Undergoing a major crisis in its relations with the international community, Israel could decide to regain the initiative in a form that its political leaders are fully aware of: a regional conflict with controlled effects. However, and despite expertise in this field forged over time, new political and social constraints that have recently emerged may force the Israeli Prime Minister and his staff to obtain international legitimacy before any action is taken.

The latest political events in the Middle East have never been more deserving of attention, for several reasons, the most frightening being the likely imminence of renewed fighting by Israel . Or should we talk about a resumption of the initiative?

The Iranian issue has become a core issue around which there is a frenetic agitation from a West that is fiercely opposed to a nuclear Iran and a Middle East that supports the Iranian initiative. The former, led by the Obama-Sarkozy couple, wish to harden the existing sanctions against the regime in Tehran; the latter emphasise the right of peoples to the right of peoples to have access to new technologies while skillfully advocating a world without nuclear weapons, the latter being considered by Imam Khamenei as "Haram" [1]. 1] But the real object of all this excitement remains Israel and its front for refusing to make any territorial concessions.

In addition, new actors, who will be described as "medians", take advantage of this theatrical situation to assert their interest by playing on several scenes: China, Turkey, and more recently Brazil. It should be noted that these first two powers, unlike the European Union and the United States, were represented at the Iranian counter-conference' on nuclear disarmament in April, the conclusions of which were, in the end, very commendable.... but were they sincere? In any case, they will in any case have allowed the middle players to discuss the energy agreements'.

Israel seems to have lost the initiative and is still waiting for future international decisions, starting with the NPT [2] review conference held at the UN in May this year. Decisions on a possible strengthening of sanctions against Iran have yet to be confirmed, but recent events off the coast of Gaza have undoubtedly shaken the Security Council's agenda. For Tel Aviv, this is therefore a privileged moment to reorganize its troops and focus on the essential: its next move.

Why would Israel be likely to relaunch the armed conflict? What would be its objectives? These are the questions we will try to answer prospectively by analyzing the current geopolitical context from "open" sources, and then by carrying out an adapted and pragmatic tactical reflection.

In the Middle East, a new order could gradually take shape around converging ideas, rejections and interests.

The 2010 Arab League summit which has just ended will have been marked by a severe declaration by Syrian President Bashar al Assad against Israel. Applauded by all the countries gathered, the "raïs" confirmed his wish to see the Arab League consider "other options in case of failure of negotiations" [3], implying a possible resumption of armed conflict. He convinced the members of the league to converge their efforts in order to obtain a viable Palestinian State. As for relations between Lebanon and Syria, they are in good shape, according to the recent statements of President Sleiman; the "Hariri" dispute on which the TSL (Special Tribunal for Lebanon) is working no longer seems to be an obstacle to a "pragmatic" resumption of Lebanese-Syrian cooperation.

The observation of a politically strong and proactive Syria is interesting for several reasons. First of all, let us recall that Bashar-al-Assad had become a target that the Bush administration would have gladly hit if the Democrats had not won the American elections. Then let us recall that from 2003 (Syrian condemnation of the American intervention in Iraq) to 2006 (end of Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon), Syria was threatened with war by the United States and, in reaction, pursued a surprising (but fine) policy of appeasement. Today, Bashar-al-Assad is the discreet but undisputed leader of a movement in support of the Iranian President. He is relaunching the international community on the subject of the occupied territories in the hope of benefiting from a general dynamic that would lead to the Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights and, with a little inertia, to the return of the Liwa Iskanderun [4]. 4] Syria has certainly muted this last claim in favour of a better relationship with Ankara, but to believe that the Alawite heir, Bashar-al-Assad, has definitively abandoned the idea of recovering the cradle of its ancestors[5] would be to seriously underestimate the weight of history and Eastern tradition. Let us not delude ourselves: the Palestinian cause remains for Bashar al-Assad, as it was for his father, very secondary.

An increasingly present player on the Middle East chessboard, Turkey has confirmed its change of course vis-à-vis Israel, its great ally of the 1990s. Ankara is today invited to take the leadership of a regional cooperation body bringing together the countries of the Arab League and some African countries (including Senegal!), while reaffirming its support for Iran and refusing to strengthen sanctions against it as Barack Obama and Nicolas Sarkozy would like. Although it is not a permanent member of the Security Council, Ankara could use its influence to prevent the rallying of the 9 votes necessary for a possible resolution.

While the international community seems to be out of breath due to the persistent lack of discernment of the Hebrew state, languages are loosening.

Obama's policy towards Israel irritates the Hebrew state, and if the international press is relaying this new "media bomb" with such enthusiasm, it is because this new situation could well produce effects unique in the history of American-Israeli relations; the United States and Israel have been at the forefront of the debate on Israel's policy towards the Hebrew state.The United States feels that it has a mission to protect and accompany Israel in its development, positioning itself as the ultimate guarantor of its security and its existence, but the series of political slaps inflicted by the Netanyahu administration on the Americans no longer leaves them indifferent. The HARRETZ speaks of a "radical change in American policy towards Israel". Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel-Angel Moratinos, speaking before the Arab League, clearly announces the intentions of the European Union (over which Spain holds the presidency today) by making any lasting peace conditional on a return to the 1967 borders, following in the footsteps of Hillary Clinton who, before AIPAC [6], no longer hesitates to declare that only the "two states solution" [7] can guarantee a lasting peace. Even if the unwavering ally and protector will not reduce its efforts to support the Jewish State, the affair of the constructions in East Jerusalem will have been violently felt by the Obama administration, which has not hidden it, moreover. The United Kingdom, which is not without having played a major role in the Arab-Israeli crisis[8] (even if the collective consciousness seems to have put it aside), has decided to take a more active role in the Arab-Israeli crisis.The United Kingdom, which played a major role in the Arab-Israeli crisis[8] (even if the collective conscience seems to have set it aside), is now declaring that it intends to review its military cooperation agreements with the Jewish State following the use by the latter of British weapons during Operation "Cast Lead" [9]. David Cameron, the newly appointed British Prime Minister, recently told the press that he is opposed to the policy of the Jewish state.

It is clear that the State of Israel is now politically isolated... Netanyahu is decidedly not serene.

Take back the initiative... but at what price?

In the face of these converging factors of weakening support from the international community, the strengthening of anti-Zionist sentiment in the Arab countries and Tehran, and the probable Iranian nuclear military programme threatening the survival of the State of Israel, the burning question of a resumption of the initiative by the latter becomes relevant. In view of Israel's history and its current government's uncompromising policy, it is not impossible to think that the latter could opt for a military action that would distract attention from its pursuit of colonization and prevent it from lifting the veil on its nuclear armament [10]. 10] The question is when, in what form, and what the consequences would be.

The application of a simple method of tactical reasoning leads us to rule out a surgical strike against Iran's nuclear installations from the outset.

First of all, Tsahal is not equipped to simultaneously neutralise all of the nuclear installations and the known (and a fortiori unknown) conventional vector defences, thus running the risk of an Iranian conventional response based on ground-to-ground vectors which have been widely publicised in recent years. Next, Tehran would draw from this the legitimacy of an action of retaliation which, given the quality and size of its army, inspired by the 'divine mission to eradicate the Zionist enemy,' could effectively provoke an Israeli nuclear strike. In this particular case, it is unlikely that a Western country would support such a disproportionate act of defence (although the disproportionality remains questionable considering the size of the two states). On the other hand, it is highly likely that Syria would open up an eastern front, starting with the recuperation of the Golan Heights! As for Turkey, unless the legitimacy of the action acquired by a UN vote, it would not intervene to prevent action by Iran or Syria. On the other hand, it could find an opportunity to assert its influence in the Near and Middle East zone by "channelling" Iranian or Syrian military actions to limit the damage and thus put on the fleece of "peacemaker" by coordinating the armistice process that would follow.

Another option would be to seize Gaza under the pretext of fighting Ismael Haniye's Hamas, but one does not seize a hostile agglomeration of 3 million inhabitants as one would seize a bridge. Tsahal would suffer unacceptable losses and could not justify collateral damage far superior to that inflicted during "hardened lead", which had been unanimously condemned by international opinion and by the families of the conscripts of Tsahal. Furthermore, is it really in Israel's interest to fight Hamas, which today guarantees a political division of the Palestinian Authority? Secondly, Israel wishes to send a strong message to Iran; attacking Hamas would not have that effect. Finally, action against Hamas would mean the death of the young soldier Gilad Shalit.

The most likely option might be to retake southern Lebanon and strike a blow at Hezbollah.

This option is interesting because it seems to become clearer with the condemnation by Israel of a hypothetical delivery of "SCUD" launchers to Hezbollah by Syria. This condemnation could evolve into a "necessary and sufficient reason" to trigger a "pre-emptive" military operation [11]. By penetrating into southern Lebanon to "drive out" Hezbollah, Israel would achieve several relevant objectives: it would affect Iran, Syria, divide Lebanon by the play of divergent confessional allegiances (note that the armament of Hezbollah and its legitimacy are currently the subject of debate in Lebanon), and would wash away the affront of 2006. If successful, it would grant itself an additional territorial pledge that it could put back on the table for negotiations that would not fail to follow immediately. This is what is known as a "high added value objective".

In order to carry out such an operation, it would first need to combine several factors: a pretext for triggering the operation, a method of action that took account of the time constraint and a policy for ending the crisis.

First of all, a pretext, a valid reason in the eyes of the international community, because despite Netanyahu's desire to remain in control of his domestic policy, he will not be able to free himself indefinitely from international support. As mentioned above, confirmation of a delivery of SCUD missiles to Hezbollah may be sufficient; the resumption of harassment by Hezbollah would be unexpected, but it would appear that Damascus has succeeded in putting an end to such actions... for the time being. However, they could resume if the international community strongly condemns Iran following the NPT review conference last May; this is where China comes in.

As a permanent member of the Security Council, China could exercise its veto power and prevent a strengthening of sanctions against Tehran, as it had initially made clear to the Iranian leader. However, President Xhin-Tao is reported to have recently given assurances to the United States and Europeans that he would not do so. In the current international context, it is difficult to say that China will deprive itself of a privileged collaboration with an Iran with abundant energy resources... which a rapidly growing China drastically needs! Beyond that, if Turkey succeeds in uniting the will of the Middle Eastern countries and Brazil around a refusal to be imposed a monolithic vision of international politics, Beijing would pay dearly for its support of Mrs. Clinton in the Iran affair.

We can therefore expect either a non-binding resolution, sparing the interests of the emerging powers of China, Brazil and Turkey, or the lifting of sanctions; the first option, however, seems more likely!

Secondly, the operation should only last for a very short time; indeed, the last two IDF operations have revealed a major time-related handicap: the speed at which Israeli opinion is deteriorating. Young Israelis are convinced that their survival is linked to a strong and immediately available army, and do not question military service; but faced with the realities of war, a large proportion of them need to be motivated by the legitimacy of their action, which the IDF command cannot always guarantee. Although Israel was founded in a spirit of solidarity, it very quickly found its strength in the fight against those who wanted to deprive it of its existence; today, however, most Arab countries recognize directly or implicitly the right of this State to exist (Egypt since Camp David, the Palestinian Authority since the Oslo agreements). The young conscripts of the IDF return home in the evening, and cable television or the Internet provide them with the means to form their own opinions, thus affecting their motivation. The IDF will therefore have to take advantage of the state of grace provided by a regular aggression, but will also have to hold the ground quickly, which requires a colossal deployment of troops.

Finally, armed with an additional territorial pledge and a position of "winner", Israel could base its exit from the crisis on the immediate cession of the Shebba farms (thus annihilating the only pretext justifying the arming of Hezbollah), southern Lebanon and/or part of the Golan Heights, in order to keep Jerusalem as the capital of the Hebrew State and thus cool down any desire on the part of outside countries to claim another status for this three-times holy city. Jerusalem (with the underlying capacity to continue colonization and expand Israeli territory) against southern Lebanon, part of the Golan Heights and a political guarantee that a Palestinian state will finally emerge! Let's admit that it could be tempting...

The "atomization" of the Palestinian State would still have to be settled (Gaza and the West Bank do not provide the territorial unity necessary for a viable State), but that is another story!

To conclude, let us be certain that Israel is not in the habit of allowing its policy to be dictated and must now take the initiative again in a form yet to be determined. If action in South Lebanon remains an option with a strong "return on investment", its management will have to be fine, flexible and reactive in order not to degenerate into a major conflict; Israel has already proved that it is capable of doing so.

Let us be certain that the state of mind of the leaders of the majority and of a large part of the Israeli population is that of a "rabbit on the benches of the school of wolves", which implies a duty to remain master of the decisions taken in the "classroom" and to preserve a space for manoeuvre. A "pacifist" Israeli writer recently declared on French television that "it is not what we do that is reproached to us, but what we are. ». Should Israel's future be guaranteed by maintaining a conflict, an instability that allows it to change its position quickly? The future of this region is so much like its past that Netanyahu really must not be serene.

1] Illegal, sacrilege

[2] Non-proliferation treaty

3] SANA, Syrian National News Agency.

4] Sandjak d'Alexandrette, ceded by France to Turkey in exchange for its non-alignment.

5] The Alexandrette Sandjak region was 65% Alawite before it was ceded to Turkey.

6] American Israel Public Affairs Committee, an American lobby group created in 1951.

7] Two-state solution

8] From the Balfour Declaration to the Sylves-Picot agreements.

9] One of the clauses of the British arms sales contracts to the Israelis stipulates the formal prohibition to use them against the Palestinians.

10] Iran keeps reminding us that Israel is not a signatory to the NPT and, in the context of a nuclear-free Middle East, remains the only nation equipped with such weapons of mass destruction. An argument that was taken up during the Iranian "counter-conference" on nuclear issues in April 2010.

11] Action aimed at countering a belligerent intention, to be distinguished from "preventive" action which requires the presence of an identified armed threat.

A graduate of the École Militaire Interarmes, promotion General Gandoët (1996-1998), Squadron Leader TABARLY comes from the armoured-cavalry weapon. Winner of the DT LRI 2009 competition, he is studying Arabic at the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilizations (INaLCO). He is the author of an article published in May 2010 in the Lebanese daily newspaper - "L'orient, le jour" - entitled "Turkish-Syrian axis: for a union of the Levant".