The article focuses on the participation of an Austrian military unit in the EUFOR TCHAD/RCA mission, which ran from January 2008 to March 2009. This contribution of the Austrian armies immerses us in other realities. Far from the fury of the fighting in Afghanistan and the gigantic size of the NATO machine, it is the contribution of these third powers to peace operations that we are talking about. A modest but very real contribution, and one that cannot be dispensed with in the name of the necessary international legitimacy that the coalitions are seeking.

Background of the operation

The European Union (EU) conducted the bridging military operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA from 28 January 2008 to 15 March 2009, in accordance with the mandate given by United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1778. Deployed in eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR[1], it took place in the framework of the ESDP and in line with the EU Strategy for Africa. The French army provided more than 2 000 troops out of a total of 3 700. The other major contingents came from Poland (400), Ireland (400), Sweden (200), Austria (160) and Romania (100). About ten other countries provided personnel in more or less homeopathic doses.

More specifically, this operation had the following objectives

• to contribute to the protection of 260,000 refugees in thirteen camps and about 180,000 displaced persons within the borders of Chad;
• to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid;
• to improve the security situation in eastern Chad and thus facilitate the operation of MINURCAT [2] whose primary task was the training of the Chadian police.

Planning of the Austrian contribution

The first Austrian officers were sent to the OHQ at Mont-Valérien in Paris at the beginning of October 2007. This meant that the staff in Vienna could be involved from the outset, which facilitated planning. Simultaneously, several plans were drawn up on a variety of topics ranging from drinking water treatment to the use of special forces. The Austrian contingent was eventually formed by a force of 160 soldiers, mainly special forces [3]. 3] Another 50 soldiers were sent for a more limited period of time to set up infrastructure. Finally, the contingent also included 15% soldiers from the reserve, in particular for national support needs.

The logistics of the Austrian forces, because of the remoteness, was a great challenge. Much of the available resources were pooled to facilitate the engagement in Chad. For example, due to the distance and limited absorption capacity of the port of Douala, Cameroon, 136 days were required for the deployment of EUFOR.

The preparation phase attracted the attention of the Austrian media, not least because the operation generated a great deal of debate with the opposition parties. On the ground in Chad, the rebel groups took advantage of the situation: using the global media, they blew on the embers, sometimes successfully stoking up tensions.

Deployment of the contingent

After repeated delays, the Austrian vanguard finally reached its area of action on 30 January 2008. However, the deployment of EUFOR was delayed by an attack by a Chadian rebel column taking refuge in the Sudan who attempted to seize power in Chad. The Austrian advance element was then trapped by fighting between the rebels and the Chadian armed forces in the Kempinski Hotel in N'Djamena. This incident demonstrated the need for the "lead nation" to have a powerful force and appropriate knowledge of the situation on the ground. For security reasons, the Austrian antenna was eventually transferred to the French Kossei camp at the airport. After the failure of the rebel attack, the transport of the Austrian contingent and the EUFOR force could continue.

EUFOR special forces mission

After the passage under the authority of the Force Head Quarters (FHQ) in Abéché, commanded by French General Jean-Philippe Ganascia [4], special operations in Abéché were conducted by the FHQ, which is the French army's main base in Abéché.4], special operations designed to facilitate "intelligence preparation of the battlefield", or "initial entry operations", throughout the area of operations began in early March 2008. It is necessary "to be operational right away, even if all the logistical issues are not settled. Intelligence must be obtained, patrols must be organized, visibility must be everywhere" [5]. 5] Flexible and efficient, capable of taking or retaking the initiative during their patrols in the depths towards the border with the Sudan, the Austrian special forces were able to provide considerable added value. Precise planning was therefore of utmost importance. The deep patrols lasted up to three weeks.

In operations of the EUFOR type, it must be borne in mind that many difficulties exist due to differences in the tactical approach and the equipment to be supported by the numerous EUFOR members [6]. 6] Highlighting the professionalism of its soldiers, Austria has been given command of the Combined Joint

Special Operations Task Force [7](COM CJSOTF) from mid-April to mid-October 2008.

Although the engagement of Special Forces remained at a relatively low level, patrolling in the depths of the area of action was sometimes dangerous, as the incident of March 2008 demonstrated. On that occasion, a French EUFOR soldier was killed during a reconnaissance near the Sudanese border following a clash with Sudanese forces.

Conclusion

Participation in EUFOR Tchad/RCA has shown that Austria is a reliable partner. The Austrian army's special forces were used for the first time as an "early entry force", and the army gained valuable experience from this. Logistics remains a great challenge for small European countries participating in this type of intervention.

For the Austrian army, which was also engaged in other theatres, much of the remaining resources were pooled to facilitate the engagement in Chad. It would be desirable to improve pooling at EU level. Thus, a common approach to the use of available manpower and means in the Member States is undoubtedly to be favoured. With better synergy, it would be possible to save staff and reassign them to other tasks.

Despite its success, however, Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA has experienced difficulties in its build-up. It took nearly 7 EU conferences to arrive at a contingent that could meet the challenge.

1] Central African Republic

2] United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURSO).

[3] Units were only engaged in operations at the lower end of the special forces spectrum

4] Born in 1953, graduated in 1977 from the Saint-Cyr academy, parachutist (1978-1989), then at the Foreign Legion (1994-1999), before serving in the Army Command (1999-2003), the Joint Force and Training Staff.

5] Statement by General Ganascia during a press interview on Brussels 2, 28 April 2008.

6] Fully deployed, it gathered up to 3,700 troops, with 19 Member States present in the field and 22 at headquarters.

7] Among others, special forces from Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland, etc....

Lieutenant-Colonel Florian PAMMER was born on 21 October 1957 in Graz. For 32 years in the Austrian Army, he has served in the office of the Chief of Staff. Since 1985, he has served in three external missions: most recently in the Austrian Military Representation to the EU and NATO, and before that in two missions as a military observer to the UN in Kuwait and Cambodia.