Irregular warfare is not new. Four centuries B.C.E., Sun Zi had already theorized them in his Thirteen Articles on the Art of War. In the tenth century, the Byzantine emperor Nicephorus Phokas dedicated a treatise to them. In 1808, the Spanish guerrilla warfare against Napoleon recalled their possibilities. At the height of the Cold War, Major G. Brossolet^[1] had even suggested its use against the waves of communist assaults on Western Europe.

Since the Vietnam War, however, American strategists have been using a new word for them: asymmetry. Since then, the term has been used as a thought-provoking term and has since led to the definition of a new concept. In 1995, the Pentagon incorporated it into its joint doctrine.^[2]. Today, it roughly characterizes a war from "weak to strong"...^[3].

1] "Essayon Non-Battle," Commander G. Brossolet, 1975

[2] As part of the "Armyafter Next" program...

3] "Asymmetrical warfare or the defeat of the winner", J. Baud, 2003.

At first glance, this concept may seem pretentious, to the point of wanting to reinvent war. This is not so. American strategists have thought it up in order to prepare and adapt their country to a new context of engagement. By highlighting a major change in the face of war, their thinking has initiated a major evolution of the Western strategic model.

Genesis, definitions and limits of the model

In the United States, asymmetry defines everything that hinders the maximum performance of the conventional military aircraft. When the term appears officially, it initially has a very limited meaning: it characterises the opposition between forces from different backgrounds (air force versus land force, for example). In 1999, however, the JointStrategy Review changed the definition. It states that asymmetry "circumvents or underminesstrengths while exploiting institutional weaknesses through the use of methods that differ significantly from those expected. Its actions are generally aimed at achieving a major psychological impact that affects the adversary's will, capacity for initiative or freedom of action". This definition will be broadly adopted in 2001 by analysts Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II^[1] in "Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background and Strategic Concepts».

The vocabulary used by the Americans, however, leads to confusion: any war leads de facto to the search for asymmetry. "Thewar past, present and future is a duel."^[2]. Even in a so-called "symmetrical" conflict, it is illusory to think that our opponents will act like us. Possessing their own capacity for reflection, deduction and adaptation, they will bypass our strong points and exploit our lines of "least resistance".^[3]. Like the English archers during the battle of Crécy, they will place themselves on fields of battle that we will refuse or will not wait for.

The concept of asymmetric warfare is also too inclusive. Its threats range from terrorism to subversion, organised crime, information warfare and the proliferation of weapons of all kinds. In so doing, it blithely mixes notions and suggests a unified representation of actors, their motivations and modes of action. But an Iraqi insurgent does not fight like an Al Qaeda fanatic, a Vietnamese communist, a Somali pirate or a member of the Camorra. Unlike the Taliban, drug traffickers have no interest in triggering hostilities. Bin Laden doesn't trade his hostages for ransom. The concept of asymmetrical conflict is therefore a bit of a catch-all. It can be pernicious at times.

By its very existence, however, the concept of asymmetrical conflict has the merit of highlighting major changes in the strategic context.

"Context, context, context, context!"

Colin S. Gray, 2005

First of all, the concept of asymmetrical conflict confirms the recent evolution of the face of war. Globalization and the transfer of new technologies now favour irregular strategies. Since the end of the Second World War, asymmetrical actors have undergone a profound metamorphosis. Thanks to ideology, their once 'telluric and defensive' posture^[5] has become "mobile and offensive". The globalization of economies has also opened up new spaces for them. Skillfully mixing old and new elements, they now enjoy nebulous networks stretching across all continents. These networks guarantee them protection, freedom of movement and an international media audience. They also allow them to prosper rapidly through the exploitation of all kinds of trafficking (drugs, precious stones, etc...). The Weak also benefits from the dissemination of knowledge. This increases its firepower and brutality tenfold. The example of Hezbollah is emblematic: armed with systems normally reserved for state powers (drones, wire-guided missiles, etc.), it has defeated the Tsahal. This "innovative insurgent"^[6] never ceases to change its operating methods, its communication and its management of meaning. All of this gives it exceptional strength.

At the same time, the relative disarmament of our societies is increasing. The recent strengthening of legal and media constraints significantly limits the Fort's freedom of action. During the Malaysian uprising of 1953, British General Templer razed entire villages to the ground in order to establish his conquest of "hearts and minds". This example is no longer reproducible. The indictments of French officers during the "Poncet" affair, as well as the latest broadcast of 15.000 classified documents of the American army by Wikileaks... Western societies are also becoming so demilitarized that they can no longer fight populations whose relationship to death is so different from their own. Losing their sense of reason, they start wars that they are unable to fight.^[7]. At the same time, they are looking for all the means to lead them by substitution (robots, private military companies, etc...). This schizophrenia places them in inextricable situations. Afghanistan is an example of this.

In this new environment, the teachings of History are finally no longer transposable. Human geography has indeed profoundly changed. The principles of authors like D. Galula^[8] or R. Trinquier^[9] become difficult to apply. In 1954, Algiers had 500,000 inhabitants. Baghdad now has more than 4 million inhabitants; Kabul more than 2.5 million. In contrast to the 15% Blackfoot population of the "White City", neither of them has an American citizen. How can such cities be controlled? The same applies to the Soviet operations in Afghanistan: since 1979, the Afghan population has more than doubled.

Faced with such changes in the strategic context, Western decision-making chains are in crisis. "Difficulty indistinguishing and understanding the threats"^[10]...they are finding it extremely difficult to find the right balance between ends and means...^[11]. Trampling through endless conflicts, all are searching for solutions and adaptingtheir defencetools"under fire". The concept of asymmetrical conflict finds here all its relevance.

The concept of asymmetrical warfare de-dusted especially our strategic models and initiated their evolution.

"One of the strong consequences of this change is the broadening of the spectrum of missions".

General Desportes, "La guerreprobable", 2007

The concept of asymmetrical conflict reminds us first of all that absolute superiority is a vulnerability. Today, no state has either the weight or the size to challenge the Americans. Moreover, because of the budgets involved, the Americans will maintain their military lead for a long time to come. According to B. Courmont^[12]In theface of such domination, any attempt at confrontation is doomed to failure. It therefore becomes logical to resort to indirect strategies to find another field of struggle. By their concept, the Americans thus suggest that hegemony can also represent a weakness. Pragmatic and realistic, they conceptually prepare their public opinion for terrorism.

By opening up the spectrum of conflicts to areas that have been deliberately limited or forgotten until now, the concept of asymmetrical warfare also makes it possible to better apprehend strategies that are "out of bounds".^[13]. It reminds us that the enemy fights without our rules and in spaces that we cannot imagine: war is not about destroying tanks, but about destroying a will. Politicians are de facto the first to be affected by the consequences of asymmetric conflicts. Those responsible for the "total strategy"^[14]they must constantly juggle with the overall effects of the war.^[15] to be produced, in unexpected and constantly changing proportions. Forced to rapidly adapt the pattern of forces, economy and society to this "new art of war"...^[16]their awareness has led to profound changes in the US armed forces. In the field of equipment, the logic of the Cold War and its long-term programmes have been put into perspective. The type of armament has also been modified [17]. At the same time, the Pentagon introduced accelerated acquisition procedures. According to the theories of Lieutenant-Colonel J. Nagl^[18]feedback has been improved. The emergence and spread of COIN[19] shows a real willingness to change an institutional culture that is too marked by the confrontation of blocs.

Finally, the concept of asymmetrical conflict helps to support defence efforts. By saturating the models of classical armies, "hybrid wars"...^[20] are a reminder that no specialization of our defense tool is possible. Forced to cover the entire threat spectrum, Western armies can no longer exchange personnel for technology. Stopped in their ideology of the "peace dividend", politicians are invited to review their strategies and rebalance defence efforts. After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the Americans thus massively relaunched their war efforts (their military budgets had been in constant decline since the fall of the Berlin Wall).

"Asymmetrical or irregular warfare should not be ignored: it will remain in the field of warfare for a long time to come, because it is complex and corresponds to a thick world.^[21]. In spite of its approximations and confusions, the concept of asymmetrical conflict therefore has a meaning for our societies: by placing them in front of probable wars, it forces them to think outside their past or dreamed wars. As a vehicle for adaptation and reinforcement, it reminds them that war is not "dead".^[22].

However, care must be taken to ensure that this concept does not oversimplify the complexity of war. War is indeed non-linear. It has its own life. "It isfar from obeying only the laws of rationality."^[23]. Irregular warfare is therefore not absolute. "Onlyour ability to conduct conventional warfare diminishes its occurrence."^[24]. Strategic surprise has always existed and will always exist. Mao Zedong's theory of revolutionary warfare invites us to think about this: Doesn't the last phase of revolutionary warfare end in conventional confrontation?

[1] «Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background and Strategic Concepts", Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, 2001

[2] «War in the 21st Century: A New Century of Fire and Blood"Colin S. Gray, 2005.

[3] «Strategy", L. Hart, 1941

[4] «War in the 21st Century: A New Century of Fire and Blood"Colin S. Gray, 2005.

[5] «Partisan Theory", Carl Schmidt, 1963

[6] «The bastard wars"A. de la Grange and J.M. Balencie, 2008.

7] This observation is valid in political, financial and sociological terms.

[8] «Counterinsurgency: Theory and Practice", D. Galula, 1963

[9] «Modern Warfare"R. Trinquier, 1961.

[10] «The new art of war", G. Chaliand, 2008

11] The United States continues to take a military rather than a political view in its conduct of war. Conversely, Europeans recognize global threats but are diminishing their defence capabilities.

[12] «Asymmetric wars: past and present conflicts, terrorism and new threats", B. Courmont, 2002

[13] «War Out of Bounds", Qiao Lang and Wang Xiangsui, 2003

[14] «Introduction to the strategy", General Beaufre, 1963

15] Political, military, diplomatic, economic, media, psychological and cultural...

[16] By reference to "The war beyond limits" by Qiao Lang and Wang Xiangsui

17] The FCV program was abandoned; the F22 command was reduced. On the other hand, the Americans equipped themselves with UAVs. They also encouraged the development of means of surveillance and crowd control.

[18] «Learning to eat soup with a knife"J. Nagl, 2002.

19] Counter-injury

[20] «Conflict in the^21st Century: the rise of hybrid wars"F. Hoffman, 2007

[21] «The thickness of the world"F. Heisbourg, 2007

22] To use the expression of General Le Borgne.

[23] «The probable war", General Desportes, 2007

[24] Ibid.