ON THE "INDIRECT" NATURE OF THE EASTERN VICTORY

According to General Beaufre, commenting directly on Liddel Hart, the indirect approach (6) "consists in the military operational field of not taking the bull by the horns, that is to say, of not taking the bull by the horns".that is to say, not to confront the enemy in a direct showdown, but to approach the enemy only after having worried him.The central idea of this conception is to reverse the opposing balance of power.The central idea of this conception is to reverse the opposing balance of forces before the battle by a manoeuvre and not by a combat... This central idea is translated by a geographical manoeuvre... " (7)

Thus defined, the indirect approach is not much different from manoeuvring, in the general sense that it is understood when one says of someone "that he has been manoeuvred". This is, in fact, what our British friends mean when they call it "the Manoeuvrist Approach" which they oppose to " the attritionist approach", the direct approach or approach by attrition, of which the Battle of the Somme seems to them the archetype.

As soon as the Battle of the Marne was over, some leaders in France and England became aware of the new impossibility of achieving the decisive strategic result sought on the French front. Because of the combined effects of technical and industrial progress and mobilization systems, the entire width of the battlefield was now blocked by a continuous fact saturated with armaments on which the breakthrough would prove costly in human lives and resources and would require too much time to be exploited.

From October 1914 to March 1915, several personalities defended the idea of an attack on the Central Powers by an intervention in the Balkans: Castelnau, commander of the 2nd army; Aristide Briant, on January 1st 1915; Gallieniin February; Lloyd George to Prime Minister Asquith at the same time; and above all,before all the others, General Franchet d'Espérey, commander of the 5th army, in a memoire delivered on 6 October 1914 to President Poincaré in person and presented to the government shortly afterwards by the Speaker of the House. (8).

Throughout the war, these ideas would give rise to political confrontations within governments and staffs between thethose who believe it is illusory to squander the necessary forces on the main front for uncertain purposes. They will lead to the attempt against the Straits (Dardanelles, Gallipoli) and its avatar, the Salonika expedition. The results obtained seem rather to give reason to the apostles of the concentration of efforts on the western front. In the East, in the absence of a substantive agreement on the goals of war, the French and British act mainly to provoke the entry into the war of new allies, at the price of contradictory promises that will inevitably lead to a flawed peace. After the failure of the direct attack against the straits, the entry into the war of Romania could have been used to try to break the Bulgarian lock by a joint attack on two fronts, with the effect of re-establishing the link with Russia and cutting off the Central Empires from their Ottoman allies. Instead Romania, left to its own devices, attempted to attack Austria-Hungary and was quickly crushed and eliminated. The expedition of Thessaloniki, unable to save Serbia, leads to nonsense due to a lack of strategic will: In 1918, 31 Allied infantry divisions (twenty-one if we exclude the Greek divisions) supported by considerable artillery and aviation actually hold before them only six battalions and fifty-one German batteries and two Austrian divisions, because the Bulgarian government has never seriously considered committing its armies on another front.(9)

At the strategic level, the Franchet d'Espérey plan is therefore the result of the pursuit of an idea that has been constant since the Battle of the Marne. Knowing from his predecessor the state of decay of Bulgaria and its armies, the weakness of the German forces in the theatre and the dissensions between the central allies, knowing also the good state of morale and organisation of the allied forcesThe new commander-in-chief believes that it is time to capitalize on the interest of the investment made over the past three years.The new commander-in-chief felt that it was time to capitalize on the investment made over the past three years by targeting the heart of the German machine with a determined offensive at its weakest point. He is aware that the staffs will deny him additional resources, but considers that the means for an indirect approach at the level of military strategy are not yet available.He is aware that the staffs will refuse him additional resources, but believes that the means for an indirect approach to military strategy are already available, i.e. that it is possible, as things stand, to achieve a tactical and operational success of strategic importance. At the strategic level, the immediate objective is to get Bulgaria out of the war, the later objective is to open the road to Vienna and Berlin; at the operational level, theAt the operational level, the manoeuvre will target communications between the 11th German Army (German-Bulgarian in reality) and the bulk of the Bulgarian armies.

At the operational and tactical levels, a combination of command choices gives the manoeuvre its indirect approach character:

- the choice of the point of attack, a seemingly impregnable natural barrier presenting insurmountable logistical obstacles, where the Serbs have already failed twice, but which is clearly poorly defended and outside the concerns of the enemy command (10) ;

- the choice of the contingent in charge of the effort: Franchet d'Esperey believes that the Serbs, considered demoralized and backward by the German command, will be capable ofa considerable effort if they are properly supported and if it is a question of re-conquering their country (they will also face the most demoralised Bulgarian units);

- the enormous efforts being made in all areas to deThe enormous efforts made in all areas to see the adversary with the idea that the attack will take place in the loop of the Crna or in the Vardar valley ;

- the effort made on behalf of the 2nd Serbian Army to attack on the Sokol-Dobropolje-Vetrenik front in the direction of the Krivolak-Gradsko communication nodes ;

- the manoeuvre of the 2nd Serbian Army in front of the Sokol-Dobropolje front, pushing its effort to the centre to gain direct access to Kravica Peak, which commands all the ridges of the

sector and makes it possible to overflow and render inoperative the Sokol-Dugački Zid-Courtine-Charnière positions, strong positions leaning against the successive chasms of the Lešnica, Gradešnica and Zaduka ;

- the concentration of considerable artillery resources, facing the poorest sector of the front in terms of artillery;

- the deployment of this artillery at the front and on inaccessible peaks...(field batteries in the starting trenches, breakaway group on Floka-Belo Grotlo),

allowing you to shoot as far as you can without maneuvering;

- the deployment of second echelon divisions within 1,000 yards of the starting trenches, a choice contrary to the habits of the time;

- the conduct of the action, planned from the design stage according to the principles of the

"blitzkrieg."

o immediate in-depth exploitation, with no rear and flank concerns;

o development of old (living in the country) or innovative logistical solutions

(air-to-air refueling of the cavalry brigade during the raid on Uskub);

o direct support of the air force in the breakaway battle, in superimposition of troops;

o audacity of the raids, obtaining great psychological results by the irruption of small

tactical elements (the arrival of the cavalry brigade in Uskub completes the willingness of the

Bulgarian will);

- the pursuit of the enemy without disabling, in the "operational depth", without allowing him to reorganize: Vranje, Niš...

Finally, four observations:

- It is at the level of the theatre that intelligence, counter-intelligence, and disappointment, take their extent.

- The superiority in aviation and cavalry on a theatre reputedly secondary yet hostile by

The deep maneuvering nature plays a major role here.

- The course of the breakaway battle on the front of the 2nd Serbian Army heralds the fighting of 1940 in the Sedan sector: the role of the Frankish groups in seizing

bunkers and strong points, close air support, operational troops, logistics solutions...

- Finally, the design and conduct of the operations also announced May-June 40, while doing justice to the overly caricatured doctrine of Colonel de Grandmaison: "The bulk of the forces

sera split into very unequal columns with only one concern, that of reaching, at The only concern is to achieve the set objective at all costs, for their own account, whatever happens; and that one does not fear that in reality one does not care enough for one's neighbours : they are taken care of...

tstill too much. It is the responsibility of the] command to determine the intervals between engagements, to monitor them, and if it deems it advisable, to stop them in time....

The reserves should not be intended to support the failures of the troops involved in the struggle, but to give, at the points where success is desired and possible, the extra power needed to succeed. (11)»

end of Part 3...

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(6) Which is part of the direct strategy in which success is sought through battle?

(7) General Beaufre, Introduction à la stratégie, 3rd edition, Hachette Littératures, Paris, 1998, p. 145

(8) Gérard Fassy, Le commandement français en Orient, Economica, Paris, 2003, pp. 13, 14.

(9) Unlike Prince Regent Alexander, commander of the Serbian armies, who himself had proposed to General Guillaumat the transfer of his troops to the Western Front in June 1918. See Louis Cordier, op.cit., p. 251.

(10) The assessment of the German command also corresponds point by point to that made by General Guillaumat on his departure from the theatre: von Scholz placed his reserves around Prilep and in the Vardar valley, exactly where the "Guillaumat plan" recommends attacking.

(11) Quoted by A. Bernède in 1914- Les armées de la République entrent en guerre, 14-18 Magazine, hors série n°2, March 2005, pp. 18-19.