation Overlord, sections of artificial harbours were temporarily moored opposite Boulogne in order to make it look like a landing in the Pas-de-Calais. During the capture of Okinawa, a naval demonstration was carried out in front of the south-eastern end of the island, while the actual landing succeeded on the west coast. Simulated objectives were simulated in order to divert the enemy's fire. As the Allied air force intensifies its bombardment east of the Rhine, the Germans create fake installations, fake runways, fake dwellings made of light materials, limited to walls and roofs. The whole thing is drowned out by partial emissions of artificial fog. The record of disappointment goes to the fake city of Stuttgart, created like the real one, in a loop of the Neckar. An important objective due to the presence of the Mercédès factories, the city is "rebuilt" 30 km from the real one... out of the nine raids carried out on the objective, only one bomb falls on Stuttgart...^₂₁. The deception may also concern the area of action and the timing of the decisive action. The Battle of El-Alamein (23 October-3 November 1942) is a perfect illustration of this. Marshal Montgomery²² intends to make its effort in the coastal sector and decides to lead the enemy to believe that the bulk of its offensive will be carried out at the other wing of its device. The British built a fake pipeline to the south, pretending that it would not be operational until November. At the same time, a month before the attack, the British transferred a large number of carcasses from fake trucks to the coastal sector. At night, tanks and artillery, ostensibly concentrated in the south, moved towards the coastal sector to hide under the dummy trucks. The German reconnaissance aircraft, which Montgomery did not hinder, took a large number of photographs, the interpretation of which would deceive Marshal Rommel.²³. The Germans give in the panel. In October 1943, in order to make the Germans believe that an operation was being prepared from Corsica to central Italy, General Patton²⁴ and June²⁵go to the island, accompanied by sailors who, in the Bastia region, measure the depth of the creeks likely to be used as embarkation beaches for the occasion. The axis forces, alerted, reacted by transferring two German infantry divisions stationed on the Italian peninsula to central Italy. This transfer will have the effect of relieving the action of the 5th US Army engaged on the Volturno River.²⁶.

The list of deception operations is obviously not exhaustive. They are innumerable, and the very notion of "deception" is so important that we come to create a "deception plan" that is closely linked to the plan of the manoeuvre. It includes the following headings:

• a goal to achieve: that is, how the force commander wants to deceive the enemy within the space-time frame of his own maneuver;

• an idea of deception that specifies how the leader intends to achieve the goal;

• the directives of the higher authority, it being understood that these measures are the corollary of decisions taken at higher levels;

• any amendments to be made;

• the implementing agencies, their particular mission, the means they will need.

 Conclusion

Disappointment, the importance of which in the 20th century has just been praised, does appear to be a possible component of the leader's freedom of action. One even evokes then even "a deception manoeuvre", that is to say a lot of artifices which aim at accrediting the leader's freedom of action.The consideration of this will favour the real progress of friendly operations. Moreover, it is not forbidden to imagine the unfolding of "a deception manoeuvre" simultaneously with "a true manoeuvre". However, a caveat is necessary: the former must not prejudice the latter, by diminishing the available potential below which the true manoeuvre cannot succeed.

What remains today, within the land forces, of a possible "deception manoeuvre"? Of course a doctrine exists, but who uses it? Moreover, in the joint domain, no document is dedicated to deception.²⁷. While threats of denial of access concern both non-state and state actors, the notions of 'decoy' and 'deception' may be of renewed interest.

1 Vladimir-Nikolayevich Lobov, born in 1935, Russian military thinker and theorist, author of various manuals on military tactics, who gives an important part to the ruse of war in the conduct of operations. He is notably the author of an article entitled: "The role and place of the ruse of war in military art", Stratégique, number 55, 1992, 16 pages.

2 JeanVincent Holeindre, La ruse de la force, une autre histoire de la stratégie, Perrin, Paris, 2017, states that the ruse "is a tactical procedure combining concealment and deception with the aim of provoking surprise".

3 For land forces, the doctrine of deception (EMP 20561-T TA 172 of 1 March 2010) defines the three principles of deception which are: concealment, diversion and intoxication.

4 Verses 29 and following of the Book of Judges: "After ambushing around Gibeah, the children of Israel said, 'Let us pretend to flee and lure the Benjamites into the ways out of the city...'.

5 Alexander the Great (356 BC - 323 BC).

6 Hannibal Barca (247 BC - 183 BC).

7 Julius Caesar (100 BC - 44 BC).

8 William the Conqueror (c. 1027-1087).

9 Claude-Louis-Hector de Villars (1653-1734), Marshal of France.

10 Heinz Guderian (1888-1954).

11 François-Jules-Louis Loyzeau de Grandmaison (1861-1915).

12 Louis-Nicolas d'Avout or Davout (1770-1823), Duke of Auerstaedt, Prince of Eckmühl, Marshal of France.

13 Alexander I of Russia (1777-1825).

14 Mikhail Illarionovich Golenichtchev Kutuzov (1745-1813).

15 Jean de Dieu Soult (1769-1851), Duke of Dalmatia, Marshal of France.

16 Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte (1763-1844), prince of Ponte-Corvo, marshal of France.

17 Piotr-Ivanovitch Bagration (1765-1812).

18 "The word disappointment has been used since at least the 15th century," says Lieutenant-Colonel Hémez, who quotes Monsieur Coutau-Bégarie in "Ruse", in T. de Montbrial and J. Klein (eds.), Dictionnaire de stratégie, PUF, 2007.

19 Edmund-Henry-Hynman Allenby (1861-1936).

20 Henri-Joseph-Eugène Gouraud (1867-1946).

21 An identical stratagem had been developed in France in 1918. A fake Gare de l'Est railway station in the northern suburbs of Paris was created from scratch to divert German air raids at night.

22 Bernard Montgomery (1887-1976).

23 Erwin Rommel (1891-1944).

24 George Patton (1885-1945).

25 Alphonse Juin (1888-1967).

26 River located between Caserta and Cassino, south-east of the latter town.

27 "Rehabilitating operations of deception: three questions for Rémy Hémez", Army Lieutenant Colonel, Ultima ratio, the blog of the ifri Centre for Security Studies, 5 July 2018.