At a time when France is about to acquire armed drones, it seems interesting to try to draw up an assessment of American strikes in Afghanistan in order to be in a position to question the limits of the use of these means. This article will show that drones are by no means a panacea and that their effectiveness depends on the existence of a system, both human and technical, capable of providing precise and up-to-date information on where and when to strike.

On 28 September 2010, the newspaper Le Monde reported a sudden intensification of drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas [1], seeing it as an attempt by the US Central Intelligence Agency to thwart a terrorist plot in Europe [2]. 2] Relaying articles from the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, the French daily reported a sharp increase in drone strikes during the month of September 2010, with about twenty attacks, and also mentioned the conduct of three American helicopter incursions into Pakistani territory. Beyond the debate on international law that these strikes and incursions have generated, and at a time when France is wondering about thepossible need to acquire armed Reaper-type drones,[3] the questionarises as to the usefulness and effectiveness of these strikes. In this respect, it seems relevant to try to draw up an assessment of them before examining the limits that may characterise them.

Update on UAV strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas

Since June 2004, the United States has carried out 195 drone strikes as part of its air campaign against Pakistan's tribal areas. A total of 185 strikes have been conducted since the summer of 2008, illustrating the intensification described by the press and open sources.

During these six years, the strikes have mainly concentrated on the territories of the Pakistani agencies in North Waziristan (69%) and South Waziristan (26%). It should be noted, however, that this geographical distribution is largely evolutionary and that the attacks follow the objectives assigned to them. The distribution between these two agencies has thus reversed following the offensives of the Pakistani army in South Waziristan. The strikes targeting this agency have increased from 51% to 7% between 2009 and 2010. At the same time, the proportion increased for North Waziristan (91% of the strikes in 2010 against 42% in 2009) where a good number of militants found refuge during the Pakistani operations.

Since 2006[4], drone attacks have reportedly killed 1,600 terrorists and insurgents targeted by American missiles. This figure hides an increase in the effectiveness of the strikes, which are causing a growing number of deaths (nearly ten deaths per strike in 2009 compared to eight in 2008).

It is clear that the main aim of the drone strikes is to target and eliminate the headquarters of the terrorist group al-Qa'ida and its operational cells in Pakistan's tribal areas, in order to prevent them from striking Europe or the United States. The attacks have thus targeted areas known to be home to Qaidist authorities or operatives, as well as their command or training infrastructure. According to the data provided by open sources[5], 16 members of the al-Qa'ida headquarters have been killed in this way since January 2008.

The secondary objective assigned to the campaign appears to be to disrupt the command and logistics of the Afghan insurgency, which has taken refuge in Pakistan. The strikes are thus fully in line with the current American counter-insurgency doctrine, allowing to break free from the obstacle of international borders described by David Galula as favouring the insurgency [6]. 6] The nature of the areas targeted confirms this state of affairs, insofar as the North Waziristan agency concentrates the bulk of the drone attacks, particularly in the region of the North Waziristan region.Miram Shah region, which is reputed to be the Pakistani stronghold of the Haqqani network, one of the components of the Afghan insurgency, and is also home to a good number of international jihad militants.

Beyond these two objectives, drone strikes also target terrorist groups threatening the stability of the Pakistani state, most notably Tehrek e Taleban Pakistan (TTP). Several journalists speculate that there may be US-Pakistani collaboration in this regard, which would explain why Pakistan's protests against the strikes remain symbolic. The best example of an objective shared by the Pakistanis and the Americans is undoubtedly the elimination, on 5 August 2009,[8] of Baitullah Mehsud, then head of the TTP.

Given that drone strikes, which appear to have specific objectives and are aimed at weakening both international terrorist organizations and the Afghan insurgency located in Pakistan's tribal areas, have increased significantly over the past three years, it is now appropriate to examine the question of their limitations.

The limits of UAV use and the strategic debate on UAVs

Drone strikes raise two difficulties. The first, of an ethical nature, concerns the question of collateral civilian casualties, while the second, of a strategic nature, tends to cast doubt on their effectiveness.

Since 2006, drone strikes have reportedly resulted in 104 civilian casualties[9]. 9] This estimate is based on figures published by the Pakistani press and press releases from both the US military and insurgent and militant groups. Remarkably low, this figure should be put into perspective with the number of strikes and the losses recorded among the militants. American experts estimate that the precision of the strikes is increasing and that they are causing fewer and fewer collateral casualties, which represented 9.5% of casualties between 2006 and 2009, a figure that has risen to 8.5% since 2009.

Beyond that figure, however, there is the question of the usefulness of these strikes which, despite their number and the losses caused, do not undermine the will of the targeted individuals, do not lead them to cease their terrorist activities and do not incite Afghan insurgent groups to negotiate. Thus, the Haqqani network maintains its radical position despite the fact that it is one of the main targets of the drone attacks, having suffered 51 strikes while in the end suffering only 8 significant losses in its hierarchy. The debate on the effectiveness of UAVs is thus in line with the debate on the primacy to be given, in accordance with John Warden's theories[10], to the air arm, and it is important to note that the debate on the effectiveness of UAVs is not only about the effectiveness of the air arm, but also about the primacy to be given, in accordance with John Warden's theories[11], to the air arm.It is interesting to note that the unofficial air campaign against the Pakistani tribal areas raises more or less the same doubts as NATO's campaign in Kosovo in 1999 and Israel's campaign in Lebanon in 2006.

There are many voices, both in the US military and the intelligence community, in favour of incursions into Pakistani territory to help out against "high-value targets" [11]. 11] In October 2010, theInstitute for the Study of War, one of the many American 'think tanks' interested in defence affairs, published a report[12] devoted to this issue. 12] on the Haqqani network advocating not only the further intensification of the campaign of drone strikes, but also the conduct of special forces operations in Pakistan. While rumours persist about the existence of such raids, the United States has admitted having conducted only one operation on 3 September 2008[13]. 13] The scale of the protests in Islamabad at that time showed that Pakistan retains its sovereignty sensitivity: even if it tolerates missile launches by the United States from platforms such as armed drones, Islamabad's protests cease to be symbolic as soon as its territory is subjected to ground attacks. Such incursions are unlikely to be repeated because the international consequences, both political and legal, are so great.

In conclusion, armed UAVs should be seen as yet another tool in a military arsenal. While they offer immeasurable advantages in terms of cost, range and endurance, it should nevertheless be stressed that they are effective only if their use is part of an intelligence system that is both human and technical, effective and sustainable. In any event, drone strikes have at least the great merit, in the current context of the debate on the strategy to be followed in Afghanistan, of recalling the initial aim of the United States' entry into the war in October 2001: to destroy al-Qa'ida.

1] Since Pakistan's independence in 1947, tribal areas have been designated as FATA (Federally Administered TribalAreas). Islamabad is represented there by administrators whose power is limited by the very large tribal autonomy and by the absence of both the army and the federal police. The FATA is divided into seven agencies which are, from north to south: Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, North Waziristan, South Waziristan.

2] http://www.lemonde.fr/asie-pacifique/article/2010/09/28/la-cia-intensifie-ses-attaques-au-pakistan-pour-dejouer-des-attentats-en-europe_1416904_3216.html

3] Cf. article Le futur drone français sera-t-il américain? by Jean Guisnel, on http://www.lepoint.fr/chroniqueurs-du-point/jean-guisnel/le-futur-drone-francais-sera-t-il-americain-23-11-2010-1266059_53.php.

4] Figures are not available for the years 2004 and 2005.

5] See http://www.longwarjournal.org.

6] Cf.Counterinsurgency, theory and practice"p. 57 (Ed. Economica, 2008).

7] Cf.http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704029304575526270751096984.html: CIA escalates in Pakistan Pentagon Diverts Drones From Afghanistan to Bolster U.S. Campaign Next Door.

[8] Cf. http://www.lemonde.fr/asie-pacifique/article/2009/08/07/le-chef-des-talibans-pakistanais-aurait-ete-tue_1226451_3216.html.

9] Cf. http://www.longwarjournal.org/ "Casualties from Predator strikes inside Pakistan: Civilian vs. Taliban/Al Qaeda".

10] Cf.The air campaign, planning for combat"by John Warden III, Ed. Economica 1998.

11] According to the acronym HVT for high value target.

[12] http://www.understandingwar.org/report/haqqani-network.

[13 ] http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1840383,00.html.

Infantryman, Battalion Commander LAMBERT is currently studying for his technical degree, a Master 2 in geopolitics at the École normale supérieure and the University of Paris I.