On September 18, 2018, the CDEC received Professor Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau as part of a discussion on the spirit of war and the "culture of war" in 1914-1918. Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau is a historian, researcher at the EHESS and President of the International Research Centre for the History of the Great War in Péronne. He wrote his thesis on the trench press during the First World War.

He had the opportunity to work with military personnel in the context of an article on mourning with General BACH. 1. More generally, he works on issues of contemporary war violence, which has led him to study subjects as varied as Rwanda and the Bataclan.

It is fundamental to know how to distinguish between "warrior spirit" and "healing". Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau prefers the second term because it implies a historical, even anthropological process. The notion of warrior spirit, for its part, seems to him too immanent to be approached, as a historian, in a precise manner.

This is why he chose to address this issue through the prism of the First World War, around the way in which the "culture of war" was expressed during the conflict. In his view, it is an essential, even paradigmatic element of this conflict.

The notion of " culture from guerre "

The notion emerged twenty years ago as part of the renewal of historical studies on the First World War in Europe. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the war in the former Yugoslavia provided a favourable conjuncture for the revival of interest in a conflict that seemed destined for relative oblivion.

The culture of war could be defined by the way in which its contemporaries, both civilian and military, represented and portrayed the conflict. The great diversity of these representations, as evidenced by the importance of cultural production during the Great War, suggests a genuine 'subjectivation' of war. Here we must question the meaning of the conflict: the First World War was certainly meaningful to its contemporaries, and much less so to us.

This notion of a "culture of war" is certainly open to criticism: can we envisage the emergence of a "culture" in the space of only four years? However, it can be objected that time, and more precisely linear time, does not take subjectivation into account. War has its own temporal framework and its actors see their perception of time transformed by it. This is where the concept of the culture of war comes into play, as it allows us to understand this alteration of the temporal framework, which is itself closely linked to the meaning given to war.

The Meaning of War for Contemporaries

If the First World War was meaningful to its contemporaries, it is difficult for us who perceive this war as absurd to understand it today. Three points need to be stressed in order to grasp this meaning that escapes us: Firstly, the war provoked the emergence of a "defensive patriotism" which helps to explain the change in attitude of many social actors, who had previously been opposed to the war.

Indeed, European societies at the time were all convinced that war was a defensive act constrained by enemy aggression. Even taking the offensive, as in the case of Austria-Hungary or Germany in 1914, was then perceived as a defensive action to prevent possible attacks. Four years later, an interesting fact was the cessation of the spring 1918 strikes in France during each German offensive: they did not resume until they had been repulsed.

This type of phenomenon allows us to understand the collapse of all the Internationales (socialist, trade union, religious, scientific and feminist...), just as it explains the success of the Sacred Unions and the suspension of the political confrontation. Nations then impose themselves on the individual.

As an example, the United Kingdom, which had the only professional army at the beginning of the conflict and where the pacifist movement was the most influential in Europe (v. the great pacifist demonstration of 2 August 1914 in London), saw its recruiting offices besieged by volunteers between August and December 1914 (one and a half million volunteers, with a peak - and not the reverse - after the great battles of August 1914). One million volunteers poured in again in 1915, before conscription was introduced in 1916. It should be noted that the first volunteers were mainly from the middle classes, without the absence of other social groups, particularly workers.

Second significant element to be taken into account: the "barbarity of the adversary". Invoked as early as the summer of 1914, the use of a growing and deep-rooted feeling of hatred towards the enemy made it possible to exploit the very real exactions of the enemy.The use of a growing and deepening sense of hatred towards the enemy, which was invoked as early as the summer of 1914, made it possible to exploit the very real exactions of invading armies, such as the executions of some 6,000 civilians in northern France and Belgium (a phenomenon that was ignored in the 1930s).

Such events took the form of a self-fulfilling prophecy and were expressed mainly in racial terms: the "German race" was thus perceived as biologically different from the "French race", to use the vocabulary of the time. This contributed to the brutalization of the spirits (G. Mosse) and led in France to a deep hatred of the French towards the Germans. Soldiers expressed this in the autumn of 1918 (the postal control reports it) when they thought they would soon be entering German territory.

Finally, the First World War has a millenarian dimension: more than a military victory, the war must lead to a world free of war itself. French society was particularly sensitive to this idea, in line with republican thinking on the one hand (France "...), and on the other hand (Germany "...). lighthouse of humanity" thanks to the French Revolution) and Catholic on the other (France has been the eldest daughter of the Church since the baptism of Clovis). From this point of view, the French victory was supposed to be that of the human race.

The notion of "consent" thus goes beyond that of patriotism. The First World War offers only one example of the collapse of consent: that of Russia. But while Russian soldiers did indeed leave the front in the fall of 1917, they did not leave the violence of war.

This violence is mainly expressed through the lynching of officers and the proliferation of groups of soldiers converted into armed gangs leading pogroms in the towns and villages they pass through. The violence of war, hitherto mainly externally oriented, is spreading and spreading within national borders, even before the start of the civil war.

A nostalgia for France parfaite ?

The "great ordeal" of 14-18 (Pierre Chaunu), with its 900 deaths per day on average over four years (which represents approximately 1,300 deaths per day in the Russian society), was a major event in the history of Russia.tional society today), contributed to the emergence of a kind of "myth of perfect France" attached to the Great War.

However, nostalgia for this disappeared France should be viewed from a distance. Let us put things in context: the Great War completed a process of national construction at the end of which the nation had become an absolute. The "homogenization" of societies through schools, the distribution of newspapers and military service produced such a result, particularly in France. But there is no possible return to such a historical moment.

Towards a return to the culture of guerre ?

However, the national reaction to the attacks of 2015 allows us to qualify this last observation. Several markers allow us to draw a parallel between these events and the culture of war of 1418 : cohesive effects of the attacks on the entire population, the return of the symbols of the Republic (the Marseillaise is sung spontaneously in many gatherings where it is not heard), the return of the symbols of the Republic (the Marseillaise is sung spontaneously in many gatherings where it is not heard).); a tightening of opinion around democratic values; a marked dichotomy between "them" and "us", with the development of numerous discourses on atrocities.s and the barbarity of the enemy; the emergence of a phenomenon of heroism among soldiers, medical personnel and civilian victims, who are themselves assimilated to soldiers, as during the CeFinally, a peak in military voluntary service, multiplied by three at that time, all of which was part of a process of new Sacred Union. However, this phenomenon of national mobilization did not last, probably due to the absence of any recurrence of losses, unlike the Great War.

To conclude, the social experience of the year 2015 remains disturbing because of the possible parallels with some characteristics of the Great War: it is therefore necessary to be cautious about any prediction about the possible reactions of the social body.

Professor Audoin-Rouzeau's presentation prompted a discussion with the CDEC officers, transcribed below.

The officers at CDEC :

There is a link between the culture of war and world conflict, but is it transposable to expeditionary wars? Can we conceive of an offensive patriotism?

Pr.Audoin-Rouzeau :

It all depends on the conflicts in question. While social unanimity was palpable in the First World War, the social body was fractured during the wars in Indochina and Algeria. During the Second World War, on the contrary, a culture of war developed within the societies of the warring great powers. As late as 1979, during the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR, part of the Soviet social body considered this operation as a new Spanish war (as in 1936-1939), with a revolutionary and internationalist objective.

Concerning patriotism, can it be of an offensive type? Perhaps. Let's take the example of the aggressiveness of American troops towards Japanese troops after the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The extremity of the violence, which almost touches on a desire for extermination, is still surprising today. Nevertheless, this violence remains a reaction to a feeling of aggression and is therefore perceived as legitimate.

The officers of CDEC :

What is the weight of the spirit of revenge generated by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by the German Empire in the Great War?

Pr.Audoin-Rouzeau : Before 1914, the spirit of revenge was very present within the French officer corps, but much less so in the rest of society. It gradually lost its momentum outside nationalist circles. As for the idea of an offensive war of revenge, it was ruled out as early as 1880: the idea was rather that "Revenge would be done when the Germans offer it to us".

But the liberation of Alsace-Lorraine became a strong theme from the outbreak of the war in 1914: any attempt at white peace stumbled on this subject, as no French government could accept the idea that Alsace-Lorraine would not return to the national fold.

The homogenisation of French society through written culture and military service was essential to maintain patriotism. Before 1914, patriotism was self-evident: peasant soldiers, when writing to their families, did not need to mention it. It certainly wears off during the war, particularly around 1916-1917, but it reappears with force during 1918.

Officers at CDEC :

Is it France that "bears the shock" or the Allies? Without the Russians and Americans, what would have happened? Did France have difficulty resisting?

Pr.Audoin-Rouzeau : France could not have won without the Allies. Certainly, France "bears the shock" to the extent that it assumes the greatest losses in relation to the mobilized population (with the exception of Turkey and small countries like the Kingdom of Serbia). France has its empire and the part of its industry that is not in occupied territory to fuel the war, but the front line amputates part of its territory and resources.

In the rear, French resilience in a context of mass mourning found its limits in 1917: but pain mingled with patriotism, sacrifice must not be in vain and the nation must be victorious. Such a state of mind is difficult to understand today.

The officers of CDEC : How could the soldiers be so resistant? The Great War is a rare moment of national unity, where the elites become personally involved and lose loved ones in the conflict. But how does this situation compare with 2015? In a professional army, where are the elites?

Pr.Audoin-Rouzeau : The"contact officers" (lieutenants and captains) paid the highest price of the war: 50% of the casualties among the Saint-Cyrians and the Normans taking part in the conflict. This excess mortality of contact officers did not go unnoticed among ordinary soldiers.

Of course, 2015 cannot be compared in a simple way with 1914-1918. But for a historian of the Great War, some parallels are striking. They were, moreover, drawn by the politicians themselves.

The officers of CDEC : Can we say that "the Frenchman is a warrior"?

Pr.Audoin-Rouzeau : It is impossible forme to answer this question since it is outside of any precise historical configuration. The French relationship with the homeland certainly has a conquering dimension, the original republicanism having very offensive aspects. For the rest, it seems impossible to me to answer this kind of speculation, which is too essen tialist.

The officers of CDEC : There is now a strong desire to reappropriate certain symbols, including the French flag. However, this reappropriation cannot be decreed: it is the result of consent. How has the notion of consent evolved? The term "race" must be understood in the sense of "noblesse oblige" by Charles Péguy, and not in the biological sense. The idea is that finally there is something that pushes us to "go for it": is it innate, acquired or just a feeling of duty?

Pr.Audoin-Rouzeau : I can try to answer for the Great War. To consent to war was to show one's loyalty to the nation, to the primary group of combatants, and to other elements. The great contests within the fighting world - the mutinies of 1917 in particular - were finally limited, involving about 40,000 soldiers. If one third of the armies were more or less affected in 1917, how can it be explained that the phenomenon of insubordination did not take place earlier and also more widely?

Mutinies have always taken place in rest areas, never on the front lines, and mutineers did not use their weapons during protests. Brutality and even insults remained rare against officers. The repression began when the movement was already in retreat on its own.

As for the military tribunals, they condemned to the death penalty as much as the civilian courts, in a context where even those advocating the abolition of the death penalty considered that there was an exception in times of war. Finally, what are soldiers forced to do? What is the role here of the war councils?

The German army counted only 50 people on death row, the Australian army none, and yet both forces showed exceptional resistance. In the German case, at the extreme end of the war, about 800,000 soldiers were stationed in railway stations, thus remaining in a "grey zone" where they were neither deserters nor mutineers. This "indiscipline" finally respected discipline and duty. The only real case of mutiny was finally the one that developed in the Russian army in the autumn of 1917.

The French military courts were dysfunctional between 1914 and 1915. But as early as 1915, the special courts are abolished and in April 1916, the code of military justice is transformed, in the middle of the battle of Verdun. After 1916, discipline was "negotiated" (Leonard Smith) between soldiers and contact officers, and the death penalty was almost no longer applied, while almost all heavy sentences were not enforced. These sentences were amnestied at the end of the war.

However, as historian Emmanuel Saint-Fuscien has shown, through their ritual and staging, military tribunals act on soldiers, even the most hardened.
The notions of coercion and consent have been the subject of much controversy, but today there is a relative consensus on the issue. For my part, I continue to regard as absurd the idea that eight million French soldiers were able to hold out for four years under the effect of coercion alone.

The officers of CDEC : Why is there no filmography on this issue?

Pr.Audoin-Rouzeau : I refer you all the same to the remarkable films by Bertrand Tavernier, Captain Conan (1996) and La vie et rien d'autre (1989). On the documentary side, historians unfortunately have very little influence: for example, in the series Apocalypse, la 2e Guerre mondiale (2009), historians failed to impose their views. Yet it is vital, if we wish to understand this era, to put ourselves in the eye of the contemporaries of the time, and to abandon our own a little.

The officers of CDEC : A difference is noticeable among American soldiers before and after 2001, when the enemy was barbarized. This phenomenon is quite close to 1914-1918, and is also part of a defensive war perspective. American patriotism is another form of consent. But the risk is not nil that this consent is only formal. To quote an American Army lieutenant colonel: "We are fighting the war while America is in the supermarket".

Pr.Audoin-Rouzeau : This isolation of the military fact ultimately leads to a form of social isolation and gives rise to a feeling of incomprehension and loneliness. However, this is already what the soldiers felt in 1914-1918, when French society at the time was living in anguish over the death of loved ones. It is therefore important not to judge too quickly. It may be that the characteristic of those who fight is to think that they are neither understood nor considered. I don't think that's true.

Officers at CDEC : Society accompanies military success, but soldiers sometimes feel that the trial is not transformed at the strategic level. Eventually there is a willingness to share what one feels at the front line. What can be done to reach people? How is the warrior spirit acquired?

Pr.Audoin-Rouzeau : These questions reflect a social concern, which as a researcher, I do not ask myself. But I do ask myself another question: at the moment, yes, from the Western point of view, there is indeed a crisis of war and a crisis of thought about war.

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1 André Bach (1943-2017) is a general and historian, specializing in World War I and military justice issues. He was also head of the Army Historical Service (SHAT).