The forthcoming arrival of SCORPION in the Army will allow, thanks to a new generation of information management technology, the further development of decentralised combat and will lead to increased autonomy at the lowest tactical levels. Seizing initiatives and opportunities will be partly linked to tactical actions and decisions. of these subordinate elements. In France, however, seizing an opportunity is only is not widely delegated to tactical commanders in the field and is primarily considered by Level 3 or higher headquarters for planning and manoeuvre plans.

Increased autonomy of subordinate levels

Historically, the autonomy conferred was explained by the difficulties and rudimentary nature of the liaisons (alternating command with voice and messengers of the heroic age, dispatchers and motorcyclists of the modern age, then transmissions). The isolated or remote detachment therefore had to have sufficient prerogatives to fulfil the extent of its missions, while at the same time dealing with contingencies. This was particularly true for distant overseas expeditions.

During the Second World War, the 2nd Armored Division of the General Leclerc was organized into "three main groupings and, from time to time, a fourth grouping available to the General to force the final decision.²⁸ ». This is one of the reasons why it has earned a reputation as a highly manoeuvrable unit.

Acceleration, aggressiveness, plasticity
Acceleration of the maneuver and increased aggressiveness should be the main contributions of collaborative combat. The innovative aspect is not so much in the combination of inter-service effects as in the acceleration of the detection/comprehension-analysis/strike loop.

"Our soldiers are incapable of resigning themselves to ignorance. When they are given an order that has no explanation in their judgment, they obey, but with a grunt.⁸ "With this statement, Maurice Genevoix was putting into words an age-old reality of war: in combat, the soldier is generally plunged in uncertainty, in ignorance of the manoeuvre general. Advances in communications could lift some of this fog and radically change the face of future land combat.

Doctrine and innovation: what a fine oxymoron! These are two terms that do not necessarily go together, especially, let's be a bit provocative, in the military field. It is well known that the military is always one war behind. As Gamelin said, "the day war is declared on Germany, Hitler will collapse... the troops stationed in the western fortifications will offer little resistance. We will go into Germany like butter". Laziness and the sin of pride have brought about the result we know. What is certain, however, is that the victor does not have a war behind him. And to be part of this camp, one must not be satisfied with applying the usual patterns. We won't talk here about the current state of law and order in France, since ethics dictate that ambulances should not be shot...

When a general officer leaves active service and joins the G2S, one of the first issues he may seek to resolve is that of the new freedom of expression that will be his... It must be acknowledged that investigations can be disappointing:

- There are no rules specifically applicable to general officers, let alone those in the second section;

- The texts, which are common to all categories of military personnel, are in the end not very explicit (which in a way is to be welcomed);

- These reference texts are not, moreover, specific to the military function, but are in general those in force for all civil servants...

So, when we talk about the duty (or obligation) of reserve, what are we referring to?

At the beginning of the 21st century, the media in the broadest sense of the term are increasingly occupying the space of communication and are thus constantly participating in the societal debate, becoming a key player in theThe question of the place and role of the military in this area is raised by certain more or less recent cases such as that of Generals Desportes and Soubelet. The same applies to defence associations or groups such as the G2S.

To sum up in one sentence the opinions expressed in this dossier, I am tempted, in a very laconic way, to write that, for the future of the army, we must give priority to what makes the posture more than the size, structures or supplies.

For GCA (2S) Jean-Tristan VERNA, we cannot free ourselves from a reflection on the respective roles of those who preside over decisions in terms of preparing for the future.

The combination of unprecedented operational and technological challenges, as well as the acceleration of time, raises the question of adapting the role of the actors of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Do the combination of new operational and technological challenges and the acceleration of time not raise the question of adapting the role of those involved in the Ministry of Defence who, for the past twenty years or so, have been sharing responsibility for preparing for a future whose prospects are gradually being renewed and tightened?

In particular, how can the Army Chief of Staff become the central actor, for his army, of the ambition of innovation brought by the 2019-2025 military programming law, in order to "face the challenges of the future"?