Modern command systems are therefore hampered in operations, by a very high degree of complexity that is not only related to that of the environment, but also well often to the systems and command organization themselves-themselves. This complexity, which varies according to the context, always of the various commitments, can be characterized either as follows by porosity, or by a partitioning between levels deci­levels, between media, between contributors to the resolution of the between kinetic effects and informational actions, and between functional chains within the same staff.

This state of affairs isfurther exacerbated by the growing complexity of the implementation ofcommand support tools (information systems and procedures); an increase in the expertise required to acquire, processtheinformation deemednecessary to carry out a mission; and theneed for the expertise required to acquire, processand use theinformation deemednecessary to carry out a mission.The growingdissociation between the operational, media and politicaltempos ; and finally, the growing need to take into account the legal and media implications of operations. Again,these findings may vary from one engagement to another. The exercise is therefore always delicate when it comes to discerning salient trends, through the reports and feedback from headquarters engaged in operationsover the last two decades.It is therefore necessary to remain cautious and measured with regard to the immediate conclusions that canbe drawn from them. Without claiming to cover them all, this section therefore aims to describe the proven factors of complexity thatcharacterise the current operational command structures inFrance.

Let us first look at the problem of the decision-making levels. The classic distinction since the mid XXe century, and intellectually very comfortable, of three levels distinct (strategic, operational and tactical), in principle allows for to establish responsibilities and clarify the areas of action of all the actors involved in the design and management of the project. operations. This differentiation thus makes it possible to organize the decision making, generally based on a logic of theatres of operations, the prerogatives of each and the issues at stake in progress. However, under certain circumstances, the tac­tick may temporarily escape the control of the strategic and operative, due to the urgency of an initial deployment, as was the case when Operation Serval was launched. in Mali, early 2013. Thus, due to extensions, problems with the communications, or simply the speed of the movement of the­particularly in the dynamic phases of a manoeuvre, traditional levels of decision making can be mechanical­mentally compartmentalized. Nevertheless, recent French commitments show that, in reality, these levels can more generally be intertwined to very different and fluctuating degrees, to the point where they are that even if they are geographically differentiated, or even if they are identifying to particular entities in the decision-making chain (CPCO²² - components - tactical units), their interactions may be marked by high porosity. From In fact, the effects produced at the tactical level are likely to have an impact on the impacts at senior levels (Strategic Corporal²³), which can naturally lead to a temptation to enter the higher level in the conduct of operations by levels subordinates. The variable nature of this entryism is generally related to the importance of the issues covered and can lead to an audit.­table micro­management. That's what we call crushing... levels, when a higher level monopolizes some of the tasks of its subordinates. This temptation to re-examine theconcept of subsidiarity varies according to the personalities of those responsible at each level, but is permanent and increasingly facilitated by technological progress. This porosity between levels is even more evident in the field of joint support and sustainment, particularly in theareas of air supportandsustainment , intelligence, CIS, logistics andsupport. It is generally related to thescarcity of resources and vectors engaged, sometimes simultaneously in several operations. This scarcity usually involves centralized management and rarely fully delegated to the tactical levels .

Thus, the operational or strategic levels are often not fully delegated to the tactical level.­The management team is responsible for coordinating, synchronising and regulating the oc­of these counted resources, to the benefit of tactical actors who are therefore deprived of flexibility and freedom of action necessary for the accomplishment of their mission. This state of affairs generates often creates friction between potential beneficiaries, imposes de facto cumbersome planning, coordination measures and sometimes significant re-articulations, which are not always understood by the subordinate levels. Logics doctrinal "ment/concurrent" or "supportive/supportive" doctrines and an effects-based approach, are often insufficient to achieve the desired results.­planning, as well as driving, to avoid shouting and screaming.­the Force, when prioritizing the allocation of of counted vectors. Re-impose clear decision levels and often appears to be an attractive solution, but it's not always easy to the necessary flexibility, imposed by the reactors, is difficult to accommodate.­the geographical, and above all political, environment.­co-strategic, of each operation. The American concept of multi-domain battle advocating the decompartmentalization of native levels of decision making, and as such, brings interesting perspectives­The study of the health risks to be studied, if they are transposable to the systems.­French commanders. Reducing complexity requires therefore necessarily through a clarification of the roles of each and cannot avoid the renewed subsidiarity granted to to each subordinate level, which is currently very often put to the test. often undermined for the time being. If ATF²⁴ explicitly insists on the imperative of a preser­vation of this subsidiarity in the performance of the order­Nevertheless, one can legitimately question the aspect of the incantatory of this assertion. The scarcity of the means granted in operations and increasing communication capabilities, brought by new technologies are two trends which should in principle not fundamentally change in the future. the future.

A second factor of complexity linked to our current command architectures is acertain semantic confusion which contributes to the lack of legibility of the different decision-making levels .²⁵The Commission will continue to monitor the implementation of this Directive, in particular in the case of commitmentsin amultinational context. The superimposition of national C2 channels and those of the alliance concerned (ad hoc coalition, NATO or UN)very often generates a complexity that is not necessarily solved by the adoption of NATO standards.Differentunderstandingsand different applications of NATO terminology, even though it is agreed byall contributing nations, is often the source of friction, sometimes even between and within components of the same national contingent .What exactly is thesituation ? Theneed to adopt the principle of modularity from the end of the1990s and the return to the Alliance's integrated structure led French doctrine to integrate, for reasons of interoperability, a number of NATO concepts and their terminology, whichnow also apply to the command of national operations .According to the doctrine²⁶Inthis way, command can be exercised in three ways. It canbe described as integral, operational and tactical.Integral commandis "the military authority and responsibility that a commander hasto give orders to subordinates.It covers all aspects of military operations and administrationandexists only in national armies. It applies at all levels from the CEMA in France to unit commanders .Operational Command (OPCOM) is " the authority conferred on a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units , toreallocate forces and to retain or delegate operational control (OPCON), tactical command (TACOM) or tactical control (TACON ) asnecessary". This authority does notincludeadministrative responsibilities. OPCOM allows a commander to use components of assigned units separately, but does notauthorize him to OPCOM allows a commander to use the components of assigned units separately, but does not authorizethecommander tochange the basic organization of a unit to the extent that the unit cannotbe reassigned anew task or redeployed. A commander willgenerally exerciseOPCOM through commanders of subordinate components of a task force .TACOM is the "authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to the forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission directed by thesuperior authority. TACOM is narrower in scope than OPCOM, but includes the authority to delegate or retain TACOM/TACON.Control can be exercised at the operational, tactical or administrativelevels .OPCON is the "authority delegated toa commander to direct assigned forces to accomplish specific missions or tasks related to the mission.The OPCON is the "delegated authority to a commander to direct assigned forces to accomplish specific missions or tasks thatareusually limited in nature ,location or time ; todeploysuchunits and to retain or delegatetactical control of such units . Commanders may inturn delegate OPCON and TACON of assigned forces . OPCONallows commanders tobenefit from the immediate employment of assigned forces without having to obtain the consent of a higher authority .TACON is the " detailed direction and control of themovements or manoeuvres necessary to carry out assigned missions or tasks .

In general, TACON is only delegated in cases where two or more­several units, which are not placed under the same OPCON, are into a cohesive tactical unit for a specific period of time.­liar. The administrative control (ADCON) is the " management or auto­(b) the right to exercise control over subordinate or other training courses in respect of concerns administrative matters such as administration staff, supplies, services and other issues that are not part of the operational missions of these formations.­subordinate or other ». Let's face it, the need for intero­the permeability behind these semantic distinctions does not contribute to the not necessarily to the readability and innate understanding of this terminology. In practice, however, this standardization has unduly contributed to assigning to each hierarchical level the exclusivity of a particular level of authority generating, again, Tensions between the different levels of responsibility for the operation­and a growing complexity in the organisation of the command.­The result is that it is a dement. This situation is sometimes made even more difficult by more complex with the superimposition of several different chains.­in the same area of operation. This is the case with the chain of command for Special Forces and the com­both of which are directly dependent on the operational from the strategic level. Thus, the freedom of action of a tactical leader in its own area of responsibility, can be seriously seen hampered by operations decided by the EMA and for which he will frequently be required to take, at a minimum, measures of "deconfliction» and in the most compelling cases, to provide or support, sometimes challenging the process, and sometimes­of its own manoeuvre.The third major factor in making processes more complex decision-making process is linked to the continued separation between operations environment, and in particular between the airborne environment and the earth's environment. Theorized by the Italian Douhet, available in M.O.s by the Americans Mitchell, then Marshall, the decisive use of air power has emerged, first with the Spanish War and then, during the Second World War with the Blitzkrieg German. The intensive use of the airforce , either autonomously and at the strategic level (strategic bombing), or in support of theland forces where their contribution was often decisive (crossing theMeuse in May 1940, operations in the Meuse , etc.) was amajor factor .TheCobra operation in July 1944 and the end of the German offensive in theArdennes in January 1945) made it possible to establish the need, in the post-war period, toformalise air-ground coordination that the great thinkers of theair force had not initially envisaged .The notion of air-land combat was thus confirmed during theIsraeli-Arab conflicts, then definitively inscribed in the doctrinal landscape with theadvent of the American Air-land Battle doctrine inthe 1980s,then its consecration during operations in the Persian Gulf in 1991 .Popularized by Guynemer , Clostermann, Tanguy and Laverdure and Hollywood productions , air combat has a large place inthe collectiveima ginary ofswirling confrontations and fighter missions .

However, the commitments of the Western air forces­the last three decades have actually been the main reason for the­characterized by the generalization of air strikes on the ground. very close and very precise. The omnipresent media coverage of operations now means reducing the number of operations to a minimum.­mum collateral damage and the risk of fratricidal fire. Thus, apart from strategic targeting missions, the major majo­rity of air combat actions conducted in Iraq, Afghanistan, Afghanistan and Afghanistan.nistan, sub-Saharan Africa or Libya, has consisted of supporting troops on the ground, or hit ground targets in the field.­foundryman to prepare the action of the friendly troops. For all that and in fact, the implementation of this air-ground coordination is essential for the­The process is not without frictions, especially in France. As the Air Force Lieutenant General pointed out in 2010 Gaviard²⁷, « ...air operations have, since the end of the pre­World War I, were mainly designed and controlled in a centralized manner andexecuted in a decentralized manner .Air operations are nowadays planned in avery central ized mannerforreasonsmainly related to their specific characteristics andthetargets allocated to them by the theatre commander .The versatility of modernair vectors further reinforces this centralisation.

However, this hypercentralization­may prove to be clearly insufficient­health when it comes to support missions. direct to ground forces. These missions are currently planned in "sErie". by land officials first, then air afterwards and not in an integrated way.­grée "This hypercentralization justi­by the scarcity of airborne vectors, and by the complexity of coordinating third dimension actors (manned aircraft, drones, artillery), mechanically unblocked on a partitioning of planning processes specific to specific planning processes, whose tempos are significantly different. Indeed, forces operating directly in the ground environment suffer sometimes in driving, a lack of flexibility and responsiveness tactical, to obtain effects they cannot control the vectors of which they are not in control.­necessary for their realization.

In this field again, the American multi-domain concept of operations²⁸ takes note of this partitioning of environments and extends it to the other dimensions of the battlefield (cyber, space, maritime), by establishing concrete proposals aimed at decompartmentalising these environments. The army for its part, is proposing, with ATF and through the experiments conducted to develop the future Scor doctrine­pacesetter, to consolidate already existing integrative capacities, to aggregate at the lowest tactical level the capabilities of com­mand & control inter­mIlieux.

22 Cbetween the planning and conduct of operations.

23 Lhe "strategic corporal" is a concept developed by General Charles C. Krulak, in an article in Marine Corps Gazette dealing with the concept of Three Blocks War in 1999. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm

24 Future Earth Action: Tomorrow is won today, op. cit.

25 L nterested readers may usefully refer to a very enlightening article by Colonel Christophe de Lajudie, offering a clear and perceptive vision of the situation in the region.­of these notions that have become complex. OPCON, TACON... like the moon? Transfers and delegations of authority: confusion and contradictions. https://www.penseemiliterre.fr/plugins/cdec/pdf/to_pdf.php?entry=268

26 Joint Glossary of Operational Terminology, CICDE, 2013 edition. Op. cit.

27 Gaviard, Jean-Patrick, The problematic of C2: context and stakes, Proceedings of the March 8, 2010 ACSS Workshops: Commanding Flight Operations : towards a new C2?, Thinking French wings,2011.https://aa-ihednmidi-pyrenees.org/IMG/pdf/Presentation_Beauvois_sur_l_espace_en_2011.pdf28C lée, Fabrice, The Multi-Domain Battle concept. What can be deduced from the studies of the US Army and the US Marine Corps on the evolution of joint combat? au XXIe century? Doctrine Letter No. 11, CDEC, 2018. https://www.penseemiliterre.fr/ressources/30091/01/lettre-11.pdf

28C lée, Fabrice, The Multi-Domain Battle concept. What can be deduced from the studies of the US Army and the US Marine Corps on the evolution of joint combat? au XXIe century? Doctrine Letter No. 11, CDEC, 2018. https://www.penseemiliterre.fr/ressources/30091/01/lettre-11.pdf