Unsurprisingly, knowledge of the physical and human environment remains an imperative in respect of which a certain humility must nevertheless be maintained. Indeed, while it is essential to constantly seek to develop an understanding of one's operational environment, it is equally important to keep in mind that this knowledge is built over time and will inevitably remain imperfect.

Reaffirmed importance of understanding the local environment

In particular, understanding local power relations in detail takes a considerable amount of time - rarely offered by deployments of four to six months - and will ultimately be inferior to that of a partner that has been in its environment for generations. Thus, the utmost caution should be exercised when tempted to interfere in relations between local actors.

Consequently, the effort of an ACA secondment should focus on an accurate and up-to-date assessment of the reliability of the partner. Indeed, the success of joint training and operations, but also the very security of French personnel, lies above all in the ability to judiciously estimate the level of confidence that can be placed in local units, a level that can vary significantly according to the nature of the operations envisaged: Thus, a troop considered effective may lose all operational value once it has left its zone of tribal or ethnic legitimacy. It is therefore important to increase contacts with the partner in order to understand its motivations, qualities and limitations. To this end, learning the local language, however rudimentary, is a significant asset.

A fortiori, the initial audit of the partner is of a truly decisive nature in the context of an AMO mission. Indeed, this particularly delicate exercise should make it possible to identify local units with the following skills: on the one hand, the capacity to ensure the security of the French detachment within them; on the other hand, the potential necessary for development with the support of France ofoperational effectiveness superior to that of the adversary in question; lastly and above all, the real willingness to engage against this adversary by assuming the risks. The objective evaluation of these three criteria, without being influenced by declarations of intent - always exaggeratedly voluntarist - is a matter of course.The objective assessment of these three criteria, without being influenced by declarations of intent - always overly proactive - is thus truly critical and must be updated once the mission has been launched thanks to the feedback from successive detachment chiefs.

Lyautey's commitment to understanding the local culture and actors is still as relevant as ever, as the success of an ACA mission seems to depend above all on a thorough knowledge of the partner.

Partner accountability, a key factor for success

Furthermore, the effectiveness of an ACA secondment appears to be intrinsically linked to its discretion. Thus, being a mentor to the partner creates resentment and passivity among managers and staff alike. On the other hand, allowing the partner to design and conduct its operations with as little apparent interference as possible despite the constraints and frustrations that this necessarily generates, helps to strengthen the legitimacy of the local leader and thus to gain his or her recognition. The same observation remains valid during the appraisal: thus, when it comes to bringing new know-how to a partner, joint training involving as closely as possible French and local units proves to be significantly more effective than courses given to the partner by French instructors.

Moreover, the importance of the partner's accountability appears all the more critical since the mentor is often forced to adopt a backward posture in operations. In fact, the degree of acceptability of the risks incurred is generally not the same for the AMO detachment as for the unit being accompanied. Once engaged, the local leader will inevitably find himself or herself alone in the face of his or her responsibilities, with no mentor to turn to. In these moments, the confidence he will place in his abilities, but also the confidence his men will place in him, will play a truly decisive role. It is therefore important for the AMO detachment to ensure that it takes advantage of every opportunity to reinforce the legitimacy of the leader in the eyes of his men, as Lyautey did with the Moroccan elite.

To this end, it remains essential to be able to provide the partner with capabilities that it considers to be of high added value, implemented either by French mentors or by the Moroccan authorities.To this end, it remains essential to be able to provide the partner with capabilities that he considers to be of high added value, capabilities that are implemented either by French mentors or by specialists trained beforehand within the supported unit, depending on the unit's capabilities and the sensitivity of the means employed. While these key capabilities must of course be determined on a case-by-case basis according to the context, they generally fall into three categories: command support (in particular intelligence support), contact support in all its dimensions (from fire support to mobility support), and forward logistic support (particularly in the health sector). Finally, it is important to bear in mind that the tactical effect achieved is often less important than the increase in confidence within the unit being supported.

Thus, Lyautey's approach of "helping the partner behind the scenes rather than replacing him on stage" is still relevant in the context of a crisis, but it is important to bear in mind that the tactical effect achieved is often less important than the increase in trust within the unit being supported.Lyautey's approach of "helping the partner behind the scenes rather than replacing him or her on stage" is still relevant in spite of its often frustrating nature, as it encourages the development of a genuine long-term capacity to influence.

Interface with all other dimensions of the conflict

First of all, an AMO Detachment Leader must pragmatically assume a real responsibility to advise his or her partner on ethical issues. Indeed, while the partner generally has a good grasp of the effects of his actions on local power relations, he is often unaware of the consequences - sometimes truly strategic - that can result from the inappropriate use of force, once it has been observed and relayed by the international media. This dimension of operations must therefore be highlighted by the French detachment: Indeed, if it is unthinkable to hope to impose Western standards of behaviour on the partner, the extremely counter-productive repercussions that its actions may have on the international scene must imperatively be brought to its attention beforehand.

Furthermore, it is important to enable the partner to seize the opportunities offered by interministerial and international cooperation arrangements. In this field, there are many actors and the means are increasingly constrained. Knowledge of existing military and civilian assistance mechanisms is therefore particularly useful: Enabling the head of a partner unit to obtain the resources necessary for the implementation of a truly global approach means strengthening its legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. Moreover, effectively exercising this role of intermediary presupposes having established cross-cutting contacts between the ACA mechanism and the other cooperation structures. This could also be achieved by strengthening the role of general officers commanding overseas.

Beyond that, however, an ACA mechanism can be a remarkably effective lever for influence in the diplomatic field. Indeed, it happens quite frequently that a head of detachment is called upon to interact in a privileged manner with the local authorities, if only because he is sometimes the only French representative present on a permanent basis. Therefore, without improvising as a diplomat, it seems appropriate to fully integrate the political dimension that an ACA mission can have, for example by developing a network of influence within the Member States.This would allow, for example, the development of a network of influence within local authorities without being limited to military officials, in order to be able to relay messages from French diplomacy, if necessary, thus contributing directly to the achievement of the objectives set by the latter.

Ultimately, Lyautey's ability to act simultaneously and in a coordinated manner in the security, economic and political dimensions of a conflict is today, mutatis mutandis, a real source of inspiration for those in charge of AMO missions.