"I sense in our officers a paralyzing, base incuriosity. Too many bodies, too few heads. The perfect general would know all the things of heaven and earth. So if you see it that way, and if you agree with me, please use me as a text that preaches the necessity of studying more than the history books do, that of a greater seriousness in military art. With two thousand years of examples behind us, we have no excuse, when we fight, if we fight badly".

1. E. Lawrence (correspondence with B.H. Liddle Hart)

"What to learn in order to win, and how?": this fundamental recursive question remains the focus of the military leader's attention. The classic answer refers to the experience of those involved in recent conflicts and to the training that is continually enriched by the process of feedback, which is becoming increasingly mastered. However, like society, war is undergoing a flow of change: after the agrarian period, the industrial revolution and now the information age. These changes require the military to adapt through its training, which must enable it to have a reasoned response to an unforeseen situation, and therefore beyond training, which aims to deliver a controlled (and predictable!) response to an anticipated situation. Also, if learning the principles of warfare is unavoidable in the training of military personnel, it is legitimate to question the relevance of the study of military history, the capital of experience of our alumni, and its added value.e today, to prepare or assist our officers to conduct asymmetric operations in a complex context where proven and emerging technologies play a pre-eminent role.

While French armies have recently returned to learning about their past, its prestige and lessons, Anglo-Saxon armies remain convinced that the study of military history is a necessity and has the seeds of a good preparation for future conflicts. The innovative integration of questions relating to military history in the new single entrance examination to the CID can only be a step in the right direction in France.

This article, based on lectures by academics and military personnel from the Joint Services Command and Staff Course (JSCSC or Staff College), briefly relates the position of the British and some of their allies on the study of military history and explains its original methods: the Battlefield Tour, the Staff Ride and the Tactical Exercise Without Troup (TEWT) applied to history .

Military History: a constant in British training.

• A trend in British society.

First of all, as the armed forces resemble the societies from which they come, they are subject to the trends that guide the lives of their populations: the attraction of history among a people hungry for past glories and in search of evanescent landmarks has led to a profusion of books in recent years. They deal with different subjects, at different levels, from Grand Strategy to combat section tactics. This trend, which has been erratic over time in France, has become a real constant in the United Kingdom, where every local bookshop has a section on military history. The military past, selective, often orientated, is a source of pride and, in times of doubt, it becomes the breeding ground in which the necessary confidence of the British people germinates.

But military history is also, as in France, appreciated simply for its leisure value: the success of books, documentaries, war films, video games based on operations or on the lives of authentic military leaders is ample proof of this. If the search for teaching and historical accuracy are not the stated objectives, these multimedia vectors attract a large audience, in a dynamic, often interactive way, and finally have a role of initiation to military history which often evolves towards intellectual curiosity.

• A professional asset for the military.

In the British armed forces, the teaching of history goes beyond a leisurely, inspirational, descriptive and informative approach: it is critical, educational and prescriptive. Knowledge of the past, of the genesis of facts and of problems within and between societies, is an essential part of attempts to understand the present. In order to have a reasonable appreciation of the complexity of the situations in which His Majesty's armies (like ours!) are increasingly involved, a base of knowledge of the past, but also the intellectual dexterity provided by the analytical tool that historical study represents, are essential. To convince yourself of the value accorded to history, when you enter a British military school like the JSCSC, you immediately notice its presence : it challenges you on the walls with superb frescoes, in the corridors with glorious busts (of which Napoleon so feared, esteemed and copied), challenges you on the shelves of the largest library in the world.that of military history in the United Kingdom, mocking you in the showcases of the recreation rooms where you can boast of the many works of history that the academics and certain officers of the Staff College have written.

Specifically, British officers feel a duty to master certain areas of their military past. In addition to the requirement to excel in the equivalent courses of Higher Military Education at levels 1, 2 and 3, where studies of campaigns and analyses of commanders' personalities are on the programme, this knowledge contributes to the cohesion and influence of their battalion or unit: all opportunities to honour the Elders and celebrate victories are exploited during activities generally placed under the responsibility of the youngest officers. Beyond the knowledge of dates and the basic and chronological narration of a battle narrative, a broader mastery of the forms of warfare and operational art is indispensable. Thus, military history serves to promote the ancient values and glorious hours of the Empire, but, beyond that, it helps to develop the technical, tactical, psychological knowledge and character of young military officers, their perspicacity, sagacity, confidence in themselves and in their decisions.

Beyond the strengthening of the young leader's personality and his domination of the sciences of war, the teaching of military history makes up for the lack of experience in the field of military history.The teaching of military history overcomes the lack of experience of officers and becomes a source of lessons, creativity and inspiration fundamental to the mastery of the art of war ... in the future. In the words of Moltke the Elder, the British therefore consider that "military history is a tool that arms staff officers against all eventualities. But this is of value only because the history taught is interactive and applied and is intended to become an energy of the mind and not merely its food.

Finally, the British, concrete and pragmatic, are only following the example of illustrious soldiers (which they studied!): because our leaders, whatever their origins, were learning military history. Napoleon read Thucydides, Frontin and immersed himself in the lives of great captains including Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustave-Adolphe and Frederick. Passionate about history, Churchill wrote the biography of his ancestor the Duke of Marlborough, winner at Blenheim. Patton literally lived the battles of the Ancients; Dempsey [1] and Eisenhower dominated many battles, especially of the American Civil War, assimilated them with precision, not hesitating to return several times to the scene of the fighting. Eisenhower even ended up buying the resort of his retreat at Gettysburg. It is widely believed that ^World War II was won on the Gettysburg map!

Original and efficient methods: Staff Rides and Battlefield Tours.

Depending on the country, different approaches to battlefield tours emerge. Canadians, favouring a more global approach, use them to ensure their rightful place in history and to introduce young civilians and academics to the actions of their armed forces in Europe. While complementing their education system, the goal is to bring young people closer to military affairs, to their army and, secondarily, to encourage vocations. The Germans, whose idea of these visits was developed by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and then taken up by Moltke to complement the analytical studies of the battles and the Kriegspiel, are seeking to acquire experience and professional efficiency. Possessing (the most!) long experience since, as early as 1730, Frederick the Great advocated "a disciplined historical study and visits to the battlefields", they truly instituted the Staff Ride. The Americans, concerned about the training of their young elite, sought in these visits, especially after the traumas of the Civil War and Vietnam, the development of reflection and critical thinking skills useful in unexpected situations. The British Army, for its part, estimates that 300 (!) study trips and visits a year place its soldiers on the battlefield and call upon their critical thinking skills to actively participate in their professional development. The Advanced Command and Staff Course (ACSC), equivalent to the Joint Defence College, employs 2% of its time in Battlefield Tours and the Higher Command and Staff Course (HCSC), theThe Advanced Command and Staff Course (ACSC), equivalent to the Collège Interarmées de Défense, uses 2% of its time in Battlefield Tours and the Higher Command and Staff Course (HCSC), the "generals' course" without any real equivalent in France[2] , carries out a 2-week "Staff Ride marathon" in France, over a total of 15 weeks of training.

• The Battlefield Tour.

Taking up the German idea, the Battlefield Tour has become a true English tradition which would have started in ... Waterloo: in 1815, the Chief Sergeant E. Cotton of the 7th ^{Regiment of} Queen's Hussars, after having participated in the famous battle, (whose 200th anniversary we can only look forward to!) returned to marry ^a local girl. His natural pragmatism, his status as a veteran and his poor command of the local language led him to organise visits to the battlefield of Waterloo for his compatriots. In the same way, many American Civil War veterans lived by guiding tours of the sites of Fredricksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg ...

Less interactive, more superficial and therefore faster than the Staff Ride, the Battlefield Tour is a kind of pilgrimage led by a witness or expert, academic or military, to a place of the military past. While it is rich in lessons, it contributes above all to the indispensable "duty of remembrance" for the benefit of a group or category of people, thus strengthening their identity, cohesion and morale by giving concrete meaning to the supreme sacrifice in a society that is losing its bearings.

• The Staff Ride.
• Origin and Purpose.

In the United Kingdom, the Staff Ride originated from the initiative of Colonel JF Maurice, a professor at Camberley Staff College in 1870, who was already working hard to finance the idea that the plans of commanders in recent conflicts needed to be studied in the field. The first Staff Rides then took the form of TEWTs on the battlefields of the Franco-Prussian War and, after the First World War, they focused on the tactical aspects of the battles, forgetting to take into account the teachings of the operational and strategic levels. In the second half of the 20th century^{, these "} field conferences" became dependent on the enthusiasm (and vitality!) of the commanders of the 2nd war, who testified to their decisions ^{and the} actions of their troops. In order to homogenize the quality of the lessons learned and to optimize their added value, it was decided to integrate them formally into the Staff College curriculum and to focus on the operational and strategic levels.

The Staff Ride allows one to think about the battle from the inside in order to understand the decision-making process, to grasp the "frictions" and limitations encountered by the commander, and to tangibly measure the chaos and complexity of the battles. It consists of a preliminary study of a specific campaign, an extensive visit to the battle sites, covering field orientation and historical description, and, finally, the development by the trainees in situ of a particular aspect of a battle or campaign. This presentation introduces a discussion that will be concluded by the exercise director with a synthesis of the main lessons of the battle. An After Action Analysis will be held at the end of the Staff Ride where the trainees, and then the exercise director, will present the main lessons of the campaign. The Staff Ride thus provides an opportunity to immerse oneself in the lessons of battle and a campaign in a specific area that is consistent with the current teaching module. The trainee's involvement prior to arrival on site is maximized to ensure the quality of thinking, analysis and discussion. Preceded and often concluded by a demanding period of reading, the trainee's research, writing and in situ presentation work is evaluated by academic and military experts. Thus, the Staff Ride participates in the selection of the British military elite: on the one hand, it allows the students' understanding of warrior principles and their virtuosity in the art of war to be verified; on the other hand, it allows the training, as it validates the objective set for a phase of instruction and evaluates the degree of achievement of that objective.

• The power of the tool.

The pedagogical aspect of the Staff Ride is important. Some people, who often unconsciously oppose the theory read in books to the practice carried out in the field, prefer to learn by confronting their senses with physical realities rather than through reading and research. The Staff Ride is an effective and reasonable way to examine the perennial difficulties of the commander based on a concrete case, to establish simple methods for the application or practice of certain principles. In this, it should teach generations of officers how to think, not what to think.

Moreover, the vision of the terrain reinforces the theoretical study of a battle and reveals the practical difficulties for the commander and his strength: complexity of the terrain, adaptability and effectiveness of equipment, value and relevance of information received and orders given. The trainee, integrated into the framework, becomes an actor and discovers the moral dimension of the battle: the power and responsibility of the commander, the synergy or empathy of a group, the faith in the effectiveness of the action, the struggle of the opposing wills. He witnesses the chaos, the clash of the rational and the irrational in battle.

Battles become a means of showing the true face of war and authentic laboratories for the study of decision-making. Thus, the Staff Ride must not be satisfied with examining the decisions of commanders in the field, but allows one to immerse oneself in the decision-making process that led to the leader's choices, to evaluate their causes and consequences at the level under consideration. It concretely assesses the importance of each function or component, noting the benefits of a well-planned logistical manoeuvre or a well-conducted amphibious operation. To be fully relevant today, it must strive to be joint and may even include civilians, to mutual benefit, at a time when the approach to crises is comprehensive.

Aware of the capabilities of this tool, the HCSC, a joint and intergovernmental course, uses "applied military history", a method which consists, during its Staff Ride in France, in highlighting, at This method consists, during its Staff Ride in France, in highlighting, from historical examples, contemporary problems and thus providing an angle for the study of command problems and the conduct of future campaigns and operations in a joint and multinational context. Thus, the British general's professional development is based on a reflection on the experience of a past war, confronted with the current socio-cultural environment. The value of the field in this Staff Ride is all the more recognized as leaders, by adopting new technologies, tend to move away from the battlefield and are exposed to the risk of losing touch with people and realities.

Finally, as a means of creating contacts between the military of a nation and the authorities of the host nation, the primary objectives of a Staff Ride can also be political or diplomatic.

However, the effectiveness of the Staff Ride depends on the precision of the definition of its scope and objective, the level considered (tactical, operational, etc.) and the level of the mission.(tactical, operational, strategic), the component being studied (moral, physical, tactical), the approach (military, socio-political, academic humanist or military professional).

• An extension of the Staff Ride: the "Tactical Exercise Without Troop" applied to history.

Formally, the TEWT is a field training exercise, without troops, built on a hypothetical scenario and conducted with current procedures, techniques and tactics. However, in order to include the lessons of history, several variations are possible, which require finding the right balance between the lessons and tools of the past and contemporary issues.

One option is based on a challenging exercise where the battle is recreated on the ground in a kind of elaborate war game. The information and intelligence available to the commander on the eve of the battle is exposed: the situation, the physical conditions of the battle, the orders and reports received, the organization, capabilities and disposition of friendly and enemy assets at the various levels of the hierarchy. At the end of the field reconnaissance, the necessary clarifications are made and the trainees draw up their plan while the situation and information are regularly updated. The authentic battle narrative, which emphasizes the lessons learned and a possible theme for study, concludes the exercise. The trainees, who assume the responsibilities of their illustrious elders, thus become aware of human frailty, the "fog of war" and the "frictions of combat". If this role-playing in the field tends to disappear because it represents a considerable amount of work for an unsecured result, the British carry out a theoretical exercise at the operational level, where after a few hours of practice, the students are given a chance to play a role in the field.After several years of planning for the Norwegian campaign of 1940, the CCAA course, like the HCSC, requires each of its trainees to develop for 48 hours part of the OPLAN of Operation Husky in Sicily in 1943.

Another, more suitable option is to incorporate contemporary planning sessions during a Staff Ride. These sessions are designed to encourage trainees to use their operational thinking and planning methods to make decisions in a contemporary scenario consistent with the historical campaign being studied. In other words, the aim is to accommodate a Staff Ride and a TEWT on the same terrain by building on common areas of study. After the presentation of a battle by an expert, who insists on a possible theme of study such as amphibious operations, the efficiency of support, logistical manoeuvre or cooperation, the expert will present the scenario to the audience.After the presentation of a battle by an expert, which emphasizes a possible theme of study such as amphibious operations, the effectiveness of support, logistical manoeuvre or air-land cooperation, the trainees take into account the contemporary situation, carry out their analysis and then explain their intention and modes of action within the framework of the field studied. Although this type of exercise is more difficult to prepare and conduct, the interest in training the trainees is considerable. The acquisition of methods of reasoning and decision-making are closely associated with the chaos and complexity of battle. This type of TEWT allows to appreciate the qualities necessary for the commander and to convince oneself of the relevance of the processes taught.

Conclusion.

In essence, military history offers examples for all types of situations, with all types of threats, in periods of great uncertainty and extreme tension. History offers us examples of sieges, such as in Basra and Baghdad, of blitzkrieg, psychological warfare, media or civil-military operations. Widening the circle of action beyond the military domain, to control a territory, Marshal Gallieni already favoured a global approach through the triptych "battle-market-market-school": his message, "military occupation is an organisation that works", remains relevant even if the stakes, the actors, the means, the interactions with the environment are more complex. Learning military history is more than ever adapted to our uncertain times. The Anglo-Saxons have understood this: they are interested in the most recent conflicts of the French armies and remain amazed by our disdain for these pages of our history, which are being renewed before our eyes and whose lessons we often ignore.

Like many others, the British consider that operational planning techniques, the method of drawing up orders, can be learned in the sanitized environment of a classroom. On the other hand, the true value of intelligence, information, situational awareness, the reality of implementing plans, and the difficulties created by the environment, by the intervention of a deThe true value of intelligence, information, situation assessments, the reality of the implementation of plans and the difficulties created by the environment, by the intervention of a decision, of political pressure will only be appreciated, understood and assimilated at their true value, through a concrete case exposed on the ground, whose map is, after all, only a lenient representation. It is possible to study in the depths of an amphitheatre the horror of combat, the challenges to leadership in an uncertain and volatile world, but the added value of theBut the added value of study in the field is immense, which allows the awareness of the realities of this paroxysmal struggle between two wills, fighting with means, objectives, rationalities, symmetrical or not. Each mistake, each hesitation has a cost, the measure of which is revealed just a few steps away, in the military cemetery visited, where the tombs have a name, an age, an existence. Finally, beyond its realism, the Staff Ride is conceived and applied across the Channel as an excellent tool to teach officers, as part of their training and education, to think about the war ... of tomorrow.

But the Staff Ride is not the paradigm or the absolute weapon of education; it has dangers that lie in delivering a message that promotes the sacralization of technical recipes, engenders tactical uniformity and leads to the creation of dogmas in the minds of younger officers. It is very easy for a historian to deliver the wrong message, to find historical examples that support virtually any hypothesis, to confuse cause and consequence, and sometimes to link disjointed events. Misinterpretation will be avoided by analyzing events in context, by seeking the authenticity of history without erasing the role of uncertainty, which has faded with the passage of time and subsequent analysis.

History and its practical applications, such as Battlefield Tours and Staff Rides, are only there to stimulate reflection on cases that have been identified and isolated. They are tools of the intellect to learn how to think.

[1] General Dempsey commanded a corps in North Africa under Montgomery and later the 2nd Army in Normandy. An enthusiast of the Battlefield Tours, he had developed a keen sense of the terrain on which he had to fight during his campaigns.

[2] However, the HCSC could be compared to the CHEM, which focused its work on planning and control of operations at the strategic and operational levels.