Russia's return to Africa is accompanied by a significant communication activity, whether it be that of African states that rely on Russian assistance or the stories of Western journalists who are fascinated by the connections between the current era and that of the Cold War. In any case, the Russians themselves are organising the staging of this return by developing an informational manoeuvre combining positive communication actions with actions of influence and disinformation, withoutMoreover, it is always possible to completely untangle what is a matter of institutional and diplomatic action or that of the avatars who represent private Russian interests in the CAR.
Nowhere else than in the CAR has the support provided for this return by communication been so visible and in this country in crisis, France has found itself in the front line in the face of a particularly virulent Russian information offensive. Directly targeted, France had to develop a reactive communication strategy aimed at restoring, locally and internationally, its tarnished and defamed image.
But was this Russian communication strategy and media hype effective and did it really serve Russia's interests in Africa? The purpose of this study is therefore to examine the communication strategy implemented by Russia in the CAR since October 2017 and its results.

THE LIMITS OF THE RCA COMMUNICATION STRATEGY IN RCA COMMUNICATE TO MASK ITS WEAKNESSES

INTRODUCTION

Russia's return to Africa is accompanied by a significant communication activity, whether it be that of African states that rely on Russian assistance or the stories of Western journalists who are fascinated by the connections between the current era and that of the Cold War. In any case, the Russians themselves are organising the staging of this return by developing an informational manoeuvre combining positive communication actions with actions of influence and disinformation, withoutMoreover, it is always possible to completely untangle what is a matter of institutional and diplomatic action or that of the avatars who represent private Russian interests in the CAR.

Nowhere else than in the CAR has the support provided for this return by communication been so visible and in this country in crisis, France has found itself in the front line in the face of a particularly virulent Russian information offensive. Directly targeted, France had to develop a reactive communication strategy aimed at restoring, locally and internationally, its tarnished and defamed image.
But was this Russian communication strategy and media hype effective and did it really serve Russia's interests in Africa? The purpose of this study is therefore to examine the communication strategy implemented by Russia in the CAR since October 2017 and its results.

RUSSIAN OVER-INVESTMENT IN THE COMMUNICATION FUNCTION.

The announcement of Russia's arrival in the CAR, following the Sochi meeting in October 2017 between Central African Prime Minister Simplice Mathieu Sarandji and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, was accompanied by a major Russian effort in the field of communication.
In terms of messages, in implementing its communication strategy, Russia has mobilised several arguments aimed at African and Western public opinion:
the reminder that Russia has never had a colonial empire in Africa, which de facto absolved it of all bad intentions; the reminder of the Soviet involvement in the struggles for independence and the training of African cadres to beat the recall of the faithful; the appeal to the bad conscience of the Westerners on the crimes of colonization which would still be perpetrated today in another form and the will to make them feel guilty; the image of a Russian army, heir to the Red Army, which would be an invincible steamroller and capable of defeating terrorism in Africa and all the oppression of which Africans would still be victims.

A Russian arrival in the CAR with fanfare At the end of 2017, the arrival of the first Russians was therefore a great boost to communication actions, whether it be media coverage or events. Just look at the most visible and spectacular achievements:

the appearance on social networks of pro-Russian and frankly anti-French sites (Facebook: Support for Russia in the CAR, Bangui 24 News etc., which copy each other);
the mobilization of pseudo pan-Africanist NGOs in charge of singing the praises of Russia and vilifying France (Urgences Panafricanistes, Aimons Notre Afrique etc.) often created for the occasion;
actions of influence (delivery of trampolines, sending children on holiday to Russia etc.);
announcements (strengthening partnerships in the security field but also in the economic, cultural, academic, etc.).

the scripting in the form of fairs for the training purposes of the FACA organized by Russian instructors in Berengo with a great deal of pyrotechnic effects, rock music, jumping through flaming hoops etc., all in the presence of the Russian ambassador, the highest Central African authorities, observers and the local population.
An effort that has not faltered over the weeks and which has been supplemented by other equally spectacular actions:
the creation of a radio station (Radio Lengo Songö: "Nouons la solidarité" in October 2018);
poster campaigns (in favour of Radio Lengo Songö or in support of the Central African Armed Forces);
event campaigns (on 25 and 26-08-18 a football tournament called "Cup of Hope" between the different districts of Bangui; 09-12-18 election of "Miss Central African"; on 15-12-18 a taekwondo tournament etc.).
and the broadcasting of films or cartoons praising for example "the friendship between the bear and the lion".

This bubbling and this multiplication of actions or announcements (often at low cost or low level of human investment) were at first undeniably successful. For a country in crisis such as the CAR, ready to grasp any extended hand, the announcement of a new partnership with a country perceived as powerful and proactive may have aroused real enthusiasm among certain political elites and part of the population.

An aggressive and anti-French communication strategy

In practical terms, in terms of actions to be carried out in the field, the Russians have developed a communication strategy with two objectives:
To amplify the "background noise" of the denigration of France, consisting of the systematic development of 9 recurring themes that allow each event to be reported by finding each time an angle to attack France's action:

PR Macron (and his predecessors) intervenes personally to harm the CAR;
France defends its "pre-square" which is its preserve and wants to drive Russia out of the CAR at all costs;
France has double standards in its African policy (which helps its ʺvaletsʺ and punishes those who stand up to it);
France manipulates "armed gangs", the neighbouring countries, and uses "agents" to destabilize the CAR;
France abuses its position in the Security Council to harm the CAR;
France maintains and prolongs the crisis in the CAR to further its own interests;
France holds the levers of the institutions leaning over the CAR (EUTM, DUE, IMF, MINUSCA etc.);
France is disloyal ("versatile") plotting against the CAR and wants to harm the international image of the CAR;
France holds the economy in the CAR (including thanks to the CFA franc) and wants to monopolize the country's wealth, which is essential for the survival of its economy.

Constantly criticize the French media, especially RFI (often referred to as "Radio Mille Collines"), which are discredited, systematically presented as being at the behest of Paris and accused of relaying France's supposedly anti-Central African policy.

Assailed day after day, the themes presented and the media criticism allow, whatever the field, to be reported to practically any French action in order to discredit it. The aim is to "soften the terrain" to weaken France's position overall and facilitate the development of more targeted criticism: the "Affaires" (cf. insert) which mobilise over a short period of time the entire anti-French theme on a particular event. The "Affaires" are relayed on all possible media and are the indisputable mark of a coordinated action (and not a simple aggregation of messages from individual protesters).

Beyond their criticism of France, the Russians, by systematically denigrating the role of all the actors working to restore peace, respect for the law and the reconstruction of the state, have deliberately taken the risk of destabilizing an entire international operation to the benefit of the CAR.

Suborned local media, fascinated and blinded French media
While officially communicating on their declared and positive intentions of support for the CAR and cooperation with all international actors, the Russians also used the intermediaries of the French media and the French media in order to make a statement.The Russians also used intermediaries by paying local journalists or by mobilising so-called pan-Africanists to sing the praises of the Russian action and to decry the action of France and other partners of the CAR.They also relied on the strike force of the Russian Yevgeny Prigojine's ʺusines to Trollsʺ, which multiplied pro-Russian or anti-French sites. In order to be more responsive and to be closer to local journalists, the Russians have set up an office within the presidency itself to coordinate anti-French actions locally.

Thus, locally, as soon as the announcement of Russia's arrival in the CAR was made, the capacity of the local PQN to quickly write credible anti-French narratives suddenly developed and the number of anti-French articles in the PQN increased significantly. In the hodgepodge of anti-French and pro-Russian articles being disseminated, the sophistication of certain disinformation operations, the appearance of certain angles ofattack against France, the emergence of anti-French ʺd'Affairesʺ documented by pseudo evidence has contrasted with the known style and capacities of the Central African media. The tempo, method, and motive that objectively served Russian interests clearly pointed to a Russia seeking to degrade the image of France in the CAR.

Internationally, this spectacular arrival of the Russians was complacently relayed by the French media fascinated by the Story Telling skillfully orchestrated by Russia itself and by the so-called debacle, on the continent, of a France that would be honest. Overall, the Russian strategy has been unabashedly presented as unstoppable and perfectly effective. A blitzkrieg of which France - which had decidedly never understood anything about the CAR - could only inevitably pay the price: ʺEchec and mate for the Kremlin, which takes partieʺ as Le Point categorically stated in December 2018.

This "bevelling" is less aimed at considering what Russia was really doing for the CAR and to report on the progress of the peace and reconciliation process than at scrutinizing with greedy eyes the slightest signs that would show a collapse of French influence in the region has been a striking feature of the treatment of the situation in the country by non-resident journalists. This chosen angle was all the more audible as French correspondents in CAR who could have counterbalanced this Story Telling were at the same time subject to intimidation and even threats. In April 2018, RFI and France 24 journalist Édouard Dropsy, presented by the CAR media as a French spy, was forced to leave the CAR under pressure. On 30 July 2018, three Russian journalists who were investigating the activities of Russian Wagner in CAR were murdered. These warnings and threats against the handful of French journalists who continue to reside in CAR have helped to inhibit them and make them cautious.

DESPITE ALL THIS, A RUSSIAN COMMUNICATION STRATEGY THAT IS MARKING TIME

At the beginning of 2019, Russia's communication strategy is therefore developing unopposed. French Bashing is in full swing. In January 2019, in the PQN, for example, anti-French articles are extremely numerous and virulent. France's action in the CAR is the subject of almost no favourable articles and the ratio can be, in some weeks, from 1 to more than 20 in favour of negative articles. Nevertheless, the situation will quickly change in France's favour.

Humiliation as a mode of action or how to provoke a reaction from the adversary that is the opposite of the one sought. We must not overlook the pride that exists in the development and conduct of the foreign policy of nations. The choice made by Russia in the CAR to add its humiliation to France's obliteration was particularly bad. Instead of adapting its communication policy to a local objective, which would have been to facilitate and accompany a reduction in France's commitment in the CAR, Russia has stigmatized and smeared France's action in that country. Few see this as an ontological aspect of Russia's foreign policy vis-à-vis the West: a desire for revenge and a desire to humiliate those whom it considers responsible for its loss of influence in the world since the break-up of the Soviet Union? Can they also see in it the local application - without taking into account the particular context of the CAR - of a more general directive with an explicit scope on the rigidities of a Russian system whose efficiency and pragmatism are praised by some? Be that as it may, in the particular context of the CAR, where France had committed itself to a withdrawal (which was not tantamount to abandonment) and was willing to cooperate with new partners, this dogmatic attitude sounded like a mistake.

Considering France, therefore, as an adversary whose positive action should be denied, whose image should be tarnished and whose ability to limit or even destroy its capacity to act was limited.The communication strategy implemented by Russia could only - almost mechanically - provoke a French reaction.
Creating hope and expectation or how to be manipulated by the Central African partner
While the Central African media were very enthusiastic about the announcement of Russia's arrival, with many articles presenting Russia as a positive alternative to France in the CAR, the Russians wanted to amplify the phenomenon by acting in two directions.

Teaser and create hope: by multiplying the effects of announcements and encouraging - or at least letting - Central Africans extrapolate on future actions that Russia would implement in the CAR without necessarily denying them ;
Denigrating France's action: by promoting, developing and professionalizing very aggressive anti-French communication through the Central African media or social networks.

The Central Africans, who have a propensity to expect a lot from their partners to whom they ask to commit far beyond what they have promised, have grasped the manoeuvre and played on the expectations that had been raised. They also saw it as a way of putting the French and Russian partners in competition with each other, but as the weeks went by, the demands and impatience with the Russian partner increased. This evolution was all the more natural as France was vilified and Russia was praised, and it was with regard to the Slavic partner that the expectations were the highest. After the demand for the creation of a base to house regular Russian troops and the demand for direct military engagement by Russia alongside the FACA to eradicate the rebel bands and reconquer the Slavic partner, it was the Slavic partner that had the greatest expectations.rir the territories escaping from central authority, the Central Africans asked the Russians to rebuild the economy and to take over the agricultural sector or education etc. As the weeks went by, the Central Africans' disappointment was proportional to the initial enthusiasm.

The Russian communication actions - while they had a strong impact in terms of outreach - could not hide the very limited scope of their concrete achievements in the CAR. As Central Africans did not obtain satisfaction from the Russians that met their expectations, disappointment quickly gave way to bitterness, and in some cases even hostility. In any case, there is now a mistrust of Russian intentions that can no longer be changed by a simple policy of communication and sleight of hand.

A REORIENTATION OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNICATION STRATEGY THAT SIGNALS A LOCAL FAILURE

In the summer of 2019, Russia's position in the Central African Republic has changed significantly, in particular due to the following factors:

France's reaction, which probably took the Russians by surprise by distorting their analysis of the local fragility of its position and its willingness to disengage from the country;
the disenchantment of Central Africans (leaders and civil society) due to the concrete action of the Russians in the country and the reality of their objectives;
a duplicity of Central Africans, both loyalist and rebel, who use the Russian presence for the benefit of their local interests;
the fragility of the peace agreement of 6 February 2019, the implementation of which requires the effective collaboration of CAR's various partners, which cannot hide the insincerity of many of its signatories and whose results are mixed.
In this context, Russia has begun a rapprochement with France, which shows more its weakness than a willingness to work in a sincere collaborative mode. In terms of communication, the media's virulence against France's action, while remaining high, has largely diminished in intensity.

France has actively gained a point of equilibrium

With regard to its action in the CAR, France had objective assets which, if properly used, gave it a clear competitive advantage, because whatever those who denigrate France's action in the CAR may say, the facts are there: France is the Central African Republic's leading bilateral partner, and even more so if we take into account France's commitment through the international organizations that help the CAR (DUE, EUTM-RCA, MINUSCA, and many others). France remains the leading power in the CAR in terms of security and defence cooperation, governance support, security and defence.France remains the leading power in CAR in terms of security and defence cooperation, governance support, budget support, in the economic field where most of the largest local companies are French (Orange, Total, Bolloré, Castel, etc.).), in the field of education (Lycée Français, number of scholarships granted to Central African students, teacher training, etc.), in the field of health (Laboratoire Pasteur, the first analytical laboratory in the CAR), in the cultural field (Alliance française de Bangui) and in many other areas. These activities, whatever the contemptuers of France's action may think, enable the Central African State to obtain fiscal resources, Central Africans to have jobs, to have access to better education or to quality health care?
These are all objective facts that enable France to regularly feed its communication on tangible actions. Once the embassy was able to develop a positive communication with a sufficiently regular rhythm to create the event and force its detractors to position itself in relation to its action, Russian counter-communication based essentially on denigration has lost all the more strength since the Russians' own record is mixed, even mediocre. Since the Russians do not show positive, quantifiable and qualifying actions commensurate with the French commitment, their message has become less audible and above all less credible.

A point of equilibrium reached by default by Russia

The Russian communication strategy thus failed on three levels and prevented it from achieving its initial objective of marginalizing, or even ousting, France.
An underestimation of the French reaction: the Russians initially developed a communication strategy that brutally and crudely denigrated France's action intended to quickly "sideline" it. An objective that seemed all the more accessible a priori as France was able to give the impression through the evolution of its policy in the CAR that it no longer necessarily wanted to play a leading role in the country. Despite its initial successes and since this initial objective was not achieved due to the French reaction, the anti-French media campaign was disrupted and Russia had to react more often. As the driving force behind this anti-French campaign, Russia also became more visible. This anti-French strategy ended up finding less echo and running out of steam.

An underestimation of the time factor: as months went by, Russia came to the end of its possibilities in terms of surprise and novelty. When they arrived in the CAR, the Russians denounced a lot, promised a lot or let it be known that they would do so. Their actions, now that the surprise effect has passed, appear for what they are: essentially cosmetic. The Russians are therefore now forced to prove in concrete terms the interest for the CAR of their commitment, which puts them in a less easy position than a few months ago. Russia, which was moving forward unopposed, must now redirect part of its communication capabilities to react and concretely prove that it is pursuing a positive policy for the CAR.
Disappointing political results: in the security field - which is the main focus of Russia's efforts in the CAR - the results are also disappointing. After the spectacular announcement of the signing of the Khartoum agreement and then the Bangui agreement on 6 February 2019, the results have been slow to be translated into concrete action. The implementation of the agreement, which Russia is invoking and yet supported by the international community, is chaotic. Worse, the armed groups that have been granted recognition and whose leaders have had access to institutional responsibilities are now playing on two sides: they have access to certain preconditions of power while continuing to obstruct the return of the administration, to resist the deployment of the FDS and to levy taxes on the population under their authority. Finally, PR Touadéra, in view of the future presidential election (1st round in December 2020) seems to want to attract rebel leaders into the orbs of its United Hearts Movement (MCU) in order to guarantee its re-election. The result is great frustration among the people who supported him, who feel that they are the victims of a dupe's deal and who wonder whether Russian intervention, far from being a "success", will be a "success".The result is great frustration among the people who supported him, who feel that they are the victims of a deceptive deal and who wonder whether Russian intervention, far from having resolved the crisis, has not made it more complex to resolve and created the conditions for a new crisis in the future, which could be even harder.

A reorientation of Russian policy towards France towards a more collaborative mode
In the context described, Russia is now in a more fragile position than it appears and needs to put in place a more collaborative policy with France, in particular, which has real credibility and capacities for action in the CAR that it does not have.

It is in this sense that we must analyse the search for greater diplomatic honor on the part of the Russians, which has resulted, vis-à-vis France, in a marked warming of relations since Ambassador Vladimir Titorenko took office in Bangui on March 1, 2019. Ambassador Titorenko is seeking to present his country as a positive power, eager to maintain normal relations with the other acting powers - including France - and welcomes the actions implemented by the various partners and institutions working to revive the country.

With regard to its communication, Russia, which also sees its actions criticized, is, like France, a victim of the bad actions of the Central African media. Russia is following France's example by taking action with the media and the High Council for Communication (HCC). It demands the publication of rights of reply and calls for certain publications to be condemned.

In very concrete terms, the drop in the number of anti-French articles is flagrant and, above all, for the moment, there is an absence of "cases" as virulent as the "Raineteau Affair" or the "Cut Finger Affair". Nevertheless, the anti-French "background noise" remains significant and even if it is not possible to attribute it exclusively to Russia, it is clear that Russia has adjusted its strategy. However, it is maintaining sufficient media pressure on France to be able to resume its virulence instantly (its capacity to react and its opportunism are proven).
The all-out criticism of France is now giving way to an attempt to "channel" its action towards certain areas (education, justice, etc.) while Russia is said to be concerned about security. A division of labour which now seems to be Russia's immediate objective in the CAR, as Sputnik recently echoed.

CONCLUSION

When analysing their communication strategy in the CAR, it is clear that the Russians have devoted a great deal of effort and resources to it, with mixed results:
If the objective was to marginalize France or even get her to leave, this result was not achieved. On the contrary, France has regained a central position in the resolution of the crisis and the Russians need its support for the implementation of the agreements which, although they were partly inspired by Russia, are not, in particular, financed by the latter.

If it was a question of getting the Central Africans to adhere to Russia's policy in the CAR, after initial enthusiasm, the disillusionment is there: few concrete achievements and Central Africans who are slow to see the benefits for their daily lives and security but who see, on the other hand, how Russia is trying to monopolize the wealth of the Central African subsoil.

Even the signing of the peace agreement of 6 February 2019, which the Russians present as their Great Work and whose entire merit they would like to see recognised internationally, is not the dazzling success they promised: Several members who signed the agreement refuse to implement it, deadly unrest continues in some towns in the country and the Central African administration is struggling to deploy inside the country. In terms of security, whether in terms of training or equipment for the FDS, the added value brought by Russia compared to the action of the CAR's other partners, whether France, EUTM or UNMISCA, has not been demonstrated.

Examination of the conclusions of the Sochi Russia-Africa summit, which ended on 24 October and which could have been an opportunity for Russia to make concrete announcements to Africans signing an ambitious policy, does not contradict the analysis made in this document: Behind the success of the media display, the Russian declarations remain imprecise, without a clear calendar and the few concrete announcements are ethical. The call by African presidents for Russian involvement in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel has only provided a vague response. In the economic field, Russia announces that it wants to double the volume of trade with Africa, which in 2018 was 20 billion dollars (40% of which was with Egypt alone and largely represented by arms) within 5 years. 20 billion dollars is 2.5 times less than France alone, 10 times less than China and 14 times less than Europe.

Despite all the communication efforts of the Russians to glorify their action and smear the reputation of countries such as France, the mask is falling off. On October 30, one week after the Sochi summit ended, Facebook announced the dismantling of a Russian disinformation operation in Africa. The accounts, pages and groups concerned were generated by Prigojine's famous Russian ʺusines to Trollsʺ.
In the end, the action of the Russians appeared more anti-Western than pro-Africa and did not generate notable improvements in the daily lives of Central Africans. The manipulation of information, the denigration of France, the blows etc. implemented by the Russians in CAR do not make a real policy. In this respect, the example of the Central African Republic must therefore be looked at for what it is: the Russian attempt to hide its weaknesses by betting on a strong and ultimately unproductive communication strategy.
Insert: "Business

The "Affaires" mobilize over a short period of time the whole anti-French theme and focus criticism on a particular event. One can distinguish the "Businesses of Opportunity" that seize the opportunity to harm France through a controlled, intense and highly targeted media campaigne and "Planned Affairs" which take advantage of a predictable event to direct communication on the subject in such a way as to harm France.

E.g.: the "Ngaïssona Case" named after an anti-Balaka leader and boss of Central African football, arrested in France and transferred to the International Criminal Court on 23 January. A case for which France is not responsible but which is presented in such a way that unfair France etc. becomes the instigator.
Ex: "the Case of the severed finger", the revelation by RFI on January 21st 2019 of a UN investigation "on torture by Russian armed men" committed on a Central African who was the subject of a Russian reaction that was at the same time very much in the public eye.This was a rapid and elaborate response that saw it develop a reactive communication with the aim of clearing itself locally of the abuses committed and pointing to France as being responsible for the acts of torture and for having organised an operation to harm Russia.
Ex: "the Raineteau Affair", named after the consultant accused of supporting the Seleka, and especially of having been involved in the murderous attack against the church of Fatima in Bangui (01-05-2018). Described by the Central African media as ʺmercenaireʺ, ʺterroristeʺ, or ʺgénocidaireʺ, he is also presented as an agent of the French services (code name ʺAlphaʺ) whose mission was to destabilize in CAR, which allowed him to orchestrate a campaign against the French "barbouzeries" by linking the case to the theme of France plotting against CAR.

E.g.: "The MOCAF Affair", in January 2019, a new French DG was sent to Bangui to take over a bloodless company that had been managed laxly and was being trafficked in various ways. The reorganisation led to strikes and blockades of the site and pressure on the DG to return to the status quo ante. A defamatory press campaign is launched in the Central African media, which misrepresents MOCAF as the "national brewery" (even though the company is 100% privately owned and belongs to the French group Castel) that France would like to kill. A situation instrumentalized to be reduced to a French conspiracy against the regime and the maintenance of an underdeveloped CAR to satisfy the predatory will of France.