On 15 June 2009, the Council of the European Union decided to extend Operation Atalanta for one year, starting on 13 December 2009. This military operation, which is taking place in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy, is based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions (1814, 1816, 1838 and 1851). It aims to combat the increasing acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia.

Despite the major media coverage of the attacks, it must be acknowledged that the economic and financial impact on the maritime transport sector, which is currently experiencing a crisis of overcapacity, is generally limited.

First, the situation in the Gulf of Aden and the low-intensity threat posed by the phenomenon of piracy should be presented, and then the consequences for a sector in crisis should be observed.

A transit zone conducive to piracy

The Gulf of Aden is an area with conditions conducive to piracy. Indeed, Somalia has a favourable geographical position, it borders a gulf and a strait (Bab el Mandeb) crossed by a very busy maritime route; nearly 20,000 ships transited through the Suez Canal in 2008, i.e. 7.5% of world trade. It is one of the poorest countries in the world where public authority is lacking. The motivation of Somali pirates is clearly lucrative; 2008 was a big year for piracy, with attacks bringing in more than $30 million in ransom[1].

Elaborate and bold modes of action

The modus operandi of the pirates, who have informants in all ports in the Arabian Sea, is evolving and modernising. From mother ships, they no longer hesitate, using fast boats, to operate on the open sea and attack large vessels. The reduction in the number of crew members (about 20 on average), while saving money, also increases the vulnerability of the boats and their cargoes. For example, in November 2008, pirates took possession of the 330-meter long, 300,000-ton oil-laden super tanker Sirius Star off the coast of Kenya, proving that pirates are no longer confined to small ships. "The British Chatham House Institute says: "They are nolonger just opportunists: their operations have become professional and will become even more sophisticated if we don't provide any answers.

Attacks on the rise

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB), a specialized division of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), established in 1981 to assist in the fight against all types of maritime crime, recorded 111 acts of piracy in 2008 (+200 per cent) attributable to Somali pirates.

Explosion in insurance premiums

Until the summer of 2008, shipowners operating on the high seas were content to provide only the vessel, cargo and crew. With the increase in incidents and the classification of the Gulf of Aden as a war zone, insurers such as Lloyd's offered a policy that provided for the reimbursement of the ransom and the loss of income due to the detention of the vessel. The additional cost for a shipowner wishing to take out a policy is estimated at $30,000. However, most shipowners have passed on this additional cost to their clients, so that to send a 20-foot sea container through the Suez Canal, the latter have to pay about $25 for war risks. The amount of insurance premiums and the risk involved (the probability of a ship being attacked is only 0.167%, bad weather is a greater risk) has had only a limited overall economic and financial impact on the shipping industry. Even if small shipowners are more exposed than multinational shipping companies.

A sector more concerned by the global crisis

The crisis in the maritime sector is of more concern to shipowners than piracy. There is now a mismatch between transport supply and demand. Indeed, in order to cope with a sustained growth in demand for transport and to respond to the "Chinese boom", shipowners ordered ships on a massive scale in the mid-2000s, at high prices, with a delivery time of 3 to 4 years. Today, the number of tankers on order compared to the existing fleet in 2007 is 48%. The financial crisis of 2008, the drop in world demand and the fall in freight rates (in 2007, the cost of an oil tanker was $250,000/day, falling back to $50,000/day at the end of 2008) caused a crisis of overcapacity. In order to cope with this overcapacity and reduce costs, some ship owners decided to reduce the speed of their vessels (low steaming) and to pass through the Cape of Good Hope. They thus use their entire fleet (to compensate for the increase in delays), save the passage through the Suez Canal (around €600,000 for a container ship), and the additional insurance premiums.

Inconclusion, it can therefore be said that acts of piracy have limited effects on the maritime transport economy. Thus, unlike the financial crisis of 2008, piracy has not caused a change in shipping routes and has not disrupted supply chains.

However, the Asia/Middle East-Europe sea route, one of the busiest routes in the world, is a strategic route for the supply, in particular of hydrocarbons, to Europe. It is therefore legitimate for Europe and the international community to commit themselves to securing this lawless zone and above all to curbing the progress of this easy and lucrative business.

It cannot be ruled out that terrorist networks may in future use the routes used by pirates or their methods of action.

Steps must also be taken to ensure that the capture of an oil tanker does not one day end in an ecological disaster.

1] P.Middleton, Piracy in Somalia, October 2008.