THERE ARE IRRATIONAL ASPECTS TO LEADERSHIP, BUT IT IS ALSO A SCIENCE.

NATO's doctrine on "command" gives rise to two complementary concepts: "command" and "control" (C2). Within NATO, taking up the American meaning of the terms, "command" is limited to the development ofWithin NATO, using the American meaning of the terms, "command" is limited to the drafting and distribution of orders, while "control" corresponds to conduct and coordination. Thus "command" is the most important part of C2.

This concept encompasses the commander's prerogatives and powers of command, the decision-making process, the exercise of authority, in short the unique and personal nature of command. Control" describes all that is involved in the operation of command systems to accomplish the mission, in accordance with the commander's intent, covering both CP systems, their operation and related equipment. The concept of "command", which calls upon the intelligence and intuition of the leader, is the art of command, while the"Control, which is based on organizations, structures, methods and technology, is the science of command.

In this respect, the contingency of the situation presents itself to the leader in all imaginable forms: indeed, the exercise of command is subject to only one law; the harsh demands of the facts that the leader can neither ignore nor neglect under penalty of his command becoming pure divagation. Realities - mission, environment, enemy, population - will always impose their law.

In an almost universal way, command is therefore both an art, because it is centred on the personality of the leader, his intuition and ultimately the expression of his intention, and also a science, because it is based on methods, systems and organisations.

Faced with the seriousness of the situation generated by the sudden German offensive in the Ardennes on 16 December 1944 and the surprise that it General Eisenhower summoned his army commanders to BRADLEY headquarters the following day. Patton, commander of the 3rd Army, took the floor there to declare: "My army will be able to take the offensive within 48 hours to unblock the 101st Airborne at Bastogne."Eisenhower makes no secret of his irritation at what he sees as a new form of bluster from his boiling subordinate: Indeed, to engage in Saarland, facing north-east in the direction of the Rhine, such a maneuver corresponds for the 3rd Army to a 90° bypass movement with a total reorientation of all its logistical penetrations, without shearing any route, that is to say a meticulous preparation. But Patton resumed: "Ike, it's been 72 hours since, when my B2 gave me the first indications of a German counter-attack, I put my entire staff on the fine planning of several counter-attacks. This work is complete. As soon as this meeting is over, I go back to my headquarters, give my orders and in 48 hours, the 3rd Army will come out. "That's exactly what happened.