Are the GTIAs contemporary versions of the autonomous Mobile Groups (GM) of the Indochina War? For the authors of this article, the answer to this question is yes. Indeed, the GTIA, tactical manoeuvre pawns with a modular structure, draw their strength from the proven commitment and flexibility of the MGs, while benefiting from a well-developed doctrine of use and being enhanced by the modernity of their equipment. These assets are highlighted by the "GTIA SCORPION" project.

In May 2013, Hezbollah publicly acknowledged its military aid to the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. This military intervention outside its borders earned it national and international blacklisting. The purpose of this study is to analyse the reasons that led Hezbollah to take what appears to be a very dangerous decision, as well as the reasons that allow it to benefit today from its involvement in Syria.

Innovation cannot be decreed, and like any word with numerous and changing definitions, the main threat to innovation would be to reduce it to a mere declaration of intent. To paraphrase General de Gaulle, one can jump on his chair like a goat and say "Innovation! Innovation! Innovation!", but that leads to nothing and means nothing. Battalion Chief Jean Michelin takes the discussion further on what innovation could imply, concretely, and in the Army in particular.

«Ugood lieutenant is someone who has fifty ideas a second and who we have to put the brakes on. Not someone you have to push."

Author Martin Van Creveld is a military historian and studies war as a social behaviour. He teaches at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Considered to be the promoter of reflection on military transformation over the last twenty years, he is the author of Supply and War (1977), Command and War (1985)[1], Technology and War (1988) and Women and War[2].

Critic of Clausewitz, Martin Van Creveld is a follower of the so-called "chaos school"[3]. 3] According to him, terrorist, mafia and civil wars are becoming the normal form of violent conflict and are likely to become widespread. This is what he claims to demonstrate in The Transfomation of War, written before the end of bipolarity but published in France in 1998 under the title La transformation de la guerre.

[1] Analysis of the history of command through the ages as an endless race between the growing need for information and the ability of command systems to respond to it.

[2] Thesis that it was the decline of military organization that led to the recruitment of women. This recruitment accelerates the decline of armies. The author relativizes the progress of women's access to the military and demonstrates that, where war is played out, men still have a monopoly on violence since they are the ones who pay what Clausewitz called "the price of war" and who "commit" what Tolstoy called "the act of killing".

[3] Chaos Theory: the end of bipolarity will consecrate a theory according to which the master thinker in strategy will no longer be Clauzewitz but Sunzi. In fact, as the enemy becomes indistinct and his behaviour random, it is no longer a question of fighting decisive battles and destroying the opponent but of managing crises and winning without fighting. This thesis is also defended by John Keegan, A History of Warfare, (London 1993).

The fighting in the summer of 2006 between the Israeli army and the Lebanese Hezbollah forces, with the rest of Lebanon's population and economic potential as collateral victims, constitutes one of the longest "Arab-Israeli wars" (35 days). They have involved in the foreground, albeit to different degrees, Israel, Lebanon in all its components, and the Palestinians in the Territories. But they obviously had regional consequences and led to a new form of involvement, not without ambiguity, of the main international players.

The French landing in Algeria in 1830 was due to a political decision with an indisputable strategic motive: to cleanse the western Mediterranean of barbarian pirates.

Once Algiers was conquered, was it necessary to colonize the rest of the province? This debate was answered in the affirmative at the time, because of the facts on the ground: the state of political, administrative and health decay that was disinheriting this province and irresistibly attracting the seizure of power by whoever wanted it, in this case France. Good or bad, it does not matter. The purpose of this article is not to make a comparative philosophical and moral study, Jules Ferry and Clemenceau have publicly opposed each other on this subject, but to make a concrete assessment of 132 years of French presence and to describe the legacy left. It is a photograph, because hospitals, agriculture, roads, railways, ports, airports, oil and gas are undeniable realities.

It is not useless to make this assessment by answering, in passing, the main accusations against this colonization, apart from the philosophical concerns about the inferior and superior races. I will therefore examine the civic disparities (referred to as inequalities) between Europeans, Jews and Muslims, the inequality in the education of these different groups, the inequality in the quality of schooling, the inequality in the quality of the education of the Jews and the inequality in the education of the Muslims.I will therefore examine the civic disparities (treated as inequalities) between Europeans, Jews and Muslims, the inequality in the schooling of these different categories, public health, agriculture (allegedly reserved for settlers), infrastructure facilities, mining resources: especially oil and gas.

The reflections in progress in the framework of the new White Paper are visibly influenced by the so-called post-modern philosophy of rejection of systems of thought. The result is a vision of things that is not based on the deep and short-term past. The purpose of this fact sheet is therefore, very modestly, to place the current debates in the long term and to call on major historical and economic theories (Toynbee, Kennedy, Kondratiev) to shed original light on the subject.

"The important thing is not the reality of life...

but what people believe"

Roger Mucchielli

Then a Legion officer, I took part in the summer of 1994, as Commander of the Southern Group, in Operation Turquoise (21 June - 21 August 1994), from the 21st of June to the 21st of August.launched with the approval of the UN (resolution 924) in the south-west of Rwanda to establish a Safe Humanitarian Zone for a period limited to 2 months...

I had never previously served in Rwanda, neither as part of military cooperation (military cooperation agreements had been signed by France and Rwanda in 1975), nor as part of the military operations triggered by France to establish a Safe Humanitarian Zone for a limited period of 2 months...October 1990 to December 1993 (dates of the start and end of Operation Noroît) and then in April 1994 (evacuation of French and foreign nationals from Kigali at the start of the massacres that were to become the 1994 genocide).

A section of the 4th Company of the ^8th R.P.I. in Afghanistan has had a painful experience of a skirmish.Ma and especially the polemic that followed (and which continues) generated by journalists, self-proclaimed defence specialists, encourage me to share some thoughts with you. I had to expose them in "8" chapters.

Everything has been transparent in the rise of Nazi peril. The deep intentions, the methods, the order of battle, everything was known in detail by the French. Nothing was done to stop it until September 1939, largely because it was materially impossible.