For Western militaries engaged in counter-insurgency, the concept of force protection must be based on a process of comprehensive and dynamic action to ensure the necessary, but fragile, balance between the imperative of protection and the preservation of freedom of action.

In Beirut, in October 1983, the attack against the French cantonment of a company of the 1st RCP [1] caused the collapse of the Drakkar building and the death of 58 parachutists. Striking the soldiers while they were resting, this truck-bomb attack traumatized the French army and public opinion. These victims are not really combat losses, in the absence of real fighting.

This attack against UN forces and the number of casualties, unprecedented since then, had strategic consequences. In March 1984, the French government decided to withdraw French forces from Lebanon. Moreover, this tragic episode demonstrated the importance of protecting a force deployed on operations and the psychological impact of indirect attacks.

The White Paper on Defence and National Security of 2008 underlines the current context: "In the light of the intensification of conflicts, the criterion of numbers makes it necessary to continue the effort on the protection and offensive capacity of French forces so that they can maintain their freedom of action".

Force protection is defined in the Joint Force Protection Concept (PIA-03.102 ), inspired by NATO doctrine (AJP-3.14)[2]: "Protection covers all ways and means, other than combat action, to minimise the vulnerability of personnel, installations, equipment, operations and the image of a force engaged in crisis management, to all dangers and under all circumstances". Thus, combat operations are excluded: the combat units involved then ensure their own safety.

This definition nevertheless raises the pitfall of excessive concern for security. Admittedly, the preservation of the freedom of action and the operational capacity of the force require measures to be taken. However, these measures consume resources that the leader will lack for combat actions.

It is therefore a question of ensuring force protection without imposing a lasting and excessive constraint on the leader's freedom of action or making protection an end in itself. This would be tantamount to definitively favouring the "armour with the ball and chain" and to measuring the success of an operation by the low volume of casualties (e.g., the number of casualties in a battle).This would be tantamount to definitively favouring the "armour with the ball" and measuring the success of an operation by the low volume of casualties (the legacy of the "zero dead" concept), rather than by carrying out operations in the field and against the adversary. What price can be paid for protecting a force in operation? How do we assess an acceptable threshold? Are protection and combat actions antinomic?

This paper will focus on recent operations carried out by Western armies, which are the most affected by this phenomenon of resource preservation as a result of a counted and exposed military tool. Moreover, the counter-insurgency stabilization phase remains at the heart of the subject, characterized for insurgents by a strategy of avoiding direct combat.

Global and dynamic processes

For Western militaries engaged in counter-insurgency, force protection must be based on a process of comprehensive and dynamic action to ensure the fine balance between the need to protect and the preservation of freedom of action.

- Protection of force: doctrinal and historicalcontext.

Force protection is not a new phenomenon. In the 2nd century B.C., the Chinese strategist Sun-Tzu favored in "The Art of War"... deception as a means to victory. "Kill one to frighten a thousand" remains valid, as shown by the reactions to the death of the American consul in Benghazi in October 2012. The Greeks, coming out of the mythical Trojan horse, slaughter soldiers weakened by "the vapors of wine and the peace of sleep". In ancient Rome, the construction of a fortified camp or castrum was used to protect the Roman legions behind fortifications.

Nevertheless, while force protection remained an ongoing concern, "battle", a confrontation between enemy armies on a "battlefield", dominated military campaigns up to the concept of total warfare in the two world wars. The widespread use of guerrilla warfare in the 20th century ^highlights the indirect mode of action. Insurgents in the wars of decolonization attack soldiers outside of combat actions. Thus, the attack of the French divisional CP by the Vietminh on December 3, 1953 in Thaï Binh was a lesson that cost the French dearly: twenty killed and fifty wounded.

The Army underlined a major issue of protection in its doctrine document FT 01 Winning the Battle, Leading Peace: "Action within populations and the absence of a front line multiply the forms of aggression and change the very concept of protection which now concerns the whole force".

In NATO doctrine, a new function has emerged at each tactical level: the Force Protection Officer (FPO). This cross-cutting function must now be established in the chain of command. Thus, in the staff of the RRC-FR[3], the FPO is attached to the operational chain, and more specifically to the Joint Operations Center. It is thus involved in planning work and is an indispensable actor in many working groups.

- Force protection, the Achilles' heel of Western armies

"Protecting a force is not only a human imperative, but also a strategic necessity," says the 2008 White Paper on Defence and National Security .

Asymmetric insurgent combat makes use of the possibilities of a "weak-to-strong" technological battle. The rejection of a direct combat, lost in advance, gives way to a fight on the rear. The insurgents exploit their superiority in the control of the environment (terrain and population), favoured by the interweaving with the population, the absence of distinction between combatants and non-combatants. "Like a fish in water" (Mao Tze Toung), the insurgents attack the weak links of the deployed force: forces stationed in a camp, logistic movements, western trainers, ACM or CIMIC[4] units helping the population, patrols among the population, local security forces... They exploit the deficient nature of an insurgency combat, without real front lines. In 1997, General Krulak (Marine Corps) described modern operations as "three block war":simultaneously, the force fights in one neighbourhood, distributes humanitarian aid in another and carries out police missions in a third. All of this is constantly evolving.

In addition, the insurgent uses the array of adverse vulnerabilities and means to strike the force and thus generate chaos and disorder. The spectrum of threats has no limits: Attacks (vehicles or suicide bombers), bombings on camps or during missions to help the population, targeting of influential local personalities, sabotage of military means, trapping of houses or corpses, demonstrations with children and armed men, etc.The insurgents are constantly adaptingto the protection devices in order to bypass them. Thus, the use of electromagnetic jammers pushes the insurgents to favour IEDs triggered by electrical means. Their aim is to maintain a climate of insecurity among the force and the population, which is conducive to stress, misjudgements and, ultimately, the escalation of violence. In 2004, the US army engaged in Iraq suffered 400 suicide attacks, more than the number of direct attacks. This climate of fear can lead to massacres, such as that of 347 civilians in a village in Vietnam by an American unit in 1968 (My Lai).

The engagement of Western armies in counter-insurgency is marked by an increased sensitivity to casualties (wounded and killed), linked to the reduced size of armies and the context of engagements. Professional armies have limited human and material resources. The stabilization phase of conflicts monopolizes for several years troops (to be relieved regularly), expensive and scarce materials. Public opinion and the media regularly express the impression that they are at a standstill.

In addition, the insurgents know the reactions to attacks outside the fighting, and use the media impact to win the information battle. Public opinion in Western countries, where reason gives way to emotion, influences the perceptions of those in power and challenges the commitment of the force after each tragedy. In Mogadishu in 1993, the emotion aroused by the death of nineteen American soldiers and the images of the corpses of the soldiers dragged in the streets led to the withdrawal of American troops from Somalia.

The Tet offensive of the Viet Cong forces against American forces in Vietnam in February 1968 is emblematic. A tactical defeat, it was a strategic victory: it turned American public opinion upside down, shocked by the scale of the power of the Viet Cong insurgency after four years of conflict.

Soldiers are the beneficiaries of the population's increased demand for security. In a counter-insurgency fight by a force that seeks to win "hearts and minds", the protection of that force becomes a strategic imperative. This legitimate trend leads to sometimes heavy financial constraints and weighs on the decisions and risks to be taken in both organic and operational areas.

- Bunkerisation" or the danger of inaction

"At first glance, a withdrawal into oneself might seem to be the best way to guarantee its protection" [6].

6] In order to preserve force at all costs, there is a strong temptation to lock oneself into entrenched camps and lose all operational capacity vis-à-vis the population, which is a major challenge in counter-insurgency operations.

In the face of insurgent harassment, the force reacts on the first approach with a defensive protection manoeuvre. The military camps are "physically" reinforced: improved resistance of compounds and entry points, restrictions on access to the camps, tighter control of civilians. Subsequently, missions among the population are restricted, the volume of patrols increases, and logistics convoys are reinforced. In the medium term, a higher level of alert is imposed: permanent wearing of bullet-proof vests, return of armoured vehicles, prohibited zones, authorised warning shots, aggressiveness during convoys. In the long term, protective equipment and materials are favoured: over-armoured vehicles, jammers, remotely operated weapons... Industrialists know it: the motto of the industrialist RTD[7] is: "vehiclesoffer the best protected land force mobility" [8].

This additional protection influences the design of orders and modes of action. Thus, the manpower and equipment dedicated to the protection of convoys, camps or authorities restrict the resources available for tactical operations. The stress and pressure induced by these measures create a distance between local authorities and allied troops, who are more distrustful. A force that "hides", avoiding towns and cities and advancing at night, no longer disembarking its vehicles, "cowering" in its camps and behind the enemy's lines, and "hiding" in the middle of the night.A force that "hides", avoiding cities and advancing at night, no longer disembarking from its vehicles, "cowering" in its camps and behind the armour of its vehicles, delivers an anxiety-provoking message to the populations it must protect or the authorities it must support. Instead of living in the midst of the Iraqis, in 2003 American units moved out of the cities to Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). An effort is being made there to provide pleasant living conditions. By contrast, this effort makes the living conditions of the inhabitants more shocking.

Protection risks becoming a real obstacle to the freedom of action in the use of force. The ability to react and take initiative is sacrificed. The volume of force devoted to protection becomes predominant. The capacity to react is restricted by cumbersome procedures and security constraints. The needs of the population and joint operations with local forces are neglected. Fearing losses, the force gradually leaves the ground to the insurgents: the insurgency spreads. The withdrawal of the Cao-Bang post in 1950 in Indochina could not be carried out in good conditions because the RC 4 road linking the posts, nicknamed the "blood road", was not safe.

Thus, in reaction to attacks outside of the fighting, the temptation was to lock themselves in a kind of "panic-room" [9] by abandoning the terrain and the population to the insurgents. The force then loses the perception of the environment. This "bunkerization" is therefore part of a movement of withdrawal: the bunker, a place of maximum protection , is also the one from which one has only a fragmented vision through murderous openings. An IED killed six Spanish peacekeepers on 24 June 2007 in Lebanon during a patrol on a road. Hezbollah prefers the UN not to seek to control the terrain.

Protecting force at all costs is not an end in itself. It is a matter of balancing the desirable with the possible in order to implement protection appropriate to the mission.

- Effective protection, the right balance between imperative and freedom of action

"The primary instrument of counter-guerrilla warfare is the infantryman, who must be made into an intelligence agent, an agent of influence with the population and a servant of arms" [10].

In order to ensure the optimal conditions for carrying out the mission, an adaptable, proportional and reversible protection system must be designed and implemented.

Protection must first be conceived as an iterative approach that adapts to the threat in a simplified analysis cycle. Upstream environmental studies make it possible to apprehend and evaluate the threat: modes of action, probability of occurrence, allies and neutrals, insurgent objectives, etc. A cell will have to monitor and update this threat. Indicators and statistical tools will make it possible to apprehend the foreseeable evolutions.

Then, the actions proposed to the command will have to address the threat across the entire spectrum of protection. Strengthening the equipment, materials and vehicles used is the technical aspect. Training must respond to enemy modes of action before, but also during the mission. In addition, active measures must not be neglected. The aim is to control the environment in order to prevent the risk of attack through the search for expanded intelligence and targeted action on the most dangerous insurgents, while ostensibly asserting one's strength.

Finally, risk management that respects the principle of "just sufficiency" must achieve a satisfactory compromise. It is formalized by orders from the tactical commander informed by a study by his staff of his current environment. Indeed, complete and guaranteed protection being a pipe dream, it must be constantly adapted according to environmental factors: time of the year, villages crossed, type of terrain, population, cultures, local forces. The number and type of missions and the means allocated must evolve in line with the security situation. Reversibility between different levels of protection is mandatory and requires mastery of know-how, speed of execution and visibility.

Conclusion

In response to an insurgent situation and in accordance with international law, the political decision-maker may have to deploy a force to achieve an objective in theatre. Given the current context (public opinion and military tool), protection will remain a major strategic imperative. However, sending a contingent exposes soldiers during and outside combat. The means must be sufficient for the mission.

Military leaders must provide force protection without compromising the ability to carry out the mission. They rely on environmental analysis to maintain the ability to carry out environmental control missions and "win" the population. To be effective, protection must remain appropriate, comprehensive, active and reversible, the only conditions for ensuring the delicate balance between imperative protection and sanctuary freedom of action.

However, the best counter-insurgency protection is provided by the number of soldiers engaged, as quality does not fully compensate for quantity. The recommended ratio for environmental control in FT 02 General Tactics is one soldier for every 20 inhabitants. In 2011 in Afghanistan, the ratio was one coalition soldier per 227 inhabitants (132,000 soldiers per 30 million inhabitants). The volume of "friendly forces" engaged remains undeniably a decisive factor in ensuring force protection.

Belonging to the "Bicentennial of Saint-Cyr" class (1999-2002), Captain Blaise SEGUIN was assigned to the 31st ^Engineer Regiment ^{in 2003} as section chief, deputy officer then unit commander in combat company. During this period, he is projected in mission in Ivory Coast in 2004, Afghanistan in 2008, Lebanon in 2009 and Reunion Island in 2010. He was then posted to the SIMMT in Versailles as a pilot officer in support of armoured engineer armament programmes.

[1] Parachute Fighter Regiment

[2] Allied joint doctrine for force protection

3] French Rapid Reaction Corps - France

4] ACM: Civil-Military Action (FR) or CIMIC: CivilMilitary Cooperation (GB).

5] IED: Improvised Explosive Device (GB) or EEI: Explosive Improvised Device (FR)

6] Joint Force Protection Concept (PIA-03 .102)

7] Renault Trucks Defense.

[8] the vehicles offer the best protected land mobile force.

[9 ] room in a dwelling intended to be used as a refuge in case of aggression.

10] Colonel Goya, in "Iraq: The armies of chaos»