Taken into account from the very beginning of the mission, force protection is a necessary balance between dedicated equipment and units in charge of the mission; it requires adapted tactics in the field. While protection is an imperative, it must not, however, lead land forces to isolate themselves from an environment whose proper apprehension contributes to their safety.

The use of force may be necessary in an attempt to eradicate violence or control its effects. In the face of hostile crowds or to contain their excesses, land forces must have a wide range of means and modes of action at their disposal. The development of crowd control techniques such as reduced lethality weapons and ammunition enhances the operational capability of land forces among populations.

1 - MHARNESS THE POWER

1.1 - A necessary strength, an essential mastery

In the course of the conflict, the use of force remains intimately linked to political and military objectives. It must be capable of adjustment at any time and must be adapted to the phase of the conflict, the violence that prevails and the environment of the troops.

In intervening by force, ground forces must dominate the opposing forces in order to achieve the objective by forcing them to cease fighting. Therefore, they use all the power necessary to dominate the enemy, to dumbfound him and to win militarily at the lowest possible cost. At the end of the combat phase, the use of force loses some of its effectiveness as the situation changes and new objectives are defined. Therefore, during theatre stabilisation, a limited and appropriate use of force is more likely to lead to success than an excessive use of force. In order to avoid fuelling the violence it seeks to control, a theatre group should seek to impose its force, if possible by not using it. However, reversibility must be preserved permanently. In the fury of fighting, it may seem useful to divert weapons so that success may follow a path of peace; afterwards, a sudden or gradual return to the use of force is sometimes necessary and should not be ruled out. If it can be imposed or chosen, its means must be available at all times.

By its mere presence, a land force makes it possible to bring about the desired change in the situation and to influence events in order to prevent, where this is still possible, instability from turning into a situation of generalised confrontation. This capacity for appeasement is, more often than not, based on the deterrent nature of a destructive power in the service of peace. It requires, however, that the force deployed must maintain constant credibility vis-à-vis the outside world. It is based on power and the will to use it, if necessary, and on limits clearly set for the protagonists. It is also based on rules of engagement understood by all. However, while this deterrent effect only applies to those who recognise it as such, the asymmetrical adversary places himself, precisely, outside a common rationality and seeks to circumvent it.

But the mastery of force is not pusillanimity in action. Engaging a ground force requires having sufficient means to achieve the objective set. To intervene by force, to stabilize by force, is to be able to supplant the adversary by tactical superiority, the quality of the combatants - their endurance, their training, their determination - the performance of the equipment and the mastery of information as well as the environment.

At the end of the combat phase, the use of force loses some of its effectiveness. A limited and relevant use of force based on a dissuasive capacity is a principle to be favoured in order not to feed excessive violence.

1.2 - Attaching the population, isolating the adversary and fighting the enemy

Population is the centre of gravity of most operations or at least one of the key points of success. Therefore, it must always be at the centre of the design and conduct of operations. It is essential to disassociate it from the declared adversary, to rally it - at least not to alienate it - and to avoid hindering legitimate expectations. Likewise, in progressive coordination with other actors, it is necessary to be able to respond quickly to the population, which often wants nothing more than to live with dignity and security in accordance with its own normality.

• Isolating the adversary

Just as much as defeating and defeating the adversary during the intervention phase or combat missions in the stabilization phase, one of the objectives of land units is to make the population not support or even reject the adversary. Resisting the enemy's traps, the spiral of violence it seeks to fuel, we must convince the population of our success by striking the adversary with determination whenever necessary. We must also spare them the suffering of the battle so that they can take an interest in our success and, in so doing, encourage them to take sides with us.

• Limiting destruction

Moreover, the constraints imposed in the use of force to preserve populations, infrastructures, and places of worship and culture are the guarantees of future success, because the mediatized suffering of a civilian population involved in an urban struggle always influences public opinion in a way that is unfavourable to the intervener.

Leading the war among the population, the land force must limit the destruction for political, economic, human and operational reasons and ensure the indispensable speed of force actions, otherwise it will be disavowed and lose the support indispensable to its action.

• Producing security

For those who, in a theatre of operations, live in fear of violence, atrocities and sometimes massacres, the soldier on the street corner, the patrol criss-crossing the area or the section installed in the post dominating the neighbourhood are seen as the guarantors of their security. Plunged into war and misfortune, the people demand order and justice which, for them, translates first and foremost into the security of goods and people. They expect this from the troops who, after intervening, cohabit with them, even if they quickly run the risk of being considered as an army of occupation and may become privileged targets.

The security of the population may be an explicit mission of the troops or it may be only a consequence of their presence. It is therefore a matter for the units - and first and foremost for the command - to properly assess the need for it and to define both the applicable modes of action and the limits of action. Any failure, even isolated - intrusion into a protected enclave, aggression by a member of a minority, attack on a village, killing - is borne at the expense of the Force as a whole and may call into question the legitimacy of its mission.

A major concern of the populations, especially after the initial fighting in the intervention phase, security is the greatest challenge facing the land forces. It is the primary condition for any political and socio-economic reconstruction. The restoration of trust between the belligerents, and thus the dynamic leading to peace, is always linked to the general security of the area and the sense of vulnerability of one or other of the parties to the conflict. Furthermore, the difficulties in imposing or maintaining this security, the setbacks and feelings of failure felt by one or other party have a profound effect on the morale of the soldiers involved and can have an impact on their commitment.

In fact, over and above personal security, which is desirable but always relative and is not the sole responsibility of the military force, the population needs a general sense of security. It is a matter for joint action by armed forces and police forces (local or international) as much as for legitimate authorities.

• Promoting improved living conditions

The improvement of the general situation of the population is an important factor in the gradual return to stability. By promoting increased security, the land forces act indirectly on non-military lines of operation (economic, humanitarian, etc.) by enabling others to restore the services essential to the population's life (drinking water, energy, transport, medical support, etc.). The concrete improvement of daily life thus initiated reduces this real breeding ground for revolt that The concrete improvement of daily life thus initiated reduces the real breeding ground for revolt that is the despair of a population whose adversary feeds on the logistical support and recruitment pool it finds there. In addition, the restoration of basic services supports the recognition of the legitimacy of local authorities and the re-establishment of the rule of law.

The land force is as much about rallying the population to its cause as it is about defeating the enemy. To do this, the constraints it imposes on the use of force are a guarantee of success and the assurance of support for its action. It is in the field of security and improvement of living conditions that the expectations of a generally wounded population are the most profound with regard to the intervention forces. They represent a real challenge whose failure may call into question the legitimacy of the action.

1.3 - Rules of engagement and behaviour

Defeating an enemy and winning the battle, fighting an adversary whose modes of action are fundamentally different from those of military forces, mastering unpredictable violence, ensuring the protection of forces, increasing the security of populations but also knowing how to oppose them, etc., are some of the ways in which we can help our enemies. This great diversity in the conditions for the use of force makes it necessary to define clearly the lines of conduct, i.e. rules of engagement and behaviour that enable all military personnel to act within the complexity of situations and the legal environment.

It is necessary for forces engaged on the ground to be based on simple rules that can remain applicable regardless of the extreme or isolated conditions experienced by soldiers and their leaders. These rules must, moreover, be sufficiently flexible to enable the forces to carry out their mission within a legal framework, to ensure their protection on a permanent basis and to maintain the deterrent nature of any use of force.

The sometimes ill-defined legal framework of conflicts that fall outside the conventional norms of the law of armed conflict can complicate the development of rules of conduct and affect their day-to-day practice. In particular, the treatment of persons captured by forces or temporarily detained under their authority as a result of the vicissitudes of operations remains a challenge.It is a real difficulty for the troops who are confronted with it; it is the source of many questions that no theatre of operations is spared.

Mastery of the rules of engagement and behaviour is a real challenge for land forces. Faced with the complexity of situations and regulations and the consequences of the mistakes of one person, this control is based on the ability to cope with exceptional circumstances without breaking the ethical rules shared by all and which remain the basis of individual and collective training.

The use of force is based on rules of engagement and behaviour , the control of which is an essential issue. Despite the complexity of situations, these rules must be simple and applicable by all.

2 - MMASTERING TECHNOLOGY

2.1-Technology as an efficiency multiplier

Technology is an efficiency multiplier for our land forces and enables them to maintain their ascendancy over their adversary. It provides the most significant advantages in asymmetric warfare and promotes military victory through the added power and superiority it offers.

The mastery of information technology is the most fundamental and promising aspect of it. It allows for the integration of systems, the networking of means of acquisition, processing and aggression and an ever-increasing capacity for information sharing. The significant reduction in reaction and strike times and the ability to use systems that can then act not sequentially but simultaneously allow land forces to benefit from increasing joint integration. They give them the ability to reduce or even eliminate the reaction capabilities of enemy forces. The use of new information technologies optimises manoeuvre and facilitates the disintegration of opposing armed forces.

In the service of protection, technology can greatly reduce the vulnerability of troops. It enhances the performance of protective equipment and armour and thus ensures better survival of individuals and vehicle or aircraft crews in the face of all types of threats. In addition, the transfer of certain functions away from direct threats and, where possible, the replacement of man by machine (drones, robots) contribute to preserving the life or integrity of combatants.

However, the high technological level of a land force sometimes results in interoperability problems within coalitions in which allies may have different standards. This limits the capacity for joint action and forces them to fall short of the equipment capabilities of the most technologically advanced units.

2.2 - Technology and the challenge of asymmetry

The asymmetrical nature of conflicts, which is currently predominant, and the primordial place taken by the stabilisation phases no longer make it possible to measure the capacity of land forces solely by the sophistication of their weapons. Confronted with the sometimes overwhelming superiority of a military force, the adversary generally falls into a combat of a different nature, which tends to render the technological supremacy that is opposed to it futile. Disseminating itself in the environment, refusing to hold the ground and serve as a target, it contrasts the absence of targets with the increasing acquisition and processing capabilities held by the armed forces and often forces them to remain below the threshold of using the most efficient equipment. It develops the fight in areas other than those on which the land force is striving to act. Therefore, without denying the undeniable advantages that they bring, we must, at the same time, properly assess the contribution of new technologies and guide their use in the service of combat in an asymmetrical context.

Potential adversaries and declared enemies also benefit from technical progress, including in the military field, the wide dissemination of which changes the face of certain commitments. The widespread use and circulation of modern weapons in all theatres of operations accentuates direct or indirect threats to the forces engaged. Moreover, like the constant struggle between the spear and the shield, those who oppose military forces exploit technologies for civilian use which they manage to divert to their advantage.

Leaving the forces without a counterweight for a time, they manage to conquer certain forms of local supremacy and force them to adapt in a costly and difficult way, as illustrated by the increasingly widespread use of remotely controlled explosive devices.

However, in providing responses to new threats, technological progress allows forces to fight in the same fields as the adversary and thus reduces asymmetry. Feedback reinforces this ability. It is based on a cycle whose mastery, continuity and speed contribute to developing a reactive adaptation capability geared to meeting the operational requirements of land forces and, in particular, troops fighting on the ground. Sometimes contradictory with highly controlled methods of acquiring weapons and equipment, this capability is a necessity in order to maintain the ascendancy over a constantly evolving adversary.

2.3 - Man and technology

Technology does not remove the fundamental role of the individual in conflict resolution and there even seems to be a paradox of strategic modernity that technical progress reinforces personal responsibility. Some individual errors can influence the strategic environment, as can be the case when the behaviour of a single individual leads the command or political authorities to make a public commitment or when the use of the Internet leads to the accidental or malicious dissemination of documents of an operational nature. The increasing interconnection of joint systems and the digitisation of thesometimes lead to the "crushing" of decision-making levels.or lead some individuals to act at levels far above their own, such as the ground observer, who may take the initiative in issuing powerful naval or aerial fires.

However, being made up of men and women immersed in extreme violence or acting among populations, land forces are, more than others, confronted with a human dimension that often takes precedence over technical tools. In the harshness of operations, sometimes in combat, soldiers find themselves all the more confronted with their own physical and psychological limits as the violence and misery they encounter, the fatigue, stress or fear that threaten them are far removed from their usual way of life. In particular, at all levels, leaders are most exposed to situations in which the necessary initiative and decision making go hand in hand with isolation and nervous pressure.

Moreover, the multitude and diversity of missions to be conducted in increasingly large cities or spaces require large volumes of forces without technological advances generally proving able to allow for significant manpower savings.

However, between individuals and equipment, it is not a question of choosing one to the detriment of the other. Manpower and technology are also necessary for land forces to cope with today's conflicts. They need to maintain an essential balance between their ability to deploy large numbers of troops and their ability to acquire equipment that is technologically advanced but also properly evaluated.

3 - MCONTROL TIME

The undisputed military superiority of Western armies - and first and foremost that of the United States Army - has led to the disappearance of the symmetrical mode of action by default of the enemy. Moreover, while there is no conflict of an asymmetrical nature that does not slide more or less rapidly towards asymmetry, the shortening of intervention phases in favour of stabilisation phases seems to be a solid trend. Thus, for land forces, action is taking place at a new pace that no longer corresponds solely to the accelerated time of modern conventional operations. Time management and control are becoming essential.

3.1 - Acting in a hurry

Irrespective of the timing of the political decision, the timing of the commitment is usually marked by urgency, at least for some of the forces. This is based on qualities acquired over a long period of time and maintained through daily effort.

The responsiveness of land forces is the first of these. It is a component of the overall joint responsiveness with which it must remain coherent and remains closely linked to that of the other armies. A warning system on national territory, the presence of units overseas and in areas of interest or those of forces temporarily deployed close to crisis regions are essential aspects of this. However, appropriate procedures in the areas of support, transport or equipment of the forces are also indispensable prerequisites.

Anticipation enables the responsiveness of land forces to find its full expression. It must be based on a "cold" planning capability and an army organisation that makes it possible to commit part of the forces without destroying the whole.

Flexibility is an essential capability for adapting the force to its mission and to the political and military context. It offers the state authorities and the command the possibility of exercising the necessary choices in the commitment of forces at any time. It implies maintaining an indispensable diversity of operational functions and their availability.

However, urgency cannot be divorced from the ability to sustain the troops who commit themselves in this context. Hardiness is the basis for this, because it is the only way to maintain the highest level and operational superiority in spite of the trying conditions of the initial commitment, which are necessarily marked by the weakness of support mechanisms.

Finally, adaptability enables land forces to move from an initial emergency arrangement to a force organised for a mission that can be extended over time and broaden its field of action. It requires a capacity to strengthen and develop operational structures.

The Army has developed these qualities and maintains them at the best level despite the strong constraints they generate. As an army of employment present in many theatres, it has an operational capability based on its ability to engage in emergencies. Relying on a permanent warning system offering the command a wide range of operational capabilities, it is capable of acting rapidly with a force that is not just the right size, but is tailored to the objective and the uncertainty of the war. It can take its share of a "force first" with command, contact, warning and coordination capabilities.It can take its share of a "force first" with command, contact, support and sustainment capabilities and the permanent ability to integrate into a multinational force or to accommodate allied force modules. It has a variety of specialised units trained for operations of a "first in, first out" nature.It has a variety of specialised units trained for operations of a more joint nature, which are essential for entry or action in theatres difficult to access: amphibious operations, airborne operations, special operations. Finally, it acts in coherence with the capabilities of the other armies and services which implement the means necessary for strategic and theatre projection as well as for the support of land forces.

However, the limitation of national projection capabilities makes it necessary to strike the right balance between the strength of the force engaged in an emergency, the necessary projection times and the constraints of warning. While the urgency of an emergency may sometimes be measured in hours, the need to respond to it must not lead to precipitate action or to keeping a disproportionate volume of forces on alert when necessary. Emergencies have a human and financial cost. The objective to be achieved and the force required often accommodate a longer time scale. It is often preferable to trade unnecessary speed for indispensable protection, necessary power and sufficient troop support.

The operational capability of the armed forces is partly based on the ability to respond to emergencies, which is based on a suitable organisation and cannot be maintained without a permanent effort. But emergencies have a cost; they must not lead to keeping on alert volumes of forces disproportionate to the real need.

3.2 - Making a long-term commitment

Acting in an emergency and using all the power available over a short period of time, land forces are also involved in the course of conflicts that last for years. This is true for the same theatre, in the succession of phases that follow on from one another. It is also true simultaneously in different theatres, when engaged here in stabilization, the army must act urgently elsewhere and then prepare to remain there. It must therefore have the capacity to change the size and the balance of capabilities of a contingent present in a theatre according to the situation at the time.

But duration is also, and above all, measured by the means available. Continued engagement in protracted conflicts requires sufficient men and women as well as technically available and properly maintained equipment.

However, equipment that is now used intensively, over long periods of time and under extreme conditions wears out more quickly and requires more maintenance tasks than could be envisaged in the context of violent and short-lived conflicts. Therefore, the ability of equipment to last must be based on the best possible assessment of its employment profile and on an organization with the necessary means to absorb the inequalities of an unpredictable operational rhythm. It can also lead to changes in the day-to-day management of expensive fleets, even if this aspect presents a major challenge and directly affects overall operational capacity. But the military itself is the linchpin of this capability. The number of combatants deployed is closely correlated with the ability to influence the resolution of crises based on the confrontation of wills and action in the human environment. As soon as it engages in a conflict, the army must be able to organise the rotation of its soldiers according to a cycle that ensures that operational effectiveness is maintained.The army must be able to organise the rotation of its soldiers according to a cycle that maintains the operational effectiveness of the deployed force, the preparation of units on national soil and the personal and family balance of each soldier. The training and physical, as well as moral, endurance of sufficient numbers of men and women is the guarantee of their ability to last.

Land forces are often forced to intervene unexpectedly, but they are also part of the course of conflicts that last for years.

In protracted conflicts, equipment wears out quickly . It is necessary to adapt their design and management to the irregularities of an unpredictable operational tempo.

But it is people, above all, who remain the linchpin of the land forces' ability to last . Their training, stamina and a succession planning that ensures operational relevance and personal balance are the guarantors of this.

4 - MCONTROL VIOLENCE

4.1 - Multifaceted violence directed against everyone

Outside the combat phase, violence may be aimed directly at ground forces or at other actors in the conflict. Often fragmented and sporadic, its rationality is sometimes difficult for forces to perceive. Based on the use of terrorism as the main mode of action, urban guerrilla warfare represents the easiest and most effective, and therefore most likely, response in the fight of the weak against the strong. It is the one that land forces face whenever an enemy opposes their action. The objective of the adversary is to defeat us by weighing on the political will of France because it is unable to defeat the forces.

The opposition of the population, or part of it, can be manipulated or result from incidents involving the forces engaged. It then manifests itself by obstructing the missions of the ground forces or by explosions of hatred and violence from crowds of varying numbers against anything that symbolises foreign intervention: deployed forces, diplomatic representations, international representations, national interests (companies, schools, businesses) or expatriates. These actions may be spontaneous. More often, they aim to undermine the credibility of our forces or to push them into error by seeking to provoke an overreaction that can be exploited.

The struggle of one group against another on ethnic, political or religious grounds results in assassinations, attacks, attacks against the population, massacres, kidnappings that may take place throughout the theatre of operations. Barbarism characterizes many of these actions, which are aimed at maximizing the number of victims. Their permanence and the difficulty of preventing them present a formidable challenge. Here, too, the credibility of the Force or the legitimacy of its presence may be sought. There may also be a desire to influence the way out of a crisis, to undermine a positive development or to drive certain groups out of the country.

The rejection, and for some people ignorance, of the law of war - of the law in war - is characteristic of the habitual use of violence sometimes aggravated by fanaticism and the denial of Western values on the part of adversaries acting outside any state framework. The forces must absolutely reject such logic and be extremely vigilant in this matter.

Land forces are confronted with a multitude of forms of violence often aggravated by fanaticism and the denial of Western values.These forms of violence do not spare any actor in the conflict.

Urban guerrilla warfare, obstructions or explosions of hatred of a hostile population or the barbarity of merciless internal strife are the most frequent manifestations. Their persistence and the difficulty of preventing them can undermine the credibility of the Force and present a formidable challenge .

4.2 - Opposing violence

Controlling violence in a theatre of operations consists, first and foremost, of assessing the nature of the violence and the risks of its occurrence. These depend on the situation and the objectives of each side, but also on the means available to the ground forces to counter it.

As this violence can be naturally directed against the forces, their protection becomes increasingly important. Action within populations and the absence of a front line multiply the forms of aggression and are changing the very concept of protection, which now concerns the entire force. Although it may seem relatively easy for contact units equipped with a large number of armoured vehicles, such protection is more difficult to achieve for command and logistics units, isolated or liaison elements and civilian assets working for the benefit of the forces.

The protection of individuals not only preserves their physical integrity and lives, but also guarantees the political ability to deploy the Force, given the high sensitivity of Western public opinion to casualties. Tactically, it contributes to deterrence, promotes boldness and lowers the level of violence by avoiding unnecessary responses. However, if the Force is to protect itself, it must carry out a reasoned analysis of the risks so as not to withdraw into itself and cut itself off from an environment whose proper apprehension contributes to security and cannot be achieved without the necessary openness. Furthermore, action under armour, protective equipment for soldiers and the creation of entrenched camps, if they are sometimes necessary, isolate the land forces from a population which, on many occasions, does not understand the reasons for it or its aims.

Taken into account from the outset of the mission design, protection is a command choice between dedicated equipment, units in charge of the mission, adapted organisation of the terrain or the implementation of dynamic modes of action. It also appears to be linked to the respect of adapted rules of behaviour that increase the level of acceptability of the force by a population that is always ready to show its hostility to a foreign force.

Far from reducing their action to their sole protection, land forces must act against violence in order to eradicate it whenever they have the power to do so or, at the very least, to control its effects, locally or in the course of the conflict. The use of force is sometimes necessary, but it must not be allowed to fuel the radicalization of an enemy who is not bound by any rules. The balance is always difficult and precarious for the military leader between the use of necessary, sometimes brutal, force and unnecessarily high levels of violence against an adversary.

In the face of a crowd, one must be able to fight against its excesses and sometimes act in spite of or against it. These actions can be offensive. They can also be eminently defensive and reactive when isolated elements unexpectedly find themselves in the face of hostility. To do this, soldiers must be able to use the full range of techniques and means available to them, not just the use of their weapons of war, but also the full range of techniques and means available to them. The adoption of appropriate ground modes of action, specific equipment and the necessary training are essential to enable forces to always adjust the nature of their response to hostile crowds and emerging threats. The development of reduced lethality weapons and ammunition thus enhances the operational capability of units within populations.