The army rediscovers General Lanrezac and that's good. As a result of General Yakovleff's tactical training at the Military Academy and a number of memorial publications at the time, the Army rediscovered General Lanrezac, and it was a happy event. the centenary of the First World War, this character, with his astounding personality and career, has resurfaced in the French intellectual world.

Throughout a rich and varied career that began in the Orleans region at the dawn of the winter of 1870 and continued in Tunisia, then in Paris, and in various staffs, Lanrezac developed military traits which, in many ways, are in keeping with a very modern form of warrior spirit.

Lanrezac is sometimes known for his " coup " in Guise, an original, unexpected manoeuvre, which by its singularity, routed Gal von Bülow and provoked the inflection of the German movement towards the South, diverted them from their initial objective (Paris) and allowed the constitution of the Foch army and the re-establishment of the Marne.

It is also sometimes known that Lanrezac was one of the rare people to express reservations about the tactical theories of theoffensive to excess, more or less based on the theories of Bergson and developed with clumsiness by the disciples of Colonel de Grandmaison. His mocking remark is reported to have been " attaquons, let us attack like the moon... ".

It is less remembered that Lanrezac is among the contemporary officers of Generals Foch and Pétain, all instructors at the War School who forged the generation of officers who would be on the manoeuvre between 1914 and 1918 and assume the highest responsibilities between 1939 and the 1950s.

And we always forget that he was rather badly received by Colonel Bonnal in 1892. The all-powerful boss of the École supérieure de guerre was not happy to see this poorly-rated captain rejoin his teaching staff. Lanrezac was indeed somewhat behind in his grading compared to his colleagues in the promotion of the " 14 August 1870 " (18691871). In 1873 he made a choice of heart which led him to ask, against the advice of his superiors, for a year's leave to marry Félicie Dutau. Very early on, he knew how to make choices and assume them.

Lanrezac appears in specialized books on the First World War in the shameful cart of the sacked seven ember 1914. In spite of this disavowal, he counts in the minds of today's officers, among the finest tacticians of his generation, one of those who raise the sad reputation of the generals of 1914.

It is necessary to understand the personal history of Charles Louis, Marie Lanrezac to decipher the strong characteristics of his temperament that will lead him to disobey for his misfortune, but for the success of his followers: Foch on the Marne, then Franchet d'Esperey at the head of the 5th army. It is also necessary to distinguish in him what is innate and learning in the spirit of decision which characterized him on August 24th in particular.

Lanrezac is a classic, an authentic conservative in the most positive sense of the term.

This classical culture, far from making him a stunted or narrow-minded person, allows him to welcome as a professional and even sometimes to anticipate technical progress, to be able toThis classical culture, far from making him stunted or narrow-minded, enables him to welcome as a professional and sometimes even to anticipate technical progress, to make the most of it at the military level and thus to enjoy an open-mindedness and a capacity for adaptation that is particularly virtuous for the military leader.

L’inracinement : la formytion milletitaire et morale

The son of a colonial officer born and educated in Guadeloupe, the future General Lanrezac benefited from a rigorous education that saw him join, as soon as he was born, the army of the French colonial army.At the age of thirteen, he joined the Prytanée militaire de la Flèche where he competed in equestrian events like all the officers of his generation. He will develop great qualities as a sports rider and the ability of all sportsmen to concentrate all their faculties towards a single goal: the record, victory, surpassing oneself. If it seems that this disposition led him to obstinacy and a form of arrogance, the fact remains that one does not go to war to "participate" but to win.

With a genuine classical culture, he combines in his teaching at the École supérieure de guerre, historical studies and an understanding of the characteristics of modern conflicts. Like others in this period of preparation for revenge, Lanrezac was an experienced officer. He benefited first and foremost, and there is no doubt about the importance of this underground training, a family military culture and the recites of the colonial adventures of his father, Captain Victor Lanrezac, who lived the great expeditions from Algeria to Cochinchina, from L'OubanguiChari to Mexico. Charles Louis Marie Lanrezac, the future general saw his schooling in Saint Cyr interrupted by the Franco-Prussian conflict of 1870. On 14 August 1870, his entire class was deployed in various units. Sub-Lieutenant Lanrezac was unable to join the 13th Infantry Regiment, a prisoner in Sedan. He was left without a posting for a few weeks before joining the freshly formed Western armies and taking part in the fighting in the Orléans region. He distinguished himself at Coulmiers on November 9, 1870. At the beginning of 1871, he took part in the final fighting in the Besançon region, narrowly escaping capture at Larnod, on the Swiss border, until the armistice of 28 January 1871. These six months of intense movement, withdrawal and counterattacks within a self-confident but decaying army forged the character of this generation of officers raised in the myth of the Grande Armée enriched by the colonial gesture everywhere victorious. Here Lanrezac has had the hard experience of reality.

The attrait for the progress technique : la ability to understand change

Sure of his fact, sure of himself, certainly, Lanrezac draws this assurance from a great mastery of his files. His contribution to the Dictionnaire encyclopédique militaire of 1910, as well as his reflections on the war written in 1918, offer the reader the image of an officer capable of a real effort to understand the events and technological advances taking place around him. Very early on, he imagined the possibilities that military aviation could offer in the field of bombing as well as intelligence. He imagined a direct link between the tactical chief and his pilots who explored the flaws in the enemy's system. Very quickly, he describes the necessary technical maintenance arrangements, the logistical and fuel requirements, as well as the need for visual links to ensure the transmission of information. The concentration of artillery, which he will implement in a form of artillery battle group before time on 29 September 1914 at Guise is another example of original use of military means. In his reflections Lanrezac describes the range of possibilities offered to the military leader to win as an "environment". He places on the same level the technical innovations in the field of fire or aeronautics, the development of strongholds, which "change the map" and the influence on the opinion that the press can have.

He insists in his teaching that the leader should not neglect any of these aspects and not confine himself to his field of excellence, which today we would call "cinematic combat", but opens his horizons to all the possibilities of influencing the course of events. Like many professors at the École de guerre at the time, Lanrezac sensed the global maneuver or effects maneuver now formalized.

La capacité d’adaptation : la disponibilité intellecyouelle

Pragmatic and simple in his approach to things, he adapts to events. Thus, when he was appointed head of the Fifth Army, he was given responsibility for the western flank of the French system and a vast area of operations, like a department in the French Army. the Belgian border, which was impassable until 4 August (date of the declaration of war), he carried out an exhaustive reconnaissance of his future area of responsibility in civilian clothes, like a simple tourist. From this, he drew a memorandum, dated 30 July 1914, of a rare precision that perfectly describes the diversity of the terrain on which he will have to operate. In it, he evaluated the time required for logistical and tactical movements, which proved to be perfectly accurate on both the German and French sides. This unanswered memory will be overshadowed by Lanrezac's opponents at the time of his disgrace.

This intellectual depth and capacity for concentration will also lead him to develop real stratagems to deceive his opponent by, for example, grouping his 75 mm guns - theoretically infantry escort guns - in order to simulate a high concentration of artillery at Guise and deliver a severe blow to the Germans. This very unexpected blow on the German IInd Army stopped its advance and caused the German movement towards the Ardennes to be reversed, diverting them from Paris.

It was this trait that led him, as early as 1908, to deploy referees during the major manoeuvres in the Vosges. Until then, the great manoeuvres of the army corps were more demonstrations than real preparation for combat. Far from a disordered warrior spirit, Lanrezac did not have a passion for the "military gesture", but favoured results and efficiency. On the strength of his experience of the bitter fighting in the autumn of 1870, he knew the reality of the demands of war and was not impressed by the tactical modes of the moment. While the offensive was certainly attractive, he was aware that breaks were necessary in operational movements. He will moreover wrest the authorization to leave forty-eight hours of rest from the Sordet cavalry corps which had been deployed eighteen days in contact with the enemy.

One cannot evoke Lanrezac without mentioning the night of the 24th to 25th August 1914 when he took the most serious decision that a soldier seems to be able to make. Everything leads us to believe that his strong character and his lifelong work to "forge victory", as one of his former students would say, prepared him for this decisive moment. His capacity for work and his mastery of military art enabled him to clearly identify the stakes and risks of the situation on 20 August 1914. Moreover, his independence of mind opened him up to the choice of the comfort of discipline or the adventure of transgression.

Summoned to resume the "all forces combined" offensive to the north, he disobeyed and chose - against the advice of his general staff - an organised withdrawal to the south. He wrote in his memoirs that he was perfectly aware of the gravity of his gesture, but determined to save his army in order to avoid a complete collapse of the front, he saw only this maneuver - shameful at the time - to achieve his objective. "Only France counts," he told his chief of staff, the remarkable General Hely d'Oissel. He withdrew into combat, dealt a decisive blow to the German position (Guise would be the only French victory in the battle of the frontiers) and recovered in less than a week, in almost perfect order, nearly two hundred kilometres south of his initial positions.

He was dismissed on 5 September 1914.

His army, under the command of General Franchet d'Esperey, took part "all forces combined" in the Marne offensive from the 6th September.