As a result, there has long been a search for a method of reasoning that can facilitate the resolution of tactical and strategic problems.

The development of combat procedures, the ever-increasing importance of the air factor and the atomic weapon, the spread of guerrilla and partisan warfare, all require a gradually developed method of reasoning.

In particular, any maneuver currently conceived under the sign of the dual atomic threat and general insecurity (the latter having to be underestimated In particular, since any manoeuvre that must currently be conceived in terms of the dual nuclear threat and general insecurity (the latter having to be underestimated in relation to the atomic danger), it seemed desirable to take stock of the question as a whole, and to seek to outline the essential features of a method of reasoning whose broad outlines would be applicable to situations of conventional warfare, i.e., atomic insurrectionary warfare.

It should be made clear that this is a method, and a French method, whose terminology we have retained, without allowing ourselves to be overtaken by Anglo-Saxon terms.

In the absence of an inter-allied method applicable within the framework of NATO, it seemed normal to set aside here any discussion or parallelism with the methods in force in each of the allied armies.

However, it is quite clear that while the spirit of the general method advocated is general, its methods of application may present certain differences and require some adaptation depending on the level of command considered and the form of warfare envisaged.

The problems do not arise in the same way at the Army or Theatre of Operations level or at the Battle Group level.

At the strategic levels, the main problems are execution times and the concern for long-term forecasting, with studies leading to the final design of a manoeuvre lasting several months, leading to successive revisions or fine-tuning.

At the tactical levels, however, speed and detail are the general rule. Moreover, the relative importance of the various factors, and in particular the air situation, is not the same at the different levels.

In these circumstances, the following presentation, while providing some general ideas, will be more specifically oriented towards the study of tactical problems at the Division and Corps levels.

It will consist of two main parts: