Operation Sentinel, which saw the deployment of several thousand soldiers on national territory, highlighted the role of reservists, both as a capability complement and as a link between the army and the nation.

Since the end of the Second World War, the use made of Army reservists, and their ideological acceptance, has been closely linked to changes in the French political, economic and social situation. In recent years, it has been even more closely linked to changes in the security situation.

However, many challenges of all kinds remain to equip and maintain the attractiveness of the reserve. This is what the authors show in this article, also using the example of our German and Spanish neighbours.

In 1948, the Minister of the Interior, Jules Moch, ordered the participation of the military reserve in the repression of the strikers in Valenciennes, in support of the police force, in a counter-insurgency framework. In a completely different vein, nearly seventy years later, in 2016, President François Hollande announced his intention to double the number of reservists (target 40,000) in order to employ them, this time in an anti-terrorist context.

These examples illustrate in a very different way the framework and the different reasons that motivated the use of the reserve from 1947 to the present day. This study of the military reserve, which will be understood as a force of citizens trained as soldiers to reinforce the active armed forces on the national territory or in external operations, will be limited to the framework of the Army and will open on occasion on the principles of employment of the European neighbours (Germany and Spain).

In short, since 1947, the unique position of the reserve, a necessary complement to the active army in terms of manpower and the materialisation of the "European Army", has been a key factor in the development of the armed forces.citizen-soldier", has evolved in line with operational needs and circumstances, not without facing structural or specific difficulties. The current situation is the legacy of a rich and fluctuating past.
The study will first of all look at the chronological evolution of the use of reserves, from the mass army to the professional army, and will then underline their adequacy with contemporary military and social needs. Finally, it will attempt to explain the difficulties that prevail in the principle of the use and functioning of this operational complement.

A concept for the use of reserves that has been able to adapt to the economic situation

From the war in Indochina to the terrorist attacks on the Bataclan in Paris on 13 November 2015, the willingness to commit reservists in support of land forces has fluctuated according to the economic and political (national and international) situation of the moment.

Throughout the Cold War period, the Army, as a matter of principle, could call on reserves to complement active formations or by formations composed entirely of reservists, more specifically for logistical support (transport, health, etc.) and territorial defence forces. After the Second World War, the governments' priority objective was to rebuild the ruined country. Domestic concerns monopolise the country's attention. The reserve is restricted to the defence of the metropolitan national territory.

In 1947, the Indochinese problem, secondary and distant, was the subject of distracted, even indifferent and insensitive public attention. There was no question of committing the contingent. Despite the legacy of the ideals of resistance and the strength of the nation-at-arms feeling, the reserves were not committed in Indochina in support of the French expeditionary force.

The Algerian war, by the fact that it was taking place on the national territory of Metropolitan France, made it possible to legitimately envisage the commitment of the contingent (and the reserves). After his visit to Algiers on 6 February 1956 (known as "Tomato Day"), the President of the Council, Guy Mollet, gave priority to restoring order. The vote of full powers, by a large majority, resulted in the massive sending of reinforcements and the use of conscripts from the contingent (200,000 men at the end of 1956).

From 1957 onwards, the recall of the reservists made it possible to increase the number of troops to 450,000 men and to contribute to the implementation of the strategy of squaring the terrain desired by General Salan in order to paralyse and destroy the NLA units. It is worth noting the decisive role of conscripts and reservists who refused to take part in the putsch of the generals that took place in Algiers on April 22, 1961 and made it fail in part.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the disappearance of the USSR in November 1991 led to the disappearance, or at least the reduction of the immediate threat. It is the time of the "peace dividend", which must be reflected in a reduction in military budgets. The mass reserve is no exception to this principle.

Indeed, this system has, in the end, been little or not used at all since the Algerian war and seems to be less and less suitable. It is cumbersome and costly in view of the low level of funding allocated, and the equipment is disparate. However, new risks and new tensions are emerging, multiple in form, linked to the resurgence of ethnic, cultural and regional rivalries...

The active forces, moving towards a professional army, still need to be supported. The "Reserves 2000" plan of 1992, aimed at ensuring a rise in power adapted to the new situations, and its extension, the law of 1993, give a new impetus which will unfortunately prove insufficient.

Finally, it was the 1997-2002 programming law that saw the establishment of a more modern, better trained reserve, the aim of which was to provide the active forces with the necessary reinforcements (possibly replacing them) to maintain or increase their capabilities, and finally to maintain the link between the armed forces and the nation. The Operational Reserve (RO1) is made up of volunteers and the Operational Standby Reserve (RO2) of former military personnel who have been out of service for less than five years. This is a shift from the duty to serve to the right to serve.

The attacks on Charlie Hebdo on 7 January 2015 and on the Bataclan on 13 November 2015 have led to a new surge in the use of reserves, this time as part of Operation Sentinel. The Minister of Defence, Jean-Yves Le Drian, announced in March 2016 that he wanted to deploy around 1,000 reservists (including 800 reservists from the French Army, which will thus provide 80% of the reservists engaged on the national territory) in this framework, on a daily basis, and to increase the overall volume by 28.000 to 40 000 by the end of 2018, mainly to meet the growing terrorist threat.

The French Army is not alone in experiencing a profound change in the use of its reserves. The example of Spain shows us that the reserve of the Spanish land forces has always been cut and shaped by the political, economic and social situation over the same period.

Indeed, since the 1936 Civil War, Franco's regime has maintained a potential reserve (through compulsory military service) of up to 2,000.000 men who can be recalled in case of emergency in the face of an internal enemy (mainly North African threatening the sovereignty of the cities of Ceuta and Melilla) and external, facing the communists of the Soviet bloc. With the end of the dictatorship in 1975, with the process of democratisation and liberation of society, the army was gradually transformed (see Appendix 1).

In 2001, military service was abolished in the face of the disappearance of the threat and the non-necessity of maintaining a mass army. The Ley Orgánica de la Defensa Nacional of 17 November 2005 provides for flexibility and progressiveness in engaging the reserves. In 2011, Real Decree 383/2011 establishes the three types of reserves. The first is the voluntary reserve (reinforcement of the active forces). The second is the temporary reserve, which is made up of former military personnel who can be recalled. The last is the compulsory reserve, which is made up of all Spaniards between the ages of 18 and 25 and can be mobilised in the event of a serious crisis or war.

Thus, in Spain as in France, from the end of the Second World War to the present day, the reserve has adapted to the situation.

A principle of employment globally in line with today's needs

The concept of reserve employment meets the needs of the Army, both in its role as an operational complement and in its role as aThe aim is not to dissociate the reserve from the active army.

The aim is not to dissociate the reserve from the active army. The structure of the reserve is similar to that of the active army both in its organisation in the district and in operations. Each tactical unit has a reserve company, which therefore carries the attributes of a unit and uses the means of the regiment. This company is a reinforcement for the regiment and is used with the regiment. At both regimental and brigade staff levels, reserve officers may also reinforce their home unit.

For the emergency engagement, the "Reserve Cheetah" was created in the summer of 2011 . It is made up of a pool of volunteers from the regimental reserve units that can be engaged with 48 hours' notice and for 8 days. A timetable and implementation modalities are established for the eleven land forces brigades. Nine brigades arm two sections and one Proterre group (69 personnel), and the last two brigades arm three sections and one Proterre group (96 personnel), totalling more than 800 reservists.

At the operational level, the reserve, in its complementary role, offers a dual capability both on national territory and for external operations. Between 15 December 2015 and 15 January 2016, 15 reserve companies are engaged in addition to individual reinforcements in the active companies. Thus, nearly 8,000 reservists from all the armies will be serving on national territory in 2015.

This trend will be accentuated with a target of 20,000 reservists who can be engaged in internal protection. Even if the number of personnel in external operations is less numerous, in the order of 240 for all the armies over the year 2015, the reserve offers a certain qualitative reinforcement by providing many specialists. Finally, the reserve provides an essential capability complement in the event of a major crisis.

The "Reserve Cheetah" plan (mentioned above) was also activated in November 2011 (even though the number of personnel was limited to 70) to test the concept. RO2 is showing encouraging results: a recall was carried out during the Vortex exercise from 31 March to 2 April 2016 with two Army brigades (11th Parachute Brigade and Logistics Brigade). This recall, for which 1,663 of the 3,494 reservists requested responded, shows that a real capacity reservoir exists.

The reserve, with the end of conscription, also plays a decisive role as a link between the army and the country, highlighting the role of the citizen-soldier in the service of his nation. Operation Sentinel provides us with a representative example, in terms of the size of the number of citizen reservists engaged in the service of the nation for the direct protection of the population.

The example of the Federal Republic of Germany provides us with a relevant illustration and opening. Since 1955, Das Heer and its reserve forces have played a fundamental role there, providing a link with a nation which, following the Second World War, moved away from its army. In addition, the plan of 12 November 1955, based on 12 divisions for the entire army, organizes the reserves regionally within a "territorial defence". The concept evolves according to the geopolitical situation until the 1990s and, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, a significant reduction in the size of the reserves takes place. Indeed, the development of external operations changed the paradigm from the protection of national territory to operational commitments, which led to a sharp reduction in the size of the reserve force.

Since the 2010's, a reversal of this trend has been taking place with the new programme called "reserve concept", which is based on three pillars. Firstly, the reinforcement of active units by specialist reservists, secondly the territorial reserve for the defence of the national territory (with a civil-military vocation) and thirdly the general reserve (in cases of extreme emergency). The reservist is thus a real link between the army and civil society.

The example of the Bundeswehr thus shows that the reserve has always played a fundamental role in securing national territory and integrating the armed forces into society. However, in France, the use of this operational complement has never been without difficulties.

A concept that has to face both "historical" and cyclical difficulties

Despite a certain proximity to the reality of the operations and a minimum link maintained with the company, the principle of using the reserves of theThe principle of using the Army's reserves must face new difficulties, while struggling to free itself from the constraints inherited from past decades. These difficulties contribute to widening the gap with the active forces.

Many of the difficulties experienced by the mass reserve have been in the process of finding solutions in recent months. The most obvious solutions concern the resources allocated to the reservist for both equipment and training. Almost universally, the clothing and individual armament were of a generation prior to the equipment of the active forces.

Until recently, there were no plans to distribute the new Félin fatigues to reservists (equipped with the F2 uniform). But this is not a new phenomenon. In comparison, in 1974, when the new textile brelage gradually equipped the active forces, the reserves had to make do with the old "pure pig" leather brelage model 1945!

Also, since mid-2016, the reserve has been the subject of a real effort of equipment. It is now part of the plan to equip the forces with the latest generation lattices and it is planned to equip the reserve units with 12,930 individual weapons of the future (AIF). However, in order to train (or be committed), they need to benefit from the means that have become rare and indispensable for active units, in particular signals, troop transport, etc.

This equipment must be borrowed and "shared" with professional companies. The historical difficulty of the gap between active and reserve forces is tending to disappear as reservists help to strengthen professional units. This contribution is leading to a greater integration of the reserve into the active, which must be pursued .

Moreover, contemporary times are seeing unprecedented difficulties in the use of the reserves. New brakes are limiting their commitment, but solutions are being adopted.

First of all, the legislative framework for the use of reserves is unfavourable. The law obliges the employer to release the reservist for five days a year and, if the activities performed during working hours exceed five days a year, the reservist must obtain the agreement of his or her employer.

There is a reactivity clause which makes it possible to reduce the notice period vis-à-vis the employer: it allows reservists who have signed a contract of employment containing this obligation to be recalled within 15 days. Reservists may indeed be absent for up to 60 days (210 days in exceptional circumstances) if the duration of their activities justifies it, but this may put them in difficulty with their employer. As such, too many Reservists spend their military periods on their leave .

The recently re-evaluated reserve budget now generates fewer constraints : from 37.86 million euros in 2014 for the Army, it has risen to 54.3 million euros in 2016, which allows reservists to be employed for an average of almost 30 days a year. It is also planned to compensate for the excess consumption generated by Operation Sentinel.

In addition, developments are under way, providing for a strengthened partnership with companies and the creation of a specific commission (26 November 2014 at the plenary assembly of the Conseil supérieur de la réserve militaire). Thus, 328 agreements with companies had been validated by 31 December 2014, representing a 4% increase compared to 2013.

Lhe reserve must be attractive. The operational employment of troops is an essential driving force and marks the culmination of a long training cycle consisting of at least 15 days' initial military reservist training (FMIR) to acquire basic know-how (see Annex 2). The communication campaigns also aim to highlight this point (see Annex 3). Recruitment, however, is proving to be imperfect because it is not sufficiently diversified, since in 2014, according to the Ministry of Defence's report on the reserves, one third of reservists were former active military personnel.

In conclusion, employment of reservists in the Army has always fluctuated in line with changes in society and the economy. The reservist provides more than ever today the indispensable (and adapted) reinforcement to the active forces; he is also the guarantor of a fragile armed-nation link. The reserve sees its use perfectible, but is hampered by universal, historical difficulties, but also by new problems, mainly linked to the relationship with the company.

The reserve provides the active army with a dynamic and competent operational complement that must be used to the best advantage!

Tomorrow's challenges and issues lie in the obligation to make the profession of reservist even more attractive, in particular by maintaining a high level of operational employment, and to offer facilities to volunteers who want to become reservists.to serve the Army in accordance with their professional situation, while guaranteeing them the means necessary for their training and the execution of their mission.

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- Saint-cyrien of the promotion "General de Galbert", the BUREU Battalion Chief chose to serve in the infantry. He spent his first part of his career at the 13th BCA ^as section ^chief, deputy officer and then unit commander; he was projected there five times. Assigned to the École Polytechnique from 2013 to 2015, he served as unit commander. He is, since¹ September 2016, a trainee at the CSIA.

- Saint-cyrien of the promotion "General de Galbert", the Chief of Battalion NICLOUX chose to serve in the naval artillery. He spent his first part of his careerⁱⁿ the 1st Marine Artillery Regiment, as section chief, deputy officer and then unit commander; he was projected there four times. Assigned to the Army Intelligence Teaching and Study Centre (CEERAT) from 2013 to 2015, he served as an editor in the doctrine office. He has been a trainee at the CSIA since¹ September 2015.

- Commander of the German Army, trained at the Munich Academy, infantryman, Major André CORNELIUS served mainly in infantry units. He was twice projected, in Kosovo and Afghanistan. He was previously military assistant to the deputy commander of the RRC-FR. Since 7 March 2016, he has been a trainee at CSIA. He will be the second in command of Jägerbataillon 291 from 18 June 2016.

- Commander of the Spanish Army, trained in the academies of Zaragoza and Segovia, artilleryman, Major Luis Alonso SANCHEZ has mainly served in the Spanish Army's airborne forces as a pilot and maintenance officer. He has been projected five times in different functions, as a journalist, B2 officer, helicopter operations manager and military assistant. He has a university degree in Communication and Defence. Since 7 March 2016, he has been a trainee at CSIA.

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43] Mobilization plan of 1959

44] "Algeria is France", Pierre Mendès-France, November 12, 1954.

45] "L'histoire militaire de la France", tome 4, André Corvisier, Paris, Presse Universitaires de France, 1994.

[46] The General de Gaulle strongly urged reservists and reservists to obey him (he ends his televised speech with "Help me!") by all means.

[47] For the first time since 1956, conscripts and reservists are clearly invited to choose between obedience to their superiors and fidelity to the Republic. They then refuse the risk of a partition of the country or a civil war. However, this episode betrayed the idea of an army unit by highlighting the existence of a majority aspiring to "the keel" and widened a moral gap.

[48] The resource available to the Army was ten times the 300,000 posts to be filled under the mobilization plan.

[49] The budgets allocated are increasing from 71 million in 2012 to 100 million for the year 2016. Between 2014 and 2018, the annual budget is expected to increase by 77%.

[50] http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2005/06/02/

[51] http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2011/03/23/

[52] Further details on http://www.ejercito.mde.es/personal/reservistas-voluntarios.html

[53] Law 2011-892 of 28 July 2011 on the Cheetah Reserve.

54] Armées d'aujourd'hui n°405, dossier: Réserve, la nouvelle donne, March 2015.

55] Armées d'aujourd'hui n°405, dossier: Réserve, la nouvelle donne, March 2015.

56] Note that a platoon of reservists belonging to the 511th ^train regiment was projected into a unit formed in Bosnia at Mostar in October 2007.

57] Source: http://lignesdedefense.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2011/11/04/guepard-reserve-la-9e-blbima-experimente.html

58] Source:http://lignesdedefense.blogs.ouest-france.fr/index-2.html

59] It does, however, require real monitoring to keep personnel operational, both in terms of individual equipment and medical monitoring or human resources.

60]Source:http://www.deutschesheer.de/portal/a/heer/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9jNTUIr2i1OLUorLUzFwwLz21ODkjMzmjJFW_INtREQCae04S/

[61]Source:http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pPKUVL3ikqLUzJLsosTUtJJUvaLU4tSislS97Py8qtQCkAb9gmxHRQDEfL_A/

[62] Defence Code: articles L4221-1 to L4221-10 on the commitment to the operational reserve

[63] Report on the Military Reserve, 2014

64] The adviser to the Minister of Defence undertook, at the Reserve Steering Committee meeting of 17 June 2016, to "cover" the overruns generated by missions on national territory..

[65] Evaluation Report of the Military Reserve 2014, Conseil supérieur de la réserve militaire.