As part of the interministerial policy of Defence Engagement, British defence cooperation has shown renewed ambition since the Brexit vote in June 2016. Battalion Commander Jean-Hugues Delhumeau shows that the new structures created within the British Army in its land-based version offer, particularly in Africa, new opportunities for Franco-British cooperation with local armies.

The 2017 Strategic Review has just reaffirmed the very strong partnership between France and the United Kingdom in the field of defence, pointing out1 that ".there can be no situation in which the vital interests of one would be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened"2. Since 2010 and the Lancaster House agreements, our two countries have been cooperating closely at bilateral level in the nuclear, capability and operational fields. In particular, the Joint Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF3) continues to grow in strength with the validation of its concept (FVOC) in 2016 and its full operational capability (FOC) expected in 2020. The CJEF should eventually be able to carry out missions across the entire operational spectrum, both in high-intensity engagement and post-crisis stabilisation4. However, the field of crisis prevention remains to be explored with a view to possibly further expanding this cooperation. Aline Leboeuf has described French defence cooperation in Africa5. What about her British counterpart at a time when the stated objective is a United Kingdom with global reach and global influence6? We will see that British defence cooperation, ambitious and original, takes place at the interministerial, joint and land levels and offers an interesting complementarity.

Building stability: an interdepartmental strategy

Current British military cooperation abroad has its origins first and foremost in the need for stability first highlighted in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). The need to take better account of the whole spectrum of crises is emphasised: "to improve our ability to take rapid, appropriate and effective action to prevent crises or halt their growth or spread"7. 7 It also points to a lack of inter-ministerial cooperation after the war in Iraq. This is why, as of 2011 and the Arab "springs", the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FCO), Defence (MoD) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) will be working with the Arab countries to improve their capacity to take rapid, appropriate and effective measures to prevent crises or to halt their growth or spread.velopment (DfID) are jointly signing a "Building Stability Overseas Strategy" (BSOS). The strategy is aimed primarily at fragile or conflict-affected states and sets three priorities: early warning, immediate action to prevent or respond to a crisis, and conflict prevention well in advance8.

BSOS calls for diplomacy of influence, defence cooperation, which we will discuss later, and a development effort with increased resources. Among these, the existence of a dedicated interministerial fund9 (today directly coordinated by the National Security Council10 ) gives impetus to interministerial coordination upstream of crises: while providing the bulk of development aid, this fund also finances diplomatic, defence and security activities linked to strengthening stability, giving rise to integrated local strategies. The BSOS also provides for the systematic production of common documents, the "country strategies" or "regional strategies". It is therefore, in a way, at the origin of reinforced interministerial coordination, of a real British global approach (the Integrated Approach) to crisis prevention,anticipation and management. It is in this context that the United Kingdom's defence cooperation and the associated Defence Engagement strategy are being developed.

Reinvesting defence cooperation: the MoD's international ambition

After the demand for interdepartmental cooperation abroad in the SRHR 2010 translated into the 2011 BSOS, the SRHR 2015 is pushing the envelope and going even further with additional budgetary means allocated. The aim of further interdepartmental integration is to transform defence policy into an international and interallied policy with an emphasis on interoperability and alliances (international by design) from the outset. This character is made permanent by multiplying and planning over time the activities of its four pillars: joint formations (the Nordic JEF expeditionary force11, the aforementioned Franco-British CJEF, the enhanced NATO Response Force eNRF and its Rapid Reaction Force VHRJTF12), deCollaborative capability development (with the United States and France), international institutions (NATO and the UN), and Defence Engagement (all non-combat activities). The SDSR 2015 establishes this as a fully-fledged mission of the MoD13, which in 2017 declares it as a common strategy with the FCO14 to promote British influence abroad.

The UK Defence Engagement has five objectives: developing understanding of national security imperatives, preventing conflict, developing capabilities and interoperability, promoting prosperity, and deploying and sustaining influence15. They are achieved through four broad categories of defence diplomacy activities (network of defence attachés, liaison officers andexchange officers, international visits... and tours by the acrobatic Red Arrows patrol, as recently in the Middle East16), support for prosperity (for exports, development and trade), and support for the development of the European Union.velopment, economic development, protection of resources and supplies), training of foreign capabilities (individual training of foreign officers in the United Kingdom, joint exercises abroad), operational assistance (specialist and material support to local forces, participation in UN missions)17. This renewed international ambition draws on the network of British bases abroad: In addition to permanent training centres in Canada (BATUS), Belize (BATSUB), Kenya (BATUK), and permanent garrisons in Nepal and Brunei, training and assistance teams are deployed in several countries in Africa, Europe and the Middle East. These Short Term Training Teams - STTTs -, British Military Advisory and Training Teams - BMATTs - or British Peace Support Teams - BPSTs - are small teams that can be assimilated to French defence cooperation teams abroad: They train, advise and coach, but do not accompany in combat or spread to surrounding countries.

They train, advise and train, but do not provide combat support or extend their influence in the surrounding countries. This ambition is being densified and restructured to better respond to the peace-crisis-conflict continuum and is reflected in new units. The creation, decided at the end of 201618, of three joint cells (the British Defence Staffs) in Nigeria, the United Arab Emirates and Singapore, tasked with coordinating the MoD's actions for the rebuilding of the armed forces in the region.The creation, decided at the end of 201618, of three joint cells (the British Defence Staffs) in Nigeria, the United Arab Emirates and Singapore, responsible for coordinating the MoD's actions for the regions of West Africa, the Persian Gulf and Asia-Pacific, gives these key regions for British defence a permanent pre-positioned operational level that did not previously exist. While not currently theatre operational headquarters, but also having the role of supporting the British footprint in the region (de(defence attachés, training and assistance teams, exchange officers), perhaps they will evolve into a structure capable of receiving reinforcements or even commanding an operation. The decisive role of the joint staff of the French elements in Senegal during Operation Serval in 2013 has in fact shown the interest in the event of a crisis of the pre-positioned bases and headquarters. But in the United Kingdom itself, it is above all the creation of the Adaptable Force thatillustrates , within the British Army , this renewed Defence Engagement and opens up new prospects for cooperation with local armies.

Cooperation on the ground between war and peace: the mission of the Adaptable Force of the British Army

Decided in 2011 with the Army 2020 plan, the creation of a land force dedicated to Defence Engagement, and more specifically to operational training and assistance, aims to fill the space upstream of crises by adapting to the local context and needs. The AdaptableForce consists of six (initially seven) infantry brigades grouped within the 1st (UK)Division (supplemented for a time by logistics brigades). These brigades have a double originality: firstly, they are dedicated to the training and assistance abroad of local forces in a specific area of the world, to which each one has to acculturate when not deployed there. Spread throughout the United Kingdom, they then act as a pool of forces in the event of a domestic threat19.

19 These brigades, made up of active and reserve light infantry battalions, would focus their training and deployment in these predefined areas on a wide spectrum ofThese brigades, composed of active and reserve light infantry battalions, would concentrate their training and deployment in these predefined regions on a wide range of training and assistance activities, but without entering into a high degree of technicality or expertise, and remaining well in advance of crises, in a context where there is no proven threat.

The SDSR 2015 specified the Army 2020 model and the Adaptable Force: thecreation of Specialized Infantry Battalions (Spec Inf Bns) was decided to complete the system. These battalions are intended to act in greater depth and in the long term for very specific missions, in a context of proven threats, and are essentially made up of cadres with a strength of around 300 people per battalion. Planned to number four20, the first two battalions have been grouped together since 1 October 2017 within the Spec Inf Group, their supervisory staff. Operating with and alongside local forces, these battalions would have the objective of "...to provide a safe and secure environment for the local population.understand, train, advise, assist and accompany"21 them, and would therefore a priori take into account the combat support of local forces in crisis situations. The Spec Inf Bns would therefore fall somewhere between French operational military assistance (advice and support) and the combat support provided by American special forces. Regional cooperation brigades and specialised infantry battalions are therefore complementary in terms of the size, nature, duration and threat level of the cooperation activity carried out: The continuity of defence cooperation is thus ensured from peace to conflict.

Crisis cooperation, the cooperation at the highest threat level, is the accompaniment of local forces in combat. Since the ambush on 4 October 2017 of the Nigerian forces and the American special forces that were accompanying them (which resulted in four deaths), this crucial component of defence cooperation has been at the centre of debate22. As far as the Spec Inf Group is concerned, questions remain unanswered: what heavy equipment should be used by these battalions, which at present have only small arms? What air-land support can be mobilised in their immediate environment in the event of a hard blow? What joint preparation with the allied defence cooperation forces present in the region of deployment (the cooperation centres and the Barkhane force in the case of French forces in the Sahel, for example)? These are all points that will no doubt be clarified between now and 2020...

Conclusion: West Africa, towards bridges between French and British cooperation mechanisms?

British defence cooperation, or Defence Engagement, has been built in recent years on an interministerial basis for the search for stability abroad. Since 2015, it has been a reinforced international ambition for the MoD, developing the already existing footprint by creating original units within the Adaptable Force for the British Army:regional cooperation brigadesand specialised infantrybattalions. These are complementary in their missions and employment context, and thus make it possible to meet all the cooperation needs that exist between peace and war.

As noted by Brigadier General Robert Thomson, British trainee at CHEM last year, "there are many similarities between the British model of Defence Engagement and the French cooperation missions in French-speaking Africa. The networks of the two nations are well established and complementary, particularly in Africa, but their effectiveness could be better exploited"23: extending the pairings already existing within the CJEF framework, the establishment of bridges between cooperation units (permanent bases and planned units, etc.) and French cooperation units in French-speaking Africa could be improved.es) during the preparation and conduct of operational deployments would no doubt make this possible in bases pre-positioned abroad and in the metropolises. Above all, joint pre-deployment training courses, exchanges of good practice, joint exercises in theatre and exchanges of managers to promote better mutual knowledge would make it possible to provide joint assistance locally in the event of a crisis, while the necessary reinforcements are sent from metropolitan France. For these light defence cooperation units are increasingly finding themselves on the front line, particularly in West Africa, in the face of an enemy seeking temporary local superiority.

The Minister of the Armed Forces, Florence Parly, stated in Washington on 2 November: "We needto find support everywhere we can, we must find support wherever we can"24. 24 France must follow with attention and interest the renewed ambition of the British Defence Engagement, particularly in West Africa, in order to seize or propose opportunities for partnership between the two complementary defence cooperation arrangements.

Battalion Commander Jean-Hugues DELHUMEAU served in the Foreign Legion at the 2nd REP and the 3rdREI. He completed his studies at the War School in 2016-2017 in exchange at the Advanced Command and Staff Course, his British counterpart. He is currently following a specialized master's degree at ISAE-SupAéro in the framework of the Army's higher military scientific and technical education.

1 Defence and National Security Strategic Review 2017, p.62, para 197, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/dgris/la-dgris/evenements/revue-strategique-de-defense-et-de- securite-nationale-2017.

2 Affirmed for the first time in the Chequers joint declaration of 30 October 1995 between President Chirac and Prime Minister Major http://www.jacqueschirac-asso.fr/archives- elysee.fr/elysee/elysee .fr/english/interventions/conferences_et_points_de_presse/1995/octobre/ fi003770.html.

3 Combined Joint Expeditionary Force.

4 UK/FR CJEF Joint Concept of Employment 2015, p.1.

5 Aline Lebœuf, "Coopérer avec les armées africaines", IFRI, Focus stratégique n°76, October 2017 .

6 Her Majesty's Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: a secure and prosperous United Kingdom ( London: The Stationary Office, November 2015), 5.

7 HMG, A Strong Britain in an age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy ( London: The Stationary Office, October 2010), 2.

8 DfID, FCO, MoD, Building Stability Overseas Strategy (London: The Stationary Office, July 2011), 18-19.

9 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), which in 2015 replaced the Conflict Pools created in 2001 for development aid.

10 Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, Conflict Stability and Security Fund .Second Report of Session 2016-2017, 30.

11 The Joint Expeditionary Force, with the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, non-permanent and established in 2015.

12 The Enhanced NATO Response Force and its 5,000-strong alert element, the Very High ReadinessJoint Task Force, led by the United Kingdom in 2017, are one of the measures in the re-insurance plan agreed at the 2014 NATO Wales Summit.

13 Her Majesty's Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: a secure and prosperous United Kingdom ( London: The Stationary Office, November 2015), 49.

14 MoD & FCO, UK's International Defence Engagement Strategy, February 2017.

15 Ibid, 10.

16 http://britishairshows.com/red-arrows-tours.html.

17 Ibid, 11-16.

18 MoD, British extends global Defence reach, 12 December 2016. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/britain-extends-global-defence-reach.

19 British Army, Transforming the British Army: an update, July 2013, 8-9.https://www.army.mod.uk.documents/general/Army2020_Report_v2.pdf.

20 The 1st SCOTS and 4th RIFLES were restructured in the summer of 2017, the 2nd PWRR and 2nd LANCS will follow in late 2018. The entire Spec Inf Group is expected to be fully operational from Aldershot in 2020 (FOC). Sir Michael Fallon, Strategic Defence and Security Review - Army: written statement– HCWS367,15 December 2016, https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written- statement/Commons/2016-12-15/HCWS367/.

21 British Army official Website, Army 2020 Refine, update December 2016. http://www.army.mod.uk/structure/33449.aspx.

22https://www.wavellroom.com/2017/11/09/accompany-that-third-myth/.

23 Brigadier General Robert Thomson, Les possibles évolutions de la relation franco-britannique d'ici dix ans, in "Penser demain - 66ème session du CHEM", Les Cahiers de la Revue Défense Nationale, November 2017, 40. http://defnat.com/e-RDN/cahiers-de-la-RDN.php.

24 In Alice Pannier, "Between autonomy and cooperation: the role of allies in France's new defence strategies, War on the Rocks, Texas National Security Network", 2 November 2017. https://warontherocks. com/2017/11/between-autonomy-and-cooperation-the-role-of-allies-in- frances-new-defence-strategy/ .