Operations are now undergoing the pre-eminence of the stabilization phase and the strong impact of the control of physical and human space. As a result, military processes must adapt to the imperatives of a global manoeuvre traced by the strategic effect to be achieved.

The notions of "direct" and "indirect" approach

The framework for the use of armed forces - described in Part I - underlies a threat which, compared to conventional forces:

• seeks imbalances in all areas,
• evolves at the heart of the population and where the environment exercises its power "equalizer."

• strikes while avoiding their power in a real war of the bypass.

To deal with this, two approaches to the principles of warfare must be combined: the direct approach and the indirect approach.

Where the direct approach consists of attacking the opponent's fighting forces with a view to disabling them, the indirect approach favours attacking the sources of the opposing power: it consists in surprising, unbalancing and disorganizing the opponent, but also in shaping the environment by seeking to limit the intensity of the fighting.

A tactical problem can therefore be solved using both approaches.

❐ The direct approach aims at the progressive annihilation of the enemy through attrition :

• it considers war as a confrontation of power;
• success is achieved through the cumulative effect of the power of material destruction; it relies on both:

☞ global superiority, the ability to make the most of the destructive power available through the most immediate means;

☞ at the same time, on its own ability to withstand attrition imposed by the adversary.

• Confrontation is based on the choice of concentrations and lines of effort.

❐ The indirect approach favours a global maneuver that seeks to break the enemy's cohesion :

• it seeks victory through collapse rather than destruction by using the least predictable paths;
• the enemy's material strength is not systematically attacked as such
  
• the aim is to apply a specific relative superiority over a detected vulnerability and to obtain, by a knock-on effect, the material and moral dislocation of the opposing system;
• it is based on alternating concentrations and dispersions of effects.

Between these two extremes, combinations that vary in time and space make it possible to find both direct and indirect pathways within approaches imposed by the higher level. Thus, the choice of approach defined at the strategic level does not prejudge the type of actions to be taken at the operational and tactical levels.

In addition to their modes of action, each of the two approaches is also distinguished by a different vision of the enemy.

The direct approach adopts a quantitative and exclusive view of the enemy which is perceived as an addition of forces whose dominance presupposes a relative superiority progressively increased by inflicted attrition. This approach leads to the centralization of command and the imposed control of actions.

Conversely, the indirect approach is based on a systemic vision: the enemy is first of all an innervated, irrigated, managed system, which has strong points, but also vulnerabilities. These must be exploited to undermine an organised structure capable of producing violence and materialising a will. The target of the action is not the components of the system but its coherence. This vision favours economy of means. It leaves more room for decentralization and initiative, which are essential for the rapid exploitation of the vulnerabilities identified.

Land forces operations at the tactical level consist of a combination of direct and indirect actions. To conduct the latter, the full range of available land assets is used in both physical and non-material fields to constrain the adversary by exploiting vulnerabilities.

The global manoeuvre for land forces

Global Manoeuvre is a process aimed at achieving a desired effect on the adversary or the environment through the implementation of military or non-military capabilities in an interdepartmental and possibly multinational context.

• The principles of the global manoeuvre

This is an indirect approach that targets a centre of gravity11 as a keystone whose disappearance or reversal contributes to the collapse of the opposing system.

Centre of gravity: a source of power, material or immaterial, from which freedom of action, physical strength and the will to fight are derived.

In accordance with the indirect approach, the overall manoeuvre does not aim at a systematic destruction of the enemy. Consequently, it is important to consider the effects of the capabilities of the armed force in both material and immaterial fields of action. Environmental control and interventions of a security or humanitarian nature provide land units with a strong capacity for influence.

Throughout the continuum of operations, land forces contribute to some or all of the effects required at the operational level to act on the environment and the adversary at the tactical level. The overall manoeuvre is carried out there by the execution and declination in time and space of orders received from the higher level, and by the combination of all means. The action of the ground forces contributes to the achievement of the desired end state (EFR) allowing a way out of the crisis.

It is in order to achieve this desired end state that at the operational level - in parallel with political action in other areas - the Force Commander defines military lines of operation converging on the centres of gravity of the adversary or the environment on which to act.

☞ Lines of operation represent lines of coherence by area of action which make it possible to reach a centre of gravity directly or indirectly by exploiting the adversary's weaknesses and avoiding direct confrontation with its forces.

☞ Concentration of effort is applied on a point that must be judiciously identified. This point of application can be a centre of gravity or one of the decisive points.

☞ This process of lines of operation and decisive points is an essential contribution to adapting to new contexts of engagement when the military tool is now only one of the components used to achieve the political objective.

• The search for decisive points

The centre of gravity is a source of power or physical or moral resistance. It possesses this nature only through fundamental capacities. These depend on essential needs which are the resources that enable their existence. If these needs are sensitive to aggression, they constitute critical vulnerabilities. These critical vulnerabilities are the decisive points to destroy, neutralize, seize, isolate, control...

The decisive points can be the adversary's or the environment's:

☞ part of the main or immediate adversary;

☞ a strong point of the opponent: reserved or fanatical elements, operative mobility capabilities, PC or telecom center, external or criminal support ;

☞ a characteristic point of the terrain, logistical means, the dismantling of a militia, a training camp, a physical or virtual refuge . . ;

☞ an immaterial domain (attitude of the population, media, historical cradle...).

The tactical level integrates the decisive points of the lines of operation of the higher level, when they are in line with its means and adapted to its mission. It then complements them with those defined in its own right. The lines of operation of the tactical level, adapted in time and space, are then drawn up.

Only the large unit level, including the brigade level if it constitutes the land component level, has the means and planning capabilities to design a truly global manoeuvre. The subordinate levels can only implement the orders of the higher level according to the provisions of the overall manoeuvre.

One or more decisive points - or the centre of gravity itself - may be the point of application of the main effort. The best point of application is the one that swings the opponent's will. This choice makes it possible to concentrate efforts there and preserve the reasoned allocation of forces to the various tactical units responsible for conducting the overall manoeuvre. This is an essential step in achieving a genuine economy of means.

Like the study of the adversary, friendly global vulnerability must also be analysed, starting with the determination of the centre of gravity. The analysis begins by determining the centre of gravity of the friend, the fundamental capabilities that give it its power, the basic needs that sustain it, and the critical vulnerabilities that must be protected.

Perception of the fog of war

As described in Part I, unpredictability is an inescapable part of warfare.

☞ The first consequence is the need to conduct action according to the general principles previously detailed rather than according to fixed rules.

☞ The second is the impossibility of acquiring the certainty indispensable to the proper application of useful effort in the conduct of operations. The search for intelligence associated with discernment can nevertheless contribute to this.

The intelligence of adverse intent

Intelligence is indispensable but imperfect and there is no technological compensation for the irreducible fog of war. Thus, "in the absence of secure and accurate intelligence, a capable general should never set out without having two or three biases about likely hypotheses" 13 . The way to obtain them is:

• the knowledge that comes from a methodical and contradictory research and analysis of information; it should lead to a better understanding of the adversary's intention and thus make it possible to avoid entrusting the decision to the event;
• the technologies which today make it possible to have a better technical knowledge of effective and predictable systems, but whose effectiveness is diminished by the widening of the fields of action;
• contacts with as many protagonists as possible in order to take advantage of their knowledge of the environment (ROHUM) to benefit from information and support.

Reflection

The spirit makes it possible to develop what General de Gaulle considers to be the only principle of war: "the capacity to adapt to circumstances" . It is a question of being prepared to act despite uncertainty and of giving oneself the means to react to the unforeseen arising from friction by :

❐ The planning that must preserve the capacity to counter-react to future circumstances (GeneralBeaufre's counter-noise maneuver; it elaborates as follows:

• an operation plan that describes how to carry out the mission,
• a manoeuvring plan that allows for contralateral manoeuvring.

❐ Adaptability based on :

• the ability of modes of action and devices to bend to all circumstances,
• simplicity as a principle,
• the constitution of reserves.

Nevertheless, since planning is the result of imperfect and progressively obsolete knowledge of the situation, it cannot determine a list of successive actions correlated to hourly deadlines and ignore the uncertainty of the confrontation. It must therefore make it possible to envisage some of the possible futures by developing counter-alternative manoeuvres anticipating developments in the situation, whether favourable or unfavourable. This is the famous "What if? "planners who foresee the different possible reaction trees by producing draft manoeuvres. These are integrated into the manoeuvre plan so that the staff reaction cell can use them in a timely manner.

Above all, the plan must create the conditions for the subordinate to take the initiative in future circumstances and not restrict the freedom of action of the leader, who is the only key asset against the unexpected.

Through the unity of view it provides, unity of command is the essential quality for rapid execution to complete the ascendancy over the adversary. But command must also be consistent, simple and subsidiary.

❐ Planned action is quickly followed by the reaction of subordinates and the necessary adaptation of the leader for the future manoeuvre. Modes of action and arrangements must be flexible and simple and act along a line that threatens several objectives in order to increase adverse uncertainty.

❐ Simplicity is achieved by limiting the dependence of future actions on the achievement of the actions that precede them. The success of the latter cannot be guaranteed.

❐ Orders must set concrete objectives to be achieved and limit themselves strictly and briefly to this, while taking care to delegate a large part of the initiative. Their function is to ensure the coherence of overall action while organizing the autonomy of subordinates.

❐ Far from prescribing everything, they must define the axis and limits of action, i.e. the intention and "freedom of action bubble" of the subordinate.

Orders and reports are limited to what is strictly necessary. The area of objectives is "entrusted" to the small tactical levels. Effectiveness - particularly in the stabilization phase - is based on the subordinate's situational awareness while respecting the leader's intention.

This results in the importance to be given to command by objective as opposed to command by order as defined in FT 0415. It is the style of command best suited to the new conditions of operations. This is illustrated in the table below.

It requires a very clear expression of the superior's intent, and therefore of the major effect. Its effectiveness is based on four complementary elements:

• the leader's idea of maneuver,

• the ability of subordinates to understand and adhere to it,

• their spirit of initiative,

• the quality of the orders, which will define their mission, allocate the necessary resources to them and specify the indispensable coordination measures.

. The complexity of the new forms of threat makes it necessary to seek the collapse of the adversary that prevails in indirect strategy. It is implemented at the tactical level by means of a global manoeuvre which allows efforts to be concentrated by the completion of lines of operation on the opposing centres of gravity.

This approach cannot, however, free itself from the uncertainties associated with any confrontation. The acquisition of intelligence - the human dimension of which is once again essential - and the development of capabilities for initiative and adaptation - in particular through command by objective and reserves - make it possible, despite the friction, to execute the plan drawn up decisively.

Finally, the use of armed force is only conceivable within a strengthened legal framework of rules of engagement.