ON THE NATURE OF OPERATIVE COMMAND

Although the notion of an operative command did not yet clearly exist at the time, the Eastern AAC combines the characteristics of the Commandmentsgroups of armies that emerged during the war and those of the joint and combined theatre commands that today define this level. From the study of this command, we can therefore draw some interesting reflections for the understanding of what is called today "the operational level".rative level", a concept characterized above all by the inability of its descriptors to make it intelligible (including to the common patented staff officers). (12) and by the inability of its staffs to produce anything concrete and useful for the combat of subordinate forces.

The AAC can be described as operational first of all by the volume of the forces engaged, the duration of operations, the extent and the distance from its theatre of operations, characteristics reminiscent of those which, from the outset, have beenThese characteristics are reminiscent of those which, as soon as after the Russo-Japanese war, led Russian thinkers to imagine a new level of command of operations, because of the difficulty of commanding, from a single point, armies of several hundred thousand men, on fronts and at depths of several hundred kilometres.(13)

But it is even more so, in the sense that it is now understood by:

- the isolation and autonomy of the theatre and the multi-nationality of the forces, implying the constant interaction between political and military factors, and obliging the commander-in-chief to conceive and conduct his own diplomatic action.

- the joint nature of the forces commanded or controlled, even if the air forces are not yet considered as an autonomous component and the subordination of the fleet anchored in Thessaloniki to the commander of the CAA has never been formally pronounced ;

- the pursuit of strategic objectives through the implementation of tactical means;

- the preponderant weight of logistics functions.

As shown by Gérard Fassy, General Sarrail's command was marked from the outset by the constant constraint of political factors, influencing the decisions taken by themilitary decisions, in particular because of the complicated position of the Greek Government and the divergent interests of the allied powers. The CAA commander, far from his government, has in practice to develop his own political and diplomatic action, vis-à-vis the allied contingents and vis-à-vis what we would today call "the host nation". It will take, for example, several years and the arrival of Guillaumat to clarify the respective roles of the French liaison mission in Athens and the theatre commander. And Sarrail's personal failure to win the confidence of both sides, a failure of a political nature, was the reason for his replacement.

Commander of six contingents of disparate size and value (from the Albanian Tabor of Essad Pasha to the Serb armies under the direct command of the Prince Regent), belonging to nations with often opposing ambitions, and over which he exercises a degree of control.(from a sort of extended OPCOM for the Serbs and Greeks whom the AAC and AFO have to support, to a neighbourhood liaison without authority for the Italian corps), the AAC commander has to be permanently on call, including in the tactical field. The final success will owe much to Guillaumat's efforts to turn his purely French staff into an allied body (creation within the 3rd bureau of a British section, a Serb section, a Greek section and an Italian liaison). In this confused context, the role of the operational commander seems to be essentially to inspire confidence in the allied military chiefs and cabinets and to make the envisaged mode of action feasible despite political constraints, thanks to a game of give and take and at the price of permanent diplomatic action. The attitude of General Milne's British army, which is totally emancipating itself from the authority of the CAA, was to be seen as a "no-brainer".s Bulgarian surrender to march on Constantinople is exemplary of the problems encountered at this level and of a characteristic difference of perception between French leaders and British soldiers.The former tended to focus their efforts on the military objective prior to strategic effects, the latter concentrating all their efforts on the strategic objective and consequently showing a constant propensity to shift the military effort to others.

In terms of design and conduct, 'operative art' seems to be characterised here by a paradoxical balance between the 'art of the operation' and the 'art of the commander'.In terms of design and conduct, "operative art" here seems to be characterized by a paradoxical balance between the initiative left to the subordinates in the conduct and the entry of the commander-in-chief down to the most minute details of appearance as far as design is concerned. The commander-in-chief does not simply define an overall manoeuvre and a general role for subordinates and components: His plan details certain provisions for subordinate levels (engineering works, sequencing of units, artillery manoeuvre and deployments, camouflage and secrecy, etc.) and for the subordinate levels (engineering works, unit sequencing, artillery manoeuvre and deployments, camouflage and secrecy, etc.).). It was Franchet d'Espérey himself who imposed on the commander of the 2nd Serbian Army to deploy his artillery at the front (as far as the trenche trench) and to deploy his operating divisions less than a kilometre from the starting trench, under the nose of the Bulgarian observers and batteries. It is still he who imposes to the AFO the details of articulation (formation of the reserves and the Tranié group, role of the cavalry brigade and provisions of all orders for its action, etc.).It is always he who ordered the air force of the 2nd Serbian Army to directly support the breakaway attack at Dobropolje, in superposition with the infantry. But once the breakthrough is made, his command shines by a conduct "long reins" based on general instructions and an effect to obtain.This does not sometimes exclude the command of the front as on the morning of September 23, when the commander-in-chief goes in person to the CP of the cavalry brigade of theAFO Cavalry Brigade CP near Dobruševo and directly gave the order to march to the colonel commanding the 1st African Chasseurs, in terms that clearly show the major effect of his plan: "Bournazel, I want you to be in Prilep tonight: I want to have lunch there tomorrow and then: hurry to Uskub! I want the entire 11th German army to be taken prisoner or to go to Albania to die of hunger. (14) ». A style that is not without reminding us of the mission command, the Auftragstaktikand, more generally, the style of the great German leaders of 1870 and 1940-45.

Characteristic of the operative level, the link between the tactical or military objective andthe strategic effect is evident here since it is the main idea of the plan. It is a question, as Franchet d'Espérey writes in black and white, of cutting the Macedonian front in two, firstly to eliminate Bulgaria from the conflict, and secondly to open the road to Vienna and Berlin, obviously strategic objectives. The tactical manoeuvre, the choice of points of effort, are obviously subordinate to these desired effects, which, it must be stressed, far exceed the letter of the mission received by the theatre command.

Last but not least, the AAC offers a good example of what could be one of the main characteristics (if not the only justification) of operative command: the absolute primacy of logistics. Gérard Fassy repeatedly emphasises the preponderant weight of logistical issues at all levels: strategic or diplomatic (the agreements between the French and British on the supply of meat, the support of Serb and Greek contingents by the French even when they are placed under British command, the problems of supplying Greek wheat, etc.).) as a tactic (permanent drawdown of considerable numbers of troops to maintain the regimental, divisional and army vegetable gardens needed to feed the troops in a country under British command, etc.).The use of cavalry in the rear to guard the railways or supervise harvests, the creation by Guillaumat of specialized forestry services, market gardeners, etc., within the CAA staff.) It should be noted that, before Napoleon, who spoke on this subject of the "higher parts of tactics" or "great tactics," thethe art of moving and resupplying the army before the battle was called "logistics" by Pierre de Bourcet in his

"Principles of Mountain Warfare", in which he proposed to divide the army into

We could consider "divisions" for reasons that we could consider as "operational", because it is impossible to move and feed the whole army in one valley. Perhaps we could simply ask ourselves whether operative art is not confused with logistics: indeed, how does a theatre commander mark and balance efforts if not by logistical priorities?

end of part four ...

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(12) On this subject, read H. Couteau-Bégarie, Contre l'opératique, in Objectif Doctrine n° 39.

(13) Richard W. HARRISON, The Russian Way of War, Operational art, 1904-1940, Kansas University Press,2001.

(14) Doctor Major Millet, A travers la Serbie libérée, Paris, Lavauzelle, 1923, quoted by Louis Cordier, Op. cit. p.235.